B. Krishna Bhat vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 March, 1990

0
75
Supreme Court of India
B. Krishna Bhat vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 March, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1990 SCR (2) 1, 1990 SCC (3) 65
Author: S Mukharji
Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj)
           PETITIONER:
B. KRISHNA BHAT

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/03/1990

BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)
PUNCHHI, M.M.

CITATION:
 1990 SCR  (2)	 1	  1990 SCC  (3)	 65
 JT 1990 (2)	34	  1990 SCALE  (1)653


ACT:
    Constitution  Of  India, 1950: Articles  32	 &  37--Writ
Petition  for  direction to State of  Karnataka	 to  enforce
total prohibition--Whether maintainable.
    Karnataka  Excise (Sale of Indian and  Foreign  Liquors)
Rules,	1968: Rule 3(11)(b) as amended by  Amendment  Rules,
1989  "Distributor  licence--Monopoly  conferred  on  State-
Whether constitutionally valid--Writ Petition under Art.  32
of  Constitution for enforcement of policy  of	prohibition.
Whether maintainable.



HEADNOTE:
    Clause  (b)	 of sub-rule (11) rule 3  of  the  Karnataka
Excise	(Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968  as
amended	 by  the Amendment Rules, 1989, requires  the  State
Government to issue distributor licence only to such company
owned or controlled by it as may be specified.
    The	 petitioner assailed the constitutional validity  of
clause (b) on the ground that the policy of prohibition	 was
not  being  implemented	 as enjoined by Article	 47  of	 the
Constitution  inasmuch as the State of Karnataka instead  of
bringing total prohibition in the State, had evinced  inter-
est  in taking up the responsibility of selling	 liquors  to
the general public, and sought a direction to the Union	 and
other  State  Governments  to enforce the  policy  of  total
prohibition.
Dismissing the writ petition, the Court,
    HELD:  1. There is no direct or casual violation of	 any
fundamental  right of which the petitioner can	legitimately
claim enforcement.
    2.	Article 47 is in Part IV of the	 Constitution  which
contains  Directive Principles of State Policy.	 Article  37
enjoins	 that the provisions of this part shall not  be	 en-
forceable  by any court. Article 32 gives the Supreme  Court
the  power to enforce rights which are	fundamental  rights.
Fundamental rights are justifiable, Directive Principles are
not.
2
Directive Principles are aimed at securing certain values or
enforcing  certain  attitudes in the law making and  in	 the
administration	of law. Directive Principles cannot  in	 the
very nature of things be enforced in a court of law.
    Akhil  Bharatiya  Soshit Karamchari Sangh  v.  Union  of
India, [1981] 1 SCC 246, referred to.
    3. Whether a law should be made embodying the principles
of  Directive Principles depends on the legislative will  of
the  legislature. In the instant case, what  the  petitioner
sought	to achieve by his application was to inject a  sense
of priority and urgency in that legislative will.  Determin-
ing  the  choice of priorities and  formulating	 perspective
thereof,  is a matter of policy. Article 32 is not  the	 ma-
chinery	 through which policy preferences or priorities	 are
determined.  It	 is  not the nest for all the  bees  in	 the
bonnet of 'public spirited persons'.
    Rustom  Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3	 SCR
550, referred to.



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
of 1990.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
N.D.R. Ramachandra Rao and Vineet Kumar for the petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. This is a petition under
article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner
claims to be “a public spirited individual”. He further
claims to be a person aggrieved and seeks to assail the
constitutional validity of the State of Karnataka and the
Union of India not promoting, enforcing and carrying out the
policy of prohibition i.e. manufacturing, sale and consump-
tion of intoxicating drinks and drugs throughout the coun-
try–India–Bharat, and also assails the constitutional
validity of clause (b) of sub-rule 1 of rule 3 of the
Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules,
1968 as amended by the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and
Foreign Liquors) (Amendment) Rules, 1989 which came into
fore on 10th September, 1989.

The petitioner refers to the Preamble to the Constitution
which,
3
according to him, explains the general purpose behind the
general provisions of the Constitution. He refers to Mahatma
Gandhi and his commitment to prohibition. According to the
petitioner, manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicat-
ing drinks and drugs have become a stumbling block and a
dangerous dragon to the progress and stability of the nation
as a whole. The petitioner states that unless this dragon is
completely destroyed the country could never think of
achieving the objects of the Constitution and
justice–social, economic and political. People are flouting
the laws of this country, therefore, the petitioner objects
that the State should take upon the business of selling
liquors. He has asserted that the State of Karnataka instead
of bringing total prohibition in the State, has evinced
interest in taking up the responsibility of selling liquors
to the general public. Hence, it is bad and contrary to the
Constitution, and he challenges the amendment which pre-
scribes the licence for sale shall be issued to only such
company owned or controlled by the State Government as the
State Govt. may specify. According to the petitioner, such a
rule is unconstitutional. He draws our attention to Article
47 of the Constitution of India which indicates directive
principles.

In the aforesaid view of the matter he claims that this
Court should direct the Union of India and other State
Governments to enforce the policy of total prohibition
throughout the country including the State of Karnataka and
to impose restrictions on manufacture, sale and consumption
of intoxicating drinks and to declare rule 3 of the these
rules as void and unconstitutional.

We are unable to entertain this writ petition under
article 32 of the Constitution. The petition of the peti-
tioner is that the policy of prohibition is not being imple-
mented as enjoined by article 47 of the Constitution. In our
opinion, it is not entertainable. Article 47 of the Consti-
tution, which is part of our Directive Principles of State
Policy enjoins that the State shall regard the raising of
the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its
people and the improvement of public health as among its
primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour
to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for
medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which
are injurious to health. Article 47 is in Part IV of the
Constitution which contains Directive Principles of State
Policy. Article 37 enjoins that the provisions of this Part
shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles
therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the gover-
nance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State
to apply these principles in making laws. It has to be borne
in mind that Article
4
32 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to
enforce rights which are fundamental rights. Fundamental
rights are justifiable, Directive Principles are not. Direc-
tive Principles are aimed at securing certain values or
enforcing certain attitudes in the law making and in the
administration of law. Directive Principles cannot in the
very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. See in
this connection the observations of this Court in Akhil
Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,
[1981]
1 SCC 246. Whether a law should be made embodying the prin-
ciples of Directive Principles depends on the legislative
will of the legislature. What the petitioner seeks to
achieve by this application is to inject a sense of priority
and urgency in that legislative will. Determining the choice
of priorities and formulating perspective thereof, is a
matter of policy. Article 32 is not the machinery through
which policy preferences or priorities are determined and
this Court is not the forum where the conflicting claims of
policies or priorities should be debated. See the observa-
tions of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of
India,
[1970] 3 SCR 530 at p. 584.

We find no direct or casual violation of any fundamental
right of which the petitioner can legitimately claim en-
forcement in this application. To make the State accept a
particular policy, desirable and necessary as the policy
might be is not the function of Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is not the nest
for all the bees in the bonnet of ‘public spirited persons’.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we decline to
entertain this application and the same is accordingly
dismissed.

P.S.S.					 Petition dismissed.
5



LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here