JUDGMENT
D.R. Dhanuka, J.
1. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned Order of Compulsory Retirement dated 13th September, 1995, passed by the Governor of Maharashtra, copy whereof is Exhibit “G” to the petitioner. The petitioner was Additional District Judge and a member of Industrial Court at the relevant time. The appropriate authority has passed the impugned order in exercise of the power conferred on it under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982. It was recited in the said order that the petitioner had entered into service before attaining the age of 35 years and the petitioner had attained the age of 53 years on the date of passing of impugned order. It was further recited in the said order that the Government of Maharashtra was of the opinion that it was in public interest to retire the petitioner from service by giving him three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The Governor of Maharashtra passed the said order relying upon the recommendations of the Review Committee of the Honourable High Court consisting of three Senior Judges of this Court appointed by the Honourable Chief Justice finalised at its meeting held on 4th October, 1995 as set out in affidavit in reply dated 4th October, 1995. The recommendation of the Review Committee was accepted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice and the Government was moved thereafter to accept the recommendation made by the Review Committee and issue the necessary order regarding compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The Governor of Maharashtra accepted the said recommendation and passed the impugned order of compulsory retirement. On 15th September, 1995, the petitioner was served with the necessary notice and a cheque for the amount of three months’ salary and allowances was tendered to the petitioner. According to the respondents, the petitioner stood compulsorily retired on 15th September, 1995, in accordance with law.
2. The relevant facts are required to be set out in detail.
3. The date of birth of the petitioner recorded in the official records of the High Court is 16th December, 1944. On 12th April, 1976, the petitioner joined the judicial service as Civil Judge, Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate, First Class in the State of Maharashtra, when he was below the age of 35 years. On 1st January, 1985, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil Judge, Senior Division. On 18th September, 1989, the petitioner was promoted as an Additional District and Sessions Judge on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. At the relevant time the petitioner belonged to the cadre of Additional District Judge and was functioning as Member, Industrial Court, Bombay.
4. The relevant service record referred to and relied upon by the Review Committee in support of its recommendation concerning the compulsory retirement of the petitioner consists of the following :–
(a) The confidential record of the petitioner written by the High Court for the years 1989-90, 1990-91 & 1991-92;
(b) Complaints received by the High Court concerning the petitioner during course of years ;
(c) Note of caution recorded in the service record of the petitioner on 13th January, 1992 in view of the delay on part of the petitioner in respect of disposal of Miscellaneous Application No. 193 of 1988 inspite of the order passed by the learned District Judge, Thane, to give priority to the said proceeding as set out in para 12 of the Affidavit of Shri Jaypal Amritrao Patil dated 4th October, 1995.
5. During course of submissions, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the fact that the disposal of the petitioner was found by High Court to be adequate or not worthy during course of years and even the favourable remarks were made by some of the learned District Judge in the past while assessing the performance of the petitioner. The relevant minutes recorded by the Review Committee read as under:
“The confidential record of A.C. Doshi written by the High Court for years 1989-90, 1990-91 & 1991-92 reflects that in respect of judicial work, the officer is average. The reputation and integrity of the officer is not good. The behaviour of the judicial officer towards the members of the Bar and public is unsatisfactory. The confidential record of the judicial officer for last three consecutive years is unsatisfactory. The judicial officer was cautioned in pursuance of the complaint received by the Chief Justice about delay in disposal of cases. The confidential record also indicates that the complaints were received and one complaint which involves the Judge in regard to the participation of the judicial officer with the accused involved in the rape case is pending consideration. The judicial officer was born on December 16, 1944 and joined the service on March 12, 1976 and can be retired on attaining the age of 50 years on December, 16, 1994. The committee recommends that the officer should be retired on reaching of 50 years on December 16, 1994.”
5. The relevant portion of the decisions taken at Chamber meeting of Hon’ble Judges held on 2nd May, 1981 are extracted hereinafter for the sake of convenience;
“IV.(A) Decisions on the following matters shall be taken at a meeting of all the Judges.
(1) Promotion of an Assistant Judge as a District Judge if such promotion involves supersession of any Senior Judge or Judges.
(2) Appointment of a Civil Judge as a Civil Judge, Senior Division, otherwise than in accordance with the order of seniority.
(3) Appointment of a Civil Judge as a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judge of the Court of Small Causes.
(4) Promotion of
a) A Metropolitan Magistrate as an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or as Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
b) A Judge of Small Cause Court in Bombay as an Additional Chief Judge or as the Chief Judge of that Court.
5) Postponement of confirmation of a Judge or a Magistrate.
6) Recommendation by way of disciplinary action against any Judge or Magistrate.
7) Appointment of an Inspecting District Judge.
8) Recommendation of names for appointments to posts other than those of District Judges and Bombay City Civil Court Judges where such appointments are to be made on the recommendation of the High Court.
Decision : Accepted.
vii.) In respect of any matter not mentioned hereinabove a proposal be initiated by the Chief Justice and circulated among all the Judges and decision shall be taken in accordance with the majority opinion. The Chief Justice may, if he so desires, instead refer the matter to the meeting of all the Judges.
Decision : To be deleted and substituted by the following residuary clause:
“Decisions of all matters except those enumerated in paragraph IV(A) shall be taken in accordance with the practice followed hitherto or in accordance with the directions that the Chief Justice may issue from time to time hereafter”
6. Article 216 of the Constitution of India provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President of India may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. Thus the High Court consists of the Hon’ble Chief Justice and all the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court, i.e. the full Court. Article 225 of the Constitution confers power on the High Court to make rules of the Court. Article 235 of the Constitution provides that the High Court shall have control over the Districts Courts and courts subordinate thereto including in respect of post and permission of, and the grant of leave to the persons belonging to the judicial service of the State and all respects. The High Court has the disciplinary jurisdiction and jurisdiction to recommend compulsory retirement of a subordinate judicial officer of the State. The recommendation made by the High Court is binding on the State Government.
7. On 2nd May, 1981, relevant decisions were taken at the Chamber meeting of the full Court i.e. meeting of all the judges of the High Court. By Resolution No. IV(A) passed at the said meeting, it was provided that decisions on the matters specified therein shall be taken at the meeting of all the judges. By Resolution No. VII passed at the said meeting, it was provided that decision of all matters except those enumerated in paragraphs/Resolution IV(A) shall be taken in accordance with the practice followed hitherto or in accordance with the directions that the Chief Justice may issue from time to time thereafter. Prior thereto, in respect of unspecified matters, the proposal concerning the judicial officer was required to be circulated amongst all the Judges and the decision taken in accordance with majority opinion. Now no such circulation is necessary. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice has appointed various committees distributing the administrative work amongst the Hon’ble Judges of this Court. The review committee for the judicial officers is one of such committees appointed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justices as contemplated under the abovereferred resolution. According to the existing practice, the recommendation of the review committee is not required to be circulated amongst the Judges or placed before the full Court meeting for information. No rules are made by the High Court governing the administrative business of the High Court.
8. The annual confidential reports pertaining to the petitioner for the period 1989-90 written by the Hon’ble Senior Judges of the High Court clearly indicates that the petitioner was rated by the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court as “an average judicial officer” in respect of his knowledge of law and quality of his judgments. Column 9 of the said annual confidential report pertains to remarks regarding the behaviour of the petitioner towards the members of the Bar and the public. In this column it was recorded that the behaviour of the petitioner towards members of the Bar and the public was unsatisfactory. Column 10 of the said annual confidential report deals with the remarks in respect of reputation integrity impartiality and character of the petitioner. In this respect, the view taken by the Hon’ble Judges of High Court as recorded in confidentials was expressed as under :
“Needs watching”.
Column 18 of the annual confidential for the above referred year deals with the subject of net result. In this column the view taken by the High Court was that the petitioner was a ‘poor judicial officer’. The said annual confidential report is dated 23rd February, 1992. Almost similar adverse remarks are to be found in the annual confidential reports pertaining to the petitioner for the period ended 31st March, 1991 and 31st March, 1992. In the confidential reports pertaining to the petitioner for the period ended 31st March, 1992, in column 18, it was opined that the petitioner was an average Judicial Officer. The annual confidential reports for the period 1st April, 1992 to 8th June, 1992, indicates that the petitioner was an average Judicial Officer and the petitioner was required to be watched as the complaints were received against the petitioner. List of complaints received against the petitioner during course of years has been made available to the Court. I have not gone through the complaints themselves. It was considered unnecessary to do so. It is not necessary to do so. Files pertaining to four of such complaints were closed as the complaints were found without substance. On 18th April, 1994, a complaint was received by the High Court alleging that the petitioner was involved with an accused in an offence of rape. The said complaint was not processed at the time when the review committee took its decision. All these complaints shall have to be ignored, for purpose of this petition. The same were practically ignored by the review committee as well. The petitioner was rated as a poor or an average Judicial Officer. The reputation built around the petitioner was not good. The allegations made against the Judicial Officers in the complaints were unsubstantiated and the last of the alleged complaint was not even processed. The said complaint may be untrue and based on unfounded suspicion. The recommendation of the review committee is based mainly on adverse remarks in latest annual confidentials. No hair-splitting is permissible in matters of this nature. The Court cannot go behind the confidentials. In some of the reports forwarded by the District Judge to the High Court in the past, it was written that the performance of the petitioner was satisfactory. The entire service record was before the Review Committee. The disposal of the petitioner were found to be satisfactory.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 is not applicable to the petitioner. There is no merit in this submission. The said rules are adopted, followed and treated as applicable to the Judicial Officers of the State throughout. Such an exercise is permissible in law.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Review Committee did not consider the entire service record of the petitioner and the Review Committee had considered uncommunicated adverse remarks in support of its recommendation pertaining to compulsory retirement of the petitioner to the prejudice of the petitioner. I am totally unconvinced on this aspect of the case. The recommendation of the Review Committee was based on relevant evidence and material. For purpose of examining the above referred plea, it is necessary for the Court to consider the scope of judicial review in matters of this nature as laid down by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The scope of permissible judicial review is rather minimal and rightly so.
11. In Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, , B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., speaking for the Apex Court laid down the following principles:
(1) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies neither any stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour ;
(2) The order has to be passed by the Government or the appropriate authority on formation of the opinion that it was in public interest to retire the Government servant compulsorily.
(Note:–In case judicial officers, order of compulsory retirement is required to be passed by the Government on recommendation of the High Court to the effect that it is in public interest to retire a judicial officer compulsorily.
(3) Principles of Natural Justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement;
(4) The High Court as a Writ Court is not entitled to examine the relevant evidence as if an Appellate Court. The Writ Court may however, interfere in the matter, if it is satisfied that the impugned order is passed;
(a) mala fide or (b) based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material, in short if it is to be found to be a perverse order.
(5) The Government or the review committee as the case may be shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter of course attaching more importance to record of a performance during the later years.
(6) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by the Court merely on showing that while passing it, uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is possible only on the grounds set out in sub-para (3) of para 32 of the judgment.
12. In Union of India v. V.P. Seth and another, , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the above referred principles. The Hon’ble Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court consisted of A.M. Ahmadi, J. (Now the Honourable the Chief Justice of India) M.M. Punchi and N.P. Singh, JJ., In this case, it was held by the Apex Court that the judicial review of the order of compulsory retirement could be made only on the grounds of mala fides, arbitrariness or perversity and not on the ground that the impugned order was based on uncommunicated adverse remarks. The Apex Court held that the rule of audi alterem partem was not applicable in such cases since the order was not penal in nature. In our case here, the adverse remarks referred to in earlier part of this order were not communicated to the petitioner. The fact of non-communication of adverse remarks is irrelevant.
13. In S. Ramchandra Raju v. State of Orissa, , K. Ramaswamy, J., speaking for the Apex Court took the view that the entire service record should form the foundation for opinion of the Government and not a solitary adverse report. In para 9 of this judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the provision for compulsory retirement of public servant in the service rules was made to effectuate the efficiency of the public service and to remove the dead wood. It was laid down in this case that the public officers live by reputation built around them. The general reputation built around the officer during the course of years is relevant. It was observed by the Apex Court in this case that in an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinary action of removal from service but the reputation of the officer may be such that his continuance in service would be injurious to public interest. The ratio of this case also provides sufficient guidance to the Court in respect of the approach of the Court while exercising its power of limited judicial review in a case of this kind. The Senior Administrative Judges are presumed to be familiar with the reputation of judicial officers concerned. In this case, the reputation of the petitioner, in general was not that good as one would like it to be.
14. In K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India and another, , the Hon’ble Supreme Court took the same view. If the quality of performance of an officer is found to be average, he can be compulsorily retired in order to effectuate the main object of service rules to effectuate the efficiency of service. Similarly if an officer possesses doubtful reputation in the opinion of appropriate authority, an order of compulsory retirement can be passed even if there is no evidence to substantiate the conclusion of doubtful evidence on basis of which disciplinary action of removal of the officer from service could be taken.
15. In Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Bhubneshwar and others v. Suresh Chandra Behera, , the Hon’ble Justice Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, speaking for the Apex Court took the same view. It is thus clear that the scope of judicial review in a matter of this nature is rather minimal. The High Court cannot examine for itself the service record of an employee and substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Review Committee.
16. The question to be asked is as to whether there was some evidence before the Review Committee on basis of which the Review Committee could legitimately recommend that the petitioner be compulsorily retired. The said question must be answered in affirmative. The petitioner was rated as an average officer, during course of years. The petitioner was cautioned by the High Court vide note of caution dated 13th January, 1992. There was enough material before the Review Committee to recommend the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The Review Committee appears to have referred to the complaints received against the petitioner in the passing. In my opinion the Review Committee has not made the unprocessed complaint as the basis of compulsory retirement involving the petitioner in an incident of alleged rape. If the object of the rules made for passing of order of compulsory retirements is borne in mind, it would be obvious that the recommendation made by the Review Committee was mainly to effectuate the efficiency in service and in view of some what doubtful reputation of the petitioner without stigmatising the petitioner as such. There is no substance in this ground of challenge. On merits, the petitioner has no case at all. If this was the only ground of challenge, I would have dismissed the petitioner. The annual confidential reports pertaining to the petitioner written by the Hon’ble Senior Judges of the High Court by themselves constituted sufficient material to justify the recommendation of compulsory retirement. One more ground of challenge is required to be considered as indicated below.
17. I shall now refer to any ground of challenge made by the petitioner which appears to me to be fairly arguable.
18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the powers of the full Court under Article 235 of the Constitution are to be exercised by the Review Committee or by the Administrative Committee, it is incumbent upon the High Court to frame the necessary rule in this behalf. I am conscious of the fact that the prevailing practice for number of years is to regulate the manner of exercise of the power of the full Court by passing appropriate resolution instead of framing rule. The said practice has worked well. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged the law point indicated above and vigorously pursued the same. I am unable to reject this contention straight away for the reason briefly indicated above. In my opinion, the question of law raised by the petitioner should be settled by definite and clear by pronouncement of law by larger Bench of this Court. The question raised is fairly arguable. It is a question of practice and procedure.
19. The learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Advocate General have relied on the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and another, . The ratio of the said judgment is of considerable significance for consideration of the submission made by the learned Counsel on either side. It appears from the said judgment as under :
The Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad had framed rules known as ‘Rules of Court 1952’. The relevant rules concerning Executive and Administrative business of the Court were contained in Chapter III of the rules. Rule 1 of the said rules provided for composition of a committee of Judges consisting of the Chief Justice, the Judge in the administrative Department and five other Judges, to be appointed by the Chief Justice. The said committee was referred to in the rules as administrative committee duly authorised under the rules, to act for the Court. Rule 7 of the said rules read as under :
“7. As soon as the administrative committee has disposed of any business, a statement showing what matters were laid before the Committee and the manner in which they were disposed of shall be circulated for information to all Judges except such Judges as may be on leave”.
(Note:–The resolution dated 2nd May, 1981, does not provide for any such circulation). A question was mooted in this case regarding the power of the High Court to frame rules under Article 225 of the Constitution authorising a Judge or a committee of Judges of the High Court to act on behalf of the Court. Ultimately the Apex Court took the view that such rule making power was implicit in Article 255 of the Constitution itself.
The respondent before the Supreme Court held the post of District Judge at the relevant time. The Administrative Committee of the High Court of Allahabad had received that the respondent in the said appeal be compulsorily retired, from service. The Registrar of the High Court communicated the decision of the Administrative Committee of the High Court to the State Government and circulated the decision of the Administrative Committee to all the Judges of the High Court for their information. The Governor of the State accepted the recommendation of the Administrative Committee and passed an order of compulsory retirement. The respondent before the Supreme Court filed a writ petition impugning the order of compulsory retirement before the High Court of Allahabad. The writ petition was heard and decided by the Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad. The majority of the Judges held that the District Judge could not be compulsorily retire from service on the basis of opinion recorded by the Administrative Committee and it was imperative that the Full Court be consulted for the purpose aforesaid before the order of compulsory retirement of Judicial Officer was passed by the appropriate authority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court over ruled the majority view and held as under :
(a) The High Court had power under Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in its under Article 235 of the Constitution was exercised. The rules framed for prescribing the manner in which the power of full Court under Article 235 of the Constitution was to be exercised must be truly regulatory. The compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Court and of subordinate courts fell squarely within the power of control vested in High Court by Article 235.
(b) The power of the High Court itself should not be diluted by the regulatory rules which could be made by the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution prescribing the manner in which the control is to be exercised by the High Court in practice in matters aforesaid.
In para 10 of the said judgment, the Apex Court observed as under :
“But though the control over subordinate Courts is vested institutionally in the High Courts by Article 235, it does not follow that the High courts have no power to prescribe the manner in which that control may in practice be exercised”.
The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the High Court has prescribed the manner relating to exercise of its power through the committee which may be appointed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice by its resolution dated 2nd May, 1981. The question required to be considered is as to whether the manner in which control may be exercised by the High Court through the committee can be prescribed only by framing of a rule.
20. In the case of The Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, 1986(3) S.C.C. 211, Dutt, J., speaking for the majority of Hon’ble Judges of the Apex Court, observed in para 24 of its judgment as under :
“But in one respect, the High Court is in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of the review committee should have been placed before a meeting of the Judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before the full Court meeting. Nor there is any material to show that the same was circulated to the Judges. In that sense, the recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal”.
In this judgment no reference is to be found to any rule framed by the High Court of Madras similar to the rule framed by the High Court of Allahabad as extracted in Tripathi’s case.
21. The ratio of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tej Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and another, , also lends some support to the plausible arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on this aspect of the case. In this case the fact situation was as under :
The State Government had moved the High Court for the premature retirement of an Additional District and Sessions Judge. The Administrative Judge of the High Court of Allahabad had made his recommendation to the effects that the Additional District and Sessions Judge concerned be compulsorily retired. The Governor of U.P. had passed an order of compulsory retirement pertaining to the judicial officer on basis of the recommendation made by the administrative Judge of the High Court of Allahabad. Three days after passing of the said order of compulsory retire, the Administrative Committee of the High Court of Allahabad granted approval to the recommendation of the Administrative Judge earlier communicated to the State Government. It was held by Venkataramiah, J., (as he then was) speaking for the Apex Court that the order of premature retirement could not have been passed by the Governor of U.P. without having before him the recommendation of the Administrative Committee or of the full Court as required by the rules framed by the High Court of Allahabad.
22. In my opinion, the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on this aspect of the case is fairly arguable and cannot be rejected straightaway.
23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tripathi’s case that while prescribing the manner of exercising control by the rules made by the High Court, the High Court should not dilute the control of the full Court and the rule made should be truly regulatory in character. If the decision of the review committee is neither required to be circulated to all the Judges nor placed before the full Court for information, can it be said that the control vested in full Court under Article 235 of the Constitution is not diluted. This aspect also requires consideration. Perhaps the existing procedure and practice requires some change in light of ratio of Supreme Court Judgments discussed hereinabove.
24. I am conscious of the fact that in this case review committee has followed the existing practice based on the resolution passed at the chamber meeting of the Judges of his Court held on 2nd May, 1981 and taken the correct view on merits of the controversy. This finding by itself need not deter the Writ Court from admitting the petition if the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner regarding the legal efficacy of the existing practice appears to the Court to be somewhat doubtful and the contention urged appears to be plausible and arguable. If the Court ultimately reaches the conclusion that a rule is required to be framed in this behalf, the judgment of the Writ Court can perhaps be made operative from a future date. It is for the Hon’ble Court to examine the controversy in greater depth and mould the relief, if any. No interim relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner since no case for judicial intervention is made out by the petitioner on merits of the controversy. The petition is being admitted merely because the Court finds the procedural question raised by the petitioner As arguable.
25. In the result, I pass the following order:
(a) Rule. Hearing expedited. The respondents waive service :
(b) Prayer for Interim relief refused in view of my finding that on merits the petitioner has no case and there are no equities in favour of the petitioner.
(c) This petition involves consideration of following questions of practice and procedure:–
i) Whether the power of the High Court to recommend compulsory retirement of a judicial officer under Article 235 of Constitution of India can be exercised by the Review Committee or by the Administrative Committee for the Full Court in absence of a rule framed by the High Court in this behalf in exercise of its rule making power?
ii) If so, whether the resolution dated 2nd May, 1981 passed at the chamber meeting of the Hon’ble Judges of this Court can be equated to a rule made by the High Court prescribing the manner in which the control of the High Court vested in it under Article 235 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised ?
26. Having regard to the importance of questions framed by me hereinabove, I recommend that the above referred two questions be decided by the Larger Bench of this Court. In my opinion these questions deserve to be decided by a bench of two or more judges. I recommend accordingly.
27. The Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court, Bombay, is directed to place the paper before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice alongwith a copy of this order with the recommendation of the Court to constitute a larger bench for adjudication of the above referred two legal questions involved in this petition. The Prothonotary and Senior Master shall take the necessary steps in this behalf expeditiously. I am passing this order under Rule 28 of Bombay High Court Rules (Original Side).
28. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioner makes an application to the Court for a direction that the petitioner should not be dispossessed from the service quarter in his occupation for sometime. On the petitioner filing an undertaking in this Court to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the residential premises in his occupation alongwith all the paraphernalia to the appropriate authority on or before 30th November, 1995, the respondents are directed not to evict the petitioner from the residential accommodation till then. The written undertaking shall be filed latest by 6th November, 1995. The petitioner is present in Court. The petitioner is agreeable.
29. The respondents waive service of the Rule Nisi.
30. Issue of certified copy expedited.