PETITIONER:
BHARAT COKlNG COAL LIMITED
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/11/1987
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 127 1988 SCR (1) 869
1987 SCC Supl. 394 JT 1987 (4) 403
1987 SCALE (2)1015
ACT:
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Section 2-order for
maintenance of status quo as in the High Court-Passed by
Supreme Court-Suppression of the order from the High Court
and obtaining of another order-Whether amounts to contempt-
Scope and effect of status quo order.
Words & Phrases: 'Status quo'- Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
%
It was alleged, in the petition for initiating
proceedings for contempt, that despite the fact that this
Court passed an order on 19.12.86 directing maintenance of
'status quo as in the High Court' in the presence of the
counsel for respondent No. 4 on December 22, 1986 respondent
No. 4 and his son filed a miscellaneous petition before the
High Court, deliberately and wilfully suppressing from it
the fact that this Court had directed maintenance of status
quo, and obtained an order dated January 3, 1987 in their
favour, and had thus wilfully and flagrantly disobeyed and
violated the status quo order of this Court.
This Court on September 23, 1987 vacated the aforesaid
order of the High Court and restrained respondent No. 4 and
his son and their agents and servants from lifting
sludge/slurry from the lands in question. This Court was of
the view that there was no contempt.
Giving reasons for its decision,
^
HELD: The expression 'status quo' is undoubtedly a term
of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and
difficulty. According to the ordinary legal connotation the
term implies existing state of things at any given point of
time. The qualifying words 'as in the High Court' clearly
limit the scope and effect of the status quo order. [872F-G]
In the present case, the High Court determined only one
question, namely, that slurry was not coal or mineral. The
impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. It is, therefore,
870
obvious that status quo as in the High Court cannot mean
anything else except status quo as existing when the matter
was pending in the High Court before the judgment was
delivered. Both the parties understood the scope and effect
of the status quo order as meaning the state of things
existing while the writ petition was still pending i.e. till
the delivery of the judgment by the High Court. [872G-H;
873A-B]
No case for contempt is made out on the plain terms of
the status quo order. The parties were relegated back to the
position that obtained while the writ petition was pending.
They were, therefore, subject to the order passed by the
High Court dated January 15, 1985. [873C-D]
The conduct of respondent No. 4 for having approached
the High Court and obtained the impugned order by
suppressing the fact that this Court had passed the status
quo order, is highly deprecated. The proper course for him
was to have approached this Court for clarification, if he
had any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo
order. [873C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petition No.
4673 of 1987. (In C.A. No. 452 1 of 1986).
From the Judgment and order dated 20.12.1985 of the
Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1133 of 1984.
L.N. Sinha and M.L. Verma for the Petitioner.
S.N. Kacker, S.B. Upadhyay, M.M. Kashyap and Smt. Asha
Upadhyay for the Respondents.
The following order of the Court was delivered:
O R D E R
This is an application made by the appellant for
initiating proceedings for contempt against respondent no. 4
Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh. It is alleged
that despite the fact that this Court had on 19th December
1986 after hearing learned counsel for the parties granted
special leave and also passed an order directing maintenance
of status quo as in the High Court in the presence of
learned counsel for respondent no. 4, three days after i.e.
On 22nd December, 1986 respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and
his son Vijendra Singh filed a criminal miscellaneous
petition no. 4841/86 (R)
871
before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court alleging
inter alia that respondent no. 4 had the right to collect
slurry, deliberately and wilfully suppressed from the High
Court the fact that this Court had directed maintenance of
status quo, and thereby obtained an order from the High
Court dated 3rd January, 1987 in the said proceedings by
which respondent no. 4 was allowed to transport briquettes
from the area in question i.e. Iands covered by the
notification issued under s. 9 of the Coal bearing Areas
(Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957 including the disputed
plot no. 370, and bad thus wilfully and flagrantly disobeyed
and violated the status quo order of this Court.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties at quite
some length, we were satisfied that the High Court was not
justified in passing the impugned order. We accordingly by
order dated 23rd September, 1987 vacated the aforesaid order
of the High Court dated 3rd January, 1987 and also allowed
the application made by the apellant for grant of a
prohibitory order and restrained respondent no. 4 Ram Nath
Singh and his son Vijendra Singh and their agents and
servants from lifting sludge/slurry from the lands covered
by the notification under s. 9 of the Act, in terms of the
registered indenture of lease dated October 20, 1984
executed by the State Government in favour of respondent no.
4 and further directed that all operations carried on by
them shall stop forthwith. There was a further direction
made with regard to the withdrawal of the amounts deposited
by respondent no. 4 and his son towards the price of slurry
collected by them in pursuance of the order passed by the
High Court dated l5th January, 1985 on furnishing bank
guarantee. As the conclusion of the hearing we were inclined
to the view that there was no contempt. The reasons therefor
follow.
The question whether respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh
and his son Vijendra Singh are guilty of contumacious and
wilful disregard of this Court’s order must depend on the
precise meaning of the words `status quo as in the High
Court’. There is not much of a controversy as to the scope
and effect of the status quo order passed by this Court.
Shri L.N. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the words ‘status quo as in the High Court’
mean status quo as prevailing between the parties when the
matter was pending in the High Court and not after the High
Court had passed the impugned judgment and disposed of the
writ petition. The learned counsel contends that same
meaning must be given to these words as otherwise, the
application for grant of prohibitory order would be
infructuous and the order passed by this Court meaningless.
He placed emphasis on the
872
word ‘in’ in the collocation of the words ‘status quo as in
the High Court’ to define the scope and effect of the status
quo order. According to him, the word ‘in’ must mean status
quo while the matter was in the High Court; it was in seisin
of the High Court till the moment before the delivery of the
final judgment. Once the judgment had been delivered, the
matter came to an end in the High Court. In substance, 13
the contention is that the status quo as prevailing between
the parties when the matter was pending in the High Court
had to be maintained.
In reply Shri Kacker, learned counsel for respondent
no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh submitted
that the words ‘status quo as in the High Court’ must be
interpreted to mean that the parties were relegated back to
the position that obtained between them when the writ
petition was still pending. Upon that basis he submitted
that the contemnors were governed by the terms of the
earlier order passed by the High Court dated 15th January,
1985 permitting them to collect sludge/slurry from public
land. It is urged that the disputed plot no. 370 is such
public land from which respondent no. 4 in terms of the
registered indenture of lease dated October 20, 1984
executed by the State Government in his favour, was entitled
to remove sludge/slurry from the lands covered by the lease.
The learned counsel points out that although respondent no.
4 had been restrained by the High Court by its earlier order
dated 19th October, 1984 from removing sludge/slurry from
the disputed plot of land, it had by the subsequent order
dated 15th January, 1985 permitted him to collect
sludge/slurry on certain conditions. One of the conditions
was that respondent no. 4 was required to deposit Rs. 10000
in the High Court and that had been done. He also drew our
attention to cl.(B) of that order which directed respondent
no. 4 to deposit the price of slurry in court along with
monthly returns and it is said that several lakhs of rupees
are in deposit in the High Court on that account.
The expression ‘status quo’ is undoubtedly a term of
ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty.
According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term
‘status quo’ implies the existing state of things at any
given point of time. The qualifying words ‘as in the High
Court’ clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo
order. In the present case, the High Court determined only
one question, namely, that slurry was not coal or mineral.
It refrained from entering into the question of right or
title of the parties on the ground that it involved
investigation into disputed questions of facts. Therefore,
apart from the abstract question that slurry was not coal or
mineral, the impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the
rights of the
873
parties. Viewed from that angle, it is obvious that status
quo as in the High Court cannot mean anything else except
status quo as existing when the matter was pending in the
High Court before the judgment was delivered. Both the
parties understood the scope and effect of the status quo
order as meaning the state of things existing while the writ
petition was still pending i.e. till the delivery of the
judgment by the High Court. Respondent no. 4 moved the High
Court in Crl. M.P. No. 4841/86 (R) without impleading the
appellant herein and obtained the impugned order from the
High Court dated 3rd January 1987 which we have vacated. The
proper course for respondent no. 4 to have adopted was to
have approached this Court to seek clarification, if he had
any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo
order. We highly deprecate the conduct of respondent no. 4
for having approached the High Court and obtained the
impugned order by suppressing the fact that this Court had
passed the status quo order. Even so, strictly speaking, no
case for contempt is made out on the plain terms of the
status quo order. The parties were relegated back to the
position that obtained while the writ petition was pending.
They were therefore subject to the order passed by the High
Court dated 15th January, 1985. No other conclusion is
possible looking to the terms of the status quo order.
We must add that there is no merit in the contention
that the disputed plot no. 370 was public land and the State
Government was entitled to grant a lease for removal and
collection of sludge/slurry despite the notification issued
under s. 9 of the Act. It is quite clear upon the terms of
the notification issued that the Central Government has made
the requisite declaration under s. 9(1) of the Act for
acquisition of the lands measuring 778.45 acres as specified
in Schedule ‘A’ and it specifically includes the disputed
plot no. 370 in Village Sudamdih. The appellant in paragraph
11 of the application for contempt has averred that on the
publication in the official gazette of such declaration by
the Central Government under s. 9(1) of the Act, the
aforesaid lands vast absolutely in it free from all
encumbrances. The aforesaid declaration by the Central
Government under s. 9(1) further specifies as enjoined by
cl.(b) of sub-s(2) thereof that the acquisition of the right
in or over lands measuring 778.45 acres describe in Schedule
‘A’ also carries with it the right to mine, quarry, bore,
dig and search for, win, work and carry away minerals in the
lands. It is pertinent to observe that respondent no. 4 Ram
Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have not in the
counter-affidavit denied the aforesaid averment made in
paragraph 11 except to say that they are a matter of record.
It is plain upon the terms that the area in question i.e.
plot
874
no. 370 has been acquired under s. 9(1) of the Act together
with the right to mine, quarry, bore, dig and search for,
win, work and carry away the minerals thereon. lt is idle to
contend that the disputed plot no. 370 was open land. It is
nothing but an afterthought and is illconceived.
It is unfortunate that the appellant rested itself
content by obtaining the status quo order in terms in which
it was passed. It should instead have for safeguarding its
interests insisted upon a prohibitory order. In the
meanwhile, we are informed that respondent no. 4 Ram Nath
Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have been taking advantage
of the qualified status quo order by removing sludge/slurry
or briguettes worth about Rs.50,000 per day. The appellant
is at liberty to take recourse to such legal remedy as is
available for the protection of its rights. We have tried to
secure its interests to some extent by permitting withdrawal
of the moneys deposited by respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh
and his son Vijendra Singh in the High Court on furnishing
bank guarantee.
C.M.P. is disposed of accordingly.
N.P.V. Petition disposed of.
875