JUDGMENT
S. Narayan, J.
1. This application being one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated November 29, 1995, passed in an execution proceeding being T. A. No. 57 of 1995, by the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta. By this order the petitioner’s prayer for adjournment, that is to say, stay of the said proceeding during the pendency of an appeal being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 787 of 1994 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur was refused and the Tribunal directed to proceed ahead with the execution proceeding.
2. Be it recorded at the very outset that by the enforcement of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short “the Act”) with effect from June 25, 1993, every suit or other proceeding pending before any court stood transferred to a Tribunal under the provision under Section 31(1) of the said Act. What has happened in the instant case is that the decree towards recovery of the bank debts to the tune of Rs. 48,12,586.83 was passed by the District Court at Sehore in Bho-pal, Madhya Pradesh in R. C. Suit No. 45A of 1989 and the said decree ultimately stands transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, for execution in a proceeding bearing T. A. No. 57 of 1995. While some proceeding initiated at the instance of the judgment-debtor/petitioner was still pending in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, the execution proceeding pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, was sought to be adjourned at the instance of the judgment-debtor petitioner. This being the germane of the instant revisional petition, it would now be necessary to give some more details as to the history of the litigation.
3. In a suit for recovery of debt being R. C. Suit No. 45A of 1985, the bank O. P. No. 1 obtained an ex parte decree from the District Court at Sehore in Bhopal, M. P. for the sum of Rs, 48,12,586.83 with interest at 18 per cent. per annum and certain amount of costs, The judgment-debtor/petitioner,
however, filed an application before the said court for setting aside the ex parte decree under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The trial court, upon contested hearing, was pleased to reject the said application for setting aside of the ex parte decree. Against this order of rejection, the petitioner has preferred an appeal, being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 787 of 1994 in the High Court of M. P. at Jabalpur. It may be added here that the petitioner also moved in the High Court an application for stay but as submitted at the Bar, the High Court did not pass any ad interim order of stay in the matter, Another aspect of the matter was that the ex parte decree, which was not set aside under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure , was since transferred to the City Civil Court, Calcutta, for execution but, on account of the point of jurisdiction involved, it was transferred to this court (i.e., the Calcutta High Court) for execution and it was registered as Execution Case No. 5 of 1992. In the meantime the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, came into force and, in terms of the said Act, the execution proceeding pending before this court was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta.
4. Now, coming to the controversy between the parties, it is to be noticed that the main thrust of the instant revisionai petition was that while an appeal being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 787 of 1994 was still pending in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, the proceeding as such would be deemed to be in continuity of the original suit for recovery of debt and that being as such, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, had no jurisdiction to proceed ahead with the execution proceeding. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has made an endeavour to make out two points, one being that the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not vested with power to execute a decree passed by a regular civil court, meaning thereby that the decree passed by a regular civil court, could be executed only by the same court or any other civil court to whom it may be transferred. The second point urged on behalf of the petitioner was that since an appeal arising out of the decree in question was still pending, the Debt Recovery Tribunal should not proceed ahead with the execution of the said decree.
5. As to the first point urged on behalf of the petitioner, it would be apt to just refer to the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the Act, as per which such Tribunal had been provided with power and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and the financial institutions and all such suits and proceedings shall be transferred to the Tribunal by operation of the law. What is significant to be noticed here is that the definition of “debt” as contemplated in the Act also extended to the liability payable under a decree or order of any civil court. In order to better appreciate the point involved here, I prefer to extract the definition of “debt” as contained in Section 2(g) of the Act.
6. In order to further elucidate the above point, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged before me that in view of the provision under Section 31(2)(b) read with Section 19(7) of the Act, the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has a jurisdiction to issue a certificate only on the basis of the order of the Tribunal for recovery of amount of debt in the certificate and not otherwise. By such submission he probably meant to submit that the stage of the execution proceeding has no berth in Section 19 of the Act, as such, the execution proceedings cannot be transferred before the Tribunal. I am, however, unable to concur with the view expressed as such, I would rather, most certainly, disagree with this submission for the simple reason that as seen above with regard to the definition of “debt” contained in Section 2(g) of the Act, it (debt) incorporates the liability payable also under a decree or order of any civil court. This would certainly mean that the proceeding before the Tribunal can be taken up from the stage subsequent to the passing of a decree or order by any civil court. Furthermore, even the provisions of Section 31(2)(b) of the Act have made it abundantly clear that the Tribunal may on receipt of such records (after the transfer) proceed to deal with such suit or other proceedings, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application made under Section 19 (of the Act) from the stage it was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit, The legislative intention was, therefore, obvious on the surface of such provision that on the transfer of a suit or other proceeding at any stage to the Tribunal it was open for the Tribunal to proceed ahead even from that stage. Most certainly, there was no bar provided in the Act that only such suit or proceeding would be transferred to the Tribunal which has not yet commenced before any civil court. So far as the provision of Section 19 of the Act was concerned, it incorporates the steps to be taken in a proceeding before the Tribunal which has been initiated only before the Tribunal. This would not mean that the proceeding in which some steps have already been taken and it was in midway, those would not be affected by the statutory provision of transfer of all such matters relating to recovery of debt from an ordinary court of civil jurisdiction to the Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal has in no way been ousted by any provision of law in the Act with regard to the transfer of a decree only for the purpose of execution before the Tribunal.
7. Thus, a decree obtained from any civil court could also be proceeded with before a Debt Recovery Tribunal. By no stretch of imagination, was it possible for the petitioner to urge that a decree passed by any civil court could not be entertained for the purpose of execution by a Debt Recovery Tribunal.
8. Now, coming to the second point urged on behalf of the petitioner, it is abundantly clear from the record as also from the case advanced on behalf
of the petitioner himself that the appeal, being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 787 of 1994, pending before the High Court, M. P. at fabalpur was not against the original ex parte decree, rather it was preferred against an order of the trial court, whereby a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected. It is true that both the recourses were open to the judgment-debtor petitioner either to prefer a regular appeal against the ex parte decree or to go for a miscellaneous proceeding for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whatever may be the net result of the two proceedings, in effect and substance, the test of the two proceedings stood on a different footing and in any view of the matter, since the prayer under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure has already been rejected by the trial court, the original decree, be it in the nature of ex parte, still subsisted. Furthermore, significant to note was the submission at the Bar on behalf of the bank respondent that in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 787 of 1994, the High Court has not granted any ad interim stay order in the matter. There was thus no legal impediment in proceeding ahead with the execution proceeding which has been duly launched by the bank O. P. after obtaining the ex parte decree in due course. The two decisions as relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner reported in Hoshiar Singh v. Ram Dev, , and Jnanendra Mohan Bhadhury v. Profullananda Goswami , do not appear to have formulated any legal proposition to the advantage of the petitioner to avoid the execution proceeding pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.
9. For the reasons aforesaid, I could not be successfully persuaded by learned counsel for the petitioner so as to differ with the view as expressed by the learned presiding officer of the Tribunal and to invoke the juris diction of this court as contained in Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
10. This revisional petition, therefore, must fail and, accordingly, it is dismissed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.