PETITIONER:
BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MADRAS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
14/02/1952
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ)
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
CITATION:
1952 AIR 149 1952 SCR 425
CITATOR INFO :
E 1954 SC 10 (12)
F 1959 SC 102 (3)
E 1971 SC 221 (15,18)
R 1978 SC 727 (44)
RF 1989 SC 1 (8)
ACT:
Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 2 (3)--Indian
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), s. 499--Contempt of subordinate
Court--Jurisdiction of High Court to take cognisance--Con-
tempt punishable as defamation under Penal Code--Whether
jurisdiction ousted--Scope and object of Contempt of Courts
Act.
HEADNOTE:
Sub-sec. (3) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1926, excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court to take
cognisance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in
respect of a Court subordinate to it only in cases where the
acts alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as con-
tempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code,
but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other
description for which punishment has been provided for in
the Indian Penal Code.
The fact that defamation of a judge of a subordinate
Court constitutes an offence under sec. 499 of the Indian
Penal Code does not, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the
High Court to take cognisance of the act as a contempt of
court.
Defamatory statements about the conduct of a judge even
in respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily consti-
tute contempt of Court. It is only when the defamation is
calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of
justice or proper administration of justice that it amounts
to contempt.
Kisan Krishna Ji v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St.
Vincent de Paul (A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334) disapproved. V.M.
Bason v. A.H. Skone ([.L.R. 53 Cal. 401) explained. Subordi-
nate Judge. First Class Hoshangabad v. Jawaharlal (A.I.R.
1940 Nag. 407), Narayan Chandra v. Panchu Pramanick (A. L R.
1935 Cal. 684), Naresh Kumar v. Umaromal (A.I.R. 1951 Cal.
489), Kaulashia v. Emperor (I.L.R. 12 Pat. 1), State v.
Brahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556), Emperor v. Jagannath
(A.I.R. 1938 All. 358), Bennet Colman v. C.S. Monga (I.L.R.
1937 Lah. 34) approved.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
13 of 1951. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order of the High Court of Madras (Rajamannar C.J. and
Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated 10 th April, 1950, in Contempt
Application No. 10 of 1949.
426
S.P. Sinha (S.S. Prakasam, with him), for the appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent.
1952. February 14. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MUKHERJEA J.—This appeal has come up before us on
special leave granted by this court on May 23, 1950, and it
is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the
Madras High Court dated April 10, 1950, by which the learned
Judges found the appellant guilty of contempt of court and
sentenced him to serve simple imprisonment for three months.
The appellant is the publisher and managing editor of
a Telugu Weekly known as “Praja Rajyam” which is edited and
published at Nellore in the State of Madras. In the issue
of the said paper dated 10th February, 1949, an article
appeared under the caption “Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur,
corrupt?” The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan
Murthi, the stationary Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur, was known
to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to be
in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways. He was
said to have a broker, through whom negotiations in connec-
tion with these corrupt practices were carried on. Several
specific instances were cited of cases tried by that offi-
cer, where it was rumoured that he had either taken bribes
or had put the parties to undue harassment, because they
were obdurate enough to refuse the demands of his broker.
The article, which is a short one, concludes with the fol-
lowing paragraph:–
“There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur
Taluk. Taking advantage of those parties many wealthy
persons make attempt to get the opposite party punished
either by giving bribes or making recommendations. To
appoint Magistrates who run after parties for a Taluk like
this……. is to betray the public. It is tantamount to
failure of justice. Will the Collector enquire into the
matter and allay the public of their fears?”
427
The attention of the State Government being drawn to
this article, an application was filed by the AdvocateGener-
al of Madras before the High Court on November 14, 1949,
under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act XII of
1926) praying that suitable action might be taken against
the appellant as well as three other persons, of whom two
were respectively the editor and sub-editor of the paper,
while the third was the owner of the Press where the paper
was printed.
On receiving notice, the appellant appeared before the
High Court and filed an affidavit taking sole responsibility
for the article objected to and asserting that the article
was published because of his anxiety to uphold the highest
traditions of the judiciary in the land and to create
popular confidence in courts, the duty of which was to
dispense justice without fear or favour and without any
discrimination of caste, creed or community. It was said
that before the article was published, numerous complaints
had reached him from various quarters imputing corruption
and disreputable conduct to this Magistrate and the only
desire of the appellant was to draw the attention of the
higher authorities to the state of public opinion in the
matter and to invite an enquiry into the truth or otherwise
of the allegations which were not asserted as facts but were
based only on hearsay.
The High Court after hearing the parties came to the
conclusion that the publication in question did amount to
contempt of court, as it was calculated to lower the pres-
tige and dignity of courts and bring into disrepute the
administration of justice. As the appellant was not prepared
to substantiate the allegations which he made and which he
admitted to be based on hearsay and did not think it proper
even to express any regret for what he had done, the court
sentenced him to simple imprisonment for three months.
The other three respondents, through their counsel,
tendered unqualified apology to the court and the learned
Judges considered that no further action against them was
necessary.
428
The propriety of the decision of the High Court so far
as it relates to the appellant has been challenged before us
in this appeal and Mr. Sinha, who appeared in support of the
same, raised before us a two-fold contention; his first and
main contention is that as the contempt in this case was
said to have been committed in respect of a court subordi-
nate to the High Court and the allegations made in the
article in question constitute an offence under section 499
of the Indian Penal Code, the jurisdiction of the High Court
to take cognizance of such a case is expressly barred under
section 2 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The other
contention advanced by the learned counsel relates to the
merits of the case and it is urged that in publishing the
article objected to, the appellant acted in perfect good
faith, and as the article amounted to nothing else but a
demand for enquiry into the conduct of a particular person
who was believed to be guilty of corrupt practices in the
discharge of his judicial duties, there was no contempt of
court either intended or committed by the appellant.
So far as the first point is concerned, the determina-
tion of the question raised by the appellant would depend
upon the proper interpretation to be put upon section 2(3)
of the Contempt of Courts Act which runs as follows :–
“No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt
alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subor-
dinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the Indian Penal Code.”
According to Mr. Sinha, what the sub-section means is
that if the act by which a party is alleged to have commit-
ted contempt of a subordinate court constitutes offence of
any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal
Code, the High Court is precluded from taking cognizance of
it. It is said that in the present case the allegations made
in the article in question amount to an offence of defama-
tion as defined by section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and
consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred.
Reliance
429
is placed in support of this proposition upon the decision
of the Nagpur High Court in Kisan Krishna Ji v. Nagpur
Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul(1). This con-
tention, though somewhat plausible at first sight, does not
appear to us to be sound. In our opinion, the sub-section
referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court
only. in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt
of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt under
specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where
these acts merely amount to offences of other description
for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian
Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of the
sub-section which uses the words “where such contempt is an
offence” and does not say “where the act alleged to consti-
tute such contempt is an offence”. It is argued that if such
was the intention of the Legislature, it could have express-
ly said that the High Court’s jurisdiction will be ousted
only when the contempt is punishable as such under the
Indian Penal Code. It seems to us that the reason for not
using such language in the sub-section may be that the
expression “contempt of court” has not been used as descrip-
tion of any offence in the Indian Penal Code, though certain
acts, which would be punishable as contempt of court in
England, are made offences under it.
It may be pointed out in this connection that al-
though the powers of the High Courts in India established
under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superi-
or Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority
or processes have never been doubted, it was a controversial
point prior to the passing of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1926, as to whether the High Court could, like the Court of
King’s Bench in England, punish contempt of courts subordi-
nate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The
doubt has been removed by Act XII of 1926 which expressly
declares the right of the High Court to protect subordinate
courts against contempt, but
(1) (1943) A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334.
430
subject to this restriction, that cases of contempt which
have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code
should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court. This
seems to be the principle underlying section 2(3)of the
Contempt of Courts Act. What these cases are need not be
exhaustively determined for purposes of the present case,
but some light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter by the
provision of section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
which empowers any civil, criminal or revenue court to
punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing
any offence under sections 176, 178, 179, 180 or section 228
of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the
court. We are not prepared to say, as has been said by the
Patna High Court in Jnanendra prasad v. Gopal(1), that the
only section of the Indian Penal Code which deals with
contempt committed against a court of justice or judicial
officer is section 228. Offences under sections 175, 178,
179 and 180 may also, as section 480 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code shows, amount to contempt of court if the “public
servant” referred to in these sections happens to be a
judicial officer in a particular case. It is well known
that the aim of the contempt proceeding is “to deter men
from offering any indignities to a court of justice” and an
essential feature of the proceeding is the exercise of a
summary power by the court itself in regard to the delin-
quent. In the cases mentioned in section 480 of the Indian
Penal Code, the court has been expressly given summary
powers to punish a person who is guilty of offending its
dignity in the manner indicated in the section. The court
is competent also under section 482 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code to forward any case of this description to a
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it, if it considers
that the offender deserves a higher punishment than what can
be inflicted under section 480. Again, the court is enti-
tled under section 484 to discharge the offender on his
submitting an apology, although it has already adjudged him
to punishment under section 480
(1) I.L.R 12 Pat. 172.
431
or forwarded his case for trial under section 482. The mode
of purging contempt by tendering apology is a further char-
acteristic of a contempt proceeding. It seems, therefore,
that there are offences which are punishable as contempt
under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate courts can
sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of
criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper
to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court
under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act;but it
would not be correct to’ say that the High Court’s juris-
diction is excluded even in cases where the act complained
of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an
offence under the Indian Penal Code.
This view has been taken and, in our opinion quite
rightly, in a number of decisions by the Calcutta,(1)
Patna,(2) Allahabad(3) and Lahore(4) High Courts. The only
authority which Mr. Sinha could cite in support of his
contention is the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kisan
Krishna Ji v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de
Paul(“). The authority is undoubtedly in his favour as it
proceeds upon the assumption that the idea underlying the
provision of section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act is
that if a person can be punished by some other tribunal,
then the High Court should not entertain any proceeding for
contempt. It is to be noticed that the learned Judge, who
decided this case, himself took the opposite view in the
case of Subordinate Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad v.
Jawaharlal(6) and definitely held that the prohibition
contained in section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act
refers to offences punishable as contempt of court by the
Indian Penal Code and not to offences punishable otherwise
than as contempt. This decision was neither noticed nor
dissented from in the subsequent case, and it is quite
possible that
(1) Narayan Chandra v. Panehu Pramanik (A.I.R. 1935
Cal. 684); Naresh Kumar.v. Umaromar (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 489).
(2)Kaulashia v. Emperor (12 Pat. 1).
(3) State v. Brahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556);
Emperor v. Jagannath (A.I.R. 1938 All. 358).
(4) Bennett Coleman v. G. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34).
(5) A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334.
(6) A.I.R. 1940 Nag. 407.
56
432
the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to this
earlier pronouncement of his, in which case the matter
would certainly have been more fully discussed. We think
further that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in V.M.
Bason v. A. H. Skone(1) which was the basis of the decision
of the learned Judge in the subsequent case does not really
support the view taken in it. In the Calcutta case what
happened was, that a clerk of the Attorney, who appeared for
the respondent decreeholder, went to serve a notice under
Order 21, Rule 37(1), of the Civil Procedure Code upon the
appellant judgment-debtor. The judgmentdebtor refused to
take the notice and abused and assaulted the Attorney’s
clerk. Upon that, contempt proceedings were started against
him and Mr. Justice C.C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side
of the High Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty of
contempt and fined him Rs. 200. On appeal, this judgment
was affirmed by the appellate Bench and there was a general
observation made by Chief Justice Sanderson at the close of
his judgment that it is not desirable to invoke the special
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court by way of proceeding
for contempt if ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate’s court
are sufficient to meet the requirements of a case. This was
not a case under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act
at all and no question either arose or was decided as to
whether if an act is otherwise punishable as an offence
under the Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction of the High
Court under that section would be ousted. Undoubtedly the
High Court had jurisdiction in that case and whether such
jurisdiction, which is certainly of a special character and
is exercised summarily, should be called in to aid in the
circumstances of a particular case would depend upon the
discretion of the court. This has, however, no bearing on
the point that has arisen for consideration before us. We
would hold, therefore, that the right view was taken by the
learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the earlier case
and not in the later one,
(1) I.L R. 53 Cal. 401.
433
It is next urged by Mr. Sinha that even assuming that
this view is correct, the language of section 499 of the
Indian Penal Code is wide enough to cover a case of contempt
of court. What is said is, that if a libel is published
against a judge in respect of his judicial functions, that
also is defamation within the meaning of section 499 of the
Indian Penal Code and as such libel constitutes a contempt
of court, it may be said with perfect propriety that libel
on a judge is punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal
Code. We do not think that this contention can be accepted
as sound. A libellous reflection upon the conduct of a
judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly come
under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and it may be
open to the judge to take steps against the libeller in the
ordinary way for vindication of his character and personal
dignity as a judge; but such libel may or may not amount to
contempt of court. As the Privy Council observed in Surendra
Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High
Court,(1) “although contempt may include defamation, yet an
offence of contempt is something more than mere defamation
and is of a different character.” When the act of defaming a
judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due
course of justice or proper administration of law, it
would certainly amount to contempt. TIle offence of con-
tempt is really a wrong done to the public by weakening the
authority and influence of courts of law which exist for
their good. As was said by Willmot, C.J.(2)
“attacks upon the judges excite in the minds of the
people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determi-
nations…… and whenever man’s allegiance to the laws is
so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and dangerous
obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a
more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction
whatsoever; not for the sake of the judges as private indi-
viduals but because they are the channels by which the
King’s justice is conveyed to the people”.
(1) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 109 at 131.
(2) Willmot’s Opinions page 256; Rex v. Davies 30 at p.
40–41.
434
What is made punishable in the Indian Penal Code is the
offence of defamation as defamation and not as. contempt of
court. If the defamation of a subordinate court amounts to
contempt of court, proceedings can certainly be taken under
section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, quite apart from
the fact that other remedy may be open to the aggrieved
officer under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. But a
libel attacking the integrity of a judge may not in the
circumstances of a particular case amount to a contempt at
all, although it may be the subject-matter of a libel pro-
ceeding. This is clear from the observation of the Judicial
Committee in the case of The Matter of a Special Reference
from the Bahama Islands(1). The first contention of Mr.
Sinha, therefore, fails.
The second point raised by the learned counsel does not
appear to us to have any real substance. The article in
question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty
of a judicial officer. Specific instances have been given
where the officer is alleged to have taken bribes or behaved
with impropriety to the litigants who did not satisfy his
dishonest demands. If the allegations were true, obviously
it would be to the benefit of the public to bring these
matters into light. But if they were false, they cannot but
undermine the confidence of the public in the administration
of justice and bring judiciary into disrepute. The appel-
lant, though he took sole responsibility regarding the
publication of the article, was not in a position to sub-
stantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein.
He admitted that the statement was based on hearsay. Ru-
mours may have reached him from various sources, but before
he published the article it was incumbent upon him as a
reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations he
received and ascertain, as far as he could. whether the
facts were true or mere concocted lies. He does not appear
to have made any endeavour in this direction. As the appel-
lant did not act with reasonable care and caution, he cannot
be said to have acted
(1) [1893] A.C. 138.
435
bona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence at
all in a proceeding for contempt. What is more, he did not
express any regret for what he had done either in the High
Court or before us and his behaviour does not show the least
trace of contrition. In these circumstances, we think that
the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: S. Subrahmanyam.
Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.