JUDGMENT
Sunil Kumar Sinha, J.
1. This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2839/2002 of the Court of C.J.M., Raigarhs (changed No. 453/2006 of the Court of J.M.F.C., Raigarh).
2. The facts are that respondent No. 1 herein was married to petitioner No. 1 on 25.11.1997. She filed a criminal complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh on 5.11.2001 against the petitioners. This complaint case was filed under Sections 498A and 506 (Part-II), I.P.C. and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It appears that after filing of the complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C., learned Magistrate sent this complaint for inquiry to the police under Section 156, Cr.P.C. and after inquiry, the police filed a charge sheet under Sections 498A/34, I.P.C. vide Crime No. 166/2002.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners prays for quashing the proceedings of criminal case on the ground that the proceedings are mala fide. He also raises an additional ground that the Court of Magistrate at Raigarh will have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this case. For the mala fide, he argues that after the marriage, the husband filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 vide Civil Suit No. 79-A/, 1998, in which a decree for divorce was passed in his favour on 22.2.1999 and thereafter this false criminal complaint was filed on 5.11.2001. About the territorial jurisdiction, he argues that no part of cause of action arose in the territorial jurisdiction of Raigarh Court, therefore, the Court at Raigarh will have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this criminal case.
4. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents argue that this criminal case can be entertained and disposed of by the Criminal Court at Raigarh.
5. So far as mala fides are concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that after a lapse of about 2 years and 9 months from the date of passing of decree for divorce against the respondent, she filed this false complaint case against the petitioners only to harass them and this belated step taken by the respondent is an outcome of mala fide and is an abuse of process of law.
6. A perusal of the complaint filed along with the petition would show that the respondent has made allegations about treating her with cruelty and the same was investigated by the police and a charge sheet under Sections 498A/34 has been tiled against the petitioners. The contents of the complaint go to show a probable story which on investigation was prima facie found to be correct and therefore only, the charge sheet was filed. In the facts and circumstances, at this stage, prima facie it cannot be said that the complaint case as well as charge sheet filed by the Police is an outcome of mala fide. So far as the falsity/veracity of the allegations are concerned this is not a proper stage for this Court to go into those factors. There is no merit in this point and the same cannot be accepted.
7. So far as the point of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, a perusal of the criminal complaint would show that just after the marriage on 25.11.1997, the complainant came to Bilaspur to reside with her husband and in-laws. Para 3 of the complaint would show that the cruelty began at Bilaspur and thereafter the complainant went to Mumbai to live along with the husband and she alleges vide para 5 of the complaint that in Mumbai also, where she reached on 13.12.1997, she was beaten by the husband and ultimately she returned to Bilaspur and thereafter she resided at Bilaspur up to 25.1.1998 and then she was left at Raigarh on the same day by the husband. Therefore, on bare perusal of the complaint, it appears that the alleged acts of cruelty were committed either in Bilaspur or in Mumbai, but not in Raigarh.
8. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) provides for jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials. Section 177 provides for ordinary place of inquiry and trial. It has been provided that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 provides for place of inquiry or trial in relation to the offences when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas. It has been provided that in all such cases the offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, a conjoint reading of these two sections would show that the rule laid down by Section 177 is one of general applications and governs all criminal trials held under the provisions of the Code, subject to the exceptions elsewhere provided in the Code. Whereas Section 178 governs the exceptions as are provided therein.
9. Approving the decision of Bombay High Court reported in Ramnarayan Baburao v. Emperor AIR 1937 Bom. 186, the Supreme Court laid down in the matter of Narumal v. State of Bombay , that the word “ordinarily” in Section 177, Cr.P.C. means “except where provided otherwise in the Code. The State Legislature is competent to provide for the trial of offences created by its statutes otherwise than is prescribed by Section 177; but it must clearly appear from the relevant provisions of the special statute that a departure from the general principles prescribed by Section 177 is intended.
Referring to the decisions rendered in the matter of Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal ; L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras , Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. , and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. II , the Apex Court held in the matter of Y. Abhraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. III (2004) CCR 130 (SC) : 2004 AIR SCW 4788, that the exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court.
10. Therefore, it is well settled that unless the exceptional circumstances are there as are embodied under Section 178 of Cr.P.C., the jurisdiction to try an offence shall be with the Court within whose local limits, the offence was committed except where provided otherwise in the Code.
10. In the present case, it is clear that on the basis of criminal complaint and other materials, no part of cause of action pertaining to crime under Section 498A, IPC, arose in the territorial jurisdiction of Raigarh Court. Therefore, in terms of Sections 177 and 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court at Raigarh will have no jurisdiction to try the aforesaid offences vide Criminal Case No. 2839/2002 (changed No. 453/2006).
11. In the result, the petition is allowed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction and the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2839/2002 of the Court of C.J.M., Raigarh (changed No. 453/2006 of the Court of J.M.F.C., Raigarh) are hereby quashed on the said ground only. Since finally after inquiry on the complaint case the charge sheet was filed by the police, the learned Magistrate shall return the charge sheet to the concerned police and if so advised, they may file the same in appropriate Court in accordance with law. The criminal complaint shall also be returned to the complainant who may also take necessary steps before an appropriate Court in accordance with law.