IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CR. REV. No.832 of 2011
Bijendra Yadav @ Bijendra Kumar, son of Sita Yadav, resident
of village- Shahjahanpur, P.S.-Bikram, District- Patna.
..........Petitioner
Versus
The State of Bihar .
....Opposite Party
-----------
3. 21.11.2011 The accused petitioner has preferred this
revision application under Section 53 of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for the sake of
convenience) against the order dated 24.03.2011 passed by
the learned Additional Sessions Jduge, 2nd , Danapur in
S.T.No.786/1995 by which petition filed under Section 18
of the Act has been dismissed.
The main contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that the petitioner is facing trial in Bikram
P.S. Case No.300/1992 under Sections 324, 307, 300/34 of
the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act in the court of
2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Danapur. The allegation is
that the occurrence took place on 22.12.1992 and the date
of birth of the petitioner is 12.10.1976. As such, he is a
juvenile.
In support of this contention, the petitioner has
2
filed photo copies of the certificate of the School as well
as the college. The learned trial court has also considered
that on the date of occurrence, the petitioner was 16 years,
2 months and 8 days.
It appears from the impugned order that the
learned trial court has held that at the time of occurrence
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force and the Act of
2000 came into force on 1.04.2001 under which the age of
juvenility has been raised as below 18 years. Since the
occurrence has taken place when the Act of Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 was in forced at that time the age of
juvenile for a male was below 16 years.
It further appears that the learned trial court
has placed reliance upon a decision in the case of Pratap
Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand and another reported in
(2005) 3 SCC 551.
He has further submitted that the learned trial
court has not appreciated the decision correctly.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has
further contended that during the pendency of the trial, the
1986 Act repealed and new Act of 2000 came into force.
As such, the petitioner will also be declared a juvenile as
3
his age is below 18 years. Under the new Act, the age of
juvenile is below 18 years. Thus, it will be presumed that
on the date of occurrence, the petitioner was a juvenile.
In support of his contention, he has relied upon
a decision in the case of Dayanand Vs. State of Haryana
reported in 2011 (1) Supreme 77.
The learned counsel for the State could not
controvert the contention of the petitioner.
After hearing the learned counsel for the
petitioner and the learned counsel for the State and on
perusal of the materials on the record, it appears that the
learned trial court has found that it is admitted case that
the occurrence has taken place on 20.12.1992 and the
certificates produced by the petitioner shows that the date
of birth of the petitioner is 12.10.1976 and as such, on the
date of occurrence, the petitioner was more than 16 years
and below 18 years. During the pendency of the trial, the
Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000
was amended in 2006. It appears that effect of the
amendments in the Juvenile Justice Act has been
considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Dayanand (Supra). In paragraph 14, it has been held as
4
follows :
“The effect of the amendments in the 2000 Act
were considered by this Court in Hari Ram Vs.
State of Rajasthan and Another reported in
(2009) 13 SCC 211. In Hari Ram this Court
held that the Constitution Bench decision in
Pratap Singh’s case was no longer relevant
since it was rendered under the un-amended
Act. In Hari Ram this Court held and observed
as follows :
“59. The law as now crystallized on a conjoint
reading of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7-A, 20 and 49
read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all
doubt that all persons who were below the age
of 18 years on the date of commission of the
offence even prior to 1.04.2001, would be
treated as juveniles, even if the claim of
juvenility was raised after they had attained
the age of 18 years on or before the date of
commencement of the Act and were
undergoing sentence upon being convicted.
xxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
67. Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act,
2000, made provision for the claim of
juvenility to be raised before any Court at any
stage, as has been done in this case, and such
claim was required to be determined in terms
5
of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act
and the Rules framed thereunder, even if the
juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the
date of commencement of the Act.
68. Accordingly, a juvenile who had not
completed eighteen years on the date of
commission of the offence was also entitled to
the benefits of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if
the provisions of Section 2 (k) had always
been in existence even during the operation of
the 1986 Act.
69. The said position was re-emphasized by
virtue of the amendments introduce in Section
20 of the 2000 Act, whereby the provision and
Explanation were added to Section 20, which
made it even more explicit that in all pending
cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any
other criminal proceedings in respect of a
juvenile in conflict with law, the determination
of juvenility of such a juvenile would be in
terms of Clause (1) of Section 2 of the 2000
Act, and the provisions of the Act would apply
as if the said provisions had been in force
when the alleged offence was committed.
70. In the instant case, there is no controversy
that the appellant was about sixteen years of
age on the date of commission of the alleged
offence and had not completed eighteen years
of age. In view of Sections 2 (k), 2 (1) and 7A
6
read with Section 20 of the said Act, the
provision thereof would apply to the
appellant’s case and on the date of the alleged
incident it has to be held that he was a
juvenile”.
Considering the facts and circumstances stated
above, in my opinion, the impugned order is not fit to be
sustained. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is
remanded to the learned trial court to pass an order in
accordance with law.
In the result, this application is allowed.
V.K. Pandey ( Amaresh Kumar Lal, J.)