JUDGMENT
Nishita Mhatre, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the earthquake/project affected persons from Koyna claiming a plot of land in Mumbai for housing the displaced persons.
2. After the earthquake in Koyna in the year 1967 and the construction of the dam at Koyna, several people living in Koyna were rendered homeless. Many of them migrated to Mumbai in 1967. However, on their arrival in Mumbai, it was difficult for them to find any shelter and proper housing. Therefore, after a period of fifteen years, i.e. on 7th September, 1982, petitioner No. 1, who was one such displaced person, applied to the Mamlatdar, Borivali for allotment of a plot of land in order to construct a building where all these persons who proposed to form a Co-operative Housing Society could accommodate themselves. The petitioners also addressed an application to the Additional Collector, Bombay Suburban District, requesting him to allot a plot of land. The Additional Collector replied to this letter on 7th January, 1983 informing the petitioners that their application had been sent to the Tahsildar, Borivali for inquiry. The petitioners were further directed to provide such information as would be required by the Tahsildar to complete the necessary formalities. At this point of time, the petitioners claimed a plot of land admeasuring 4000 sq.yds. from Survey No. 144, Mouje Vajera, T.P.S. No. III, Borivali (West). The petitioners also met the then Chief Minister and requested him to consider their application. It is the claim of the petitioners that the Chief Minister directed the authorities to treat their case as a special one. The Additional Collector informed the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department, that there was no objection for allotment of a plot of land to the petitioners except the portion which was to be used for road widening as per the development plan. The petitioners again requested the then Chief Minister for approval for allotment of land. Thereafter, they received a letter from the Revenue and Forest Department informing them that a report had been called for from the Additional Collector and thereafter their request for allotment would be considered. Additional documents which were required by the Collector were furnished by the petitioners. The petitioners at that stage also stated that they were willing to accept whatever area was available in the survey. The petitioners on 6th February, 1984 also furnished necessary proof in accordance with the policy prevailing at that point of time showing that 20% of the members of the proposed society belonged to the backward classes. The petitioners claimed that they pursued the matter with the Revenue and Forest Department as also with the Chief Minister but their efforts were of no avail. The petitioners thereafter learnt that the plot which they were trying to obtain for themselves was reserved for the Power Station of Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply Limited. However, on representations being made by the petitioners to the Chairman of the Development Committee of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, a plot of land admeasuring 2500 sq.mtrs. was released. In 1986, the petitioners requested the Revenue Minister for allotment of this 2500 sq.mtrs. in favour of their proposed society. However, no allotment was made in favour of the petitioners. In the meantime, encroachers settled in illegal and unauthorised huts on the plot of land which the petitioners were claiming for constructing the proposed society. On 18th October, 1997, the Revenue and Forest Department informed the petitioners that the plot of land in question had been allotted to another society and, therefore, the request of the petitioners could not be considered.
3. The petitioners have, therefore, filed this writ petition for a writ of mandamus against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 directing them to allot the plot of land bearing Survey No. 144, T.P.S. No. III, Borivali Final Plot No. 365 admeasuring 2500 sq.mtrs. to the proposed Koyna Co-operative Housing Society.
4. The petitioners had initially not joined respondent Nos. 6 to 10 herein as parties to the petition. However, on receiving information that the plot of land of which they sought allotment was allotted to respondent No. 6, who is the Chief Promoter of the proposed Co-operative Housing Society of police personnel the petition was amended and respondent No. 6 was added as a party respondent. Thereafter, during the pendency of the petition, the petitioners became aware that respondent No. 7 had been allotted a plot and had constructed a building on the said land. Therefore, respondent No. 7 has been joined as a party since this plot which was allotted under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme was according to the petitioners earmarked for them. Respondent Nos. 8 and 10 are officers under the Slum Rehabilitation Act and respondent No. 9 is the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay.
5. On 10th October, 1995, T.P.S. III Scheme was finalised. There were encroachments on certain plots of land and several slum dwellers were residing on these plots as also the development plan road. This area consisted of final plot No. 433-A measuring 906.2 sq.mtrs, final plot No. 434 admeasuring 2902.70 sq.mtrs., final plot No. 449 of 15,000 sq.mtrs. and part of the development plan road. The Government of Maharashtra by its letter dated 17th April, 1996 directed respondent No. 7 herein to submit a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for the Siddhi Vinayak Rahiwashi Mandal, Borivali, a proposed housing society consisting of these slum dwellers. This scheme was approved by the State Government and the scheme was sanctioned by the slum rehabilitation authority. Commencement certificate was issued by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority on 22nd July, 1989 in favour of respondent No. 7 for housing these slum dwellers on the plot. A building consisting of 77 tenements has been constructed on final plot No. 433-A for rehabilitation and the hutment dwellers have already been shifted to the new accommodation under the Rehabilitation Scheme. The second phase of the Rehabilitation Scheme has already commenced and about 124 eligible hutment dwellers would benefit under this Scheme. The other two plot which vested in the Bombay Municipal Corporation i.e., respondent No. 9, have been cleared of the hutment dwellers and those who were eligible have been housed in the building constructed by respondent No. 7. Final plot No. 434 is reserved for housing the dishoused and final plot No. 449 is reserved for a Fire Station. Both these plots vest in respondent No. 9. The development plan road has also been cleared by respondent No. 7. The petitioners were thus seeking an allotment of a plot from Survey No. 144 admeasuring 4 acres 17 gunthas and 38 acres out of final plot No. 433-A admeasuring 906.2 sq.mtrs. which has been allotted to respondent No. 7 under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
6. The petitioners have based their submissions principally on two main contentions, namely, the doctrine of legitimate expectancy and the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The submission made on behalf of the petitioners by the learned Counsel is that the petitioners were promised a plot of land by the Government ever since they requested the Government to allot them a plot of land in September 1982. It is submitted that the correspondence between the petitioners and the State Government demonstrates amply that the petitioners were indeed promised a plot of land which was approved by the then Chief Minister. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, fairness demands that this plot of land should have been allotted to the petitioners and possession of the same should have been handed over to the petitioners rather than allotting the same to either respondent No. 6 or respondent No. 7. By not giving possession of the plot to the petitioners, the State Government had acted to the detriment of the petitioners, thereby adversely affecting them. It is further submitted that the correspondence entered into by the petitioners with the State Government aroused the petitioners expectation for being allotted a plot of land which, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, gave the petitioners, locus standi to make such a claim. It is further submitted that the Revenue & Forest Department of the State Government supported the petitioners’ claim that they should have been allotted the plot. The petitioners have also submitted that the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 7 is in breach of the Land Disposal Rules and G.R. dated 12-5-1983. However, this contention has not been pleaded in the petition nor argued but has been incorporated in the written submissions filed on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Union of India and others v. Hindustan Development Corporation and others, , Shri Guru Singh Sabha (Regd.) v. Defence Colony Welfare Association and others, 1993 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 666, Navjyoti Co-operative Group Housing Society v. Union of India, , Angarki Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others, and Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, .
7. The petitioners have also submitted that respondent Nos. 1 to 5 are guilty of gross contempt of this Court since they have not complied with the orders of this Court by making the records available to the Court as and when required. They have also filed a contempt petition against respondents as, according to the petitioners, despite interim relief granted by this Court, whereby the respondents were injuncted from handing over the plot of land to any other society but the petitioners but the sanction was accorded to respondent No. 7 to construct buildings on the plot. Respondent No. 7 having erected the buildings had committed gross contempt. The petitioners submitted that it was necessary to hear the contempt petition in the first instance before the petition itself. We did not, however, think it necessary to deal with the contempt petition immediately since we were considering the main petition itself. The question of contempt would arise only if the petitioners were able to show any right to the plot of land in question.
8. Contrary to what has been submitted by the petitioners, respondent No. 6 contended that the plot in fact had been allotted to them, but possession was wrongly given to respondent No. 7. Respondent No. 6 disputed the petitioners’ claim to the plot, but, however, supported the petitioners’ contention that respondent No. 7 had committed contempt of this Court. The main contention raised on behalf of respondent No. 6 is that by their Advocate’s letter they had called upon the respondents to hand over the plot of land to them. Despite clear documentation in their favour, according to respondent No. 6, the Government did not care to comply with their request and give them physical possession of the plot. Without filing any proceedings on their own, respondent No. 6 sought directions to the State Government to hand over the plot to them in the present petition.
9. Respondent No. 7, on the other hand, has submitted that what has been handed over to them is a plot of land, namely, final plot No. 433-A admeasuring 906.02 sq.mtrs. which vested in the State Government, final plot No. 434 admeasuring 2902.70 sq.mtrs. which vested in the Bombay Municipal Corporation and final plot No. 449 admeasuring 15000 sq.mtrs. which vested in Bombay Municipal Corporation and was reserved for a Fire Station. All these plots had a large slum on them. The slum dwellers formed a society and entered into an agreement with respondent No. 7 for development of the plot. Respondent No. 7 then in compliance with the provisions of section 31(1) of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act and Regulation 33(10) of the Development Control Regulations processed the entire project with the State Government whereby after clearance of final plot No. 449 which was reserved for fire station and the development plan road of the entire slum, vacant possession of that plot and road was to be handed over to Bombay Municipal Corporation and the eligible slum dwellers of development plan road and of the plot reserved for Fire Station would be accommodated final plot Nos. 433-A and 434. In doing so, respondent No. 7 housed 124 eligible slum dwellers in the building constructed by them on this plot. The development plan road has been handed over to the Bombay Municipal Corporation as well as the plot of 15000 sq.mtrs. which was reserved for the Fire Station. This entire project was effected in accordance with the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme in the larger public interest. According to respondent No. 7, they had no notice of the petition and they have constructed one building and have allotted 77 flats to the slum dwellers. They have also submitted that they are under the process of completing one more building for rehabilitation of eligible slum dwellers and also constructing two Balwadis and two Welfare Centres, etc. Respondent No. 7 also contended that, out of the three plots, only one plot admeasuring 906.20 sq.mtrs. vested in the State Government and, therefore, no allotment could have been made by the State Government in respect of the 2500 sq.mtrs. as prayed for in the petition.
10. Let us now examine whether in fact there was any promise made to the petitioners by the State Government for allotment of a particular plot of land for housing of the displaced persons due to the construction of Koyna dam as well as the earthquake. All along in the petition, the petitioners have at various places claimed different plots of land as well as of different dimensions. Initially, in the body of the petition, the petitioners have pleaded that they had claimed 4000 sq.yds. of Survey No. 144 from the State Government. In their letter dated 21st July, 1983 written to the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department, the petitioners requested grant of land admeasuring 400 acres out of 4 acres 10 gunthas and 38 acres of Survey No. 144. Then, on 27th July, 1983, a representation was made to the then Chief Minister claiming an area of 4000 sq.yds. out of plot No. 365-C of Survey No. 144. Again, in the letter addressed to the Additional Collector, Mumbai Suburban District, the petitioners claimed 4000 sq.yds. from Survey No. 144, plot No. 465. Similarly, in the prayers made in the petition, the petitioners have claimed 2500 sq.mtrs. from Survey No. 144, final plot No. 365. Therefore, the petitioners have all along been prevaricating on their demand. They have time and again given different dimensions for the plot of land demanded by them as well as the final plot number has been different in all their applications and correspondence as well as in the prayers of the petition.
11. The basic principle of promissory estoppel is that a person who by some statement or representation of fact causes another to act to his detriment in reliance on the truth of it, is not allowed to deny it later. Therefore, the petitioners must establish firstly that there is a promise made to them in unequivocal terms. Secondly, that promise should have lead the petitioners to act in a certain way which is irretrievable and is to their detriment if not acted upon by the Government. Taking into consideration the first ingredient as to whether there was in fact a promise to the petitioners made by the Government, the correspondence shows that all that the Government has assured the petitioners is that they would be entitled to a plot of land. However, neither in the correspondence nor in the affidavits filed by the Government did it give any assurance that the plot demanded by the petitioners would be allotted to them i.e. final Plot No. 365. The second ingredient that the petitioners should have acted on the basis of this promise to their detriment also is not present. As the petitioners were merely assured of a plot of land, there is nothing to show that this has caused the petitioners to act to their detriment. Therefore, the contention raised by the petitioners that they are entitled to a particular plot of land based on the principle of promissory estoppel does not hold much ground. There was no definite commitment made by the Government which created a right or interest in favour of the petitioners. Therefore, the question of the doctrine of promissory estoppel being applicable to the petitioners does not arise.
12. The next contention, as stated above, raised on behalf of the petitioners is that their claim is based on legitimate expectation. The Apex Court in Union of India (supra), has elaborately examined the scope and meaning of legitimate expectation. This judgment considers who is the expectant and what is the nature of the expectation? When does such an expectation become a legitimate one and what is the foundation for the same? What are the duties of the administrative authorities while taking a decision in cases attracting the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The learned Judges have observed thus:
“For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However, earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however, confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an ascertainable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and, therefore, it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense.”
The Apex Court has further observed that the protection of such legitimate expectation, therefore, does not require fulfilment of expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. Even if a substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated, that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. Doctrine of legitimate expectation does not give scope to claim relief straightway from administrative authorities when there is no crystallised right involved. The protection is limited to the extent that the person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the first instance must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus, he has locus to make such a claim. The Apex Court in this judgment, has held that legitimate expectation may come in various forms and it may owe its existence to different kinds of circumstances. No relief can be claimed from the administrative authorities if no crystallised right is involved. If an overriding public interest requires otherwise, the fulfilment of this expectation is not required. A claim based on mere legitimate expectation cannot give rise to an absolute right to a particular person.
13. Reliance placed by the petitioners on the case of Shri Guru Singh Sabha (supra) is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court held that there was a definite commitment on the part of the Government to allot a particular plot of certain dimensions to the appellant. An implicit assurance was given by the Government in its communications with the appellants from time to time. However, in the instant case, the only assurance given by the Government is that the petitioners claim would be considered. The case of Navjyoti Co-operative Housing Society (supra) was also decided by the Supreme Court on the facts obtaining in that matter.
14. In the present case, it is no doubt true that there is a legitimate expectation that the petitioners would be allotted a plot of land. However, this does not mean that the petitioners can legitimately expect that only a particular plot of land should be allotted to them. The commitment on the part of the Government is to allot a plot of land and, therefore, the petitioners may be right in expecting that such an allotment would be made. However, no right has been crystallised enabling the petitioners to insist that a particular plot of land should be allotted to them and not respondent No. 7. Moreover, the final Plot No. 433-A has been allotted to respondent No. 7 on the basis of the avowed public policy of the Government of rehabilitation of slum dwellers which, therefore, has an overriding effect over the expectation of petitioners being fulfilled.
15. The petitioners replied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Angarki Co-operative Housing Society (supra) and submitted that the allotment made to respondent No. 7 is in violation of the Maharashtra Government Rules of Business, General Administration Department, dated 26th June, 1975 as well as the Land Disposal Rules. However, this contention has not been raised in the petition and, therefore, we do not see any reason to consider this submission made by the petitioners at this stage.
16. Respondent No. 7 have been allotted a plot of land bearing Survey No. 433-A, which land incidently was not demanded at any point of time by the petitioners, based on the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. Respondent No. 7 on the basis of the scheme formulated and accepted by the authorities under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 have constructed one building of which possession has been given to 77 tenements and the second building is also being completed for housing the other slum dwellers. The Slum Rehabilitation Scheme is effected in order to clear the slums and ensure hygienic and proper accommodation to slum dwellers. In return for giving proper housing to these slum dwellers, the developer is entitled to get some additional F.S.I. for every sale. Respondent No. 7 is, therefore, merely sought to put in action the policy of the Government on the basis of which slum dwellers who were initially encroachers on plots of land are housed in proper accommodation. Therefore, to entertain the petitioners’ claim would amount to set at naught this policy of the Government which is in public interest.
17. As stated above, the petitioners do not have any right to the plot in possession of respondent No. 7 based on either the concept of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel.
18. In view of this, writ petition dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
19. In view of dismissal of the writ petition, nothing survives in Civil Application Nos. 894 of 2001, 920 of 2001 and 1154 of 2001, which are disposed of accordingly.
20. After this judgment is pronounced, a prayer is made for continuance of status quo for a period of eight weeks. In view of the view taken above, we see no reason to continue the status quo. The prayer is, accordingly, rejected.
21. Issuance of certified copy expedited.