ORDER
R.C. Lahoti, J.
1. M/S. Technological Institute of Textile Bhiwani is situated at Bhiwani within the State of Haryana. It made a claim for refund before the Assistant Collector at Bhiwani which was rejected. An appeal preferred before the Collector (Appeals) was also rejected. A further appeal filed before the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, has been allowed directing the refund to be sanctioned if otherwise due and admissible.
2. Feeling aggrieved, the Department filed an application under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 seeking statement of case to High Court for its opinion on a question of law arising out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. That application has also been rejected. The Department has approached this Court by filing the petition under Section 35-G(3)
of the Central Excises Act, 1944.
3. On behalf of the respondent an objection has been raised to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition. It is submitted that the petition should have been filed before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Suraj Woollen Mills Vs.Collector of Customs Bombay, 1998 iv AD
(DELHI) 504.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the ‘High Court’ for the purpose of Section 35G is the High Court having jurisdiction over the assessee industry which being situated at Bhiwani, the ‘High Court’ would mean the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. On the other hand, it is submitted by the Standing Counsel for the Department that all the orders passed by the authorities below merge in the appellate order of the Tribunal and for all practical purposes the order forming subject matter of
proceedings before this Court is the order of the Tribunal and the Tribunal having its mean seat at Delhi where the appeal was also heard and decided would be of relevance for the purpose of deciding the question of jurisdiction.
5. The ‘High Court’ as occurring in Section 35G which is placed in Chapter VI-A of Central Excises Act, 1944 has been defined in clause (b) of Section 36 as under :
36. Definition- In this Chapter
xxx xxxx xxx
(b) High Court means.-
(i) in relation to any State, the High Court for that state ;
(ii) in relation to a Union territory to which the jurisdiction of the High Court of a State has been extended by law, that High Court;
(iii) in relation to the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Goa Daman and Diu, the High court at Bombay;
(iv) in relation to any other Union territory, the highest court of civil appeal for that territory other than the Supreme Court of India
(c) xxx xxxxx xxxx
6. A similar question came up for the consideration of this court in the context of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is situated at Delhi and hears the cases arising from all over the country. A question arose whether a reference application arising out of an appeal wherein the original order of assessment was passed by the assessing authority situated at Bombay- subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay- could be heard by and is maintainable before the High Court of Delhi ? In Suresh Desai & Associates Vs. CIT 1991(230) ITR 912, following Madras High Court decision in CIT Vs. S. Sewaramakrishna Iyer 1968 (70) ITR 860 and Delhi High Court judgment in Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta Vs. CIT 1978 (113) ITR 817, the Division Bench has held that it is the High Court of that State wherefrom the matter arises which would only be competent to hear the reference petition.
7. A similar question arose under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962. Suraj Woollen Mills is situated at Panipat. It imported woollen waste from foreign countries which reached the Bombay seaport. There the proceedings under Section 108 of the Customs Act were initiated by the Intelligence Officer of DRI Bombay resulting into penalty being imposed which was appealed against to CEGAT New Delhi. A question arose which will be the High Court competent to hear a reference petition under Section 130 of the Customs Act. On a review of the law available on the point this Court has held in Suraj Woollen Mills Vs. Collector of Customs Bombay, (supra). That the only High Court competent to hear the reference petition was the High Court of Bombay, within whose jurisdiction the case had originated, and not the High Court of Delhi.
8. The definition of High Court for the purpose of Chapter XV as given in Clause (b) of Section 131-C of the Customs Act, 1962 is identical with the
one given in clause (b) of Section 36 of the Central Excises Act, 1944. The ratio of the decision in Suraj Woollen Mills’ case ( supra) applies on all the fours to the case at hand.
9. We also derive strength from the law declared by the Supreme Court in Stride well Leathers (P) Ltd Vs. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages(P) Ltd. . A question arose which is the High Court competent to hear an appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 from an order of the
Company Law Board. The registered office of the Company was situated at Madras. The appeal was sought to be filed before the High Court of Delhi. Their Lordships held that jurisdictional competence of the High Court by reference to its territory cannot be determined by finding out the place of the sitting of the Company Law Board where it may choose to sit and make the order under appeal. Having analysed the provisions of the Companies Act and having determined the legislative intent behind, their Lordships held that the High Court for the purpose of that case was the Madras High Court which had jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the Company concerned was situated and not the Delhi High Court merely because the order was made by the Company Law Board at Delhi.
10. The ratio of the decision by their Lordships in the case of Stride Well Leather’s (supra) lends support to the view taken by the High Court of Delhi in the cases arising under the Income-tax Act,the Customs Act and the Central Excises Act. We are clearly of the opinion that the jurisdiction to hear the petition under Section 35-G(3) of the Central Excises act, 1944 lies with the High Court having jurisdiction over the authority from whose order the proceedings have originated and not the High court of Delhi merely because the main seat of CEGAT is situated at Delhi and because the appeal was heard and decided at Delhi.
11. The petition is dismissed for want of territorialj urisdiction in the High Court of Delhi. Needless to say that the petitioner shall have the liberty to approach the competent High Court,which in our opinion is the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, seeking appropriate relief. No order as to costs.
