JUDGMENT
R.J. Bahadur, J.
1. This is an application for issue of a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; and also under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by one Ahmad AH, who is under detention in consequence of an order of the District Magistrate of Ranchi dated the 8th June, 1968, under Sections 3(2) and 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’. The order is Annexure 2 to the petition
2. The petitioner was served with the grounds of detention dated the 8th June, 1968, on the 10th June, 1968, while he was in Central Jail at Ranchi, which is Annexure 4 to the petition. He was at the time of the petition lodged in the Central Jail, Bankipore at Patna. On the 19th June, 1968, the Governor passed an order confirming the detention of the petitioner made on the 8th June, 1968. The Advisory Board rejected the petition of the petitioner on the 12th August, 1968. On the 6th September, 1968, the Governor confirmed the detention order and directed continuance of the detention till the 7th September, 1969. The grounds served on the petitioner in justification of the order for his detention-Vide Annexure A-4, are as follows:
(1) That he has been inciting the Muslims and Adivasis openly and secretly to indulge in acts of violence and nurture hatred against the majority community.
(2) On 23-1-1968 he informed the Deputy Commissioner and other officers that there had been a communal incident at village Pandra, P.S. Kanke where Md. Yasin and Ishaque had been assaulted by the Hindus on communal grounds. He further alleged that Md. Shamim father of Yasin had been wrongfully confined in his house by the Hindus. On verification by superior officers, these informations were also found to be baseless and deliberately false and mischievous. In this case orders were issued by the Dy. Commissioner to warn him not to indulge in such prejudicial activities in future,
(3) On 15-3-1968, he tried to arouse communal passions of Muslims by spreading deliberately false rumour that the Hindus had been deliberately organising throwing of coloured water on the Muslim with a view to wound their feelings.
(4) In April 1968 he spread a false rumour among the Muslim community in village Sons, P.S. Mandar and in the neighbouring villages that the Hindus of that area were preparing to attack the muslims on the pretext of observing Ram Rekha Mahayagya. He also spread in that context that the Block Development Officer Ghanho and the officer in charge of the Mandar P.S. were indulging in communal activities and encouraging the Hindus in their nefarious plans. He gave this information personally to the Deputy Commissioner find other officers also. On verification by senior officers the allegations made by him were found to be completely baseless, false and mischievous.
(5) With a view to prevent communal amity between Hindus and Muslim he deliberately instigated the Muslims of Ranchi in April, 1968 not to take out Tajiyas on the occasion of Moharrum festival.
(6) On the occasion of the conference of the All India Jharkhand Mahasabha, he was seen distributing gram among the Adibasis on 19-5-1968 and moving with such members of the Adibasis who delivered speeches indicating the people to violence. He as elected Vice-President of the All India Jharkhand Party,
(7) On 7-6-1968 he instigated the Muslims Goondas, namely, Mobin, Saffadar, Jamil and others to supply weapons and explosive materials to the Adhibasis for committing violence on the Hindus.
(8) He is a registered communal agitator of Ranchi and is an important worker of the Markaji Muslim Relief committee which was set up at Ranchi during the progress of the last August, 1967 communal disturbances for spreading communal hatred.
(9) His activities above and his being at. large are bound to result in the maintenance of public order being prejudicially effected.
(10) In the circumstances I am satisfied that if he is allowed to remain at large he will indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and security of the State.
(11) For prevention of such activities I consider his detention necessary.
(12) Sri Ahmad Ali is informed that he may make a representation in writing against the order under which he is detained. His representation, if any may be addressed to the Undersecretary, Political (Special Department, Bihar, Patna) -15 and forwarded through the Superintendent of Jail as soon as possible.
3. The petitioner’s case is that he is a resident of village Sons within the jurisdiction of P.S. Mandar, in the district of Ranchi, where he has some kasht land and a kirana shop at Ranchi. He is an Alim from Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, which is a well known religious institution and had taken part in national struggle. Further the petitioner is a Fazil from Punjab University and that he has been taking part in various organisations, particularly in the district of Ranchi, for imparting religious education. He has alleged that during the communal disturbances at Ranchi in the month of August, 1967, he had devoted himself to the relief of the sufferers and taken part, in various organisations, particularly one named as Markaji Muslim Relief Committee and the Central Relief Committee. He was the Secretary of the forme; Committee and had worked with various people, as is apparent from Annexure 1 to the petition. He has alleged in the petition that his detention is mala fide and wholly unjustified.
4. We have heard Mr. Asghar Hussain for the petitioner and Mr. K. P. Varma, the learned Standing Counsel for the State. The question that falls for consideration is whether the grounds supplied to the petitioner were vague, irrelevant or nonest so as to deprive him of his statutory right of making effective representation. There has been a number of decisions by the Supreme Court in cases of preventive detention and recently a Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 35 of 1967 has enumerated the principles of law that have been enunciated in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and it is not necessary to reproduce them all over again. Mr. Hussain has fairly conceded that the principles are too well known and has referred us to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar 1968 P.L.J.R. 52A (S.C.);
It must be remembered that in this case we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen of this country. The power given to the State under the Act is an extraordinary power. It is exercisable under special conditions and is subject to definite limitations. The nature of the power is such that the liberty of an individual can be deprived on the subjective satisfaction of the prescribed authority that there is sufficient cause for his detention. A detenu has not the benefit of a regular trial or even an objective examination of the accusations made against him. As observed by this Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi , preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court, In that case this Court further laid down that under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court, a person detained under the Act, is entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars as full and adequate as the circumstances permit furnished to him as to enable him to make a representation against the order of the detention and the sufficiency of the particulars conveyed in the Cr. W.J. C. No. 35 of 1967 disposed of on 24th August 1967 second communication is a justiciable issue, the test being whether they are sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation which on being: considered may give him relief. It is also laid down in that decision that the constitutional requirement that the grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privilege under Clause (6) of Article 22 of the Constitution, and where one of the grounds mentioned is vague, even though the other grounds are not vague the detention is not in accordance with the procedure established by law and is therefore illegal.
The same view was reiterated by this Court in Shibhan Lal Saksena v. The State of U.P. . There it was found that out of the two grounds served on the detenu one was nonexistent. The contention of the State that the detention of Shri Saxeria should not be interfered with because one of the two grounds mentioned in the order is a good ground, was rejected by this Court with the observation that to say that the other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute and in such cases the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and that would vitiate the detention order as a whole.
In Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir , Bhatia was ordered to be detained on the ground that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the, maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The said order was based on the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by Bhatia of essential goods, such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan. It was found that shaffon cloth and zari and mercury were not essential goods. It was not established that the smuggling attributed to Bhatia was substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards shaffon cloth and zari was of an inconsequential nature. On those facts this Court held that the order of detention was bad and must be quashed. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based. If some out of those reasons are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the authority would have been on the exclusion of those reasons. To uphold the order on the remaining reasons would be to substitute the objective standards of the court for the subjective satisfaction of the authority. The Court must, however, be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the authority.
In a recent case, Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. The State of Bihar Cr. Appeal 183 of 67, speaking for the Court, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed:
The detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however, high, is a serious matter, I must require the closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which it is based, indicates the need for the greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others. Since the detenu is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a right of being supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board, the grounds must not be vagau or indefinite and must afford a real “opportunity to make a representation against the detention. Similarly, if a vital ground is shown to be non-existing so that it could not have and ought not to have played a part in the material for consideration, the court may attach some importance to this fact.
5. Keeping these principles in view let me now examine the validity of the contentions raised by Mr. Asghar Hussain. Learned Counsel has urged that the grounds are vague, irrelevant and have no real or proximate connection with the satisfaction of the authorities with matters contemplated in the Act. Further the order made is not bona fide. He has urged that ground No. 1 may be taken to be a preamble even though it is vague. There can be no doubt that this ground is merely a preamble and is by no means of value.
6. Learned Counsel has grouped the grounds and has taken Up ground Nos. 3 and 6 together. The contention is that they do not give the place and time and it is difficult to know what is meant by “moving with such persons” as contained in ground No. 6. Learned Counsel has then taken up the remaining grounds, namely 2, 4, 5 and 8 together. He has urged that so far as ground No. 2 is concerned, the information was merely given to public authorities, namely, the Deputy, Commissioner and other officers and not to the public at large; and therefore, there could be no question that his giving information to them was prejudicial activity. Besides, it is said that the criminal law makes ample provision for punishing a person who gives false information and, as such, this matter would not be within the ambit of the Act. So far as ground No. 4 is concerned, it is said that this could not possibly be an offence, as it is said that this ground can be split up into two and it is not known which part, namely, the first part or the second part, influenced the authority while passing the order of detention against the petitioner. It is said that ground No. 5 is no ground at all and if the petitioner was trying to ask persons not to take out Tajiya on the occasion of Moharram festival he was merely acting according to his religious sentiment and this could not possibly disturb the communal amity. In respect of ground No. 8 Mr. Hussain’s argument is that it not known that is a registered communal agitator. So far as the other portion of this ground is concerned, the contention is that it is irrelevant. It is further said that the word “relief” from description of Markaji Muslim Relief Committee has been purposely, dropped and, is therefore, not bona fide. In respect of ground No. 7 it is said that it is non-existent as it is difficult to correctly fix the identity of the various names given who are said to be Goondas, not is the place of their residence mentioned. The submission, therefore, is that none of the grounds is sufficiently definite and specific to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation . I do not think that the contentions can be accepted as correct. A mere perusal of the grounds indicates that they just specific as the grounds could be, and they are strictly comparable with those that have been held sufficient in many cases by the Supreme Court, referred to above.
7. Mr. Varma for the State has, on the other hand, asked us to take the grounds into different groups. His contention is that ground Nos. 3, 7 and 8 should be read together while ground Nos. 2, 4 and 5 should be read together and ground No. 6 separately. It is said that ground No. 3 should be read along with Nos. 7 and 8, No. 8 says that the petitioner is a member of the organisation mentioned therein and is registered that is with the police. As such, it is not at all vague. After ground No. 8 is read, then the other two grounds namely, 3 and 7 became quite obvious, which are merely illustrative. It clearly shows upon reading of all the three aforesaid grounds that the petitioner is an agitator or an important worker, whose purpose is as mentioned in the said three grounds,
8. Turning to the other three grounds, namely Nos. 2, 4 and 5; as far as ground No. 2 is concerned, it is urged that it was falsely done on communal ground and without any justification whatsoever. It has, therefore, rational connection and ground No. 4 is also on the same line, as ground No. 2. Ground No. 5 is not at all Vague and it has obviously rational connection; namely that maintenance of public order was threatened and it was not merely an isolated act of a person, who had any particular religous belief. So far ground No. 5 is concerned, it is quite clear and specific. Mr. Hussain’s argument was that distributing gram among the Adivasis could not be an offence nor could it be a matter for the petitioner’s detention. In my opinion, all that we have to see in this case is whether any ground is vague, indifinite, irrelevant or nonest so as to preclude the detenu from making an effective representation. Further the contention of Mr. Varma is that there was no difficulty for the petitioner in making a representation which he did in fact make to the Advisory Board, though it did not recommend his release. It is therefore, urged that the petitioner did not find any of the grounds to be either vague or nonest, and if he thought that they were then he could have asked for further particulars, as has been laid down in the case of Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. The Stale of West Bengal . I think that Mr. Vanna’s contention is well founded and must be accepted as correct.
9. The view that I have venturned to take also finds support from a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Karuna Basak v. The District Magistrate, Tripura W.P. No. 16 of 1968 dated the 26th September 1968. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this case examined each ground of detention, which stated that it was necessary to detain the petitioner of that case with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and supplies essential to the life of the community in Tripura, and most of the grounds were for instigating and inciting the tribals of the forest plantations. Their lordships observed:
…From a reading of the grounds as a whole it appears that the petitioner is charged with having done the acts complained of at the above meeting. The result of his activities is also stated. The grounds state that because of his activities and incitements the forest plantation centres at Deogai-chera. Kalulia, Debdaru, Kalulia, Debdaru, Pralia, Sri Kantobari, Abhanga, Potichari, Abhangacherra and Paikhola were damaged on June 18, June 21, June 23, June 25, August 26, July 18, October 20 and December 10, 1967 respectively.
10. For the reasons expressed above, I am of opinion that it has not been established in this case that the detention of the petitioner is illegal, I would therefore, dismiss the application.
P.K. Banerji, J.
11. I agree.