JUDGMENT
Tipnis, J.
1. This is a motion taken out by the workman praying that the petitioner-Company in writ petition No. 336 of 1996 be directed to pay to the workman every month wages payable to him under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition.
2. The writ petition No. 336 of 1996 is filed by M/s. Dhrangadhra Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, 1st Labour Court, Bombay, i.e., award dated 15th November, 1995 whereunder the workman was directed to be reinstated with full back wages and with continuity of service from 11th August, 1989. The order significantly records that if the Company is closed on any particular day, then the company may follow the procedure as laid down in the Act on that particular day.
3. At the time of admission of the above petition, the division bench passed an order on 20th February, 1996 directing that the respondent will be reinstated in service on or before March 1, 1996, that the back wages legally due to the 1st respondent as adjudicated upon by the Labour Court will be deposited with the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court on or before March 22, 1996. It was further directed that the amount so deposited shall be invested in any scheduled Bank in fixed deposit initially for a period of three years and the workman will be entitled to the annual interest accruing on the said amount. In all other respects the operation of the award was stayed.
4. Thereafter the company took out a notice of motion No. 168 of 1996 contending that all the workmen of the company have been retrenched by 29.3.1996 and not a single workmen had been retained in service after 29.3.1996 and no workman has been employed by the company since thereafter. It was submitted by the company that the company be permitted to take steps in accordance with the liberty granted by the Labour Court in its award dated 15th November, 1995. By our order dated 21st June, 1996 we did not grant this specific request for the obvious reason that all those facts and circumstances were existing and were available when the division bench passed the order on 20th February, 1996.
5. Alternatively it was prayed that the company shall be at liberty to take such steps with regard to the future employment of workmen which are open to the petitioner company according to law. By our aforesaid order dated 21-6-1996 we made it clear that obviously the company will be at liberty to deal with the services of the workman hereafter strictly in accordance with the law in that behalf and the order directing the workman to be reinstated will not come in the way of the company in such event. We made in clear that we were not expressing any opinion whatsoever or were not confirming that the company has any such cause and the order shall not be construed in such a way. The aforesaid notice of motion was disposed of accordingly.
6. It appears that thereafter by letter dated 28th June, 1996 the company purported to retrench the services of the workman and an amount of Rs. 56,338.90 was also forwarded towards the legal dues.
7. The workman has taken out the present notice of motion No. 242 of 1996 claiming that the company may be directed to pay to the workman every month the wages payable to him under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.
8. Shri Kochar learned counsel appearing for the workman in support of the above notice of motion contended that this Court did not stay the award of reinstatement and further while admitting the petition directed that the petitioner-Company should reinstate the workman on or before 1-3-1996 and as such he could not file any application under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Shri Kochar contended that after passing of our order dated 21-6-1996 the company has promptly retrenched the services of the workman. Shri Kochar contended that two directors of the company are still working and as such the company cannot be said to be closed down. In the affidavit in support of the motion even the amount of legal dues is disputed. Shri Kochar further contended that in view of the fact that the award directing reinstatement is subsisting it will be impermissible for the employer to terminate the services and as such in the peculiar facts it will be unfair and unjust not to stay the award and still allow the employer to retrench the services of the workman.
9. Shri Singh on the other hand contended that not a single workman has been in employment of the company since 29-3-1990 and in fact the order of the Labour Court clearly indicates that this was so contended that the Labour Court in fact had stated in its award that if the company is closed on any particular day the company may follow the procedure as laid down in the Act.
10. While disposing of the earlier notice of motion by our order dated 21-6-1996, we had directed that in view of the order of the division bench at the time of admission, we cannot but insist that the workman be reinstated on 1-3-1996 as directed. However, we had made it clear that the company will be at liberty to deal with the services of the workman hereafter strictly in accordance with law in that behalf.
11. We are not impressed by the submissions of Shri Kochar that in the aforesaid set of facts the company can be directed to make payment under the provisions of Section 17-B. The provisions of Section 17-B come into operation only when the workman is not in fact reinstated. If the workman is reinstated then there is no question of any order being passed under Section 17-B. In facts of the case the workman is reinstated on 1-3-1996. Now merely because the petition challenging the reinstatement which is not stayed, is pending, can it be said that the workman or the employer for the matter is not governed by the laws applicable. In other words if there were no proceedings pending and if the workman could be proceeded against, in accordance with law, could it be said that only because the proceedings are pending, the workman cannot be proceeded in accordance with law. For example if the Labour Court awards reinstatement and the employer challenges that order of reinstatement, and when award of reinstatement is not stayed by the High Court and the workman is reinstated in service, and the workman commits serious misconduct or the company is in fact closed down, is it the law that merely because the petition is pending such a workman will get some additional benefits or protection then any other workmen of the company ? In our opinion the implication of the award of reinstatement would be that the workman for all purposes shall continue in the service of the employer but he will also be subject to all laws applicable in his case. For example the workman is reinstated in pursuance to the award and if he commits serious misconduct, we do not see any reason, why such workman could not be proceeded against in accordance with law and be dismissed in accordance with law. We are not at all impressed by the submissions that the fact of pendency of the petition when the award of reinstatement is not stayed at all, would make any difference in the situation. In fact that was the purport of our order dated 21-6-1996.
12. Of course it is obvious that as stated in the said order, we are not expressing any opinion or not confirming that the company had any such cause and we make it clear that the workman will obviously be entitled to challenge the legality and validity of the aforesaid purported order of retrenchment in accordance with law before the appropriate forum.
Subject to aforesaid observations, notice of motion No. 242 of 1966 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
13. Certified copy expedited.