JUDGMENT
Madhava Reddy, J.
1. In this writ petition by Ashurkhana Nalsahabgadda at Sangareddy and four others, the acquisition of an extent of Ac. 1-3 guntas of land in Survey No. 186 of Sangareddy is impugned on the ground that the land proposed to be acquired being a service Inam land granted to petitioners 2 to 4 and others for services to be rendered to the Ashurkhana, the first petitioner herein, and having been also registered as Wakf property, the acquisition infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The further ground of attack on this acquisition is that for providing house-sites, which is the avowed public purpose sought to be achieved by this acquisition, the petitioners and their shareholders are being deprived of their only source of livelihood and they are rendered landless, thus defeating public purpose sought to be achieved.
2. The petitioners averred in paragraph 2 of the affidavit that Ac. 1-3 guntas in Survey No. 186 is granted as Mafi Inam and a Muntakaab No. 13870 of 1299 Hizri (1878 A. D.) was issued to the petitioner’s ancestors on condition of rendering service to the Asurkhana Nalsahabgadda Sangareddy. According to him, their lands are Mashruthual Qidmatt Inam and that the petitioner and others have been rendering service to the said Ashurkhana. There are in all 277 persons who have a share in the said Inam land. Their right to the property is recognised by the Atiyat Department of the then Nizam Government of Hyderabad under Order No. 5243 dated 30 Amardad 1341 Fasli. The proceedings of the office of the Inspector, Wakf Board, Medak District copy of which is filed along with the writ petition, shows that this land is also registered as Wakf property. The respondents too, in the counter-affidavit, have not categorically denied that this land is service Inam land granted for the purpose of rendering service to the Ashurkhana Nalsahabgadda, Sangareddy. We have therefore, no hesitation in accepting that the land under acquisition is service Inam land.
3. The contention of the petitioners, however, that service Inam land or Wakf property endowed for the purpose of Ashurkana cannot be acquired and such acquisition violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India to religious denomination, however, cannot be accepted. So far as Article 25 is concerned, it merely guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. It does not specifically deal with the rights of a religious denomination to own or acquire any property. Article 26 (c) however, vests every religious denomination or any section thereof with a right to own and acquire movable and immovable properties and to administer such property in accordance with law. That is governed by Article 26, which reads as follows:
“26. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right,
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b)
(c) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.
(d)
(e) To own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(f)
(g) To administer such property in accordance with law.”
It would be seen that in compulsorily acquiring the property, the ownership of the property under acquisition is not sought to be questioned. While vesting a right in religious denomination to own and acquire property, Art. 26 makes the administration of such property subject to the law. Of course, any such law cannot affect the right to own or acquire property as such. That Article, however, does not, in any manner, deal with the right of the State to acquire the property for a public purpose. Although the learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions of the supreme Court in Commr. Hindu Religious Endowments v. L. T. Swamiar , Sarup Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1959 SC 860, Durgah Committee v. Hussain and Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay , none of these decisions are directly in point. They deal with the extent of the right of the State to interfere with the administration and management of the religious institutions and properties and not with right of the State to acquire the property for a public purpose. In Khajamia Wakf Estates v. State of Madras , the Supreme Court had occasion to directly deal with this very question that falls for consideration before us. In that case the contention raised with reference to Madras Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, (Madras Act XXVI of 1963), was that by abolishing the Inams and converting the same into patta, the fundamental rights guaranteed to the religious denomination under Arts. 26 and 31 of the Constitution are affected. The court held that the Legislature, by providing in the Acts for Acquisition of properties belonging to a religious denomination, has not violated Art. 26 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court further observed that the provisions under Art. 26 (c) and (d) do not take away the right of the State of acquire property belonging to religious denominations. These denominations can own, acquire properties and administer them in accordance with law. That does not mean that the property owned by them cannot be acquired by the State. Art. 26 does not interfere with the right of the State to acquire property.
4. The Supreme Court reiterated this proposition in Narendra Prasadji v. State of Gujarat where their Lordships were considering the effect of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 and specifically whether any provision thereof would infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 26 (c) of the Constitution of India. In particular, they repelled the contention that any observations of the Supreme Court in Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras were inconsistent, with the ration of the decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (popularly known as Bank Nationalisation case), and approved what was stated in Khajamina Wakf Estates v. State of Madras (Supra) in the following words:
“It is difficult to accept the submission that the views expressed in Khajamian Wakf Estates case are contrary to Rustom Cavasjee Cooper’s case . Besides, we do not even think that the submission is well founded to merit reconsideration of Khajamian Wakf Estates case (Supra).
5. The Supreme Court in very categorical terms in paragraph 26 affirmed:
“That Art. 26 guarantees inter alia the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property for managing religious affairs. This right, however, cannot take away the right of the State to compulsorily acquire property in accordance with the provisions of Art. 31 (2)…..When however, property is acquired by the State in accordance with law and within the provisions of Art. 31 (2) and the acquisition cannot be assailed on any valid ground open to the person concerned, be it a religious institution, the right to own that property vanishes as that right is transferred to the State. Thereafter there is not question of any right to own particular property subject to public order, morality, health and Art. 26 will in the circumstances be of no relevance. This being the legal position, there is not conflict between Art. 26 and Art. 31.”
In view of these authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the first of which is with reference to Wakf property, the contention of the petitioners that the present acquisition violates Art. 25 and Art. 26 of the Constitution of India, does not merit acceptance and it is accordingly rejected.
6. Even the other contention does not merit acceptance. May be the petitioners have not other land of their own than the one being acquired, but that does not establish that the present acquisition is not for a public purpose. What land should or not be acquired is primarily a matter lying within the jurisdiction of and dependent upon the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. Unless the selection of the particular land is shown to be based on a colourable exercise of the power, the discretion cannot be interfered with by this court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. We are therefore, unable to hold that the acquisition is bad for the reason that the petitioners would be rendered landless as a consequence of the impugned acquisition. It is for the petitioners to make representation in this behalf and for the concerned authorities to consider the same. This court, however, cannot issue any writ, direction or order on the ground of any hardship caused to the petitioners and their shareholders.
7. This writ petition therefore, fails and is accordingly, dismissed. No costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 150/-.
8. Petition dismissed.