JUDGMENT
K.B. Siddappa, J.
1. This revision is filed against the order passed in Crl. A. No. 10 of 1995 on the file of the First Additional Sessions Judge, at Warangal.
2. The matter arises under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The point involved is whether registered notice intimating dishonour of the cheque addressed to the accused at his correct address when returned unserved amounts to service on the accused. On this point, the trial court held that there was effective service even though the registered letter returned unserved by the postal authorities. This finding was reversed by the lower appellate court. Hence, the revision.
3. Mr. Aga Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the judgment of the lower appellate court is not correct. There is no dispute that the registered letter was sent to the correct address of the contesting respondent. It was returned unserved after waiting for seven days. He also submitted that the petitioner and the respondent lived in the same locality in close proximity. P. W.-1 in his evidence categorically stated that in all those seven days the respondent was very much in the town and he managed to send back the registered letter unserved on him. The trial court rightly held that the respondent managed to return the letter unserved. Therefore, the trial court presumed that the registered letter is duly served on the accused. In addition to this learned counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, . This case arose under the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (34 of 1966). The Supreme Court considering the scope of Sections 11 and 12 of the said Act held that notice to terminate
tenancy was sent through registered post on correct address and even if the letter was returned for non-availability of the addressee, notice is deemed to have been served and it is a valid notice. The Supreme Court also took into consideration the scope of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Justice Ramesh Madhav Bapat rendered in Crl. P. No. 2073 of 1994, dated October 18, 1994. In this case a similar question arose for” consideration. He considered several judgments including the judgment of a Madras High Court in Elangovan v. Narayana Iyengar [1992] MWN (Crl.) (Suppl.) 214 (Mad) and Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, , and also took into consideration the scope of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and held as follows :
“There is no dispute regarding the name and address of the petitioner on the postal cover. Secondly six attempts were made by the postman to serve the notice. Under such circumstances, I hold that the requirement of Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is deemed to have been properly complied with. If the notice is issued in the right name and on the right address though it is not received by the addressee because of his ‘tactful acts’.”
4. This view was also endorsed rightly by Justice A.S. Bhate in M.R. Reddy v. Gopuma Reddy Ram Reddy [1997] 2 ALD (Crl.) 189 (AP) .
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice the judgment of Justice B.S. Raikote reported in A. Sudershan v. Mannan (Shabir) [1997] 1 ALD (Crl.) 795 (AP). A different view point is expressed. The learned judge held that when the registered notice sent to the accused returned with a postal endorsement “party continuously absent for seven days” that does not amount to service under the Act and that it cannot be treated as constructive service and conviction under Section 138 cannot be sustained. He explained his stand in the following words :
“In other words if such a document is sent by registered post and if it does not return back, it is deemed to have been served. But, such a presumption is a rebuttable presumption and it is always open to the addressee to prove that in fact he did not receive such a registered post. It is only having regard to this kind of presumption found under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and also similar presumption found under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act the courts in India have presumed the service of such a notice or document when such a registered post is not returned back. Such a presumption is raised even in case the registered post is returned with postal shara ‘refused’ in view of the fact that such a refusal presumes knowledge of the addressee and presumably knowing the contents he has wantongly refused it. This hon’ble court in a decision in Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah, , has further held that unless the endorsement on the envelope ‘refused’ is proved in
the manner in which it is capable of proof no presumption of service can be raised. The High Court of Madhya Bharat in a decision in Tekchand Devidas v. Gulab Chand Chandan Mal, AIR 1957 Madhya Bharat 151, has opined in the same way. However the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a decision in Budha v. Bedariya, , has held that it is for the contestant to summon the postman and rebut the presumption.”
6. This opinion of the learned judge is not acceptable to me. The reasons are mentioned in detail by the Kerala High Court in a decision in K. Madhu v. Omega Pipes Ltd, [1994] 1 ALT (Crl.) 603 (Ker) ; [1996] 85 Comp Cas 263.
7. Now this position of law in my opinion is covered by Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, . Therefore, in the present case, there is not only the evidence of P. W.-1 who stated that the accused was very much in the town in those seven days and managed to send back the registered letter addressed to the correct address of the accused. The trial court rightly believed the evidence of P. W.-1. Further there is no rebuttal evidence on behalf of the accused that he was not in the town and the postal endorsement is correct. In the absence of rebuttal evidence on behalf of the accused, the positive evidence of P.W.-1 shall have to be taken as correct. Therefore on facts and also in law it should be deemed that the notice intimating the dishonour of cheque is served on the accused. The well considered judgment of the trial court was unnecessarily disturbed by the lower appellate court. Hence, I set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and restore the judgment of the trial court.
8. The criminal revision case is accordingly allowed.