ORDER
1. This is an application filed by Ahmedabad Electricity Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the applicant company’) seeking partial modification/review of
order dated 2nd July, 2001 passed in Special Civil Application No. 4578 of 1997, reported in AIR 2002 Gujarat 59 (Coram : Justice B. C. Patel (as he then was) & Justice D. A, Mehta.
2. The application is principally seeking deletion of direction issued in Para 69 (4) of the aforesaid judgment, whereby the applicant company has been restricted from supplying electric connection to a building unless Building Use Permission has been issued either by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and/or Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, as the case may be.
3. Mr. K. B. Pujara, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant company, submitted that the applicant company seeks review/modification of the aforesaid judgment on the following grounds :
(1) That the petition was filed in relation to fire safety system not being provided in cinema halls, factories and high-rise buildings, and hence the petition did not seek any relief against the applicant company.
(2) That the petitioner had originally sought directions only against the erring officers, who are responsible for violation of the rules and regulations, and further seeking directions against other respondents seeking creation of an independent machinery as also a mandatory agency to monitor the working of fire safety systems.
(3) That the applicant company is bound by provisions of Indian Electricity Act, 1910, Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and it functions within the parameters of the said statutory provisions.
(4) That the applicant company is also bound by the Conditions of Supply and Miscellaneous Charges as framed under Section 21(2) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and its rights and obligations are governed by the said statutory provisions.
(5) That in these circumstances this Court, in the impugned judgment, could not have issued the impugned direction prohibiting the applicant company from supply of electric connections to the consumers who fulfilled the requisite conditions laid down by the statutory provisions governing the applicant company.
(6) That the areas within which the applicant company functions extend far be-
yond the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority.
(7) That there are similarly situated licensees under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, namely, Gujarat Electricity Board, Surat Electricity Company, etc. who have been left out from being covered by such directions despite the fact that they operate within areas where similar high rise buildings etc. have come up.
(8) That Rule 50-A of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 specifically governs supply and use of energy in multistoryed buildings and there was no allegation that the applicant-company was not following the conditions stipulated in the said Rule.
(9) That the applicant-company is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. and as a commercial organization it must be permitted to carry on its operations as stipulated by the various statutes which govern its functioning without being prohibited by way of the impugned direction issued in Para 49(4) of the Judgment dated 2-7-2001 as the entire petition nowhere raised an issue regarding any violation of any statute committed by the applicant-company.
4. Mr. Pujara also submitted that the order dated 4th October, 2002. wherein various Special Leave Petitions being Nos. 15929-15930/2001 have been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, does not operate as a judgment so as to invoke the principle of merger and hence it was open to this Court to undertake the exercise of review/modification as prayed for. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587.
5. Taking up the last contention first, without entering into the aspect as to whether the order dated 4-10-2002 results in a merger of the impugned judgment dated 2-7-2001 or not, we proceed to deal with the merits of the application on the presumption that no merger results as contended by Mr. Pujara.
6. The present application requires to be rejected for the reasons which follow hereinafter.
7. It is necessary to bear in mind that the original petition was filed in 1987 and the first interim order came to be made on 24-12-1997. The same was followed by various interim orders made by different Division Benches of this Court. On 25-7-2000 a Division Bench of this Court issued further directions including disconnection of essential services and electric supply on failure to provide fire safety measures after four weeks of public notice. It is on record, and it is not disputed, that the applicant-company complied with the said direction without any demur. The applicant-company could have raised the aforesaid issues by challenging the interim order dated 25-7-2000, yet it accepted the same.
8. It is pertinent to note that the impugned judgment was delivered on 2-7-2001 and the present application has been filed on 25-7-2002. The application does not set out reasons for seeking review/modification after a period of more than one year. ‘During course of hearing it was submitted’ by Mr. Pujara that because of varibu’s other petitions and interim directions issued from time to time by different Benches of this Court, the applicant-company did not deem it fit to seek any modification. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the applicant-company did not challenge interim order dated 25-7-2000 at all and the impugned judgment for one full year.
9. It is not denied that the applicant-company was joined as a respondent in the main petition. The contention that no relief was sought against the applicant-company is besides the point, because the applicant-company was put to notice at least by the interim order dated 25-7-2000 wherein specific directions were given to the applicant-company. Thus, the grievance that the applicant-company became aware that the aforesaid directions were issued only by way of the impugned judgment cannot be countenanced.
10. The various contentions raised on behalf of the applicant-company could have been raised by the applicant-company even in the special leave petitions (which have been rejected by the Apex Court as stated hereinbefore) for the simple reason that the applicant-company was a party to the said proceedings. It chose not to do so.
11. The contention that the applicant-company is governed by various statutory provisions and it should be permitted to operate within those parameters is a contention which loses sight of the fact that the original petition was filed as a public interest litigation by the petitioner due to the fact that various statutory authorities under different Municipal laws and urban development laws had failed in their duty and one of the reasons was that illegal occupation of such high rise buildings was possible because of availability of essential services, one of them being supply of electricity. Position in law is well settled that in a public interest litigation under Article 526 of the Constitution of India the Court is empowered to issue all such directions as are necessary to ensure that the final order passed by the Court is effectively implemented.
12. The applicant-company has sought to canvas a picture to the effect that it operates in isolation, almost in cocoon, and that it has no concern with violation of any other statutory provisions, The contention that the applicant-company is a commercial organization and must be allowed to function as such fails to take into consideration that the Management of the applicant-company is required to operate not only within the laws which govern it, but as a reasonable citizen ensure that its operations do not permit the consumers to act in an illegal manner by violating other laws by which the consumers are governed.
13. The submission that other similarly situated electric power suppliers have not been directed to refrain from supplying energy is an issue which could have been raised by way of a separate petition, in case the petitioner feels discriminated against.
14. The scope of powers of review, which the High Court can exercise, have been succinctly stated by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170: (AIR 1995 SC 455) in the following terms :
The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. The review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of record and not on any other ground. An error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. The limitations of powers of Court under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226.”
Therefore, it is well settled that a mere erroneous decision per se does not permit the Court to undertake review. The review jurisdiction can be exercised only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. Thus, applying the said principles. It is not possible to accept the contention raised in this application.
The application stands rejected accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.