JUDGMENT
B.K. Behera, J.
1. These two revisions between the same parties involving common questions of facis and law have been heard together and will be governed by this common order. As petitioner in both the revisions assails the orders passed by the ieained Subordinate Judge, Berhampur, rejecting the contentions raised on its behalf that the two decrees passed in favour of the opposite party by making the awards passed by the Arbitrator rules of the Court are not legally executable having been passed without jurisdiction.
2. Being the owner of the godowns located in the city of Berhampur in the district of Canjam, the opposite party gave the godowns on rental basis to the petitioner on stipulated rnonthly rent by two separate agreements containing an arbitration clause to be operative in the event of any dispute between the parties. The petitioner entered into possession of the premises in 1973. Notice was given by the opposite party to the petitioner raising certain disputes and for reference thereof to arbitration. When the tenant failed to make the reference, the learned Subordinate judge was moved Under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act (for short, ‘the Act’) for appointment of an arbitrator and for reference of the dispute for adjudication by him. As there had been two separate agreements, two applications were made which were registered as M. J. C Nos. 364 and 365 of 1979. The learned Subordinate judge appointed Mr. Justice R.K. Patro, who had retired as the acting Chief justice of this High Court, as the Arbitrator. The appointments in the two cases were challenged by the petitioner in this Court in Civil Revision Nos. 41 and 42 of 1981. This Court sustained the appointments. The Arbitrator entered upon the references. The opp. party fifed its claims and the petitioner filed its objections thereto The opposite party put in a claim of Rs. 56,40,285-70 paise and Rs. 69,13,908-10 paise in the two cases The Arbitrator gave consolidated unreasoned awards for Rs. 7,90,635-00 in one case and Rs 9,08,736-00 in the other, allowing future interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum. Objections on several grounds were taken by the petitioner after the awards were filed in the Court In Title Suit Nos. 32 and 33 of 1982, the learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objections and made the award rules of the Court, The decisions of the learned Subordinate Judge in the two suits were challenged in Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 491 and 492 of 1982 in this Court. The appeals were dismissed. In the two appeals, the question relating to absence of jurisdiction of the arbitrator was raised, considered and negatived and it was held that the awards and the decrees passed on their basis were not without jurisdiction. Special Leave Petitions filed by the petitioner against the appellate judgment of this Court in respect of the two awards were dismissed by the Supreme Court on November 1, 1983.
3. When applications were made for execution of the two decrees in E. P. Nos, 50 and 51 of 198} in the Court of the learned Subardinate Judge, Berhampur, objections were raised by the petitioner challenging the executability of the decrees Under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure for short, ‘the Code’). After hearing the parties, the learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objections by his orders dated April 20, 1984 passed in M. J. C. Nos. 36 and 37 of 1984 arising out of E. P. Nos. 50 and 51 of 1983. These orders are now assailed in the two revisions.
4. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner in both the revisions, Mr. R. Mohanty has contended, referring to the principles laid down in AIR 1954 S C. 340 : Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1962 S. C. 199 : Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1929 Lahore 449 : Parshottam Das Nathu Ram and Ors. v. Radha Kishan and Anr. and 1974(1) CWR 72 Sm. Sobhabati Devi v. Voona Bhimayya Subudhi and others, that the executing Court can go behind the decree when it is a nullity having been passed without inherent jurisdiction and such an objection may be raised even in an execution proceeding. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that when a decree is passed by a Court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, it does not operate as res judicata- In this Connection, reference has been made to and reliance has been placed on the cases reported in (1969) 2 SCR 432, Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass and another, AIR 1971 S. C. 2355 Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossaiai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1984 Ori. 49 Krushna Chandra Sahoo v. Sndramani Sahu and others, AIR 1933 All. 751(2) Sarabjit Pratap Bahadur Sahi v. Inderjit Pratap Bahadur Sahi and AIR 1958 Bom. 30, Bai Shakri v. Bapusinghji Takhatsinghji. In AIR 1971 S. C. 2355 (supra) the Supreme Court has held that if a Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, is decision cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties Mr. Mohanty has urged that as the tenancy still subsisted when the Arbitrator entered upon the reference on January 17, 1981 and applied his judicial mind on March 15, 1981, when he passed orders for production of documents and the premises were vacated on May 21, 1981 ,the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims for determination of escalated rent which could be done only by the Controller under the Orissa House Rent Control’ Act, 1967, as provided in Secs 4 and 5 therein and as a necessary corollary, the awards were void as being against public policy and could not be made rules of the Court and the basis of the two decrees sought to be executed. Reference has been made by Mr. Mohanty to AIR 1981 S. C. 537 : Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios and another. Mr. Mohanty has contended that the validity of the decrees can be gone into by the executing Court if there i5 lack of inherent jurisdiction and it is not correct to say that the same have acquired finality under the Act and can only be challenged Under Section 33 and 39 of the Act. In this connection, my attention has been invited to the principles laid down in AIR 1970 S.C. 1475 Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rahman and others. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the tenant-petitioner had never specifically agreed to waive its rights and consequently, waiver, if any, could not confer jurisdiction on the Arbitrator or on the Court passing the decrees.
5. Mr. G. Rath, the learned counsel for the opposite party in both the revisions, has contended that there had been no lack of inherent jurisdiction either of the Arbitrator or of the Court making the two awards rules of the Court and at all stages, the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and that of the Court and had never raised the question of want of jurisdiction. Decrees passed on the basis of unreasoned awards by the learned Subordinate Judge were confirmed by this Court in the two appeals referred to above in which the question of jurisdiction was raised and negatived and the decrees, having been confirmed by the Supreme Court as the Special Leave Petitions made by the petitioner were dismissed, cannot be called in question in the execution proceedings. Reliance has been placed on a number of authorities by Mr. Rath at the hearing of the revision.
6. Section 47 of the Code authorises the Court executing the decree to decide all questions arising therein and ralating to the execution of the decree. (See AIR 1955 S. C. 376 Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.). Section 47 of the Code is in the statute bock to prevent multiplicity of suits and has been enacted for the beneficial purpose of checking endless litigations. It is intended that all objections relating to execution should be disposed of as speedily as possible. In other words, this section is a statutory prohibition against matters relating to execution of a decree being agitated by a separate suit.
7. A decree is void if the Court passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction, territorial, pecuniary or with regard to the subject-matter of the action. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree. Law is well-settled that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. Where, however, the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the case and a decree which, is a nullity is void and its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings, (See AIR 1977 S C, 1201, Suder Dass v. Ram Prakash). The provisions of Section 47 are applicable alike to the Court which passed the decree and to the Court, in which execution is sought.
8. Referring to the case reported in AIR 1973 S. C. 2391 Chandrika Misir and Anr. v. Bhaiyalal, the learned Chief justice of this Court has held in 62(1986) CLT 138 : 1988(II) OLR 8) Umesh Chandra Misra v. State Bank of India and another, that the question of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court cannot be allowed to be raised in an execution proceeding for the first time unless it raises a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction. If it is proved that the decree is a nullity, it cannot be executed, but want of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record. This Court has held in 62(1986) CLT 112, Biswanath alia Bisu Naik v. Srimati Uttara Bewa and others, that ordinarily, the executing Court cannot, go behind the decree. But it is within the competence of the executing Court to Interpret the decree sought to be executed.
9. The decrees under execution had been passed by a competent Court, under the provisions of the Act and in view of Sections 17 and 30 to 33 of the Act, the decisions relating to the validity of the awards are final and binding and cannot be called in question in the executing Court, unless it can be shown that there had been inherent lack of jurisdiction. There is no statutory bar prohibiting the Court from confirming unreasoned awards for payment of lump sum amounts and making the awards rules of the Court. The petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and had participated in the arbitration proceedings. The plea of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitrator or the Court passing the decrees does not appear on the face of the decrees and if such a plea squires investigation of facts, such a plea cannot be entertained by the executing Court. This Court has pronounced upon the validity of the reference and the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and the decisions of this Court having been confirmed by the Supreme Court, a re-examination with regard to the question of jurisdiction would attract the bar of res judicata Under Section 11 of the Code, The learned Subordinate Judge, who disposed of the objections to the awards and made them rules of the Court, was competent to pass the decrees which could not, therefore, be characterised as nullities on the ground of absence of inherent jurisdiction. The executing Court is not competent to question the validity of a decree unless the decree, on the face of it, has been passed without inherent jurisdiction.
10. In the application Under Section 47 of the Code, the petitioner had not raised any objection that the learned Subordinate Judge, while rejecting the objections Under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Act, had acted without jurisdiction and it had been contended that the decrees were nullities as the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the disputes and pass the awards.
11. In AIR 1962 S. C. 1621, Smt. Uttam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, the Supreme Court has laid down :
“……Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. … A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i.e. has jurisdiction) to determine……Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to such decisions.”
The learned Subordinate Judge, in accepting the awards and drawing up the decrees making the awards rules of the Court, did act within his jurisdiction Under Sections 30 and 33 read with Section 17 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act provides that all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. Section 32 of the Act provides :
“Bar to suits contesting arbitration agreement or award. Not- withstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground, whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act.”
As provided under in 33 of the Act, any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits, provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.
12. in the instant cases, the validity of the arbitration agreements had not been challenged in the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge when the. initial applications Under Section 8 of the Act were considered and decided. On the appointment of Mr. Justice B. R. Patro, no application had been made in the Court of the learned Subordinate judge Under Section 33 of the Act challenging the existence or validity of the arbitration agreements. When the decisions upholding the awards have been given by the learned Subordinate Judge and confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, the matters have acquired finality under the Act and are not available to be challenged in the execution proceedings, as the executing Court has no jurisdiction to determine the existence, effect or validity of the arbitration agreements.
13. In (1969)2 S. C. R. 432 (Supra) the Supreme Court has held that having regard to the scheme of Sections 14 to 17 and 31 to 33 of the Act, all questions ragarding the validity of the award have to be determined by the Court in which the award is filed and by no other Court. An invalid award can be set aside Under Section 30 of the Act. After a decree is passed on the basis of the award, it is not open to the parties to the reference to raise an objection as to the validity of the award. As between them, the decree conclusively determines that the award is valid. The decree cannot be pronounced to be a nullity on the ground that the award was invalid. Whan the Court is not prohibited by any law from passing such a decree, the decree under execution is not unenforceable.
14. Section 4 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act provides that notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, no landlord shall be entitled to charge rent for any house at a sum higher than the fair rent. As provided in Section 5 of that Act, either of the parties can make an application to the Controller for fixation of fair rent, Neither of the parties to these revisions had made any application Under Section 5 of that Act during the pendency of the agreements. The agreements had been terminated and possession of the premises had been delivered by May 21, 1981 prior to the filing of the claim-statements. There is no prohibition in the Orissa House Rent Control Act to institute a suit in the Civil Court for recovery of the agreed rent. As held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1971 S. C. 2213 Lochoo Mal v. Radhye Shyam, it is open to a party to waive the advantage of law or rule made solely for his benefit and protection. If the tenant waives his right to approach the House Rent Controller and agrees for reference of the dispute to an Arbitrator, it would not result in the violation of any statutory provision nor would it mean performance of any illegal or unlawful act.
15. It has been laid down in AIR 1973 Cal 253 Ramanath Agarwalla v. Messrs Goenka & Co. and Ors. and AIR 1979 Bom. 214 M/s. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt Ltd. Poona v. Union of India and another, that the stage of entering upon the reference by an Arbitrator would come when the Arbitrator first applies his mind to the dispute or controversy before him and he does not enter upon the reference when he assumes office or when he performs some ministerial acts like calling for statements and counters. The petitioners had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and had participated in the proceeding before him and thus would be stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The petitioner had agreed that the various disputes might be referred to arbitration. As mentioned in the order passed by this Court dated February 26, 1981, in Civil Revision Nos. 41 and 42 of 1981, it had been conceded before this Court that there was an arbitration clause and that there had been existence of dispute and the petitioner had no objection to refer the dispute to arbitration. This Court has observed therein ;
“The learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government appearing for the Corporation concedes that there is an arbitration clause ; notices raising disputes had been given and disputes to exist; notices had been given and the Corporation had nor has any objection to refer the dispute to arbitration…. When asked, the learned Standing Counsel also says that he has no particular objection to the appointment of a retired Chief Justice of this Court as arbitrator…….
16. Claim statements were put in by the opposite party and objections thereto were raised by the petitioner which participated in the proceeding and ultimately lump sum awards were passed by the Arbitrator on March 15, 1982 The petitioner, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, having participated in the proceeding before Mm and having acquiesced in the making of the awards, was not entitled to raise an objection at the stage of execution that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to pass the awards.
17. The Supreme Court has observed in AIR 1975 S. C. 230, N. Challappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and another:
“…When the Board without demur participated in the proceedings before the umpire and took the chance of an award in its favour, it cannot turn round and say that the umpire had no inherent jurisdiction and therefore its participation in the proceedings before the umpire is of no avail. …”
The same view has been taken in AIR 1984 S. C. 1072, M/s. Tarapore and Company v. Cochin Shipysrd Ltd. Cochin and another.
In AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1475 (supra) the Supreme Court has observed and held :
” In the present case the question whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain the suit against Munshi depended upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease, and for user to which the land was put at the date of the grant of the lease. These questions cannot be permitted to be raised in an execution proceeding so as to displace the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. If the decree is on the face of the record without jurisdiction and the question does not: relate to the territorial jurisdiction or Under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to make the decree may be raised; where it is necessary to investigate facts in order to determine whether the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, the objection cannot be raised in the execution proceeding.”
18. In the instant cases, the question of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator cannot be decided without scrutinising the agreements which have not been appended to and are not parts of the awards, the nature of the claims put in by the opposite party and the nature of the disputes referred to arbitration, whether such disputes were also covered by Sections 4 and 5 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act and the matter could at all be referred to the House Rent Controller and as to whether in the absence of any determination of fair rent by the Controller, the dispute relating to escalated rent, as provided in the agreements, could not be referred to arbitration, which are all mixed questions of facts and law and which are to be investigated and examined before any decision is given on the validity or voidness of the decrees.
19. It is an established principle of law that unless an erroneous proposition of law appears on the face of the award, an award is not open to challenge. See AIR 1923 P. C. 66 Chimpsey Bhars Company v. The Jivaraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., AIR 1967 S. C, 1030 Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukum Chand Mills Ltd. and AIR 1975 S. C. 230 (supra). Mr. Rath for the opposite party has rightly contended on the principles laid down in AIR 1971 S. C. 696 M/s Allen Berry and Co. Private Ltd. v. The Union of India that unless a document is actually ircorporated into the award or is otherwise appended to if, the valadity of the award cannot be decided with reference to such document which does not form a part of the award. In this connection, reference may also be made to AIR 1981 Ori 160 State of Orissa v. Gokulachandra Kanungo. The executing Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the two awards in the instant cases with reference to the documents on the records.
20. In the judgment passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal Nos 491 and 492 of 1982 arising out of the two decrees in question, this Court has held:
“On the aforesaid materials, the contention of the appellant’s counsel that there was no dispute regarding enhancement of rent cannot be entertained.”
Dealing with the question of the applicability of Sections 4 and 5 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act and the contention in that regard raised on behalf of the present petitioner as the appellant, the learned Chief Justice has observed and held:
“Relying on the non-obstante clause in Section 4, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the landlord would not be entitled to charge rent over and above fair rent and the Controller is the designated authority for fixing it. I have no doubt in my mind that Section 4 overrides contracts between parties. Section 5 makes provision for determination of fair rent by the Controller. The appellant did not rely upon Sections 4 and 5 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act when the learned Subordinate Judge made his order Under Section 8 of the Act. On the other hand, as extracted above, the appellant was agreeable to have all the disputes referred to arbitration, obviously including the claim for escalated rent.
Mr. Mohanty for the appellant presses into service the ratio of the decision in the case of Natraj Studios (P.) Ltd v. Navrang Studios and another, AIR 1981 S. C. 537 : ‘Public policy requires that contracts to the contrary which nullify the rights conferred on tenants by the Act cannot be permitted. Therefore, public policy requires that parties cannot also be permitted to contract out of the legislative mandate which requires certain kind of disputes to be settled by special Courts constituted by the Act.
XX XX XX
There are, however, two other aspects which are relevant to find out whether the ratio of Natraj Studios’ case (supra) should be extended to the present appeals. As already stated, these appeals do not relate to eviction. The tenancy in the instant case had terminated about a year before the awards were delivered. There was, therefore, no existing tenancy. Sections 4 and 5 of the Orissa House Kent Control Act are complementary provisions. Section 4 gets attracted when an application Under Section 5 of the Act is possible to be made. The scheme in Section 5 of the Orissa Act stipulates determination of fair rent in a going tenancy ‘ and not in respect of a tenancy which had already terminated Therefore, when no application for fixation of the fair rent had been made during the subsistence of the tenancy and parties had agreed that the disputes regarding escalation of rent could go before the Arbitrator, I do not think, the rule of Natraj Studios’ case could have application.
Apart from these considerations, in the unreasoned awards, the Arbitrator has allowed claim of a lump sum. It is not open to dissect the awards in the way, Mr. Mohanty has contended, to find out if a portion of the awarded amounts related to rent and, therefore, the agreed rent has been escalated I have already indicated my limitations, in dealing with the situation. As no document has been referred to and the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge as also of this Court is not appellate, the investigation cannot proceed the way Mr. Mohanty has. asked for. When this Court attempted to do that in the case of Kalinga Construction Co Pvt. Ltd. (Misc. Appeal No. 53 of 1962 disposed of on 18-2-1966), the Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Anr. v. Kalinga Construction Co. (P ) Ltd., 1970(2) S.C.C. 861 reversed the decision by saying that the Court had exercised appellate powers.”
21. Once the questions relating to the validity of (he reference and the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator are finally decided by the Court Under Sections 30 and 36, read with Section 17 of the Act and as in the instant cases, confirmed in appeal by this Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, the two decisions must be taken to be final and cannot be re-examined. If an objection relating to jurisdiction could have been, but had not been taken earlier, it would constitute constructive res judicata in a subsequent proceeding or in later stage of the same proceeding including execution proceeding. [See AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1475 (supra)].
22. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner on the case reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2355 (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has held :
“It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, it it is one purely of fact, decided In the earlier proceeding by a competent Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i. e., the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression ‘the matter in issue in Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure, means the right litigated between the parties, i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a parry affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.”
Mr. Rath has rightly contended that it has not been decided in that case that the executing Court can re-open a dispute relating to jurisdiction although it has been finally determined. The ratio of the decision seems to be that if the Saw is altered on an interpretation of the statute, it gives a fresh cause of action to the applicant to move for the determination of fair rent for the premises and the bar of Section 11 of the Code would not operate.
If the matter in dispute is purely one of fact decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent Court, it cannot be re-opened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding cannot also be questioned in a subsequent one.
23. In the instant cases, the decision of this Court in the two appeals Under Section 39 of the Act had been taken on mixed questions of facts and law. The causes of action have not changed after the highest Court of the land dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on November 1, 1983. The executing Court is not competent to rexamine the validity of the ‘wo decrees under execution recorded by the learned Subordinate judge, upheld by this Court and given a final seal by the Supreme Court.
24. For the foregoing reasons, I am not prepared to accept any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. I would uphold the orders passed by the executing Court rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner with regard to the executability of the two decrees.
25. In the result, the two revisions are dismissed and the orders passed by the executing Court are affirmed. In the circumstances of the cases, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs of the revisions.