ORDER
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order of the 1st respondent dated 24-7-1993 passed in appeal against the order of the 2nd respondent dated 20-3-1993, the present writ petition is filed.
2. The authorisation granted to the petitioner to run Fair Price Shop at Dulapalli Village, Ranga Reddy District, was cancelled by the Revenue Divisional Officer on 20-3-1993 on the allegation that a quantity of 23 quintals of rice and 138 liters of kerosene lifted on 27-7-1992 was not brought to the shop nor entered in the stock register. The authorisation of the petitioner was suspended pending enquiry on 12-8-1992. Appeal against the cancellation order was rejected by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District by the impugned order.
3. It appears that there was an enquiry under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act in respect of the confiscation of the stock for the same irregularity. The petitioner was found guilty of the charge in the proceedings under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. The Joint Collector held that the petitioner diverted the rice meant for Public Distribution System for sale elsewhere and thereby violated the provisions of the Control Order. The Revenue Divisional Officer straightaway passed the order dated 20-3-1993 cancelling the authorisation given to the petitioner as Fair Price Shop dealer. The house-hold cards were tagged on to the Fair Price Shop of an adjacent village. On appeal to the Joint Collector, the Joint Collector while rightly agreeing with the contention of the appellant that the proceedings under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act and the order of cancellation of authorisation are independent of each other, nevertheless held that the facts giving rise to both the proceedings being the same, no interference was called for. It was observed by the Joint Collector that the petitioner was at liberty to file a review petition upon the favourable outcome of the appeal filed under Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act to the Government.
4. There are two fatal infirmities in the impugned order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer as confirmed by the Joint Collector. Before cancelling the authorisation, no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and there was no occasion for the petitioner to submit his explanation against the proposed cancellation. In a recent judgment rendered by me in W.P. No. 8452 of 1993, I made the following observations:
“It the order in question is construed to be a final order under Clause (3) (4), the same cannot be sustained having regard to the fact that the impugned suspension was made ex-parte without giving any opportunity of showing cause against the proposed suspension. Apart from the principles of natural justice, Sub-clause (4) of Clause 3 itself speaks of an enquiry. Thus the impugned order is liable to be set aside as being violative of the principles of natural justice and the mandatory requisite of enquiry as contemplated by Clause 3(4).
In this case also the authorisation of the petitioner was cancelled in violation of the principles of natural justice.
5. The second infirmity I have noticed is that the Revenue Divisional Officer proceeded on the premise that the cancellation of authorisation automatically follows on a finding of guilt recorded in Section 6A proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act. The Joint Collector while recognising the correct position that the proceedings under two provisions are different, nevertheless felt that in view of the similarity of the facts, the order need not be disturbed. I do not think that this is a correct approach to the problem. The power of cancelling the authorisation is confided to the Revenue Divisional Officer. It is for him to issue a show-cause notice setting out the specific charges and to take a decision after considering the explanation submitted by the dealer. The concerned statutory authority on whom the power is conferred has to act independently and objectively without being simply led away by the findings given in the Section 6-A proceedings under Essential Commodities Act. The findings in the order passed under Section 6-A may be relevant to some extent and it can perhaps be relied upon, but that is not conclusive. The Revenue Divisional Officer who is a different statutory authority exercising power under Clause 3(4) has to take an independent decision in the matter instead of mechanically following the orders under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. This essential distinction has not been kept in mind by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Joint Collector. The impugned order passed by the R.D.O. virtually amounts to abdication of power vested in him to another authority, may be a superior administrative authority exercising powers under a different enactment. That cannot be permitted to be done according to the well established principles of administrative law. On this ground also, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside.
6. The learned Government Pleader contended that there is a remedy of revision to the District Collector and, therefore, this court need not interfere. A case of this nature where there is violation of principles of natural justice and there is a misconception as to the scope of powers confided to the authority exercising jurisdiction under A.P. Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, provides an exception to the general rule of availment of alternative remedies.
7. In the result, the impugned orders passed by the 1st and 2nd respondents are hereby quashed. It is made clear that the 2nd respondent can initiate fresh proceedings for cancellation of authorisation by issuing a show-cause notice and then decide the matter in the light of observations contained in this order. If no fresh proceedings are initiated in this regard within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of this order, it is open to the petitioner to apply to the 2nd respondent to restore the dealership without prejudice to any further action that may be taken. If such a representation is made, the same shall be considered by the 2nd respondent and orders be passed thereon expeditiously.
8. The writ petition is allowed subject to above observations.
