1. There is nothing in the wording of Section 514 to limit the period within which the time may be extended by the court to the period mentioned in the previous order, nor will it be reasonable to do so. In the case reported in I. L. It, 9 M, 475, Simson v. Venkatagopalam, no order extending the time had been obtained before the award was given. The award in that case was therefore properly held to be invalid under tbe express terms of 8. 521. All that was decided in Suppu v. Govindacharyar I. L. R. 11 M. 85 was that as the application for extension of the period had been made within the time originally fixed, the mere fact of the order having been passed after such time did not invalidate the award. It was not then necessary to consider the point now raised. But as far as that decision goes it supports the contention of the present appellant, that the real test is whether the time was in fact extended so as to validate the award which the arbitrators would otherwise have had no jurisdiction to make at the time when they made it. The award in the present case was made after the time had been enlarged and within the time so enlarged. The dictum in Raja Har Narain Singh v. Ghaudhrain Bhagwant Knar L. R, 18 I. A. 55 at p. 58, that the court had the fullest power to enlarge the time under the Section (514) so long as the award was not completed supports the appellant’s contention. The construction put by the Privy Council on Section 549 in Budri Narain v. Mussum-mut Sheo Koer L. R. 17 I. A. 1, also favors the same view. As they ruled at page 4, the intention must be held to be to confer on the court a power to enlarge the time according to any necessity, which may arise, when it is just and proper that the court should do so.
2. For the above reasons we allow the appeal and, setting aside the order appealed against, dismiss the Civil Revision Petition No. 32 of 1890 with costs throughout, and restore the decree of the District Judge.