JUDGMENT
T.K. Chandra Shekhara Das, J.
1. The Petitioner is a Government of India Undertaking. The 1st Respondent is a registered Trade Union representing employees of the Petitioners. The Standing Orders applicable to the employees of the Petitioner Company was certified by the Certifying Officer for Maharashtra, Goa, Daman and Diu and the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Bombay on July 7, 1981. The Petitioner, on November 8, 1985, made a proposal modifying the existing Certified Standing Order by inserting additional Standing Orders 19(xiv), 19(xv), 19(vi) and 19(xvii). The 1st Respondent also made a proposal for amending the Standing Order of Clause 10 in August, 1986.
2. The modification proposed by the Petitioners in Clause 19 of Standing Order will have the effect of prescribing certain political activities as misconduct. The modification proposed reads as under :-
“(xiv) Becoming as office bearer of a political party of an organisation which, takes part in politics.
(xv) Taking part in or assisting in any manner in any movement/agitation or demonstration of a political nature.
(xvi) Taking part in any Election to any legislature or local Authority.
(vii) Canvassing in any election to any legislature or local Authority.”
The Certifying Authority has allowed the amendment as evidenced by the order dated April 20, 1989 prescribing the following activities as misconduct :
“(xiv) Becoming as office bearer of a political party of an organisation which takes part in politics.
(xv) Taking part in or assisting in any manner in any rnovementlagitation or demonstration of a political nature.
3. An appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority at the instance of the employees and the Appellate Authority by its order dated December 29, 1989 changed the clauses approved by the Certifying Officer as under :-
“Becoming the office bearer of a political party or a member of a political organisation the activities of which have been banned by the Government.
Except this change, the Appellate Authority has upheld the order of the Certifying Officer.
4. Referring to the amendments proposed by the employees’Union are concerned, Clause 10(a) 20 sought to be inserted providing a weekly holiday for every eleven working days but putting a limit to 30 days. This has been allowed by the Certifying Officer and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Though the Petitioners challenged this is amendment, subsequently during the pendency of the Writ Petition, an agreement has been brought about between the Petitioners and the 1 st Respondent whereby Clause 10(a) has been further agreed to be modified and the controversy about this has been settled by an agreement dated January 21, 1993. A copy of the agreement is produced by the Counsel for the Petitioners and the same is taken on record.
5. Another amendment proposed by the Union to Standing Order 10-C is with regard to the absence of a workman without leave. According to the existing order, any workman who absents himself for eight consecutive days without leave shall be deemed to have left the company’s service voluntarily. It further says that if he returns and gives explanation to the satisfaction of the Manager he may be granted leave with or without wages at the discretion of the Manager. This clause of Standing Order was sought to be modified at the instance of 1st Respondent whereby any workman who absents himself for eight consecutive working days without leave shall be deemed to have left the Company’s service voluntarily provided that the Company shall have sent at least two notices to the workman. If he returns with an explanation to the satisfaction of the Manager, he may be granted leave with or without wages at the discretion of the Manager.
6. Therefore, the challenge of the Petitioners mainly confined to Clauses 19 and 10-C of the Certified Standing Orders. With reference to Clause 19, the Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioner is a Government of India Undertaking and the modification sought is only in line with or consistent with the Central Civil Services Rules which expressly prohibits the participation of any Central Government employee in political activities. The Petitioners’ Counsel submitted that the Petitioner is engaged mainly in manufacturing of equipments required for defence and therefore the employees should be prohibited from participating in political activities and also contesting elections either of legislature or of local authority. The Petitioners’ complaint is that even though the modification is (sic.) proposed and accepted by the Certifying Authority and the Appellate Authority, but the same has been accepted with a rider. What is prohibited by the amended rule is only the participation and association with the political parties which are banned by the Government. In other words, the learned Counsel argued that the modification approved by the Certifying Authority has been in effect stultified by adding a rider which confined only to banned organisations. We do not think that the Appellate Authority has committed any illegality by limiting the act of misconduct by participation in political activities only in the banned organisation. In other words, an employee of the Petitioner can become the office-bearer of the political party and also he can contest the election if the organisation is not banned. We do not think that contesting in an election and participating in activities of the political party should be made a taboo in the service conditions of an industrial worker. The laws existing in our country relating to industry and labour do not treat the association with a political party or participation by an employee or an industrial worker in its activities or contesting an election as an anathema or an act of abhorrence. On the other hand, the law prevailing in our country approves such activities. If we refer to Section 16 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 it would go to show that those activities are permissible. In fact, the trade union movement in its origin and in its development owes much to the political parties in India and also vice versa. Both these institutions are closely connected and intertwined with each other. In fact, if we examine the history of the political parties of pre-independent India, it can be seen that the trade union activities was one of the important activities of those political parties. Even today it did not lose its relevancy. Trade union forms the core basis of many of the political parties in India. It must be understood that these historical factors have been taken into account by the law-makers in enacting Section 16 of the Trade Unions Act. Section 16 of the Trade Unions Act reads as follows :-
“16 Constitution of a separate fund for political purposes. – (1) A registered Trade Union may constitute a separate fund, from contribution separately levied for or made, to that fund, from which payments may be made, for the promotion of the civic and political interest of its members, in furtherance of any of the objects specified in sub-section (2).
(2) The objects referred to in sub-section (1) are –
(a) the payment of any expenses incurred, either directly or indirectly, by a candidate or prospective candidate for election as a member of any legislative body constituted under … (26 Geo, 5, c.2), (the Constitution) or of any local authority, before, during or after the election in connection with his candidature or election; or
(b) the holding of any meeting or the distribution of any literature or documents in support of any such candidate or prospective candidate; or
(c) the maintenance of any person who is a member of any legislative body constituted under … (26 Geo, 5, c.2), (the Constitution) or of any local authority; or
(d) the registration of electors or the selection of a candidate for any legislative body constituted or for any local authority; or
(e) the holding of principal meetings of any kind or the distribution of political literature or political documents of any kind.”
Therefore, viewing in this perspective, we find no illegality or irregularity in the amendment suggested by the Appellate Authority. As regards Clause 19(a) is concerned, we find that there is no error apparent on the face of the record and the Authorities have passed the order after considering the relevant material. If the real object of the amendment proposed by the Petitioner was to interdict the employees to participate in the political activities or they should be kept away from party politics, as argued by the Counsel for the Petitioner the said object cannot be achieved by merely proposing amendment to the Certified Standing Orders. A different legislation has to be brought about in achieving that object. Then consideration will be entirely on a different gamut. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the orders of the Authorities concerned as it suffers no infirmity. The decision of the Calcutta High Court cited by the Counsel for the Petitioner in Md. Sarafatulla Sarkar v. Surja Kumar Mondal and Others, has no application to the facts of the case, as that decision was based on Central Civil Services Rules.
7. Coming to the next amendment, namely, to Clause 10 of the Standing Order concerned, we also do not find any illegality or error in that order inasmuch as it is only prescribing a contingency where an employee has to lose his job in his continued absence. We are aware that such a modification is necessary. In our present day life there are several circumstances where an employee could not or cannot intimate the reason for his absence or his communication about his absence likely to be received late by the employer for various reasons. In such cases, the modified rule permits him to be absent continuously for eight days but it insists that thereafter he must explain his absence to the satisfaction of the Manager and on such an explanation, the Manager has got discretion to treat his absence with or without leave of course after issuing two notices. If such amendment is not there innocent absentee who can justify his absence who absents himself without prior information entails loss of (sic.) his job. In order to avert such serious consequence to innocent absentee this amendment is absolutely necessary. The Authority has exercised their power reasonably and justifiably. We see no illegality on this modification approved by the Authorities. It does not suffer from any legal infirmity such as non-application of mind or the relevant facts are not considered, etc. etc. In view of this, we do not find any reason to interfere with the orders impugned in this case. The Petitioners’ Counsel though tried to persuade us to take a different view, in the circumstances of the case, as discussed above. We do not feel this is a fit case to be interfered with by exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.