ORDER
S.V. Maruthi, J.
1. After hearing Counsel on both sides, I dictated the judgment in this matter in open Court dismissing the Second Appeal, on 14-12-1993. After the judgment was pronounced by dictation to the Court Master, Shorthand writer learned Counsel Sri C.V. Kanyaka Prasad, made a request that the matter may be posted for further arguments, on the ground that there was an important decision of the Supreme Court holding that the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 has retrospective effect, reported in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare and it has a bearing on the facts of the present case and he could not bring it to the notice of the Court, as he was not present when the judgment was dictated in the Court. In view of the request made by the learned Counsel for appellant-plaintiff in the Court, on the letter filed by Sri Kanyaka Prasad on the same day i.e., 14-12-1993, I directed that the matter be posted for being mentioned after Sankranthi Vacation. Now, the matter has been posted before me today for further arguments.
2. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents Sri Y.G. Krishna Murthy contended that this Court has no power to post the matter for further arguments when once the judgment was pronounced in open Court. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of this Court in P. Narasimhamurthy v. G. Satyavathi, AIR 1976 A.P. 401 where Sri Justice Venkatrama Sastry, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , held that:
“Under Order 20, R.I the Curt after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court by dictation to Shorthand Writer, wherever it is permissible. It bears the date on which it is pronounced. The date of the judgment is never altered by the date on which the signature has been put subsequently. The date of the decree under Order 20, Rule 7 would also be the date on which the judgment was pronounced. It is, therefore, clear that under the CPC stress is laid upon the pronouncement or delivery of the judgment as a judicial act, which has got legal effect.”
3. Therefore, Counsel argues that when once the judgment is pronounced or delivered, affixing of signature is only to authenticate the judgment, but,it does not affect the order of formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial Way in open Court. Therefore, it is not open to this Court to rehear the matter. Counsel also brought to my notice another judgment of this Court in Raja Sarvagna Kumar Krishna v. Subbarayudu, 1960 (1) An.W.R. 255 wherein it was held that-
“An application ‘for being spoken to’ is not contemplated by rules or by the procedure of the Court, but by the indulgence of Judges,, such applications are being entertained by Courts to correct obvious mistakes or slips.”
4. Therefore, Counsel argues that it is not open to this Court to hear any further arguments on any aspect.
5. Learned Counsel for the appellant Sri Kanyaka Prasad submits that under Section 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow. The procedure for pronouncing the judgment is provided under Order 20 Rule 3 of Order XX CPC says that judgment may be pronounced by dictation in open Court to a Shorthand Writer if the judge is specially empowered by the High Court in this behalf. Under Order 20, Rule 3, the judgment shall be dated and signed by the judge at the time of pronouncing it and when once it is signed in open Court, it shall not be altered or added, save as provided by Section 152 CPC.In other words, learned Counsel submits that under Order 20, Rule 3 CPC as long as the judgment is not signed, even if it is pronounced in open Court, it can be altered or added. It is only in cases where the judgment is signed, it is not open to the Court to alter it or to add anything, except by way of a review under Order 47, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code or under Section 152 CPC. Since in this case though the judgment was pronounced in the open Court, since it was not signed, it is open to this Court to alter it or add, in view of Order 20,Rule 3 CPC. He also relied on a Full Bench Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Sangam Lal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1956 Allahabad 221 and judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras hindu University and Ors.4,
6. In Sangamlal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1956 Allahabad 221 the question that arose for consideration is, whether after the judgment has been orally dictated in open Court but before it is signed and sealed, it can be completely changed. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court after considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh’s case observed as follows:
“There is power of review both in cases where judgment has been delivered but not signed and cases in which judgment has been deliverd, signed and sealed. In the former case, the power to alter or amend or even to change completely is unlimited provided notice is given to the parties and they are heard before the proposed change is made, while in the latter case, the power is limited and review is permitted only on very narrow grounds. Hence a judgment which has been orally dictated in Open Court can be completely changed before it is signed and sealed provided notice is given to all parties concerned and they are heard before the change is made.”
7. The next decision to be considered is Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras hindu University, . It may be necessary to refer to the facts of this case. The appellant Vinod Kumar Singh passed bachelor’s examination in law from the Banaras Hindu University securing 54.4% marks and was placed in second division. He applied for admission in the Master’s Course in Law in the academic session 1979/80. As he failed to secure admission, he applied for admission in the academic session 1983-84, but was not granted admission. He filed a writ petition which was came up before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench heard the matter and judgment was dictated in open Court allowing the writ petition and directing the University to admit the appellant. The appellant applied for the certified copy of the judgment but was told that the matter was again in the hearing list and would be heard afresh. Thereafter it was posted before another Division Bench which dismissed the writ petition. Against that order a Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court the main contention that was raised was that once the judgment was delivered in Open Court it became operative and could not be changed. The dismissal of the writ petition after it has been once allowed was, therefore, without jurisdiction. The Court found that on 28-7-1986, the Division Bench heard the writ petition and disposed it of. Thereafter it was posted with the following direction:
“We release this case but we direct that this cases be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice for getting it listed before the appropriate bench as the matter was once heard by us and judgment dictated but later on was not signed as was orderd to be listed for further hearing.”
8. On a consideration of the arguments on both sides, the Supreme Court held that-
“Ordinarily judgment is not delivered till the hearing is complete by listening to submissions of Counsel and perusal of records and a definite view is reached by the Court in regard to the conclusion. Once that stage is reached and the Court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstance or a review is asked for and is granted. When the judgment is pronounced, parties present in the Court know the conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such pronouncement, they proceed to conduct their affairs. If what is pronounced in Court is not acted upon, certainly litigants would be prejudiced. Confidence of the litigants in the judicial process would be shaken. A judgment pronounced in open Court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature and if there be any such the same should appeal from the record of the case………..”
The learned Judges also observed that –
“It is only after the judgment is both pronounced and signed that alterations or additions are not permissible, except under the provisions of Section 152 or Section 114 of the Civil P.C. or in very exceptional cases, under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code.”
“But, while the Court has undoubted power to alter or modify a judgment, delivered but not signed, such power should be exercised judicially, sparingly and for adequate reasons. When a judgment is pronounced in open Court, parties act on the basis that it is the judgment of the Court and that the signing is a formality to follow.”
9. Under Order 20, Rule 3 CPC the judgment shall be signed by the Judge at the time of pronouncing it and when once it is signed in open Court, it shall be altered or added, (except) as provided by Section 152 CPC or on review. In other words, in cases where the judgment was pronounced in open Court and signed, it cannot be altered or added except under Section 152 CPC or on review. There are three categories of cases, namely, (1) where the judgment is prepared and not pronounced in the Court; (2) where the judgment is pronounced in open Court, but not signed; (3) where the judgment is pronounced in open Court and also signed. In the case where the judgment is prepared and not pronounced in Court, it can be altered and changed and completely set aside as the intention of the Court is not declared and made known to the parties. In the case of a judgment which was pronounced in open Court, but not signed, Order 20, Rule 3 CPC makes it clear that it can be altered. In this context, we may refer to the observations in firm Gokal Chand v. Firm Nand Ram (AIR 1938 PC 292). In that case, the judgment was actually delivered in open Court and both the judges who constituted the Bench were present and concurred in it. But, before it could be signed one Judge went on leave. The Rules required the judgment to be signed and dated at the time that it was pronounced. It was observed that-
“The rule does not say that if its requirements are not complied with the judgment shall be a nullity. So starting a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed the Rule does not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The Rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was. It is a rule which judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt in practice judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A judge may die after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it. The Court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but even so the convenience of the Court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But in truth the difficulty is disposed of by Sections 99 and 108, Civil Procedure Code.”
It was also observed that –
“After the judgment has been delivered provision is made for review. Once provision is that it can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality, except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed. Another is that after signature a review properly socalled would lie in civil cases but none in criminal; but the review, when it lies, is only permitted on very narrow grounds. But, in this case, the mere fact that a Judge is dead and so cannot review his judgment does not affect the validity of the judgment which has already been delivered and has become effective. For this reason, there is a distinction between judgments which have not been delivered and so have not become operative and those which have. In the former case, the alteration is out of Court. It is not a judicial act. It is only part of a process of reaching a final conclusion; also there is no formal public declaration of the Judges’ mind in open Court and consequently there is no ‘judgment’ which can be acted upon. But after delivery the alteration cannot be made without notice to the parties and the proceedings must take place in open Court, and if there is no alteration there is something which is final and conclusive and which can at once be acted upon. The difference is this. In the one case, one cannot know, and it would be against public policy to enquire, whether the draft of a judgment is the final conclusion of the Judge or is only a tentative opinion subject to alteration and change. In the second case, the judge has publicity declared his mind and cannot therefore change it without notice to the parties and without hearing them afresh when that is necessary; and if there is no change the judgment continues in force. By change we mean an alteration of the decision and not merely the addition or subtraction of part of the reasoning.”
10. From the above, it is clear that as soon as the judgment is delivered, it becomes the operative pronouncement of the Court, any signing it, it become authenticated. The manner in which it is to be recorded, they way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the sealing, all the rules are designed to secure certainty about its content and matter – these are all matters which can be cured and they are only irregularities. The object of affixing signature is only to provide authenticity to the judgment. Once judgment is pronounced by dictating in open Court, it becomes the declaration of the mind of the Court at the time of pronouncement. If a judgment is acted upon eventhough it is not signed, it is valid as the mind of the Court has been declared in open Court. Further, though the judgment is dictated and pronounced in open Court declaring the mind of the Court, it takes time for affixing signature as the Court Master (Shorthand Writer) has to transcribe it into long hand. Therefore, for all purposes though the judgment is not signed, it is final and if acted upon, it is valid. However, if a judgment is not signed, then it is open to the Court to alter or amend or change the same even completely, subject to the condition, namely, that parties should be put on notice and given them a rehearing on the point of change or alteration or amendment required to be made. Therefore, in a case where the judgment is pronounced in open Court, but not signed, it can be altered provided the parties are put on notice and rehear them afresh if necessary. The judgment in P. Narasimhamurthy v. G. Satyavathi (1 supra) no doubt refers to the observations of the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh’s case (supra) which create a doubt as to whether it is open to the Court to alter or add the judgment when once it is pronounced though not signed. The learned Judge referred to one of the paras of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh’s case, whereas the other paragraphs which I have referred to above says that in cases where the judgment even though pronounced in open Court, but not signed, it is open to the Court to alter or change or amend it provided notice is given to the parties and fresh hearing is given if necessary. Therefore, it follows that as long as the judgment is not signed though it is pronounced in open Court, the Court is empowered to alter or change or amend the decision; by change means not merely the addition or subtraction of part of the reasoning. Further, the question that arose for consideration in the case of P. Narasimhamurthy v. G. Satyavathi was, whether the permission to withdraw the civil revision petition could be granted; when an order in a CM.P. was pronounced by dictation in the Court before signing it and the question, whether it is open to the Court to alter or amend or change the judgment before it is signed, in cases where it is pronounced by dictation in open Court, did not arise for consideration. To the same effect are the decisions in (1) Sasanti Devi v. Abdul Softer , (2) Beni Madho v. Adit. (AIR 1935 Alld. 416.)
11. If follows from the above, that as long as the judgment is not signed, though it is pronounced in open Court, the Court is empowered to alter or change or amend the decision, provided the parties are given notice of the said alteration or change or amendment and heard afresh. I may again refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kuar Singh’s case that “A judgment pronounced in open Court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature and if thereby any such, the same should appear from the record of the case……”. I may mention here that, in the present case, when the case was argued, in the beginning itself, I put a question to the learned Counsel for the appellant as to the effect of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Learned Counsel submitted that it has no effect. However, immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment, he appeared before me and mentioned to me that he verified and found that there was a decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the ‘Act’ has retrospective effect and it has a bearing on the facts of the case. Therefore, I am of the view that it is a fit case where the Court should hear the parties on the question of the applicability of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, and since the Court has power to alter or change or amend the judgment, before it was signed, the arguments of both parties should be heard on this issue. I, therefore, direct that the Second Appeal be posted for further arguments on Thursday.
