JUDGMENT
Mohd. Shanmim, J.
(1) This is an application by the respondent/objector (hereinafter referred to as objector for the sae of convnience) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condensation of delay in preferring the objections against the award dated 6.12.1990.
(2) The case of the objector is that they came to know with regard to the filing of the award on 29.7.1991. They thereafter inspected the court file and learnt that the notice of the filing of the award was allegedly served on the objector on 4.3.1991. In fact the objector were never served with the said notice inasmuch as the address of the respondent has been wrongly mentioned in the notice. The address of the respondent as given in the notice :- The Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, Govt. of India, New Dehi. Whereas the correct address of the respondent is :- Executive Engineer Ii, Mbr Housing Project, Cpwd, Sewa Bhawan, R.K. Puram, New Delhi.
(3) In the circumstances, stated above, the objector could not be deemed to have been served. Hence the period of limitation would start running from 29.7.1991. The period of limitation thus computed would expire on 29.8.1991. The objections were filed on 7.8.1991. Hence the same are within the statutory period of one month from the date of the notice of the filing of the award. It has thus been prayed that the delay in filing the objections be condoned and the objections be taken on record. The objections are supported by an affidavit sworn by Shri. R.N.Tyagi, Executive Engineer. The application has been vehemently opposed by the counsel for the petitioner inter alia on the following grounds: that the application is false and frivolous. It is liable to be dismissed. The address given in the notice of the objector is quite correct.
(4) The same would be stated to be the correct address of the objector as provided under Order 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The objector were served on the correct address. They would, thus, be deemed to have been served with the notice on 4.3.1991. If the period of limitation is computed from the said date, then it expired on 3.4.91. It was not at all required to send the enclosures to the objector Along with the notice of the award. The application has got no force and it is liable to be dismissed. ( I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and have very carefully examined their rival contentions and have given my anxious thoughts thereto. Learned counsel for the objector? Ms. Shashi Kiran has contended that the objector came to know with regard to the filing of the award on 29.7.1991 only.
(5) Hence, according to her the period of limitation is to be computed from the said date and if so computed it would come to an end on 28.8.1991. The objections in the instant case were filed much before the expiry of the stipulated period i.e on 8.9.1991. Hence the said objections should be treated as within time. According to the learned counsel the notice with regard to the filing of the award was never served on the objector on 4.3.1991. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the objector is that it could not have been possibly served on the objector in as much as the address given therein is absolutely incorrect. The learned counsel in support of her argument had led me through the notice. A perusal of the same reveals that the notice has been sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. Now the question which comes to the tip of tongue is as to whether the said address of the objector is correct?
(6) A perusal of the memo of the parties in the instant suit i.e S.No.3829-A/90 reveals that the said suit was filed against the Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. Thus the contention of the learned counsel that the address given the rein is incorrect does not hold any water. The next question is as to how the service is to be effected on the Union of India. Section 79 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as to how the service is to be effected on the Union of India. It provides that in case of suit against the Govt. of India the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant would the Union of India. Order 27-8-B(a) further provides that in relation to any suit by and against the Central Government or against a public officer in the service of that government, the Central Government and such pleader as that Government may appoint whether generally or specially for the purposes of this order.
(7) It is manifest from the above, that in case of any proceeding against the Central Government the notice is to be sent to the Secretary to the Government or to any other officer who may be authorised to act for the Government in respect of the judicial proceedings or to the pleader defined in Rule 8-B(a) of the said order. I am fully supported in my above view by the observations of H.L. Anand, J. of this Court reported in 2nd 1973, Vol. I, Delhi page 905, M/s. C Lyall and Company Vs. UOI. According to the facts of the .said authority a notice was sent to the Executive Engineer in place of the Secretary, Govt. of India. It was held that the service on the executive engineer was no service in the eye of law on the Govt. of India and the Govt. of India was not bound by that. It was observed “held that a notice of any proceeding to the Central Government would be valid only if it was either sent to the Secretary to the Government or to any other officer who may be authorised to act for the Government in respect of judicial proceedings or to the pleader as defined in Rule 8(B) of the said order. It is difficult to hold that any public servant who dealt with any proceedings which may have led to the institution of the suit against the Union of India would be competent to accept notice on behalf of the Union of India. It is equally difficult to hold that Union of India would be bound by notice received by various officers at different levels.In event, in the absence of any provision of law or any rule of business or any statutory rule to the contrary it is not possible to hold that the Executive Engineer was empowered, in the instant case, to accept notice on behalf of the Union of India and that the receipt of notice in his office constituted sufficient notice to the Union of India of the filing of the award in the present case”. Thus the contention of the learned counsel that the notice should have been sent to the Executive Engineer Ii, Mbr Housing Project C.P.W.D., Sewa Bhawan, R.K. Puram, New Delhi is obviously erroneous because in that eventuality it would not have been deemed to be a valid service in the eye of law.
(8) The learned counsel for the objector has then argued that the notice in the present case was sent without the enclosures. Hence assuming argued that the service of the notice was effected on 4.3.1991. It would be deemed to be no service in the eye of law. Hence the period of limitation cannot be computed from the said date. The contention of the learned counsel is divided of any force. It is now a settled principle of law that no enclosures are required to be sent to the parties at the time of the service Along with the notice. It is sufficient if an intimation is sent to the parties with regard to the filing of the award. Admittedly, the proceedings under the Arbitration Act are not a civil suit. There is no plaint in the present case. Hence, nothing is required to be sent Along with the notice. It is sufficient if an intimation is given to a party with regard to the filing of the award. I am fully supported in my above view by the observations of H.C. Goel, J. as reported in Arbitration Law Reporter Vo. 14 part 5 & 6 of 1991. “It is obvious that it is not a civil suit and there is no plaint in this case. All that was required to be served on the parties was a notice intimating them of the filing of the award and to file objections against the award, if any, within 30 days”. All this has been duly stated in the notice which was served on the objector on 4.3.1991.
(9) Further more, a close scrutiny of the impugned -notice reveals that some one accepted the notice on behalf of Union of India, Ministry of Urban Development. His only grievance was that the enclosures be sent. Thus even otherwise it can be assumed there from that the notice was served on a right person. It is earliest from my discussion above that the notice was served on the objector on 4.3.1991. Hence the period of limitation to file the objections expired on 4.3.1991. The objections in the instant case were filed on 7.8.1991. Thus the present objections are hopelessly barred by time.
(10) The application under Section 5 is thus hereby rejected. The objections are hereby dismissed as barred by time. The award dated 6.12.1990 is hereby made the rule of the Court. A decree is passed in terms of the award. The petitioner shall be entitled to the interest @ 14% p.a. from the date of the award till the realisation of the decreetal amount.