JUDGMENT
Ranjan Gogoi, J.
1. All these writ petitions being inter-connected were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
2. The facts that will be relevant to the present adjudication may be noticed at the outset.
The writ petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 2058 of 2001, Sri Amrit Kumar Khatoniar, joined as an Executive Trainee in Oil India Limited on 8.11.1982. The agitation on the foreigners issue was at its peak in the State of Assam around that time. According to the petitioner (Sri A.K. Khatoniar), the said agitation had affected work in the establishment of the Oil India Limited and in the course of such agitation a large number of Executive Trainees including Sri Khatoniar himself had expressed their difficulties in attending to their regular duties. On 2.7.1983, in accordance with Clause 15 of the appointment order of the petitioner as an Executive Trainee, his training was terminated leading to the consequential cessation of service. On 15.8.1985 the Assam Accord was signed which, inter alia, provided for withdrawal of disciplinary action against all persons whose services were affected on account of the agitation on the foreigners issue. According to the petitioner, in January 1986, as a sequel to the Assam Accord, Oil India Ltd. had offered to reinstate the petitioner as a Trainee by requiring him to complete the balance period of his training. The petitioner refused to accept the said offer of Oil India Ltd. and by his communication dated 22.1.1986 demanded that like his colleagues, who had in the meantime been confirmed in Grade-C, the petitioner should also be confirmed in the said Grade. Oil India Ltd. refused to accede to the said demand of the petitioner.
3. While the matter was so situated, on 16. 10.1990, the Government of India had issued specific instructions to the effect that the period of absence from duty of persons affected by the Assam agitation should be treated as on duty. Thereafter, it appears that on 17.11.1990 the petitioner was appointed in Grade-C. The letter of appointment of the petitioner indicates that the appointment was a fresh appointment and that the petitioner would be on probation. However, what must be noticed herein is that the appointment of the petitioner was made on the basis of an application submitted by him on 5.10.1990 pursuant whereto he was interviewed on 10.11.1990. The petitioner accepted the said appointment and joined service under the Oil India Ltd. on 19.11.1990. Thereafter on 7.12.1990 the petitioner submitted an application seeking seniority with his erstwhile colleagues. The said representation was followed by another representation dated 13.12.1991. By an order dated 24.2.1992 Oil India Ltd., while granting seven advance increments to the petitioner in order to bring his pay to the level of his erstwhile colleagues, rejected the prayer for seniority.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action taken by the Oil India Ltd., the petitioner instituted a writ petition being Civil Rule No. 1583 of 1994 seeking seniority in service at par with his erstwhile colleagues of the 1982 batch of trainees; arrear pay from 2.7.1983 (date of cessation of service) to 7.12.1990 (sic) (date of reappointment) and for other consequential benefits. The said writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court by judgment and order dated 31.5.1996. By the said Judgment and Order it was held that the appointment of the petitioner in Grade-C made in the year 1990 was a fresh appointment effective from the said date and that there is no basis for grant of seniority to the petitioner from any anterior date. Aggrieved by the said order passed in the writ petition filed, the petitioner carried the matter in appeal by instituting a Writ Appeal registered and numbered as Writ Appeal No. 261 of 1996.
While the said Writ Appeal was pending before the court, on 3.6.1999 the petitioner submitted a letter requesting the authorities of the Oil India Ltd. for an opportunity to explain the entire issue involved to a person to be nominated by the Oil India Ltd. and for an amicable out of the court settlement. In the said communication dated 3.6.1999 the petitioner agreed to withdraw the writ appeal filed by him if his case is to be sympathetically considered by the Oil India Ltd,
On receipt of the said letter dated 3.6.1999 the authority of the Oil India Ltd. informed the petitioner by letter dated 16.6.1999 that on consideration of the request made by the petitioner, the OIL authorities are appointing one Dr. P.K. Choudhury as Arbitrator to have a fresh assessment of the case in order to arrive at a settlement. The petitioner was advised to consider as to whether he would deem it appropriate to withdraw the pending writ appeal. Simultaneously with the aforesaid letter dated 16.6.1999 the OIL authorities also wrote a letter dated 17.6.1999 to Sri P.K. Choudhury informing him of the detailed facts of the case and requesting his consent to act as an Arbitrator. It must be noticed, at this stage, that in the letter dated 17.6.1999 the OIL authorities had indicated that it is seeking the ‘valued opinion’ of the ‘arbitrator’ appointed, i.e., Sri P.K. Choudhury.
Thereafter, on 2.8.1999 the Writ Appeal filed by the petitioner, i.e., W.A. No. 261 of 1996 was dismissed by the court as withdrawn.
5. Sri P.K. Choudhury, the appointed ‘Arbitrator’ passed an ‘Award’ dated 22.4.2000 holding that the petitioner should be confirmed in Grade-D with effect from 1.1.1992 and in the next Grade, i.e., Grade-E on completion of the required time-frame of three years. By the aforesaid ‘Award’ dated 22.4.2000 it was also directed that the petitioner may be paid his stipend/salary and other financial benefits like bonus/ex-gratia/ LFA for the period of absence minus such salary that the petitioner may have received from other organizations where he had worked during the relevant time. However, by a subsequent communication received from the ‘Arbitrator’ it was clarified that the aforesaid later direction for salary, etc., did not form apart of the ‘Award’ of the ‘Arbitrator’.
6. Thereafter, on 20th of July 2000, the Chief Personnel Manager acting on behalf of the Resident Chief Executive of the OIL informed the petitioner that as an Award has been passed at the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, in accordance with the said ‘Award’ a decision has been taken that the deemed date of promotion of the petitioner in the Contracts and Development Department would be 1.1.1992 to Grade-D and 1.1.1995 to Grade-E. By the said letter the petitioner, however, was directed that he will continue to be in his present assignment in the Technical Audit Department until further orders. The petitioner was also informed that the issues relating to back wages, etc., if any, are being examined and the decision of OIL will be intimated to the petitioner in due course. However, by another communication dated 12.8.2000 the petitioner was informed that in view of mass discontent amongst the Executives due to implementation of the Arbitrator’s Award the earlier letter dated 20.7.2000 is being withdrawn. By the said letter the petitioner was also informed that a process of finding an amicable solution is on and the petitioner would be informed in due course. Thereafter on 14th of August 2000 the petitioner was informed that a high powered committee has been appointed to review the whole matter including the discontent amongst other Executives on account of the Award in question. The petitioner was advised that he should call on the members of the High Powered Committee on 16.8.2000 in the office of the General Manager of Oil India Ltd. The materials on record would indicate that the petitioner appeared before the High Powered Committee and took part in its deliberations.
7. While the aforesaid developments were going on, on 21.8.2000 the Oil India Ltd. filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the Act’) in the court of the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh, for setting aside the Award dated 22.4.2000 passed by the Arbitrator (Sri P.K. Choudhury). The said application was accompanied by another application seeking condonation of the delay that had occurred in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the Award. The learned District Judge, Dibrugarh, after hearing both sides, by order dated 10.10.2002, condoned the delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act and fixed the matter for further consideration.
8. In the court of the learned District Judge an application was also filed by Oil India Executive Employees’ Association seeking leave to intervene in the arbitration proceedings pending in the said Court. No order on the said application has been passed by the learned District Judge till date. The proceeding before the learned District Judge, as evident from the order sheet, has remained stayed by specific orders passed to the said effect which appears to be on account of the pendency of the present writ petitions, particularly the writ petition filed by the Oil India Executive Employees’Association, as noticed below, and the interim order of status quo passed in the said case on 20.9.2002.
9. In the above facts and circumstances, the petitioner Sri A.K. Khatoniar had instituted W.P. (C) No. 2058 of 2001 challenging the order dated 12.8.2000 by which the OIL authorities had withdrawn their earlier de-cision dated 20.7.2000 to implement the Award of the Arbitrator. In the aforesaid writ petition directions have also been prayed for enforcement of the said decision dated 20.7.2000. The writ petitioner, Sri A.K. Khatoniar, has also instituted W.P. (C) No. 7407 of 2002 calling into question the entertainment of the application filed by the Oil India Ltd. under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the Award dated 22.4.2000 including the Order 10.10.2002 passed in the case by the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh, condoning the delay in filing the application under Section 34.
The Oil India Executive Employees’ Association has instituted W.P. (C) No. 5837 of 2002 challenging the Award dated 22.4.2000 passed by the Arbitrator, Sri P.K. Choudhury, as well as the order dated 20.7.2000 of the OIL authorities informing the petitioner that the Award dated 22.4.2000 is being implemented. While entertaining the said writ petition, i.e., W.P. (C) No. 5837 of 2002 this Court by order dated 20.9.2002 had directed maintenance of status quo by the OIL authorities. It must be noticed at this stage that it is by virtue of the aforesaid order of status quo that the petitioner Sri A.K. Khatoniar has primarily contended the initiation of the arbitration proceedings before the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh, to be null and void which is the subject matter of the contentions advanced in W.P. (C) No. 7407 of 2002.
10. I have heard Sri K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri A.K. Khatoniar, and Sri A. Kathphalia, learned Counsel appearing for the Oil India Ltd. None has appeared on behalf of the Oil India Executive Employees’ Association to press W.P. (C) No. 5837 of 2002. However, as the issues arising in the said writ petition are adequately taken care of by the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the Oil India Ltd. and the said issues are closely connected to the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents (OIL) in W.P. (C) No. 2058 of 2001, the present order will cover W.P. (C) No. 5937 of 2002 also.
11. The arguments advanced by Sri K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri A.K. Khatoniar,) 1 are to the effect that the correspondences exchanged by and between the parties, particularly the letter of the petitioner dated 3.6.1999 requesting for an out of the court settlement and the reply in confirmation dated 16.6.1999 of the OIL give rise to a valid agreement to refer the existing dispute between the parties to arbitration as contemplated by Section 7(4)(b) of the Act. According to Sri Choudhury, after the parties had agreed to resolve their differences by recourse to arbitration, Sri P.K. Choudhury, a person of eminence and repute, was nominated as the Arbitrator by the OIL itself. OIL had taken part in the arbitration proceedings at all stages and after the Award dated 22.4.2000 was passed it had communicated its decision to implement the Award. This was by the letter dated 20.7.2000 addressed to the petitioner. In such circumstances, according to Sri Choudhury, it was no longer open for the OIL to withdraw its aforesaid decision as has been purported to be done by the subsequent letter dated 12.8.2000. Sri Choudhury has further submitted that the grounds stated for such withdrawal, i.e., mass discontent of the employees cannot be a legitimate ground for a decision not to act upon a valid arbitration award. Alternatively, according to Sri Choudhury, oil’s letter dated 20.7.2000 gives rise to an agreement between the parties. The subsequent decision of OIL contained in the letter dated 12.8.2000, on the ground assigned, i.e., mass discontent amongst other employees, cannot be a good reason for the court not to enforce the aforesaid agreement between the parties.
11.1. Sri Choudhury has further submitted that in W.P. (C) No. 5837 of 2002, the court, at the instance of the Employees Association, had passed an order of status quo dated 20.9.2002. The status quo order is in respect of the arbitration Award. Therefore, according to Sri Choudhury, the order dated 10.10.2002 passed by the learned District Judge condoning the delay is contrary to this Court’s order of status quo. That apart, Sri Choudhury has submitted that the ground stated in the letter dated 12.8.2000 for the withdrawal of the decision to implement the Award dated 22.4.2000 is mass discontent amongst other employees. The same is not a ground for filing of an application under Section 34 of the Act. As OIL had earlier decided to implement the Award and subsequently wanted to recall the said decision for the aforesaid reason i.e. mass discontent, the ground pleaded before the learned District Judge in the application under Section 34 of the Act has necessarily to be understood as afterthoughts and frivolous, untenable and unreal grounds which have been projected merely to bring the application within the ambit of Section 34 of the Act.
12. Replying to the contentions advanced on behalf of Sri A.K Khatoniar, Sri Kathphalia, learned Counsel for the OIL has based his arguments on several alternative planks. Firstly, it is contended that the writ petition filed by Sri A.K. Khatoniar for enforcement of the Award dated 22.4.2000 is not maintainable on the very face of it. Sri Kathphalia has argued that Section 5 of the Act has made it abundantly clear that in matters governed by Part-1 of the Act judicial intervention is limited to the extent specifically provided. An Award can be enforced only in accordance with the provisions of the Act and after the objections thereto as may be raised under Section 34 are disposed of. According to the learned Counsel, enforcement of an arbitral Award by issuing a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is neither contemplated not would be consistent with the statutory provisions. It has, therefore, been the consistent view of the courts that the Arbitration Act being a complete Code a writ proceeding to enforce an award would not be appropriate. In this regard, Sri Kathphalia has relied on several decisions of the Apex Court of which notice may be taken of the decision reported in (2003) 12 SCC 140 [CDC Financial Services (Marutius) Ltd. v. BPL Communications (P.) Ltd. and Ors.].
Sri Kathphalia has further argued that the grant of reliefs sought the writ petition, i.e., W.P. (C) No. 2058 of 2002 will result in a situation where OIL would be denied its statutory rights to seek its legal remedies under the provisions of the Act which process had already been initiated by OIL by filing an application under Section 34 of the Act against the award dated 22.4.2000. Arguing further, learned Counsel has contended that in the present case there is no valid agreement between the parties to go to arbitration. The letter dated 17th June, 1999 written by the OIL authorities to Sri P.K. Choudhury, the ‘Arbitrator’, according to the learned Counsel, makes it abundantly clear that though appointed as an arbitrator, what was really sought by OIL from the said arbitrator is an expression of his opinion on the dispute. According to the learned Counsel, the said letter, notwithstanding the use of the word ‘Arbitrator’ indicates that what OIL had in mind is a non-litigious settlement of the dispute. Learned Counsel has submitted that it is from the aforesaid standpoint that the participation of OIL in the proceedings held by Sri P.K. Choudhury should be construed. In any case, mere participation will not confer jurisdiction if such jurisdiction does not exist. In this regard, the learned Counsel has further argued that if the Award dated 22.4.2000 is to be construed to be a legal, valid and binding award under the Act, the same would have the effect of over-riding the judgment of this Court dated 31.5.1996 passed in Civil Rule No. 1583 of 1994 by which judicial order the very same claims as adjudicated by the Arbitrator were negated by the court; any such award, according to the learned Counsel, will, therefore, be opposed to public policy besides being legally barred on the doctrine of res judicata. In this regard, Sri Kathphalia has specifically contended that the object of an arbitration could never be intended to nullify a judicial order between the same parties and any award having such an effect must be held by the court to be contrary to public policy.
13. Replying to the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-OIL, Sri K.N. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the petitioner, in an elaborate argument has cited a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi, etc. v. Narsinghsa Bhaskdrsa Kabadi, etc. , to contend that the Award dated 22.4.2000 having been acted upon, as evident from the letter dated 20.7.2000 of the OIL, the foundation for the relief sought by the petitioner is not the award itself but the subsequent act of the parties acting upon the award. In this regard, the following observations contained in paragraph 22 of the Judgment would be relevant on which specific reliance has been placed by Sri Choudhury.
22.It may be sufficient to observe that where an award made in arbitration, out of court is accepted by the parties and it is acted upon voluntarily and a suit is thereafter sought to be filed by one of the parties ignoring the acts done in pursuance of the acceptance of the award, the defence that the suit is not maintainable is not founded on the plea that there is an award which bars the suit but that the parties have by mutual agreement settled the dispute, and that the agreement and the subsequent acting of the parties are binding. By settling up a defence in the present case that there has been a division of the property and the parties have entered into possession of the properties allotted, defendant No. 1 is not seeking to obtain a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an award. He is merely seeking to set up a plea that the property was divided by consent of parties. Such a plea is in our judgment not precluded by anything contained in the Arbitration Act.
After answering the point of maintainability, in the above manner, Sri Choudhury has relied on another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vaidya Harishankar Laxmiram Rajyaguru of Rajkot v. Pratapray Harishankar Rajyaguru of Rajkot , to contend that on the ratio of the said judgment it must be held that the correspondences exchanged by and between the parties in the present case, particularly the letters dated 3.6.1999 and 16.6.1999, does give rise to a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. Reliance has also been placed by Sri Choudhury on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dodsal Private Ltd. v. Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi , to contend that it was visualized by the Apex Court that participation in an arbitration proceeding where the Arbitrator did not have any jurisdiction may not render the award a nullity. Sri Choudhury has further contended that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors v. State of M.P. , lays down principles to the same effect.
14. The arguments advanced on behalf of the contesting parties, as elaborately noticed above, would require the court to determine, the rights of the petitioner, Sri A. K. Khatoniar, under the ‘Award’ dated 22.4.2000 and the rights, if any, independent of the said ‘Award’. Naturally, the aforesaid determination will have to be made in the light of the contentions/objections advanced by the OIL.
15. Under the provisions of the Act an arbitration award is to be enforced in the same manner a decree of the civil court. Such enforcement of an award, however, can be made only after the time-frame for filing of an application under Section 34 has expired or in a situation where such an application has been filed and has been disposed of.
16. The rights claimed by the petitioner under the Award dated 22.4.2000 have been contested by the OIL by contending that a writ petition for enforcement of the award is, per se, not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 5 of the Act which visualizes limited Judicial intervention as provided for under the different chapter contained in Part-I of the Act as well as the provisions contained in Chapter VII which provides for a distinct mode through which an award has to travel before reaching its finality under the law. While it is correct that the extent of judicial intervention has been limited by Section 5 of the Act to what has been specifically provided for and Section 34 has provided for a distinct machinery for setting aside an award, the question that confronts the court in the present case is whether such restrictions or inhibitions would bar the exercise of the plenary jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution being the medium for exercise of the power of judicial review as contemplated by the Constitution, the writ power will always be available for exercise subject to such restrictions as may be self-imposed by the courts themselves. In any event, the writ power being conferred by the Constitution cannot be curtailed by an ordinary legislation. Authority for the above view can be found in the unanimous view of the Apex Court on this point in an otherwise split verdict delivered in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors. (1992) Supp. (2) SCC 651. However, having said that, the court must hasten to add that the availability of power is one thing, the propriety of its exercise in the given facts of the case is another. This is an area where the courts have always exercised utmost caution and circumspect to ensure that questions that cannot be determined by judicially manageable standards must be left out of the purview of the exercise of the writ power. Also in situations where the statute has expressly provided a self-contained machinery for redressal of disputes, ordinarily the writ court must be loath to exercise its powers, at least, in deference to the expressed intention of the Legislature.
17. There is no dispute that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self contained code providing an elaborate procedure for the appointment of arbitrators; passing of awards; enforcement of such awards and judicial intervention at different stages of the proceedings contemplated by the Act. Against an award passed by the arbitrator an aggrieved party is required to file an application under Section 34 of the Act, within the time prescribed, for setting aside the award. Such an application is required to be filed in the identified court. The Act contemplates an elaborate judicial adjudication of the objections taken to the award. Only after such objections are disposed of or if no such objections are raised the award becomes final and capable of enforcement/execution under Section 36 of the Act.
18. In the present case, the OIL has filed an application under Section 34 in the court of the learned District Judge at Dibrugarh for setting side the ‘Award’ dated 22.4.2000. The petitioner who is the opposite party in the said proceeding has filed his written statement in the case. The order of status quo dated 20.9.2002 passed by the court in W.P. (C) No. 7407 of 2002, in the context of the reliefs sought in the writ petition, cannot be understood to be in the nature of a restraint on the proceedings under the Act by the competent court. The condonation of delay granted by the order dated 10.10.2002 being for the permissible period under Section 34(3) of the Act and the power having been exercised on due satisfaction, there is no reason why the court would invalidate the said proceeding on the strength of the contentions advanced in WP (C) No. 7407 of 2002.
19. A reading of the pleadings advanced by the parties in the arbitration proceedings initiated in the court of the learned District Judge would go to show that the very same questions that have been raised before this Court in the present writ proceedings are in issue before the learned District Judge. Whether there was an arbitration agreement at all; whether there was a reference of a dispute to the arbitrator or whether only the opinion of the person appointed and termed as the arbitrator was sought; whether the subject matter of the dispute could be referred to arbitration; whether participation of the OIL in the said proceedings can be said to have conferred jurisdiction on the arbitrator; whether the award is a valid arbitration award; whether the same is opposed to public policy and otherwise barred by the principles of res judicata on account of the order dated 31.5.1996 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 15 83 of 1994; are some of the common questions in issue in the present writ proceedings as well as in the arbitration proceeding pending in the court of the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh. When the Act has provided a remedy against an award to an aggrieved party and such remedy has been availed of, it is the considered view of the court that the law as set in motion, must be allowed to reach its logical conclusion. The course of action, visualized by the statute having been initiated and presently pending before the competent court, in the absence of any extraordinary circumstances, must not be interdicted by intervention under article 226 of the Constitution. No extraordinary or even any compelling circumstances have been disclosed for the exercise of the writ power. The court is, therefore, of the view that restraint must be exercised not on the ground that the exercise of the writ power has been barred or curtailed by the legislature but because the exercise of the writ power, in the facts of the present case, will not be appropriate or proportionate.
20. On the view that has been taken and recorded as above, the position that emerges is that the rights of the petitioner, Sri A.K. Khatoniar, under the ‘Award’ cannot be determined in the present proceedings. In such a situation the court cannot bind Oil India Ltd. to a course of action which is consistent only with the Award dated 22.4.2000.
21. The petitioner, Sri A.K. Khatoniar, has also claimed a right to obtain the reliefs sought independent of the Award dated 22.4.2000. Referring to the letter of the OIL dated 20.7.2000 it has been contended that the said letter embodies the decision to enforce the award and that the subsequent decision to withdraw the same, on the ground assigned as evident from the communication dated 12.8.2000 is not sustainable in law. The parties had agreed to implement the award and therefore must be held by the court to be bound by the agreement reached. Reliance in this regard, as already noticed, has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi, etc. (supra).
22. A reading of the letter dated 20.7.2000 of the Oil India Ltd. would seem to indicate that by the said letter the OIL had communicated its decision to implement the ‘Award’. However, no steps in implementation had been taken by the OIL and, in fact, by the said letter the petitioner was asked to maintain his ‘present position’ until further orders. Subsequently, by the communication dated 12.8.2000 the petitioner was informed that the decision contained in the letter dated 20.7.2000 is being withdrawn in view of mass discontent amongst the employees. The above facts would go to show that though a decision to implement the award was taken, yet, before the process of effective implementation had commenced the said decision was withdrawn. Independent of the award dated 22.4.2000 the decision taken and withdrawal thereof are acts of a public body, the validity of which has to be judged on the touchstone of fairness and reasonableness of the action. In the present case it has been elaborately explained by the OIL in the affidavits filed that the grant of seniority to the petitioner (A.K. Khatoniar) and retrospective promotions in different grades would have the effect of supersession of as many as 400 other Executives who were not parties to the proceedings held by the arbitrator, Sri P.K. Choudhury. As the implementation of the ‘Award’ of the ‘Arbitrator’, though agreed to initially by the OIL, gave rise to a mass discontent amongst the Executives, jeopardizing the good relations between the employer OIL and such other employees, it was decided to recall the decision to implement the award. If that is the reason for the withdrawal of the decision to implement the award, the court must hold that the decision contained in the communication dated 12.8.2000 does not suffer from any such fundamental unreasonableness or vice so as to require intervention of this Court. A decision of an administrative body can always by altered/reviewed for good and sufficient reasons, particularly, before it had been acted upon.
The decision of the Apex Court in Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi, etc. (supra) turns on its own facts. In the said case the parties had actually implemented the award by partition of the properties. In the present case, as already noticed, no effective steps in implementation had been taken by OIL.
23. However, the above view of this Court being on the issue of the rights of the petitioner independent of the award dated 22.4.2000, it must be made clear that the observations contained above will not, in any manner, come in the way of deciding the entitlement of the petitioner under the award dated 22.4.2000 which determination will now follow the adjudication of the application under Section 34 of the Act presently pending in the court of the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh.
24. In the light of the above discussions, WP. (C) Nos. 2058/2001 and 7407/2002 are dismissed whereas W.P. (C) No. 5837/2002 shall stand answered accordingly.