JUDGMENT
P.K. Misra, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) filed on behalf of the Land Acquisition Collector. Challenging the award passed by the Subordinate Judge, Jajpur in L.A. Misc. Case No. 38 of 1986.
2. Ac. 0.80 decimals of land appertaining to Plot No. 748 recorded as homestead in mouza Charinangal was acquired for construction of Krushnadaspur-Ratnagiri Road under Gazette Notification No. 2139 dated 7-12-1984. The Land Acquisition Collector had offered compensation at the rate of Rs. 300/- per decimal of land and Rs. 3,000/- for the house standing thereon, but no compensation had been awarded for the well situated in the acquired land. The original claimant, Dhanu Behera, the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents received the compensation under protest and claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per decimal of land, Rs. 50,000/ – for the house and Rs. 6,000/- for the well. The Subordinate Judge by his order dated 13-9-88 awarded compensation of Rs. 7,000/- for the house and Rs. 1,000/- for the well but confirmed the market value of the land. The original claimant filed F.A. No. 260 of 1991 which was disposed of on 11-5-1993. While confirming the valuation in respect of the house and the well, the Hon’ble High Court remanded the matter to the Subordinate Judge for fresh determination of market value in respect of the land and directed that opportunity shall be given to the claimant to prove the sale deeds of the years 1980 and 1982 in respect of other lands in village Charinangal and to prove the other similar transaction, if any. Opportunity was also given to both sides to adduce oral evidence to explain the nature of land etc. in the sale deeds as well as the acquired land. The present respondents were substituted in the earlier first appeal and one of them was examined as P.W. 4 after remand. He has proved the sale deeds dated 26-4-82 and 5-9-80 as Exts. 4 and 5. No further evidence was adduced on behalf of the Land Acquisition Collector.
3. As per Ext. 4, PW. 4 had sold Ac. 0.2 decimals of homestead land on 26-4-82 for Rs. 2,000/- that is to say at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per decimal. Ext. 3 shows that another co-villager had sold Ac. 0.5 decimals of land in the year 1980 for Rs. 3,000/- that is to say at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per decimal. From the unchallenged evidence of P.W. 4, it is apparent that the aforesaid pieces of homestead land were at a higher level than the acquired land. Keeping in view the fact that the aforesaid lands had been sold in the year 1980 and 1982 and the land in the present case had been acquired in December 1984, the Subordinate Judge fixed the market value at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per decimal.
4. In the appeal, it is contended that the valuation of a small tract of land should not have been taken into consideration while deciding about the market value of acquired land which was a larger area.
The learned counsel for the respondents while supporting the reasons given by the trial Court has cited a decision reported in AIR 1992 SC 2298; Bhagwathula Samappa v. Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer Visakhapatnam Municipality and submitted that the proposition that a large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not an absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. He has further submitted that since the large tract which was acquired had already been developed, the price reflected in Exts. 4 and 5 should not be ignored. In the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court it was held (Para 13):–
“The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparision is not warranted. With regard to the nature of the plots involved in these two cases, it has been satisfactorily shown on the evidence on record that the land has facilities of road and other amenities and is adjacent to a developed colony and in such circumstances it is possible to utilise the entire area in question as house sites. In respect of the land acquired for the road, the same advantages are available and it did not acquire any further development. We, are, therefore, of the view that that the High Court has erred in applying the principle of deduction and reducing the fair market value of land from Rs. 10/- per sq. yard to Rs. 6.50 paise per sq. yard. In our opinion, no such deduction is justified in the facts and circumstances of these cases. The appellants, therefore, succeed.”
5. Law is well settled that the amount fixed by the Subordinate Judge in a reference under Section 18 of the Act should not be interfered with by the appellate Court unless the amount awarded is arbitrary and grossly excessive.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the land which was acquired was a homestead land containing a house and as such had already been developed. The transactions wherein the homestead land in the same village had been sold at the rate of Rs. 1,000/-per decimal were of the year 1980 and 1982 whereas the acquisition in the present case was in December, 1984, more than two and half years after the transaction under Ext. 4 dated 26-4-84. It can be judicially noticed that the price of homestead would have increased and not gone down. Applying the ratio of the decision of the aforesaid Supreme Court, (AIR 1992 SC 2298) (supra) and the fact that the possibility of increase in the land price cannot be discounted, it cannot be said that the market value fixed by the Subordinate Judge is arbitrarily excessive so as to warrant interference in this appeal. Since the acquisition was made after Act 68 of 1984, the claimants-respondents are entitled to all the statutory benefits including payment of interest as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984.
6. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.