1. The only question which had to be decided in this suit was that of estoppel. It is not denied that the plaintiff did represent to the parents of the 2nd defendant in 1876 that she had the authority of her husband to adopt, that acting upon the belief that such representation was true, they gave the 2nd defendant in adoption and that the plaintiff then brought up the 2nd defendant as her adopted son, and as such married him to the girl of her choice, and as her adopted sort he for years performed the funeral ceremony of her husband. Having so acted she cannot now be heard to deny that the adoption was invalid. We have been referred to the cases reported at 11 B. H. C. R, 190, Sadashiv Moreshvar Ghate v. Hari Moreshvar Ghate, and I. L. R, 11. B, 381, Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmibai in both of which it was held that the conduct of the person who actively participated in the adoption estopped him from disputing the validity of the adoption. It seems to us that this is just such a case as Section 115 of the Evidence Act was framed to meet and we are unable to assent to the argument of the appellant’s pleader that estpoppel only refers to cases of contract.
2. This second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.