JUDGMENT
B.J. Shethna, J.
1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 11.8.1994 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. l, Chittorgarh in sessions case No. 130/1994 by which the learned Judge ordered to frame the charge against the present petitioner accused Bhagwan Lal for offence punishable under Section 8/29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Physchotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act‘).
2. Learned Counsel Shri Rastogi for the petitioner accused vehemently submitted that against the present accused except the evidence in the form of statement of co-accused Kishan Das, from whom the opium was found, there is no other evidence. He submitted that the confessional statement of the co-accused cannot be used against the present accused. Thus, it is a case of no evidence. He further submitted that the learned Judge erred in relying upon the fact that the petitioner is a licence holder for growing opium because in village Potla Kala along with petitioner accused Bhagwan Lal, many persons have the licence for growing the opium. Therefore, he submitted that in absence of any other positive \evidence against the petitioner, the learned Judge ought not to have ordered to frame the charge against the accused under Section 8/29 of the N.D.P.S. Act. In support of his first submission, viz., that confessional statement of the co-accused cannot be relied for the purpose of framing the charge against the present accused, Mr. Rastogi relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in case of Hari Charon Kurmi and Ors. v. State of Bihar . He also relied upon the judgments of this Court report in case of Kishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 176 and Mohd. Nasir and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 355.
3. As against that, learned P.P. Shri Bhati for the respondent State vehemently submitted that the scope of the revision petition is very narrow and limited. He submitted that this Court cannot go into the sufficiency of evidence at this stage when the learned Judge on considering the material before him found that there is a prima facie sufficient evidence to frame the charge against the accused. He submitted . that at the end of trial if the learned Judge comes to the conclusion that there is no enough evidence against the accused to convict him for the offences for which he was charged then he might be acquitted, but at this stage this Court should not interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.
4. In Hari Charon Kurmi’s case (supra) the accused were convicted by the Courts below for the offences punishable under Section 396 IPC and the matter was carried right upto the Supreme Court. The Apex Court held that “in criminal cases where the other evidence adduced against an accused person is wholly unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of a co-accused person, the presumption of innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt.” The case on hand is under the Special Act of N.D.P.S. Act where the Court has not to start with the presumption of innocence but the Court has to presume that the accused is guilty unless it is proved by the accused as provided under Section 35 of the N.D.P.S. Act that he has not committed any offence and he is not guilty for the offences for which he is charged. Question of giving benefit of doubt would arise only at the end of the trial and not at the stage of framing of charge. Thus, in my opinion, the judgment of the Apex Court in Hari Charan Kurmi’s case (supra) will not be applicable in this case. Similarly, the judgments of this Court in Kishan Singh’s case (supra) and Mohd. Nasir’s case (supra) will have no application. In Mohd Nasir’s case (supra), Rajendra Saxena J. of this Court found that the impugned order of framing charge passed by the learned judge was cryptic and non-speaking and the learned Judge not considered the contentions raised before him by the petitioner, therefore, considering the. charges framed against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 29 and 8/15 and 8/25 of the N.D.P.S. Act and on facts of that case, this Court quashed the charge framed against the accused under Section 8/25 of the N.D.P.S. Act. But, it is pertinent to note that the order of framing charge against the accused for offence punishable under Section 8/29 of the N.D.P.S. Act was maintained and the revision petition was dismissed qua the charge under Section 8/29 of the Act. In Kishan Singh’s case (supra) the charge was framed against accused under Sections 21, 22 and 29 of the NDPS Act on the basis of confessional statement of the co-accused. This Court found that neither there was a direct or indirect evidence against the petitioner and no prima facie case was made out, therefore, quashed the charges framed against accused. It was also held that under Section 67 of the NDPS Act the confessional statement made under Section 67 was admissible in evidence only against person who makes it and not against any other person. About the applicability of Section 29 of the Act, the Court also explained in the judgment. However, the important provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act i.e., Section 35 of the NDPS Act was not at all considered. Be that as it may. The judgments always apply on the facts of each case. In the instant case, there is a confessional statement of the co-accused along with it the petitioner accused is found to be a licence holder for growing opium. The submission was that the petitioner was falsely involved in the case by the S.H.O. as along with the petitioner many Mother persons of village Potla Kala were also having licenses for growing opium. Whether the accused was falsely involved or not ? that question cannot be gone into by this Court at the stage of framing charge. It requires evidence. There were other persons in the village also who had the licences but none other was involved. Therefore, in absence of any contrary evidence, it cannot be held that the SHO has falsely involved the petitioner in this case. The question of sufficiency of evidence can only be considered by the Court at the end of trial and not at the stage of framing charge. On facts I am fully convinced that there was a sufficient evidence against the accused to frame the charge under Section 8/29 of the NDPS Act and the learned Judge has rightly framed the charge.
5. In view of the above discussion, it cannot be said that the learned Judge has committed any error either on facts or on law which is reavired to be corrected by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The Apex Court and this Court has time and again held that the scope of the revision petition is very narrow and limited. Unless and until gross injustice is caused then only Court would exercise its revisional jurisdiction otherwise not.
6. In view of the above discussion, 1 do not find any merit of substance in this revision petition. Accordingly, it fails and is dismissed. Unfortunately, this revision petition of 1994 is pending till today and the record and proceedings from the trial court were summoned before this Court, therefore, the trial could not proceed. Now the office is directed to send the record forthwith to the trial court and the trial court is directed to proceed with the case and decide the same in accordance with law as early as possible.