JUDGMENT
Muzaffar Jan, J.
1. Application has been submitted, seeking condonation of delay of 352 days in filing the application for restoration of OWP. No. 624/1994, which came to be dismissed on 12.12.2000 for want of prosecution.
2. As the application for restoration of the writ petition was not filed within the time permitted for filing the same, the present aplication seeking condonation of delay has been filed on the main submissions that the applicants had to migrate from the Valley in the year 1991. The counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants in writ petition No. 624/94 did not inform the applicants about the date of dismissal of the writ petition. It was on one of the visits of the applicant to Valley, in connection with some demand notice issued by Sales Tax Auithority, that the applicant got the knowledge in the last week of August, 2001, about the dismissal of the writ petition on 12.12.2000. It is further submitted that the applicant had taken all steps required under law to engage the counsel to pursue his case. On these submissions, it is prayed that the delay be condoned, as it is not deliberate or intentional and the writ petition be restored to its original number.
3. Heard learned counsels for the parties at length and considered the submissions in view of the material submitted on record.
4. While considering the condonation of delay, it is to be ensured that the meritorius and enforceable right of the party is not frustrated on technical grounds of delay by refusing the prayer for condonation. In the instant case, although details of the grounds and prayer made in OWP No. 624/94 have not been submitted, but it has been stated that the writ petition was filed for seeking incentives by the present applicant. The right to seek incentives cannot be claimed as a fundamental right, because of the simple interpretation that incentives are given as a matter of concession to sustain, emlarge and increase the scope of the business establishments of the citizens. In any case, as it is not shown that even consideration of the meritorious and enforceable claim would be refused, if the delay is not condoned, the submissions of the learned counsel, on this ground is not sustainable and is rejected.
5. It has been submitted in para No. 5 of the application that the applicant acquired the knowledge of dismissal of his writ petition in the last week of August, 2001. The applicant has not stated the source who informed him about the dismissal of the writ petition. The learned counsel verbally submitted that some clerk informed him about the dismissal of the writ petition. No affidavit of the said clerk has been submitted to indicate the exact date when knowledge of the dismissal of the writ petition was conveyed to the applicant.
6. Moreover, as it is admitted that the counsel was engaged by the applicant to represent him in the said writ petition and the counsel did not inform the applicant about the dismissal of the writ petition. In the first instance, the name of the counsel has not been indicated in the application and secondly there is no affidavit by any clounsel to establish that the counsel engaged by the applicant did not inform him about the dismissal of the writ petition on 12.12.2000 in such a manner that the applicant was left unaware of the dismissal of his writ petition.
7. The learned counsel has referred to dismissal order dated: 12.12.2000 and pleaded that although it is endorsed in the order that notice was issued to the applicant before the dismissal of the writ petition, but no notice has been issued to the applicant and the impression conveyed in the order that notice has been issued and gathered from the office report, is factually not correct.
8. It is a settled preposition of law, that correctness and genuineness of all court orders has to be presumed unless facts contrary challenging the same are shown. In the instant case there is a clear observation endorsed in the court order dated: 12.12.2000 that the Registry reports that notice has been duly served on the applicant, but despite notice applicant is not present.
9. There is no reason to take a view contrary to the view taken by this court in the order dated: 12.12.2000 regarding the issuance and service of notices on the present applicant. Moreover, this plea has not been taken in the present application and, as such, this objection cannot be accepted to condone the delay in the present circumstances.
10. As per applicant, he left Valley in the year 1991, but during his absence he filed the writ in the year 1994, that means at the time of filing of the writ petition, the applicant could manage to engage the counsel on the date of filing of his writ petition. He was duty bound to keep constant track of the dates of hearing and monitor the progress of his petition in the court. Simply because a counsel was engaged, would not exonerate the applicant to pursue the matter and ensure his representation by the counsel of his choice and even by the replacement by another counsel in case his counsel was not available or had left the Valley. The present case is not one where, even on equal able grounds the delay deserves to be condone because the delay appears to be deliberate and willful, caused by negligence of the applicant which he cannot attribute to his counsel.
11. Therefore, for the reasons given above, no ground for condoning the delay is made out. The application is without any merit and is accordingly rejected.
