JUDGMENT
A.P. Subba, J.
1. By this Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the two petitioners namely Shri Alempa Ao and Shri K.D. Ramsiej seek to challenge the order dated 21.02.2002 cancelling their Ph.D. registration with the North Eastern Hill University (for short “NEHU”) and pray for issuance of a direction to allow the petitioners to submit their thesis under the guidance of their supervisor, Prof. N. Malla.
2. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the two petitioners, namely, Shri Alempa Ao, (the petitioner No. 1) and one Shri K.D. Ramsiej, (the petitioner No. 2) both Research Scholars were registered for the Ph.D Degree in the Department of Philosophy, NEHU in the year 1997-1998. Both the petitioners joined the University in the same year i.e. 1997 as Research Scholars in the same Department After joining the University they got themselves registered for Ph.D Degree in the Department of Philosophy on 17.04.1997 and Prof. N. Malla, a distinguished Professor in the same Department of the University was assigned to them as their Supervisor. After their registration, the petitioners worked under the guidance of their supervisor for a continuous period of three years and completed their thesis their entitled (a) the Concept of Right: An Examination; (b) Thought and reality: A Critical Study of Hegel. Even though the work on the thesis was duly completed they were unable to submit their thesis as Prof. Malla, the supervisor was placed under suspension on 16.09.2000 on trumped up charges. It is the case of the petitioners that their thesis was ready for submission well before the suspension of Prof. N. Malla. Accordingly Prof. Malla, the supervisor had, before he was placed under suspension, requested Prof. S. Miri, the Head of the Department of Philosophy and Prof. E.N. Lall to nominate one teacher each to the evaluation committee for pre-submission seminar. However, no action was taken on the request of Prof. Malla on the ground that Prof. Malla ceased to have any locus standi to conduct the pre-submission seminar after he was placed under suspension. Over and above, Prof. Mrs. S. Giri also issued instructions to her Office Staff to refrain from receiving any letter/correspondence from Prof. N. Malla in connection with pre-submission seminar. Being left with no alternative, Prof. Malla addressed a petition to Prof. S. Miri, the Chairman of Academic and Executive Council and the then Acting Vice-Chancellor, to allow the petitioners to submit their thesis, which was complete and ready for submission. However, neither any notice was taken of the letter nor any reply was given. Instead, Prof. M. Miri, the then Acting Vice Chancellor in collusion with Prof. Mrs. S. Giri and Professor E.N. Lall reassigned Dr. C.R. Agera as Supervisor to Mr. K.D. Ramsiej, (the petitioner No. 2) and Dr. Jagat Pal as Supervisor to Mr. Alempa Ao, (the petitioner No. 1) and Prof. N. Miri to Mr. Saji Varghese totally ignoring the fact that the whole work on the thesis was done and completed under the supervision of Prof. N. Malla. The petitioners accordingly addressed a representation to Prof. N. Miri, the Vice-Chancellor making a grievance that there was no provision for change of the Supervisor under NEHU Ordinance besides the fact that the thesis was complete and ready for submission only and there was nothing left to be supervised. It was also contended that the statutory provision of NEHU and that of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules do not debar a teacher under suspension for conducting pre-submission seminar in respect of thesis which such teacher had supervised. However, to their shock and surprise the petitioners were served with a letter cancelling their Ph.D. registration. It is against this order cancelling the registration that the two petitioners have come up before this Court by filing the present Writ petition.
3. The respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 contested the petition by filing a joint affidavit-in-opposition. Without disputing the fact that the petitioners were registered as Ph.D. scholars, it was contended that the work of supervision had to be assigned to another Supervisor following the suspension of Prof. N. Malla on 16.09.2000. It was contended that on the suspension of prof. Mulla, the department in its meeting held on 14.11.2000 took a decision to reasign Dr. C.R. Agera to petitioner No. 2, Dr. Jagat Pal to petitioner No. 1 and Prof. Mrinal Miri to Mr. Saji Varghese. According to the respondents the decision was duly communicated to the petitioners and asked the petitioners to submit their thesis under the guidance of the new Supervisor. It is the further case of the respondents that as per resolution No. EC.110:2001:8(iv)adoptedbythe Executive Council the petitioners were directed to contact the new Supervisor and to request him to take needful steps for organising the pre-submission seminar within two weeks. The Executive Council also resolved that in the event of their failure to do so, the question of their continued registration in the Ph.D. programme will be re-examined However, both the petitioners did not comply with this direction and the Executive Council in its meeting held on11.12.2001 took the view that such act of disobedience on the part of the petitioners was a breach of discipline and accordingly, adopted a further resolution that the Ph.D. registration of the petitioners would stand cancelled with immediate effect. It was contended that the University Authority was invested with necessary power to take such action under the provision of the NEHU Act, Statute and Ordinances and as such the Writ petition was liable to be rejected as being devoid of merit.
4. Mr. K. Paul, learned Counsel for the petitioners and S.R. Sen, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mrs. PDB Baruah, learned Counsel for the respondents-University were heard.
5. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Vice-Chancellor had no legal right to cancel the registration of the petitioners when their thesis had already been completed and awaiting submission only. According to the learned Counsel, the career of the petitioners cannot be dealt with so casually making them suffer both financially and mentally. It was further contended that the entire action taken by the respondents being violative of the NEHU Acts, Statutes and Ordinances as well as the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play the same was liable to be quashed. Per Contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that since Prof. Malla was under suspension, he had no locus standi to do any work associated with research guidance and in view of this, the change of the Supervisor was affected in terms of the decision taken in the faculty meeting held on 14.11.2000 keeping in view the best interest of the petitioners. However, since the petitioners were adamant and did not honour the decision of the Department, this conduct on the part of the petitioners, amounted to disobedience and breach of discipline and accordingly, it was resolved that the Ph.D registration of the scholars would stand cancelled with immediate effect. It was therefore contended that the decisions to cancel the registration was of the Executive Council and not of the Vice Chancellor as alleged. It was then contended that the Executive Council had the power to cancel the registration of the Writ petitioners in terms of Section 13(1) of NEHU statute under which the Executive Council has the power for administrative affairs of the University not otherwise provided for. According to the learned Counsel, the University had taken this action keeping in mind the best interest of the students.
6. The question that falls for consideration is whether NEHU authority had the necessary power to cancel registration of the petitioners and if so, whether the powers so exercised is in conformity with the minimum procedural standard required to be maintained in this regard.
7. The first leg of argument advanced with vehemence by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the NEHU Act, Statutes and Ordinance do not contain any provision for cancellation of Ph.D registration. The only provision specifically made in these enactments according to the learned Counsel relates to removal of name of a scholar from the rolls of the University if he/she fails to submit the thesis within five years of the date of his registration.
The related provision referred to by the learned Counsel as contained in Section OC-4.5 (2) of the NEHU Ordinance reads as follows:
The name of a scholar shall be removed from the rolls of the University if he fails to submit his thesis within five years of the date of his registration.
Provided in exceptional circumstances, the School Board on the recommendation of the department may extend the Registration of the candidate for a maximum period of two more years. If the candidate fails to submit his thesis within the extended period his registration shall lapse automatically.
8. It would be clear from the above that a period of five years has been specified for submission of thesis by a scholar and if a scholar fails to submit his/her thesis within this period the University Authority has been invested with power to remove the names of the scholar from the rolls of the University unless such period is extended under the proviso. However, it is to be noted that the case of the petitioners does not fall within the purview of the above provision in so far as the period of five years was yet to be completed and there was no default on the part of the petitioners to submit their thesis within the prescribed period. On the basis of such fact the contention raised by the learned Counsel is that the exercise of power by the University authorities in the case of the petitioners without any default on the part of the petitioners was malafide. Put in other words, the specific contention of the learned Counsel is that the University cannot cancel registration of a scholar for reasons not falling under the purview of the above provision namely Section OC-4.5(2) reproduced above. Indeed, it was very fairly conceded by Mr S. Sen, learned Counsel for the respondent University that the reason for which the registration of the petitioner was cancelled do not find place in the above provision. It was also conceded by the learned Counsel that there is no specific provision in the NEHU Act, Statutes and Ordinance empowering the University authority to cancel registration for any other reason. It is, however, contended by the learned Counsel that mere absence of specific mention in the enactment does not mean that the University Authority would be powerless in cases not covered by the specific provisions. According to the learned Counsel Section 13(1) of NEHU statute which lays down the power and function of the Executive Counsel in respect of all Administrative affairs of the University not otherwise provided for, invests the concerned authority of the University with power to take action in exigencies of the present nature. Having regard to the fact that Section 13(1) of the NEHU Statute is in the nature of Residuary power, I find considerable force in the submission of the learned Council.
Section 13(1) of the NEHU Statute referred to by the learned Counsel reads as follows:
13.(1) The Executive Council shall have the management and administration of the revenue and property of the University and the conduct of all administrative affairs of the University not otherwise provided for.
9. A plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that the authority, in the matter of exercise of power need not confine itself to the cases which only find specific mention in the relevant provisions. The residuary power conferred by the provision leave no scope for any doubt that the concerned University Authority can also exercise power in respect of matters not specifically provided for in the provision. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the University had no power to act in the manner it did in the case of the petitioners. It goes without saying that the words ‘not otherwise provided for’ are wide enough to include matters relating to discipline or otherwise. Therefore, a conclusion is irresistible that the contention that the University had no power to deal with the case of the petitioners in the manner it did cannot be accepted as reflecting correct positions in law. The same is accordingly rejected.
10. Having thus found that the University was within its powers to take action in the present case the next and the more important question is whether the authority can be said to have acted in conformity with the well established procedural requirement in such matters.
11. To recapitulate, the case of the respondent University is that consequent upon the suspension of Prof. N. Malla, the Supervisor assigned to the petitioners, the University with a view to minimize the hardship faced by the petitioners, in its meeting held on 14.11.2000 took a decision to reassign one Dr. C.R. Agera as Supervisor to Mr. K.D. Ramseij (Petitioner No. 2), one Dr. Jagat Pal to Mr. Alempa Ao (Petitioner No. 1) and Prof. Mrinal Miri to Mr. Saji Vargheese, another scholar. The decision was communicated to the petitioner No. 1 vide letter No. F.75/Phil/RS-AA/2000/2751/ dated 14.11.2000 and to the petitioner No. 2 vide letter No. F.75/Phil/RS-KDR/2000/ 2746 dated 14.11.2000. Over and above, the position was further explained to the petitioners vide letter Nos. F.75/Phil/RS-KDR/2000/2760 and F.75/Phil/RS-AA/ 2000/2761 both dated 21.11.2000. It is the contention of the learned Counsel that when a guide is not available for some reason or the other it would be the duty of the University to provide new guide to the research scholar to complete the research. It was in performance of such duty cast on the University and in the best interest of the petitioner that the University had replaced the guide and had asked the petitioner to submit their thesis under the new guide. However, unfortunately, the petitioner in whose best interest the University had taken these steps, declined to abide by the decisions and the directions issued by the University in this regard.
12. The relevant documents annexed to the affidavit in opposition in support of the above contention read as follows:
Relevant extract of the Minutes of the Board of Post-Graduate Studies in Philosophy (LOCAL) held on 02.04.2001.
3. The Board approved the decision of the Department to re-assign the following students (Ph.D.) to new supervision:
Name of Student
Supervisor
1. Mr. K.D. Ramsiej Dr. C.R. Agera
2. Mr. Alempa Ao Dr. Jagat Pal
3. Mr. X.P. Mao . Prof. M. Miri
4. Mr. Saji Vergheese
-do-
The Board also took notice of Mr. Mao and Mr. Ramsiej letters rejecting the Department’s decision to change their supervisors. The Board recommended that if the two do not comply with the order of the Controller of Examination (vide letter dated 29th March, 2001) is recommend to the School Board that their registration will be cancelled.
Extract of the resolution of the 110th Meeting of the Executive Counsel held on 17.08.2001 (Annexure-I to the affidavit reads as follows:
EC: 110:2001:8: (iv) : The Council considered the letter of Shri X.P. Mao and others regarding submission of the Ph.D. thesis and Resolved that since they have stated that the Ph.D. thesis is ready for submission they are to be directed to contact their new supervisors whom they should request to take steps towards organizing their pre-submission Seminars within two weeks time. In the event of their failing to do so the question of their continued registration in the Ph. D. programme will be reexamined.
Extract taken from the minutes of the 111th Meeting of the Executive Counsel held on 11.12.2001 (Annexed-J to the affidavit in opposition) reads as follows:
(i) Request of two Ph.D. Scholars, Department of Philosophy for pre-submission Seminar and Submission of Thesis under the Original Supervisor Viz. Dr. N. Malla.
EC: 111:2001:5:3:(i): The Council considered the matter and noted that the Council in its meeting held on 17th August, 2001, considered the cases of the following research scholars arising due to the suspension of Professor N. Malla and his subsequent forced retirement vide Resolution No. EC: 110: 2001: 8: (iv) dated 17.08.2001.
1. Shri X.P. Mao.
2. Shri Alempa Ao.
3. Shri K.D. Ramsiej.
To case the position of the research scholars, the Department of Philosophy provided them with alternative supervisors. But, the scholars did not report to the new supervisors and were deliberately defying the orders of the University Authorities. Accordingly, the Executive Council decided that they should be given a notice to comply with the directions of the Department within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. However, till date, the scholars failed to comply with the direction of the University. The Council is of the firm opinion that this is an act of disobedience and breach of discipline and therefore resolved that the Ph.D. registration of the above scholars would stand cancelled with immediate effect. However, there will not be any bar for them to get admission afresh in the Ph.D. programme of the University.
13. The notice served upon the petitioners on the basis of the resolution adopted in 110th Meeting of the Executive Council reads as follows:
North Eastern Hill University
NEHU Campus, Shillong-793002 (Meghalaya)
Prof. (Mrs.) S. Miri,
Head
Department of Philosophy.
No. F.7/Phil/Ph.D/2001/3/00
Dated, 13th Sept., 2003
Dear,
Kindly refer to the Resolution of the 110th Meeting of the Executive Council held on 17.08.2001.
EC: 110:2001:8:(iv): The Council considered the letter of Shri X.P. Mao and others regarding submission of the Ph.D. thesis and resolved that since they have stated that the Ph.D. thesis is ready for submission they are to be directed to contact their new supervisors whom they should request to take steps towards organizing their pre-submission Seminars within two weeks time. In the event of their failing to do so the question of their continued registration in the Ph.D. programme will be re-examined.
In the light of the above, you are directed to contact your new Supervisors immediately.
Yours sincerely,
(S. Miri)
To,
1) Shri X.P. Mao
2) Shri Alempa Ao.
3) Shri K.D. Ramsiej
Copy to the Assistant Registrar, (Conference) for information.
14. Having thus noticed the relevant documents annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition, we may now take up the submission made in this regard. The submission made by Mr. Paul, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Respondent Authority never served any notice of the proposed action taken by the Respondents, while the submission made in reply is that the notice Annexure-I to the affidavit-in-opposition is the notice served upon the petitioners. The question that arises is whether the above Annexure-I amounts to notice. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent in this regard is that the last sentence ‘in the event of their failing to do so, the question of their continued registration in the Ph.D. programme will be re-examined’ occurring in the notice is wide enough to include cancellation of the registration of the petitioners and as such the petitioners can have no grievance in this regard. There is no doubt that the word ‘reexamine’ is wide enough the embrace within its ambit any action including cancellation but it is difficult to concede that a notice which is wide and vague satisfies the requisites of a notice contemplated in all actions that must conform to the principles of natural justice. It is well established position in law that a notice required to be given in a case must be adequate and the test of such adequacy is whether the notice gives sufficient information so as to enable the person to put up an effective defence. A legal notice has been defined in the Blacks Law Dictionary as follows:
Notice in its legal sense is information concerning as fact; actually communicated to a person or actually derived by him from a proper source, and is regarded in law as actual, when the person sought to be effected by it knows thereby of the existence of the particular fact in question.
15. It would be clear from the above definition that a legal notice has to be adequate and specific. It thus follows that such a notice must contain statement of specific charges which the person has to meet. The importance of giving adequate notice of the proposed action has been emphasized in catena of decisions. To cite only a few, the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Salam v. Deputy Commissioner , has held that merely by receipt of a simple notice one would not know the precise charge which one is to meet. Similarly, the High Court of Punjab in M.R.K.K. and Co. v. State has held that a notice which does not specify the grounds on which license is to be cancelled would be vague and inadequate.
16. A decision of the Apex Court which elucidates the issue on the point is the decision rendered in Josheph Vilangadan v. Executive Engineer (PWD) . The facts of the case were the appellant was awarded a contract work to be executed within specific time. When the appellant did not start the work within time a letter was addressed to him by the Executive Engineer saying, “You are therefore, requested to show cause within 7 days from the receipt of this notice why the work may not be arranged otherwise at your risk and loss through agencies after debarring you as defaulter.” Pursuant to this notice the contract was cancelled and appellant was debarred from all future contracts under the PWD. Quashing this order the Apex Court held that the words ‘debarring you as defaulter’ did not give adequate notice to the appellant of the fact that he would be debarred from ‘all future’ contracts with the PWD.
17. Drawing an analogy from the above it can be legitimately concluded in the present case that the words …question of their continued registration in the Ph.D. programme will be re-examined’ do not give adequate notice of the fact that their registration would be cancelled in the event of their failing to comply with the direction contained in the notice. In other words, it can be said that the notice does not specify the action proposed to be taken against the petitioners and to this extent the notice in question is vague and inadequate.
In I.J. Rao, Asstt, Collector of Custom v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh (1989) 3 SCC 702 the Apex Court has held that where the rights of the person are adversely effected by an order made by an authority in any proceeding whether judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative, he is entitled to a predecisional notice. In a similar view the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner has observed that the Court may invalidate a decision for lack of such predecisional notice.
18. Of course, another leg of argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondent was that there was no such provision in the NEHU Acts, Statutes and Ordinance under which the University Authority is required to give such notice of the proposed action. True, admittedly, there is no such provision in the relevant Act, Statute and Ordinance. The question that arises is whether the University Authority which is an instrumentality of the State and thus an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution can be free to ignore the minimum of fair procedure. Obviously, the answer to this has to be in the negative. It is well established position in law that administrative authorities may not be required to act j udicially but they are obliged to act fairly. It goes without saying that duty to act fairly is long settled principle governing exercise of jurisdiction. It denotes obligation to follow procedural safeguards. It is in keeping with this principle that Courts in our country have insisted that Administrative Agencies must follow a minimum of fair procedure. It is thus needless to say that it is well established that some minimum procedure consistent with the principle of natural justice must be followed by the Administrative Authorities exercising quasi-judicial function. It has been made explicit by the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. H.L. Trehan that even when the authority has statutory power to take action without hearing, it would be arbitrary to take action without hearing and would be violative of Article-14 of the Constitution. In the same manner the Apex Court in a later decision rendered in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Kumar Tripathi reported in (1995) Supp (1) SCC 552 has further held that the principles of natural justice must be read into the provisions of a law even where the rules exclude, whether expressly or by necessary implication, the application of the principles of natural justice.
19. Thus if the principles of natural justice were to be read into the provisions of the NEHU Acts, Statutes and Ordinances which one must as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases cited above, it is plain that there would be no room left for any contention that the University Authority would not be obligated to follow and adhere to the principles of natural justice even though such principles of natural justice are not expressly incorporated in the relevant enactments. Thus viewed, the above contention of the learned Counsel that the University was not bound to issue any notice of the proposed action cannot be accepted. It is thus obvious that the respondent University failed to follow the minimum of fair procedure and thereby maintained minimum procedural standard in term of the principle as enunciated by the Apex Court in the decisions cited above. Therefore, the only legitimate conclusion one can arrive at would be that the proceedings in which the impugned notice was issued by the respondent University suffers from non-adherence to the principles of natural justice and thus stands vitiated.
20. At this juncture it would be relevant to take note of the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondents with regard to admissibility of the reliefs claimed. The contention raised is that even if the petitioners succeed in the writ petition they cannot be granted the relief claimed in the petition in so far as Prof. Malla, who was their supervisor has already retired on superannuation. Refuting this submission the learned Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to the averments made in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the petition wherein several instances of retired professors having been assigned the work of supervising pre-submission Seminar in respect of other research scholars have been mentioned. It is relevant to note that the averments made in this regard are not denied in toto. All that has been stated by the respondents is that no comparison can be made between those instances and the case of Prof. N. Malla in so far as in case of Prof. Malla, he was placed under suspension. Leaving aside the question as to whether the case of Prof. N. Malla can be equated with the other cases given in the instances, what emerges from the above is that admittedly there are past instances where the University has availed of the services of the retired professors for supervising pre submission seminars. There seems to be no reason as to why similar practice cannot be followed in the case of the present petitioners who have completed their research work and which is awaiting submission only. It goes without saying that non-availability of Prof. N. Malla for any reason, what-so-ever, and his disqualification, if any, should not come in the way of the petitioners submitting their thesis in any other way when the rules of University or the practice followed in this regard leave such a course open.
21. For the above reasons, discussions and observations I am of the view that the impugned letter No. G-26-24/Acad/38/97/ K-DRD-Rej Philo-1703 dated 21.2.2002 is not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is liable to be quashed.
22. In the result, the Writ petition succeeds and the impugned letter cancelling the Ph.D. Registration of the petitioners is quashed. The concerned university authority is accordingly directed to afford due opportunity to the petitioners to submit their thesis for consideration within one month from the date of receipt of this order, in the light of the observations made above.
There shall be no order as to costs.
