PETITIONER:
ANSAL PROPERTIES & INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. AND ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT28/05/1992
BENCH:
KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)
BENCH:
KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)
SAHAI, R.M. (J)
CITATION:
1992 SCR (3) 465 1993 SCC Supl. (1) 61
JT 1992 (4) 264 1992 SCALE (2)2
ACT:
Delhi Development Act, 1947-Sections 9(2), 41-
Legislative object-Master plan-Restriction on high rise
construction by Central Government-Legality of.
Delhi Development Act, 1947-Sections 41 read with Bye-
Laws 6.7.4, 6.1 of the Building Bye-Laws, 1983 of the Delhi
Development Authority-Requirement under-Deemed sanction-When
arises-Compounding fee-Charging of interest-Whether arises.
HEADNOTE:
The auction of leasehold rights on the plot in question
was in favour of the appellant for Rs. 8.13 crores on
19.1.1981. The appellant paid 25% of the auction amount on
the fail of the hammer. According to the terms and
conditions of the auction balance 75% was required to be
paid within 90 days of the formal acceptance of the bid
which was made on 18.2.1982.
The appellants did not pay the balance amount and took
a stand that there was some confusion as to whether it was
D.D.A. or the Union of India, which was the owner of the
plot in question. The appellant also sought for time for
payment on the ground that money market in relation to the
land property had gone down tremendously.
On 14.12.1984 revised terms were communicated by the
D.D.A. to the appellants. The essential terms of the
revised agreement were that 25% of the bid amount was to be
paid within 90 days of the issuance of the letter of revised
terms. 50% of the remaining bid amount along with interest
for delayed payments was to be paid in five equal half
yearly instalments which included the interest calculated at
18% per annum.
The appellants submitted a bank guarantee dated 15th
July, 1985 in favour of the D.D.A. The fresh schedule of
instalments was specifically mentioned in the bank
guarantee. Thereafter on 23.7.1985, a formal deed
466
of agreement was executed between the parties and possession
over the plot was given on 25.7.1985. The building plans
were submitted by the appellant on 12.8.1985. The D.D.A.
forwarded building plans to the Delhi Urban Arts Commission
(DUAC). The DUAC by its letter dated 18.9.1985 sought
certain clarifications from the appellant within ten days
and again sent a reminder on 24.9.1985, but the appellant
did not send any reply.
The appellant sent a notice for commencement of
construction on 15.10.1985 claiming that they having not
received any order of rejection of the plans within sixty
days as contemplated under bye-law No. 6.7.4. had become
entitled to deemed sanction; that the first instalment,
according to the re-schedule of instalments was payable on
15.11.1985 but even before that they had paid Rs.47 lakhs on
8.10.1985 itself.
Thereafter the Government of India by an office
memorandum dated 17.10.1985 decided to stop construction of
multi-storeyed building in New Delhi including areas under
D.D.A. and Municipal Corporation, with immediate effect till
the Master plan for 2001 was finalised.
The DUAC then returned the proposals of the buildings
plans of the appellant to the D.D.A. on 20.11.1985. The
D.D.A. by its letter dated 9.12.1985 informed the appellants
regarding the decision of the Government of India and
returned the building plans and it was directed not to
process the sanction further till further directions were
received from the Government of India.
A notice to stop the construction immediately till the
plans were sanctioned finally by the D.D.A. was given to the
appellants on 17.1.1986.
On 25.3.86 the D.D.A. informed the appellants that
their plans had been rejected as the same had no been
approved by the DUAC.
The appellants filed writ petition challenging the
notice issued by the D.D.A. of stopping the construction
work and also the ban introduced by the Government of India.
The High Court on 17.9.1986 passed an interim order
permitting the appellants to continue the construction work
at their own risk.
On 15.10.1987 the bank guarantee was invoked by the
D.D.A. for a sum of Rs.8 crores approximately.
467
The appellants filed a second writ petition challenging
the encashment of the bank gurantee by D.D.A. and obtained
an interim order on 28.10.1987 restraining the D.D.A. from
encashing the bank guarantee.
The ban imposed by the Central Government was lifted on
8.2.1988. The appellants completed the construction of the
building in 1988 under the cover of the stay order given by
the High Court. The two writ petitions were dismissed by
the High Court.
These appeals were filed by the contractors against the
judgment of the High Court, by special leave, contending
that the D.D.A. was not entitled to charge any compound
interest; that the D.D.A. was not entitiled to claim any
interest for the period 7.10.1985 to 8.2.1988 during which
the ban in respect of construction of multi-storeyed
buildings remained in force; that the ban itself was also
illegal; that the D.D.A. was not entitled to claim any
compounding fee; and that the D.D.A. was not entitled to
claim any interest on the compounding fee.
Partly allowing the appeals of the contractors, this
court,
HELD: 1.1. The object of Delhi Development Act is to
provide for the development of Delhi according to the plan.
While under Section 9(2) of the Delhi Development Act every
master plan has to be submitted to the Central Government
for approval and the Government may either approve the plan
without modifications or with such modifications as it may
consider necessary or reject the plan with directions to the
Authority to prepare a fresh plan according to such
directions. The Development Authority had sent the new
master plan for approval of the Central Government and as
such the Government for the planned development of Delhi was
entitled to issue directions in consonance with law. [475H-
476B]
1.2. There was no violation of law in issuing a
restriction on high rise constructions during the
formulation stages of the new master plan pending for
approval before the Central Government. Thus it cannot be
said that the ban imposed by the Central Government was in
any manner unauthorised or illegal. [476 D]
2.1. The question of deemed sanction only arises if
within sixty days of the receipt of notice under 6.1. of the
bye-laws the authority fails to intimate in writing to the
person who has given a notice of its refusal or
468
sanction or any intimation. [478 B]
2.2. In the instant case the D.D.A. had informed the
appellant that the plans had been sent to DUAC for approval
and the DUAC was also seeking some clarifications from the
appellant by their letters dated 18.9.1985 and 24.9.1985.
[478 B]
2.3. The requirement as contemplated under bye-law
6.7.4. is that the fact of deemed sanction has to be
immediately brought to the notice of the authority in
writing by the person who has given notice and thereafter if
no intimation is received from the authority within 15 days
of giving such written notice the provision of deemed
sanction comes into operation.
[478 C]
2.4. The appellant only sent a notice for commencement
of construction on 15.10.1985 and the same does not fulfil
the requirement of the notice which is contemplated under
bye-law 6.7.4. in as much as intimation had already been
given by DUAC seeking information. Apart from this the ban
on the construction of multi-storeyed buildings came into
operation from 17.10.1985 itself and in view of this
circumstance also there was no question of the applicability
of deemed sanction in the facts of this case.
[478D-E]
2.5. The amount which was required to be paid in five
instalments of Rs. 166.20 lakhs each from 15.11.1985 to
15.11.1987, included simple interest charged at the rate of
18% per annum but it was based on a fresh agreement and the
appellants cannot claim any right to re-open the transaction
on the basis of terms of auction made originally in 1982.
The indulgence of re-scheduling of delayed payment of bid
amount in July, 1985 was made on the request of the
appellant and for its own benefit. Thus the D.D.A. is
perfectly right and justified in claiming future interest at
the rate of 18% per annum on the instalments fixed in the
agreement dated 23rd July, 1985. The D.D.A. is not charging
any compound interest but are claiming simple interest at
the rate of 18% per annum on the amount of instalments fixed
in the fresh agreement dated 23rd July, 1985 till payment,
After novation of the agreement the instalments fixed shall
be considered as principal amount and thus it is not a case
of charging compound interest. [474H-475C]
2.6. For charging of interest during the ban period is
concerned, the D.D.A. cannot be held responsible as the ban
was imposed by the Central Government. This action was
taken for the whole of Delhi and the D.D.A.
469
was to carry out such directions as provided under Section
41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. [475D-E]
2.7. It is not in dispute that the building has been
constructed without any sanction or permit from the D.D.A.
as required under the building bye-laws and the building has
been constructed at the risk of the appellant under the stay
order of the High Court. [478 F]
2.8. No building permit has been given to the
appellants and as such they are bound to pay the compounding
fee according to the rates prescribed in this regard. [479
C]
2.9. In the facts and circumstances of the case the
D.D.A. is not entitled to charge any interest on the
compounding fee. [479 D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLANTS JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2457
and 58 of 1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.1991 of the
Delhi High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 1499/86 and 3068 of 1987.
Harish Salve, Ms. J.S. Wad, Ms. Tamali Wad and Manoj
Wad for the Appellants.
V.R. Reddy, Addl. Solicitor General, Arun Jaitley, Ms.
Indu Malhotra, C. Ramesh, V.K. Verma and C.V.S. Rao for the
Respondents.
D.D. Sharma, C.L. Chopra and Ms. Rachna Issar for the
Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KASLIWAL, J. Sepcial leave granted.
It is one more avoidable litigation between Ansals, a
big building contractor and the Delhi Development Authority
in which allegations and counter allegations for breach of
terms of contract have been levelled against each other. We
would have asked the appellant to stand in queue for hearing
of the matter, but the real sufferers would be those persons
who have invested their hard earned life time savings in
forlorn hope of an allotment of a flat in a commercial
building on plot No. 38 situated in Nehru Palce near Kalkaji
a prime place of importance in Delhi. It is the repetition
of the usual bureaucratic rigmarole from the side of the
Delhi
470
Development Authority and the usual payment of some
instalments of the lease money and thereafter withholding
the payment of the balance amount on one pretext or the
other form the side of the builders.
Facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the
disposal of this case are that the auction of leasehold
rights on plot No. 38, Nehru Place was knocked down in
favour of M/s Ansal Properties & Industries (P) Ltd.,
hereinafter referred to as “the appellant” for Rs. 8.13
crores on 19.1.1981. 25% of the auction amount was paid on
the fall of the hammer. According to the terms and
conditions of the auction the balance 75% was required to be
paid within 90 days of the formal acceptance of the bid
which was made on 18.2.1982. The appellant admittedly did
not pay the balance amount and took a stand that there was
some confusion as to whether it was D.D.A. or the Union of
India, which was the owner of the plot in question. The
appellant also sought the indulgence of granting more time
for payment on the ground that money market in relation to
the land property had gone down tremendously. On 14.12.1984
revised terms were communicated by the D.D.A. to the
appellant. The essential terms of the revised agreement
were that 25% of the bid amount was to be paid within 90
days of the issuance of the letter of revised terms. 50% of
the remaining bid amount along with interest for delayed
payments was to be paid in five equal half yearly
instalments which included the interest calculated at 18%
per annum. These instalments were fixed in the following
manner :
(i) Ist instalment payable on 15.11.1985 Rs. 166.20
lacs.
(ii) 2nd instalment payable on 15.5.1986 Rs. 166.20
lacs.
(iii) 3rd instalment payable on 15.11.1986 Rs. 166.20
lacs.
(iv) 4th instalment payable on 15.5.1987 Rs. 166.20
lacs.
(v) 5th instamlent payment on 15.11.1987 Rs. 166.20
lacs.
The appellant is this regard submitted a bank guarantee
dated 15th July, 1985 of the Canara Bank and New Bank of
India in favour of the D.D.A. The aforesaid fresh schedule
of instalments was specifically mentioned in the bank
gurantee. Thereafter a formal deed of agreement was
executed between the parties on 23.7.1985 and possession
over the plot was given on 25.7.1985. The building plans
were submitted by the appellant on 12.8.1985. The D.D.A.
vide letter dated 13.9.1985 forwarded building plans
471
to the Delhi Urban Arts Commission (DUAC). The DUAC by its
letter dated 18.9.1985 sought certain clarifications from
the appellant within ten days and again sent reminder on
24.9.1985, but the appellant did not send any reply. The
appellant then sent a notice for commencement of
construction on 15.10.1985. The appellant claimed that they
having not received any order of rejection of the plans
within sixty days as contemplated under bye law No. 6.7.4.
had become entitled to deemed sanction. The appellant
claimed that the first instalment, according to the re-
schedule of instalments was payable on 15.11.1985 but even
before that they had paid Rs. 47 lakhs on 8.10.1985 itself.
Thereafter the Government of India by an office memorandum
dated 17.10.1985 decided to stop construction of
multi-storeyed buildings in New Delhi including areas under
D.D.A. and Municipal Corporation of Delhi falling in South
Delhi, with immediate effect till the Master plan for 2001
was finalised. It was clarified that a `multi-storeyed
building’ may be taken as a building going beyond 45 feet or
above four storeys, which has to be serviced by lifts. The
DUAC then returned the proposals of the building plans of
the appellant to the D.D.A. on 20th November, 1985. The
D.D.A. by its letter dated 9.12.1985 informed the appellant
regarding the decision of the Government of India and
returned the building `’ plans and requested them to depute
their architect to discuss about the height of the building.
It was mentioned in the letter that the sanction shall not
be processed further till further directions are received
from the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India.
A notice to stop the construction immediately till the plans
were sanctioned finally by the D.D.A. was given to the
appellant on 17.1.1986. By another letter dated 25.3.1986
the D.D.A. informed the appellant that their plans had been
rejected as the same had not been approved by the DUAC. The
appellants then filed writ petition No. 1499/86 on 17th
July, 1986 challenging the notice issued by the D.D.A. of
stopping the construction work and also the ban introduced
by the Government of India. The High Court on 17.9.1986
passed an interim order permitting the appellants to
continue the construction work at their own risk. On
15.10.1987 the bank guarantee was invoked by the D.D.A. for
a sum of Rs. 8 crores approximately. The appellants filed a
second writ petition No. 3068 of 1987 challenging the
encashment of the bank gurantee by D.D.A. and obtained an
interim order on 28.10.1987 restraining the D.D.A. from
encashing the bank guarantee. The ban imposed by the
Central Government was lifted on 8.2.1988. The appellants
completed the construction of the building in 1988
472
under the cover of they stay order given by the High Court.
The aforesaid two writ petitions have been disposed of by
the High Court by order dated October 31, 1991. The High
Court after examining the matter in detail arrived to the
conclusion as under:-
“After considering the pleadings of the parties,
documents on record and submissions made before
this court, it is absolutely evident that the
petitioner has been consistently making defaults in
payment of the amount due to the D.D.A. on one
pretext or the other. According to the terms of
the auction, the petitioner’s bid was accepted on
February 19, 1982 and the petitioner was supposed
to deposit the balance 75% of the bid amount within
90 days. The amount which ought to have been
deposited with the D.D.A. way back in 1982 has not
been deposited till this date. Further more at the
request of the petitioner, the D.D.A. entered into
an agreement with the petitioner. This agreement
was entered into because the petitioner pleaded
grave financial difficulty and according to the
agreement, the first instalment had to be deposited
by the petitioner on or before November 15, 1985
and all subsequent instalments on or before 15th
November, 1987. Astonishingly, till this date not
even one full instalment has been deposited by the
petitioner. Looking to the entire past conduct of
the petitioner, no indulgence can be granted in any
manner because any indulgence would be at the cost
of public money”.
The High Court then observed that after careful
consideration of the facts and the issues involved in the
case it would be proper to dispose of the writ petitions
with the following directions:
(i) The petitioner is directed to pay the balance
outstanding amount due to the Delhi Development Authority,
including interest at the rate of 18% per annum within a
period of two months from today.
(ii) the respondent-D.D.A. would be entitled to encash
the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner. The amount
recovered by encashment of bank guarantee from the
petitioner would stand adjusted from the total outstanding
amount.
(iii) On the petitioner’s making the entire payment,
the respondent
473
shall sanction the building plans forthwith and in no case
later than one month of receiving the entire outstanding
amount from the petitioner.
(iv) Thereafter the petitioner shall apply for the
grant of occupancy certificate as per rules, if not already
applied.
The respondent D.D.A. shall grant necessary certificate
as per rules without any delay but in any event not later
than two weeks from the date of the petitioner’s submitting
application pertaining to occupancy certificate.
Subject to these directions, both these writ petitions
are dismissed. Counsel’s fee is addressed at Rs. 5,000. It
is made clear that if the petitioner fails to comply with
the above directions, the respondent shall be at liberty to
take necessary action as permissible according to law.
Aggrieved against the aforesaid Judgment of the High
Court the appellants by grant of special leave have come in
appeal before this Court. We have heard learned counsel for
the parties at length and have thoroughly perused the
record. The contentions now raised before us on behalf of
the appellants can be summarised under the following points:
(i) The D.D.A. is not entitled to charge any compound
interest.
(ii) The D.D.A. is not entitled to claim any interest
for the period 7.10.1985 to 8.2.1988 during which the ban in
respect of construction of multi-storeyed building remained
in force. The ban itself was also illegal.
(iii) The D.D.A. is not entitled to claim any
compounding fee which amounts to Rs. 93 lakhs.
(iv) The D.D.A. is not entitled to claim any interest
on the compounding fee.
We shall consider the above submissions in seriatim.
Point No. 1: It has been submitted by the Learned
counsel for the appellants that the authority to levy
interest in the instant case flows from the statutory
directive issued by the Government and incorporated in the
letter dated 14.12.1984. This letter states that
“………The delayed payment of premium will carry interest
18 per cent p.a. from the due date, viz.
474
17.5.1982, to the actual dated of payment…….”. The
revised agreement dated 23rd July, 1985 accordingly provides
in clause 2 “……The balance amount and the interest for
delayed payment of the bid amount shall be payable by the
auction purchaser in five equated half yearly instalments
including interest calculated at 18 per cent per annum on
the following dates…….”.
It has been contended that the bank guarantee dated
15.7.1985 is really a part of the same transaction. In fact
the licence agreement of 23.7.1985 was issued only upon
furnishing of the bank guarantee dated 15.7.1985. It is
submitted that the total amount demanded by the D.D.A.
includes an element of Rs. 6.69 crores as further interest.
This interest amounting to Rs. 6.69 crores comprises of the
following ……… (a) Rs. 3.27 crores is the interest on
the balance unpaid premium of Rs. 3.60 crores (as on
15.11.1985) (b) Rs. 3.42 crores is the interest on interest
component already included in the instalments referred to in
the bank guarantee.
It has been contended that the further claim of
interest on the five instalments of Rs. 1.66 crores each
amounts to charging compound interest as the instalments
already include interest. According to the appellants even
if the interest is charged then it should be a simple
interest re-calculated as though the instalments instead of
being paid in the period 1985-87 are being paid in 1991-92
on the same principle which was adopted when the instalments
were initially fixed in 1985. We find no force in the above
contention. As already mentioned above the auction was
knoked down for Rs. 8.13 crores on 19.1.1982 and the
appellant had paid only 25% of the auction amount on the
fall of the hammer. According to the conditions of the
auction the balance 75% was required to be paid within 90
days of the formal acceptance of the bid which was made on
18.2.1982. The balance amount was thus payable by
18.5.1982. Admittedly the appellant did not pay the balance
amount until 18.5.1982 and thereafter sought to raise
certain objections regarding the ownership of the plot in
question, but ultimately made a request that due to money
market in relation to the land property having gone down
tremendously some more time may be given for making the
balance payment. Thereafter a fresh agreement was executed
by the appellant on 23.7.1985 re-scheduling the payment in
instalments and according to which the amount was required
to be paid in five instalments of Rs. 166.20 lakhs each from
15.11.1985 to 15.11.1987. This amount no doubt included
simple interest charged at the rate of 18% per
475
annum but it was based on a fresh agreement and the
appellants cannot claim any right to re-open the transaction
on the basis of terms of auction made originally in 1982.
The indulgence of re-scheduling of delayed payment of bid
amount in July, 1985 was made on the request of the
appellant and for its own benefit. Thus the D.D.A. is
perfectly right and justified in claiming future interest at
the rate of 18% per annmum on the instalments fixed in the
agreement dated 23rd July, 1985. The D.D.A. is not charging
any compound interest but are claiming simple interest at
the rate of 18% per annum on the amount of instalments fixed
in the fresh agreement dated 23rd July, 1985 till payment.
After novation of the agreement the instalments fixed shall
be considered as principal amount and thus it is not a case
of charging compound interest as contended on behalf of the
appellants.
Point No. (ii) :- So far as charging of interest during
the ban period is concerned, the D.D.A. cannot be held
responsible as the ban was imposed by the Central
Government. The Central Government by an office memorandum
dated 17.10.1985 decided to stop construction of multi-
storeyed buildings in New Delhi including areas under D.D.A.
and Municipal Corporation of Delhi falling in South Delhi
with immediate effect till master plan for 2001 was
finalised. This action was taken for the whole of Delhi and
the D.D.A. was to carry out such directions as provided
under Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. There
is no allegation that such action was taken malafidely and
it cannot be considered as a valid ground for not paying the
interest for the period during which the ban on multi-
storeyed constructions remained in force. It may also be
noted that so far as the appellant is concerned it was not
affected by such ban as the construction contained under the
umbrella of stay order obtained from the High Court.
According to the admitted case of the appellant the
construction of the building had completed in 1988 itself
and as such the appellant was not put to any loss on account
of the ban imposed by the Central Government.
The master plan for Delhi was formulated originally in
1962 with projections up to 1981. There was no provision in
any law, master plan, zonal development plans or building
bye-laws wherein the appellant was entitled to construct
sixteen storeys. Thus the directive of the Central
Government dated 17.10.1985 imposing a ban on high rise
structures was not contrary to any law. The object of Delhi
Development Act is to provide
476
for the development of Delhi according to the plan. While
under Section 9(2) of the Delhi Development Act every master
plan has to be submitted to the Central Government for
approval and the Government may either approve the plan
without modifications or with such modifications as it may
consider necessary or reject the plan with directions to the
Authority to prepare a fresh plan according to such
directions. The Development Authority had sent the new
master plan for approval of the Central Government and as
such the Government for the planned development of Delhi was
entitled to issue directions in consonance with law.
Learned counsel for the appellants has placed strong
reliance on Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and
others, (1991) 3 JT 172. This case is clearly
distinguishable since in that case the zonal plan
statutorily provided for the user of a plot of land as a
park. The Chief Minister contrary to the said plan,
sanctioned the plot for a nursing home. Thus there was a
positive violation of law in that case. In the case in hand
before us there was no violation of law in issuing a
restriction on high rise constructions during the
formulation stages of the new master plan pending for
approval before the Central Government. Thus it cannot be
said that the ban imposed by the Central Government was in
any manner unauthorised or illegal.
Point No. (iii) :- It has been contended on behalf of
the appellants that no compounding fee can be levied since
the D.D.A. had wrongfully withheld grant of sanction to the
building plans submitted by the appellant. It has been
further contended that in view of the commitment made in the
licence deed as well as the agreement read together with the
letter of 14.12.1984, the D.D.A. was bound to sanction the
plans. It has been contended that when the plans were
submitted to the D.D.A. for sanction on 12.8.1985, there was
no sum outstanding as due and payable as all the sums which
were payable under the agreement up to that date had been
duly paid. According to the fresh agreement the first
instalment was payable on 15.11.1985 and so far as other
payments are concerned the same had already been paid by the
appellants. Even according to the bye-laws, the D.D.A. had
to sanction plans within sixty days and the D.D.A. had no
justification of withholding the sanction as nothing was
required to be done on behalf of the appellants. It has
been further contended that according to the stand taken by
the D.D.A. itself the sanction was not withheld on account
of non-payment of any dues but on account of the ban put by
the Central Government. It has been further argued that in
any event, the building has been constructed pursuant to the
interim orders of the High
477
Court which expressly permitted the construction of the
building albeit at the risk and cost of the appellant. The
High Court has itself recorded a finding that the 16
storeyed building stands constructed according to the bye-
laws and even if a formal sanction is given now it should
relate back to the date on which such sanction ought to have
been granted and the building constructed by the appellant
in the present case cannot be considered as unauthorised in
law.
The admitted facts of the case are that the building
plans were submitted to the D.D.A. on 12.8.1985 and the
D.D.A. had forwarded the plans for approval of Delhi Urban
Arts Commission (DUAC) on 13.9.1985. Section 12 of the
Delhi Urban Art Commission Act, 1973 clearly provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, every local body shall, before
according approval in respect of any building operation
refer the same to the DUAC for scrutiny and the decision of
the Commission in respect thereof shall be binding on such
local body. The DUAC by its letter dated 18.9.1985 sought
certain clarifications from the appellant within ten days
and again sent a reminder on 24.9.1985 but the appellant did
not send any reply. In the other hand the appellant sent
notice of commencement of construction on 15.10.1985 and on
that basis is claiming that having not received any order of
rejection of the plans within sixty days as contemplated
under bye-law No.6.7.4. the appellant had become entitled to
deemed sanction. We find no force in this submission. As
already mentioned above, it was necessary to obtain the
approval of the DUAC and the DUAC by letter dated 18.9.1985
and 24.9.1985 were seeking certain clarifications from the
appellant. Bye-law No.6.7.4 of the building bye-law, 1983
of the Delhi Development Authority reads as under:-
“If within 60 days of the receipt of notice under
6.1 of the Bye-Laws, the authority fails to
intimate in writing to the person, who has given
the notice, of its refusal or sanction or any
intimation, the notice with its plan and statements
shall be deemed to have been sanctioned provided
the fact is immediately brought to the notice of
the Authority in writing by the person who has
given notice and having not received any intimation
from the Authority within fifteen days of giving
such written notice. Subject to the conditions
mentioned in this bay-laws, nothing shall be
construed to authorise any person to
478
do anything in contravention or against the terms
of lease or titles of the land or against any other
regulations, bye-laws or ordinance operating on the
site of the work”.
According to the above provision the question of deemed
sanction only arises if within sixty days of the receipt of
notice under 6.1 of the bye-laws the authority fails to
intimate in writing to the person who has given a notice of
its refusal or sanction or any intimation. In the present
case the D.D.A. had informed the appellant that the plans
had been sent to DUAC for approval and the DUAC was also
seeking some clarifications from the appellant by their
letters dated 18.9.1985 and 24.9.1985. The further
requirement as contemplated under bye-law 6.7.4. is that the
fact of deemed sanction has to be immediately brought to the
notice of the authority in writing by the person who has
given notice and thereafter if no intimation is received
from the authority within 15 days of giving such written
notice the provision of deemed sanction comes into
operation. In the present case the appellant only sent a
notice for commencement of construction on 15.10.1985 and
the same in our view does not fulfil the requirement of the
notice which is contemplated under by-law 6.7.4. in as much
as intimation had already been given by DUAC seeking
information. Apart from this the ban on the construction of
multi-storeyed buildings came into operation from 17.10.1985
itself and in view of this circumstance also there was no
question of the applicability of deemed sanction in the
facts of this case. It is not dispute that the building has
been constructed without any sanction or permit from the
D.D.A. as required under the building bye-laws and the
building has been constructed at the risk of the appellant
under the stay order of the High Court. Clause (B) of the
Appendix “q” of the building bye-laws, 1983 provides for
compoundable items as under:-
COMPOUNDABLE ITEMS
Deviations in terms of covered area – If a
building or part thereof has been constructed
unauthorisedly i.e. without obtaining the requisite
building permit from the authority as required
under clause 6.1 & 6.7.1 of the building bye-laws,
the same shall be compounded at the following rates
provided the building or part thereof so
constructed otherwise conforms to the provisions
contained in the Building Bye-Laws and
479
Master/Zonal Plan regulations. For this party
shall have to submit the request for building
permit in the prescribed procedure”.
Thus under the above provision any building or part
thereof constructed without obtaining the requisite building
permit from the authority as required under clause 6.1 and
6.7.1 of the building bye-laws will be considered as a
construction made unauthorisedly and the same can be
compounded at the rates mentioned in clause (B). It is an
admitted position in the present case that no building
permit has been given to the appellants till now and as such
they are bound to pay the compounding fee according to the
rates prescribed in this regard. Thus we find no force in
the contention of the appellant that they are not liable to
pay any compounding fee.
(iv) So far as charging of interest on the compounding
fee is concerned, we are definitely of the view that in the
facts and circumstances of the case the D.D.A. is not
entitled to charge any interest on the compounding fee.
In the result we find no force in these appeals and we
uphold the order of the High Court except with the
modification that the D.D.A. is not entitled to charge any
interest on the amount of compounding fee. It is further
ordered that the directions given by the High Court shall
now be carried out from the date of the Judgment of this
Court instead of the date of the Judgment of the High Court.
Thus except the abovementioned modifications, we uphold the
order of the High Court as well as the directions given by
it. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.
V.P.R. Appeals Partly allowed.