PETITIONER: BOARD OF HIGH SCHOOL & INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION, U. P., Vs. RESPONDENT: GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/02/1962 BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. SUBBARAO, K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA CITATION: 1962 AIR 1110 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 36 CITATOR INFO : F 1962 SC1217 (3A) R 1964 SC 436 (8) RF 1966 SC 81 (5) R 1967 SC1507 (6,7) R 1969 SC 401 (4) D 1970 SC1269 (6,14) APL 1970 SC1896 (19) RF 1971 SC1005 (2) R 1973 SC 834 (20) R 1974 SC 87 (11) RF 1975 SC 596 (3) F 1976 SC 667 (4) R 1978 SC 851 (69) ACT: Examination Committee-Cancelling examination results-No opportunity given to examinees of being heard-Natural justice-if violated-Committee, if must act judicially-U. P. Intermediate Education Act,' 1921 (U. P. 2 of 1921), s. 15- Regulations, Ch. VI, r. 1 (1). HEADNOTE: The three respondents were declared by the appellant to have passed the Intermediate examination. Thereafter they prosecuted further studies and subsequently the fathers and guardians of the respondents were informed that the Examination Committee of the Board had cancelled the examination results of the respondents and that they were debarred from appearing at the next examination. The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad contending that since the Examination Committee had never afforded any opportunity to them to rebut the allegations made against them the Examination Committee had violated the principles of natural justice. They also contended that the Committee had violated the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 192 1. The appellant while admitting that no opportunity had been afforded to the respondents to rebut the allegations against them, contended that the Examination Committee was only an administrative body acting merely administratively and it was not bound to give a hearing to a party who might be affected by its decision. The Single judge who heard the writ petition held that the Committee was not bound to act judicially and there was no statutory obligation on the Committee to give an opportunity to be heard.. The respondents appealed to a Division Bench and one of the judges of Bench held that even though the Committee was not bound to act judicially or quasijudicially and it was acting administratively it ought to have given an opportunity to the respondents of being heard. The other judge was of the opinion that since the committee was acting only administratively it was not bound to give a hearing. The matter then went before a third judge who held that even though the Committee was acting merely administratively the respordents were entitled to a hearing. The appellant thereupon appealed to this Court. The appellant contended that the Committee was only a body a ing administratively and that the principles of natura 37 justice, including the maxim audi alteram partem apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. The respondents contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Committee was only an administrative body. It was further submitted by them that the mere fact that there was nothing express in the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder which might make it obligatory for the Committee to call for an explanation and to hear the examinee whose case it was required to enquire into was not wholly determinative of the question whether a duty is cast on the Committee in cases like this to act judicially. Held, that the inference whether the authority acting under a statute, where it is silent, has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the persons affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. The mere fact that the Act in question or the relevant Regulations do not make it obligatory on the Committee to call for anexplanation and to bear the examinee is not conclusive on the question whether the Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body when exercising its powers under Ch. VI, r. 1 (1), of the Regulations. It is obvious that the Committee when it proceeds to decide matters covered by r. 1 (1) will have to depend upon materials placed before it and before it decides to award any penalty it has to come to an objective determination on certain facts and this is the only manner in which it can carry out the duties impos. ed on it. Even though there is no lis in the present case in the sense that there are not two contending parties before it the Committee should hear the examinees whose lives may be seriously affected by its decision even subjecting them in some cases to criminal prosecution on charges of impersonation, fraud and perjury. Though therefore there is nothing express one way or other in the Act or the Regulation casting a duty on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of the disposal and the serious effects of the decision of the Committee lead to the conclusion that a duty to act judicially is cast on the Committee and the Committee when it acts under r. 1 (1) is acting quasi-judicially and the principles of natural justice will apply to its proceedings. Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, [1950] S.C.R. 621, Yagendranath Bora v. Commissioner of Ilills Division & Appeals, Assam, [1958] S. C. R. 1240. Shri Radheshyam Khore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1959] S. C. R. 1440, Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpo- ration, [1959] Stipp. 1 S. C. R. 319 and Nathubhai v. Union (if lndia, (1960) 2 S. C. R. 775, followed. 38 JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No., 132 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 23, 1956 of
the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 291 of 1955.
Veda Vyasa and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
J. P. Goyal, for the respondents.
1962. February 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by
the Allahabad High Court. The brief facts necessary for
present purposes are these. The three respondents were
students of G. S. Hindu Intermediate College at Sikandrarao
and appeared at the Intermediate (Commerce) Examination con-
ducted by the appellant in the year 1954. On June 12, 1954,
the result of the examination was published in newspapers
and the three respondents passed in the second division.
Thereafter they prosecuted further studies. But in December
1954, their fathers and guardians received information from
the Principal of the G. S. Hindu Intermediate College that
the Examinations’ Committee of the appellant (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) had cancelled the result of
the respondents for the examination of 1954 and further that
they had been debarred from appearing at the examination of
1955. Thereupon the respondents filed a write petition in
the High Court contending that the Committee had never
afforded any opportunity to them to rebut the allegations
made against them and that they were never informed about
the nature of the unfair means used by them in the said exa-
mination and the first thing they come to know was the
resolution of the Committee canceling their results and
debating them from appearing in the examination of 1955.
They therefore contended that they were entitled to an
opportunity being
39
afforded to them to meet the case against them of using
unfair means at the examination before the appellant took
action against them by canceling their results and debarring
them from appearing at the examination of 1955. The
procedure thus adopted by the appellant was said to be in
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as
they were given no opportunity whatsoever to defend
themselves and to show cause against the action contemplated
against them. It was further contended that the procedure
adopted by the appellant violated the provisions of the U.
P. Intermediate Education Act, No. II of 1921 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) and the U. P. Education Code, and
therefore, the resolution canceling their results and
debarring them from appearing in the later examination was
without jurisdiction and illegal. They therefore prayed for
a proper writ or order canceling the resolution of the
appellant.
The appellant opposed the application and its case was that
the respondents had used unfair means at the examination and
their cases were reported to the Committee under the
Regulations and the Committee had acted under the, powers
conferred on it under the Act and the Regulations framed
thereunder after a thorough inquiry. It was not disputed,
however, that no opportunity had been afforded to the
respondents to rebut the allegations against them in the
inquiry made by the Committee which resulted in the
resolution canceling the results of the examination.
A large number of contentions appear to have been urged in
the High Court; but we are here only concerned with one of
them, namely, whether the respondents were entitled to a
hearing before the appellant decided to cancel the results.
The contention on behalf of the respondents before the
learned Single Judge was that the appellant was Under a duty
to act judicially and therefore the
40
respondents should have been given a hearing before any
order was passed , against them. The learned Single Judge
held that no duty was cast on the Committee to act
judicially and there was no statutory obligation on the
Committee to give an opportunity to every examine to be
heard; therefore he rejected the petition.
The respondents then went in appeal which was heared by
Dayal and Brijmohan Lall, JJ., who however differed.
Brijmohan Lall, J., was of opinion that the Committee was
not required to act judicially or quasijudicially when it
considered cases of this kind and was acting merely
administratively; be nevertheless was of the opinion that
one of the rules of natural justice contained in the maxim
audi alteram partem would apply in this case, even though
the Committee was acting administratively. He was therefore
in favour of allowing the appeal. Dayal J., agreed with the
view of Brijmohan Lall, J., that in the present case no duty
was cast on the Committee to act judicially and that the
action of the Committee was merely administrative. He how-
ever did not agree that the Committee acted in violation of
the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it did not
give a hearing to the respondents. He was of the view
that.-is the Committee was acting merely administratively it
was not bound to give a hearing, as the maxim audi alteram
partem applied only to judicial or quasijudicial tribunals.
The two learned Judges also differed on two other points
with which we are not concerned. Eventually they referred
three questions to be answered by another learned Judge and
one of these questions was whether the failure of the
Committee to provide an opportunity to the respondents of
being heard vitiated its order, which was of an
administrative nature.
The matter then camo before a third learned Judge, Agarwala,
J. He was doubtful whether the
41
view of the bench that there was no duty cast on the
Committee to act judicially in the present case was correct;
but as on that matter the two learned Judges were in
agreement, he dealt with the case on the basis that the
Committee was acting merely administratively, Even so, he
came to the conclusion that the respondents were entitled to
a hearing and agreed with the view of Brijmohan Lall, J.
Consequently, the appeal was placed before the Bench again
and in accordance with the opinion of the third Judge it was
allowed. Then followed an application by the appellant for
leave to appeal to this court, which was granted; and that
is how the matter has come up before us.
The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that the
High Court was wrong in the view it took that an opportunity
for hearing was iiecessary in this case even though the
Committee acted merely administratively. It is contended
that where a body is acting merely administratively, it is
not necessary that it should give a hearing to a party who
might be affected by its decision and that the principles of
natural justice, including the maxim, audi alteram partem,
apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, i.e.,
bodies on whom a duty is cast to act judicially. It is
submitted that where no such duty is cast on a body and it
is acting merely administratively there is no necessity for
it to hear the person who might be affected by it,., order.
The respondents on the other hand contend that though the
final decision of the High Court is correct, the High Court
was not right in holding that the Committee was acting
merely administratively in a matter of this kind; they
contend that considering the entire circumstances which
operate in cases of this kind, the High Court should have
held that there was a duty to act judicially and therefore
it was necessary to give an opportunity to the respondents
to be heard before action was taken against them. It is
submitted that the
42
mere fact that there was nothing express in the Act or the
Regulations framed thereunder which might make it obligatory
for the Committee to call for an explanation and to hear the
examinees whose cases it was required to enquire into was
not wholly determinative of the question whether a duty was
cast on the Committee in cases like this to act judicially.
The first question therefore which falls for consideration
is whether any duty is cast on the Committee under the Act
and Regulations to act judicially and therefore it is a
quasi-judicial body. What constitutes ,’a quasi-judicial
act” was discussed in the Province or Bombay v. Kusaldas S.
Advani.(1) The principle, have been summarised by Das, J.
(as he was then), at p. 725 in these words:-
“The principles, as I apprehend them are:
(i) that if a statute empowers an authority,
not being a court in the ordinary sense, to
decide disputes arising out of a claim made by
one party under the statute which claim is
opposed by another party and to determine the
respective rights of the contesting parties
who are opposed to each other, there is a vis
and prima farcie and in the absence of any
thing in the statute to the contrary it is the
duty of the authority to act judicially and
the decision of the authority is a quasi-
judicial act ; and
(ii) that if a statutory ‘authority has power
to do any act which will prejudicially affect
the subject, then, although there are not two
parties apart from the authority and the
contest is between the authority proposing to
do the act and the subject opposing it, the
final determination of the authority Will yet
be a quasi. judicial act provided the
authority is required by the statute to act
judicially.
(1) [1950] S.C.R, 621, 725.
43
In other words, while the presence of two
parties besides the deciding authority will
prima facie and in the absence of any other
factor impose upon the authority the duty to
act judicially, the absence of two such
parties is not decisive in taking the act of
the authority out of the category of quasi-
judicial act if the authority is nevertheless
required by the statute to act judicially.”
These principles have been acted upon by this Court in
latter cases: see Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of
Hills Division & Appeals, Assam(1), Shri Radheshyam Khare v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh(2), Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v.
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation(“), and
Shivaji Nathubhai v. The Union of India(4). Now it may be
mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in so
many words that the authority passing the order is required
to act judicially; that can only be inferred from the
express provisions of the statute in the first instance in
each case and no one circumstance alone will be
determinative of the question whether the authority set up
by the statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The
inference whether the authority acting under a statute where
it is silent has the duty to act. judicially will depend, on
the express provisions of the statute read along with the
nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal
provided the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the
effect of the decision on the person affected and other
indicia afforded by the statute. A duty to act judicially
may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be
impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define
exhaustively:(vide observations of Parker, J. in R. v.
Manchester Legal Aid Committee)(5).
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 1240.
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 1440.
(3) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319.
(4) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775.
(5) [1952] 2 Q.B. 413,
44
We must therefore proceed to examine the pro. visions of the
Act and the Regulations framed thereunder in connection with
matters of this kind to determine whether the Committee can
be said to have the duty to act judicially when it deals
with cases of examines using unfair means in examination
halls. Under s.7 of the Act, the Board constituted
thereunder has inter alia powers to prescribe courses of
instruction, to grant diplomas and certificates, to conduct
examinations to admit candidates to its examinations to
publish the results of its examinations, and to do all such
things as may be requisite in order to further the objects
of the Board as a body constituted for regulating and
supervising High School and Intermediate education. Under
s. 1 3, the Board has power to appoint and constitute
various committees, including the examinations’ committee,
and under s. 14, the Board can delegate its power.-; by
Regulations to such committees. Section 15 gives power to
the Board to make Regulations with respect to the
constitution, powers and duties of committees, the conduct
of examinations, and all matters which by the Act may be
provided for by Regulations. Section 20 gives power to the
Board and its committees to make bye-laws consistent with
the Act and the Regulations.
It will be clear from the above that the Act makes no
express provisions as to the powers of the committees and
the procedure to be adopted by them in carrying out their
duties, which are left to be provided by Regulations, and we
have therefore to look to the Regulations framed under s. 15
to see. what powers and duties have been conferred on
various committees constituted under the Regulations.
Section 13 (1) makes it incumbent on the Board to appoint
the Committee and Chap. VI of the Regulations deals with
the powers and duties of the Committee. Rule 1 (1) of Chap.
VI with which we are particularly concerned reads as
45
follows:–
“It shall be the duty of the Examinations’
Committee subject to sanction and control of
the Board.”
“(1) to consider cases where examines have
concealed any fact or made a false statement
ill their application forms or a breach of
rules and regulations to secure undue admis-
sion to an examination or used unfair means or
committed fraud (including impersonation) at
the examination or are guilty or a moral
offence or indiscipline and to award penalty
which may be one or more of the following
:–(1) withdrawal of certificate of having
passed the examination ;
(2) cancellation of the examination;
(3) exclusion from the examination.”
There is however no provision in Chap. VI as to how the
Committee will carry out the duty imposed on it by r. 1 (1).
Further, there is no express provision in the Act or the
Regulations casting a duty on the Committee to act
judicially when exercising its powers under r. 1 (1); and
the question whether the Committee has to act judicially
when exercising these powers will have to ‘be decided on an
examination of all the circumstances relevant in the matter.
At the same time, there is nothing express in the Act from
which it can be said that the Committee is not under a duty
to act judicially. It is true that there is no procedure
provided as to how the Committee will act in exercising its
powers under r. 1 (1) and it is. further true that there is
no express provision in that rule requiring the Committee to
call for an explanation from the examines concerned and to
hear the examines whose case,% ;it is required to consider.
But we are of opinion that the mere fact that the Act or the
Regulations do not make it obligatory on the Committee to
call for an explanation and to
46
hear the examiner is not conclusive on the question whether
the Committee acts as a quasi-judicial body in exercising
its powers under r. 1 (1). Even though calling for an
explanation and hearing the examine may not have been made
expressly oblitory by the Act or the Regulations, it is
obvious that the Committee when it proceeds to decide mat-
ters covered by r. 1 (1) will have to depend upon materials
placed before it, in coming to its decision. Before the
Committee decides to award any penalty it has to come to an
objective determination on certain facts and only when it
comes to the conclusion that those facts are established
that it can proceed to punish the examinee concerned. The
facts which the Committee has to find before it takes action
are
(i) whether the examinee has concealed any
fact or made a false statement in his
application form; or
(ii) whether the examinee has made a breach
of the Rules and Regulations to secure under
admission to an examination ; or
(iii) whether the examinee has used unfair
means at the examination ; or
(iv) whether the examinee has committed fraud
(including impersonation) at the examination ;
or
(v) whether the examinee is guilty of moral
offence or indiscipline.
Until one or other of the five facts is established before
the Committee, it cannot proceed to take action under r. 1
(1). In order to come to the conclusion that one or other
of these facts is established, the Committee will have to
depend upon materials placed before it, for in the very
nature of things it has no personal knowledge in the matter.
Therefore, though the Act or the Regulations do
47
not make it obligatory on the Committee to call for an
explanation and hear the examinee, it is implicit in the
provisions of r. 1 (1) that the Committee must satisfy
itself on materials placed before it that one or other of
the facts is established to enable it to take action in the
matter. It will not be possible for the Committee to
proceed at all unless materials are placed before it to
determine whether the examinee concerned has committed some
misconduct or the other which is the basis of the action to
1 be taken under r. 1 (1). It is clear therefore that
consideration of materials placed before it is necessary
before the Committee can come to any decision in the
exercise of its powers under r. 1 (1) and this can be the
only manner in which the Commit, tee can carry out the
duties imposed on it.
We thus see that the Committee can only carry out its duties
under r. 1 (1) by judging the Materials, placed before it.
It is true that there is no lis in the present case, in the
sense that there are not two contesting parties before the
Committee and the matter rests between the Committee and the
examinee; at the same time considering that materials will
have to be placed before the Committee to enable it to
decide whether action should be taken under r. 1 (1), it
seems to us only fair that the examinee against whom the
Committee is proceeding should also be heard. The effect of
the decision of the Committee may in an extreme case blast
the career of a young student for life and in any case will
put a serious stigma on the examinee concerned which may
damage him in later life. The nature of misconduct which
the Committee has to find under r. 1 (1) in some cases is of
a serious nature, for example, impersonation, commission of
fraud, and perjury; and the Committee’s decision in matters
of such seriousness may even lead in some cages to the
prosecution of the examinee in courts. Considering
therefore the serious following the
48
decision of the Committee and the serious nature of the
misconduct which may be found in some cases under r. t (1),
it seems to us that the Committee must be held to act
judicially in circumstances as these. Though therefore
there is nothing express one way or the other in the Act or
the Regulations casting a duty on the Committee to act
judicially, the manner of the disposal, based as it must be
on materials placed before it and the serious effects of the
decision of the Committee on the examinee concerned, must
lead to the conclusion that a duty is cast on the Committee
to act judicially in this matter particularly as it has to
decide objectively certain facts which may seriously affect
the rights and careers of examinees, before it can take any
action in the exercise or its power under r. 1 (1). We are
therefore of opinion that the Committee when it exercises
its powers under r. 1 (1) is acting quasijudicially and the
principles of natural justice which require that the other
party, (namely, the examinee in this case) must be heard,
will apply to the proceedings before the Committee. This
view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Dipa Pul v.
University of Calcutta, (1) and B. C. Das Gupta v.
Bijoyranjan Rakshit, in similar circumstances and is in our
opinion correct.
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that there are a
large number of cases which come up before the Committee
under r. 1 (1), and if the Committee is hold to act
judicially as a quasijudicial tribunal in the matter it will
find it impossible to carry on its task. This in our
opinion is no criterion for deciding whether a duty is cast
to act judicially in view of all the circumstances of the
case. There is no doubt in our mind that considering the
totality of circumstances the Committee has to act
judicially when taking action under r. 1 (1). As to the
manner in which it should give an opportunity to the
examinee concerned to be
(1) A. I. R. 1952 Cal. 594.
(2) A. 1. R. 1953 Cal. 212.
49
heard, that is a matter which can be provided by Regulations
or Bye-laws if necessary. As was pointed out in Local
Government Board v. Alridge, (1) all that is required is
that the other party shall have an opportunity of adequately
presenting his case. But what the procedure should be in
detail will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There is
no doubt that many of the powers of the Committee under
Chap. VI are of administrative nature; but where quasi-
judicial duties are entrusted to administrative body like
this it becomes a quasi-judicial body for performing these
duties and it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the
principles of natural justice are followed and adequate
opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee.
It is not however necessary to pursue this matter further,
for it is not in dispute that no opportunity whatsoever was
given to the respondents in this case to give an explanation
and present their case before the Committee. We are
therefore of opinion that though the view of the High Court
that the Committee was acting merely administratively when
proceeding under r. 1 (1) is not correct, its final decision
allowing the writ petition on the ground that no opportunity
was given to the respondents to put forward their cases
before the Committee is correct. We therefore dismiss the
appeal. No order as to, in the circumstances.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1951] A. C. 120.
50