JUDGMENT
Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The challenge in the present revision petition is to the order passed by the learned Executing Court deciding objection filed by the petitioner in respect of the execution of judgment and decree dated 6.5.1998 for specific performance of sale of land measuring 14 Marias.
2. The suit field by Bakhshish Singh on 12.6.1990 for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 8.11.1989 in respect of the land measuring 14 Marias i.e. half share of defendant Amar Kaur and land measuring 4 Marias was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 8.11.1995. However, in appeal the parties entered into compromise on 3.4.1998, whereby the plaintiff relinquished his claim regarding house property measuring 4 Marias and defendant Amar Kaur agreed to execute sale deed in respect of land measuring 14 marlas being her one half share of Khasra No. 89/1 (1-8). However, before the said compromise was entered upon, Amar Kaur has executed sale deed dated 19.11.1990 in favour of the present petitioner in respect of the land measuring 14 Marlas. In terms of the compromise it was Amar Kaur who was liable to compensate her vendee i.e. the present petitioner regarding any loss of any kind suffered by or caused to him on account of sale deed dated 19.11.1990.
3. In the execution of the said judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court on the basis of compromise, the petitioner herein filed objections inter alia alleging therein that the decree is on account of connivance and warrants of possession cannot be executed in respect of sale effected in favour of the petitioner.
4. The learned trial Court dismissed such objections on the ground that the sale in favour of the petitioner is during the pendency of the suit and that sale in favour of petitioner is not bona fide transaction.
5. In the revision before this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the transaction of compromise before the first Appellate Court was an act of collusion between the judgment Debtor and Decree Holder. It is contended that the parties to the suit are not strangers but in fact, the plaintiff is step-son of the defendant and therefore, mere fact that the parties entered into compromise is sufficient to infer collusion between the parties.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent has rebutted the said argument and pointed out that though sale in favour of the plaintiff was for a sum of Rs. 18,000/- whereas sale in favour of the present petitioner is for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and that too during the pendency of the suit. Still further, the petitioner is resident of the same village and was aware of the transaction and thus, it is not open to the petitioner to allege that he is a bona fide purchaser or that there was collusion between the parties. The parties had, in fact, contested the suit. It was during the pendency of the appeal, the parties have entered into compromise. No inference of collusion can be drawn only for the reason that the parties entered into compromise.
7. The petitioner has supported his possession being purchaser on the basis of sale deed dated 19.11.1990 admittedly executed during the pendency of the suit for a sale consideration of Rs. 2000/-. As a matter of fact, the agreement for the sale of property was for Rs. 18,000/-. The difference in sale consideration is sufficient indicative of the fact that the sale deed in favour of the petitioner is not a bona fide transaction or sale for valuable consideration. Still further, the petitioner is resident of the same village that of the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtor. It is well known that/any transaction in respect of agricultural land is known to the inhabitants of the village immediately. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has purchased the suit property without notice and for valuable consideration.
8. It is well settled that the plea of bona fide purchaser is not available to a, purchaser during the pendency of the suit. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that only exception to the doctrine or its pendens is collusion between the parties to the suit. It is argued that since the patties entered into compromise, it necessarily means that the parties have colluded so as to defeat the rights of the petitioner. In fact, the terms of the agreement are also suggestive or the fact that the Judgment Debtor was aware of the sale and still the compromise was entered upon.
9. However, I am unable to agree with the said argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, collusion is a secret agreement to deceive the rights of third person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagubai Ammal and Ors. v. B. Shama Ram and Ors., A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 593 while considering the distinction between a proceeding which is collusive and the fraudulent held that collusion in judicial proceeding is a secret arrangement between the two persons that one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose. In such proceedings the claim put forward is fictitious. The contest is unreal, and the decree passed therein is a mere mask having the similitude of a judicial termination and worn by the parties with the object of confounding third parties. The Court held to the following effect:
“15. Now, there is a fundamental distinction between a proceeding which is collusive and one which is fraudulent. Collusion in judicial proceedings is a secret arrangement between two persons that the one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose.
In such proceedings the claim put forward is ridiculous. The contest over it is unreal, and the decree passed therein is a mere mask having the similitude of a judicial termination and worn by the parties with the object of confounding third parties. But when a proceeding is alleged to be fraudulent, what is meant is that the claim made therein is untrue, but that the claimant has managed to obtain the verdict of the Court in his favour and against his opponent by practising fraud on the Court. Such a proceeding is started with a view to injure the opponent, and there can be no question of its having been initiated as the result of an understanding between the parties. While in collusive proceedings the combat is a mere sham in a fraudulent suit it is real and earnest.
10. In view of the principle laid down in the above judgment, I am unable to accept the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that sale in favour of the petitioner cannot become on the subject matter of doctrine of the lis pendens on account of the alleged collusion between the parties. The defendant contested the suit before the trial Court and in fact succeeded before the Trial Court. In appeal the parties have decided to fold their differences and entered into compromise. It is not sham nor such compromise was with any sinister design or is mere mask to defeat the rights of the petitioner. The petitioner has a right to recover the amount paid to his vendor or to take such other steps which may be permissible in law but cannot raise a defence that his sale is binding on the rights of the plaintiff who has sought specific performance or has prior agreement.
11. Therefore, I do not find any patent illegality or material irregularity in the order passed by the learned Executing Court dismissing the objections filed by the petitioner.
Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed.