Dr. A.T. Dudani vs The President, I.C.A.R. on 30 March, 2007

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Delhi High Court
Dr. A.T. Dudani vs The President, I.C.A.R. on 30 March, 2007
Author: V Sanghi
Bench: M Sarin, V Sanghi

JUDGMENT

Vipin Sanghi, J.

Page 1041

1. Petitioner, Dr A.T. Dudani, a highly qualified scientist having specialisation in Dairy science, was appointed as Dairy Bacteriologist at National Dairy Research Institute, Karnal in 1959. During the period 1970-1977 the petitioner served with various organisations on important posts. During this period he also worked with the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) at Anand where Dr. Kurien was the Chairman.

2. In 1977, the petitioner joined the Ministry of Agriculture as Additional Animal Husbandry Commissioner. While examining a project submitted by said Dr.Kurien as the chairman of the NDDB, the petitioner, in a note raised certain queries regarding the impact of continuous import of certain milk products on indigenous milk production. The “note” inter alia, advocated limiting the role played by Indian Dairy Corporation (IDC) and NDDB and the restoration of the control of the Government over (Indian Dairy Corporation) and NDDB. This caused immense displeasure to Dr Kurien who reacted very sharply to the opinion expressed by the petitioner. Dr.Kurien wrote a letter dated 1.5.78 to the Secretary (A & RD), Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation, Government of India and also forwarded the said letter along with a forwarding letter of the same date to the Cabinet Secretary, Government of India. The said letter made a frontal attack on the petitioner accusing him of hositility towards IDC and NDDB. Dr Kurien States that the contents of the note of the petitioner to him are “inexcusable”. Page 1042 He states “my main purpose, therefore, in writing this letter is to point out that this situation will, have to be righted, if the national objective of our dairy development are to be achieved. Accordingly, I am copying this letter to Shri N.K. Mukherjee, Cabinet Secretary. I shall appreciate if you will discuss this important matter with him. I am sure that, between you, you will be able to decide what needs to be done in order that your Ministry can play its proper role in the country’s dairy development. As you know well, it is my great desire that this can come about, if only because your Ministry’s present ways of working vis–vis dairy development can only make all our tasks that much harder, if, if not impossible”. In his forwarding communication to the Cabinet Secretary, Dr Kurien, referred to the hostility of officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation towards IDC-NDDB as perceived by him in the “note”. He stated that “unless it is righted”, the said Ministry would fail to contribute to the success of the country’s dairy development. Dr Kurien called for “some radical surgery” so that the patient (i.e., the Ministry) can recover. He also requested that the matter be discussed with the Ministry to determine how a “remedy” may be found “before the concerned officers in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation do any more damage”. Both the communications by Dr Kurien dated 1.5.78 were marked “confidential” by Dr. Kurien himself.

3. It appears that the Secretary Agriculture, forwarded Dr. Kurien’s letter to the Additional Secretary Agriculture. The Additional Secretary officially marked the letter to the petitioner for his information.

4. On 19.5.1978 the petitioner was reverted back to his parent office viz. at ICAR at a lower pay scale as the Assistant Director General on ad hoc basis.

5. Stung by the said letter of Dr Kurien the petitioner met one Shri. Motibhai Chowdhary a member of Parliament and a member in the Consultative Committee in the Agriculture Ministry, requesting him to bridge the misunderstanding between himself and Dr Kurien. In that process, the petitioner handed over a copy of the said letter to Shri Choudhary.

6. Petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 21. 8.1978. It was alleged that getting a confidential document cyclostyled and giving it to an unauthorized person constituted a serious act of misconduct and violation of the Government Servant Conduct Rules. In reply, the petitioner honestly admitted the fact that he had given a copy of the said letter to Sh Choudhary. However, the charge was repudiated on the ground that the said letter was a personal letter written by a non-governmental person viz. the Chairman of NDDB and had not been classified as “confidential” under the relevant rules/instructions.

7. On the basis of his reply, without any further inquiry and without calling the Petitioner to defend himself, a minor penalty of “censure” was inflicted upon the petitioner on 24.11.1979. The petitioner on 15.1.1980 made a representation against the said order to the President, ICAR and the same was allowed on 8.3. 1980 and by the penalty of censure was set aside. However, by the same order, a fresh inquiry was ordered.

Page 1043

8. A fresh memorandum dated 10.7.1980 was issued to the petitioner. The Statement of Articles of Charge was also communicated to the petitioner alleging violation of Rule 3, 11 and 20 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The article of charge reads as follows:

That the said Dr.A.T.Dudani, Scientist S-3, ICAR, Headquarters while working as Addl. Animal Husbandry Commissioner in the Department of Agriculture during the period May-June, 1978, got a confidential document cyclostyled and gave it to an unauthorized person with a view to bringing political and outside influence to further his interest in service matters.

Thus he violated Rule 3, 11 and 20 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, as extended to the employees of the I.C.A.R.

9. The inquiry proceedings culminated in a report dated 17.6.1982. The enquiry officer found that the petitioner got the confidential letter dated 1.5.1978 from Dr. Kurien addressed to the Cabinet Secretary with endorsement to the Secretary (A&RD) cyclostyled and that he handed over a copy of this letter to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhary, M.P and on the basis of this admission of the petitioner held the charge as proved. The charge of the petitioner bringing political pressure to influence any superior authority was held as not proved. By his impugned order dated 5.7.1982, the President ICAR accepted the enquiry report and held that the petitioner had circulated a “Very Confidential Letter” addressed to the Cabinet Secretary and passed it to an unauthorized person, and thereby committed a very serious misconduct justifying even dismissal or removal from service. It resulted in the imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner.

10. Petitioner made repeated representations against the order imposing penalty. They were all rejected. Thereafter the petitioner filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (Tribunal) on 11.8.1987 challenging the penalty of compulsory retirement inflicted upon him.

11. The Tribunal was constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 with effect from 1.11.1985. On a plain reading of Section 21(2) of this Act, it is clear that in any case the tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain any Original Application in respect of an order passed, cause of action for which arose before 1.11.1982. This is rightly observed by the tribunal in para 16 of the impugned order.

12. In so far as ICAR is concerned, the jurisdiction of the tribunal was extended on 20.5.1987. Therefore, the earliest cause of action that the tribunal could exercise jurisdiction in respect of vis- a- vis ICAR, would be one arising after 20.5.1984. In the present case the order impugned was passed on 5.7.1982, and the cause of action lastly arose on 31.7.1982 when the representation of the petitioner was rejected. Consequently, the original application filed by the petitioner before the tribunal was not maintainable when it was filed in 1987.

13. That being the position, it becomes necessary for us to consider whether the present petition ought to be rejected on the ground of laches. Since the Page 1044 petitioner was bonafide pursuing his original application before the tribunal, we are of the opinion that by application of the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, he should get the benefit of the time spent in those proceedings. The laches would have to be considered for the period between the date of passing of the impugned order, i.e 5.7.1982 and the date of filing of the original application before the tribunal i.e. 11.8.1987. Consequently, there are laches of about five years in this case.

14. In Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd and Anr. v. UOI , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a petitioner who could have availed of the alternative remedy by way of a suit approaches the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is appropriate ordinarily to construe any unexplained delay in the filing of the writ petition after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit as unreasonable. This rule, however, cannot be a rigid formula. There may be cases where even a delay of a shorter period may be considered to be sufficient to refuse relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There may also be cases where there may be circumstances which may persuade the court to grant relief even though the petition may have been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for a suit. Each case has to be judged on its own facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public etc.

15. In Moon Mills, Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450 the Hon Supreme Court held that issue of a writ of certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, though not identical with, similar to the exercise of discretion in the court of Chancery. The Supreme Court quoted Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd Abram Farewell and John Kemp (1874) 5 PC 221 which states that “the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defense must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might Page 1045 affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

16. Consequently, to consider the aspect of whether the delay of about five years in resorting to a legal remedy ought to be condoned in the present case, we would first like to examine the merit of the petitioner’s case, to ascertain the justice or injustice that might result if we take a view one way or another.

17. Before us the petitioner has contended that his actions did not constitute misconduct since the said letter was not a confidential document and this aspect has been completely ignored by the authorities. He submits that this was the only issue that arose for consideration, since it was the admitted case of the petitioner that he had delivered copy of the said letters to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhary.

18. The petitioner has also questioned the legality of the punishment imposed on the ground that earlier he was punished with a minor penalty of “censure”. The same was set aside on his own representation. A harsher punishment could not have been imposed by resorting to a fresh inquiry that was ordered simultaneously with the withdrawal of the minor penalty of “censure”.

19. Petitioner also assails the punishment imposed as highly arbitrary, excessive and disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

20. On the other hand, apart from questioning the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the Original Application in view of Section 21(2)(a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the respondents also contended that the punishment was not disproportionate. The respondent relied on Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah and Ors. v. Hotil Lal and Anr. in this regard. On merits it has been contended that the petitioner’s admission that the said letter was cyclostyled and handed over to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhary, M.P clearly constituted serious misconduct under the CCA (Conduct) Rules. The petitioner’s conduct was rightly held to be in violation of Rules 3 and 11 of the Conduct Rules.

21. It is also contended that the repatriation of the petitioner to the parent office was neither at the instance of Dr. Kurien, nor in any manner related to the “Note” of the petitioner.

22. We now consider the contention of the petitioner that the letter in question was not a confidential document. If this submission of the petitioner has force, then it would mean that the charge leveled against the petitioner itself was ill-founded.

23. Chapter 8 of Swamy’s Manual on Establishment and Administration[2006] for Central Government Offices, deals with classification and handling of confidential documents. As per the said manual the decision whether a particular document is to be classified as “secret” or “confidential” should be made by a responsible authority. The communications and papers marked Page 1046 “confidential” should be disclosed only to authorised persons or in the interests of public service. They should not pass in the ordinary course through an office, but be dealt with only by the head of the office or by those specially authorised for that purpose. “Confidential” papers should be addressed to an office by name and should be opened by the addressee himself or in his absence by an officer performing his duties. Few copies of the same ought to be made and the register should be kept showing how each copy has been disposed of. (Rules 688 to 692 of P & T Manual, Volume II, Third Edition).

24. We may take notice of a Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pritam Singh v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 4750. The appellant Pritam Singh was working as a Head Clerk in Northern Railways. An employee sought the “absentee statement” from the appellant, which he gave. That employee used the said statement in certain legal proceedings against the railways challenging the disciplinary action taken against him. This Act on the part of the appellant was viewed as a misconduct and leakage of official information and he was charge-sheeted for the same. The appellant admitted to his having given “absentee statement”.

25. On the basis of the inquiry report, the appellant was ordered to be compulsory retired. He challenged the penalty inflicted upon him before a Bench of the Tribunal at Chandigarh. The same was rejected. The High Court also rejected his writ petition. The appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The punishment inflicted was challenged on merits as well as on the ground of being disproportionate. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the appellant was merely a custodian of the document and not the approving authority to supply the same to an employee. The appellant had not complied with the procedure for supplying of documents and was guilty of unauthorisedly communicating the “absentee statement” to another employee, who was litigating against the Railways. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not agree with the aforesaid contention of the respondent. The Supreme Court held that just because an employee is facing a litigation, he does not loose his right to get information to which he has a right so long as the same is not barred.

26. Moreover, furnishing of such information has not done or caused any damage to the office except causing an inconvenient situation to the Railways in contesting the case of an employee when the railway administration was confronted with the said “absentee statement” which prompted the Railways to initiate against the appellant.

27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the conduct of the appellant was neither a misconduct nor a serious mistake. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that the punishment of compulsory retirement in such circumstances was highly disproportionate.

28. We now proceed to consider the facts in the present case to determine if it could be said that the document, namely, the letters written by Dr. Kurien were confidential documents when placed in the hands of the petitioner and whether it could be said that the petitioner committed any misconduct in giving copies thereof to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhry.

Page 1047

29. When Dr Kurien issued the letter dated 1.5.78 addressed to Shri G.V.K. Rao the Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and another communication of the same date to the Cabinet Secretary, and marked the same as confidential, it meant that Dr Kurien wanted to keep the contents of these communications confidential. It was for the recipients of these communications viz. the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation to decide whether or not to treat the said communications as confidential. It is the consistent case of the petitioner that these communications were given to him officially in the normal course and they had not been classified as confidential by any authority in the Government of India. Dr Kurien was not, at the relevant time an officer of the government and merely because he had classified his own communications addressed to Shri G.V.K. Rao and the Cabinet Secretary as confidential, these documents did not attain the classification of being ‘confidential’ for the purpose of the Government. In fact, neither the Cabinet Secretary nor the secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation maintained the confidentiality of these communications. Else, while forwarding these communications to the petitioner, they would have in their forwarding letters classified these communications as confidential. This is not the Respondents case.

30. The purpose of giving these communications to the petitioner is not difficult to understand. The “note” which generated sharp criticism from Dr Kurien was authored by the petitioner. To give the petitioner an opportunity to meet the criticism made by Dr Kurien, and to respond to the same, the said letter was given to the petitioner. At that stage the petitioner was not informed that the communications of Dr Kurien should be treated as confidential. It appears from the record that the petitioner throughout contended in the enquiry proceedings that the said communications of Dr Kurien were not classified as confidential. The respondents did not produce any material to substantiate their charge that the communications in question were in fact confidential documents in relation to the government, though that was the only aspect that called for an enquiry, since the petitioner admitted giving copies of the same to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhary M.P.

31. In our view, on account of the failure of the respondents to lead any evidence whatsoever to substantiate their charge that the communications sent by Dr Kurien were ever marked as confidential by the government of India, the entire charge against the petitioner falls to the ground and this was a case of no evidence.

32. From the point of view of the petitioner, to whom the letters of Dr Kurien were given presumably for his comments and reaction, endeavored to clarify matters with Dr Kurien by using the good offices of Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhary. Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhary was a person connected with the field of dairy farming and was known to Dr Kurien and the petitioner. In our view, since the two communications from Dr Kurien were not marked as confidential by the government when they were forwarded to the petitioner, he acted bona fide in good faith parting with the communication of Dr. Kurien to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhry. However the attempt proved abortive. Rather it recoiled with charges of misconduct being levelled on the petitioner.

Page 1048

33. It is not the respondent’s case that the furnishing of the said letters of Dr. Kurien to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhry caused any embarassment, loss or damage to the Government. Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhry was a member of Parliament, who was closely connected with the field of dairy farm. He was a member of the Consultative Committee in the Agriculture Ministry where the petitioner was posted at the relevant time. The communications of Dr. Kurien not having been classified as confidential by the respondents and dealing with policy aspects of achieving the objectives in the field of dairy farming would have been within his reach. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of penalty deserves to be set aside.

34. From the said letter of Dr. Kurien it appears that he considered the “Note” prepared by the petitioner as nothing short of blasphemy. It is also apparent from the two communications sent by Dr. Kurien that they were written from a position of authority. How else can one explain such a reaction from the head of an autonomous body to a “Note” prepared by an officer in the concerned Ministry, where he virtually demands the head of the author of the “Note”?

35. Apparently, the ire of Dr. Kurien was, inter alia, on account of a threat perceived by Dr. Kurien to the autonomy of NDDB from the government. Though Dr. Kurien may have had his reasons to react in the manner that he did, the government could not have lost its objectivity while dealing with the demand of Dr. Kurien to carry out a “surgical procedure”, which implied the removal of the author of the offending note, that is, the petitioner.

36. In a democratic set up, the administration is expected to show sufficient maturity and tolerance to hear all points of view. This is necessary to generate a healthy debate on all issues of importance. No dissenting voice should be quelled by adopting a hostile attitude. If officers in the government are to face action without a proper enquiry, merely because a powerful personality desires that action be taken in a particular way, it would become extremely difficult for independent minded officers to express their views frankly and fearlessly and to work with complete integrity and honesty. It appears to us, that the officers in the Cabinet Secretariat as well as in the Ministry of Agriculture and irrigation were overawed by the towering personality of Dr. Kurien and after sending back the petitioner to the ICAR, when they saw an opportunity to take action against the petitioner they issued a memorandum proposing to take action against him.

37. We will now deal with the contention whether the President, ICAR had the power to order fresh enquiry proceedings for imposing Major Penalty against the Petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case. It is pertinent to mention that the earlier memo dated 24.8.1978 proposed only disciplinary action as provided in Rule 16 CCS (CCA) Rules for imposition of minor penalty against the petitioner. On the basis of the reply to the show cause given by the petitioner, the President ICAR was pleased to impose the penalty of Censure. The President ICAR thereafter vide office order dated 18.3.1980 reviewed his own order and while setting aside the punishment earlier imposed directed a de-novo enquiry against the petitioner.

38. A perusal of the relevant rules indicates that Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules confers the power to the President to remit a case or to direct such Page 1049 further enquiry as it may consider proper in circumstances of the case. However, this Court in Sh. R.K. Gupta v. Union of India and Anr. 1981(26) SLR 752 while interpreting the said provision held that the power conferred by the said Rule can only be exercised in relation to an order passed by a subordinate authority and not by the reviewing authority itself as it is of the nature of revisionary power. The President does not has power to review its own order under the said provision. Consequently, the provision of review was inserted in the form of Rule 29-A vide notification dated 6.8.1981.

39. Rule 29-A of the CCS (CCA) Rules reads as follows:

29-A. Review

The President may, at any time, either on his own motion or other-wise review any order passed under these rules, when any new material or evidence which could not be produced or was not available at the time of passing the order under review and which has the effect of changing the nature of the case, has come, or has been brought to his notice:

Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by the President unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed or where it is proposed to impose any of the major penalties specified in Rule 11 or to enhance the minor penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the major penalties and if an enquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, no such penalty shall be imposed except after inquiring in the manner laid down in Rule 14, subject to the provisions of Rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary.

40. Power under Rule 29A could only be exercised when any new material or evidence which could not be produced or was not available at the time of the passing of the order under review, and which has the effect of changing the nature of the case, has come or has been brought to his notice. Proviso to the said Rule lays down that where the existence of the above condition requires enhancement of the penalty already imposed, the same can only be done after giving a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee to make a representation, and where a minor penalty order is sought to be reviewed and a major penalty is proposed, the penalty shall not be enhanced except after an enquiry, (where it has not already been held under Rule 14).

41. The power conferred upon the President under Rule 29A is not an unbridled or unguided power. It can be exercised only within the limits and subject to the conditions laid down in Rule 29A itself. Without such limits an unguided power of review in an executive authority would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (Kindly see B.B. Rajvanshi v. State of U.P and Ors. .

42. In the instant case, the representation made by the petitioner did not bring to light any new evidence or material pertaining to the alleged Page 1050 misconduct against him to warrant an enhancement in punishment and to call for a fresh enquiry. In fact, in this case no formal enquiry was really called for since the factum of communication of the said letters of Dr. Kurien to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhry had been admitted by the petitioner. Consequently, it was impermissible under Rule 29-A for the President ICAR to have started a de novo enquiry against the petitioner for imposition of a major penalty. To that extent the order of the President 8.3.1980 is bad and liable to be quashed.

43. From our above discussion, it emerges that the petitioner has been meted out the punishment of compulsory retirement without there being any cause for the same. He was first punished, without an inquiry and after seeking his explanation by inflicting a minor penalty of “Censure”. On his own representation that penalty was set aside and a de novo inquiry ordered. The charge itself was in respect of conduct which did not amount to misconduct under the Conduct Rules. For the same alleged misconduct for which he had earlier been censured, he was given a major punishment of compulsory retirement. To our mind, the petitioner was most unjustifiedly punished.

44. Coming back to the question whether the laches in filing of the present petition deserve to be condoned or not, we think it necessary to examine whether the petitioner completely slept over his rights after the punishment of compulsory retirement was inflicted upon him. The petitioner represented to the President ICAR against his compulsory retirement on 7.7.1982 which was also rejected on 31.7.1982. Further representations were made by him on 6.9.1982 and 27.1.1984. Thereafter on 12.7.1986 the petitioner wrote a letter to the then Minister of State for Personal, Public Grievances and Pension along with the reply of DG, ICAR dated 8.7.1986 seeking a CBI probe in the matter. The ministry acknowledged the receipt of said letter by their communication dated 9.9. 1986 indicating therein that the petitioner’s case had been referred to DOP&T, AVD section, and he would be informed of the outcome. However, no information was received by the Petitioner. He made a further representation on 23.1.1987, and not getting any relief he approached the Tribunal on 11.8.1987. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner completely slept over his rights, or that he accepted the penalty imposed upon him. He kept agitating against the same from time to time. It cannot be said that he suddenly, without any action for years, came out from the cold in 1987, to challenge the order passed in 1982.

45. In the present case, the relief sought by the petitioner is to quash the imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement upon him. This relief even if granted would not effect the rights of any other officer one way or another. Moreover, the petitioner’s counsel had during the hearing of this petition made a statement that his client is not interested in seeking reinstatement from the date of his compulsory retirement and is also not interested in claiming any monetary benefits arising out of reinstatement. Instead, he submits that his client has been litigating for all these years for vindication of his honour and to remove the blot of a major penalty imposed upon him in his otherwise blemishless career. He submits that the petitioner would be Page 1051 willing to be treated as a voluntary retired from the date of infliction of punishment in the event of punishment of compulsory retirement being set aside.

46. Considering the aforesaid circumstances in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and in the facts of the present case we are inclined to condone the delay and laches of about five years in filing of the present petition, after excluding the period during which the petitioner had been prosecuting his petition before the Tribunal.

47. Further, in view of the analysis and findings hereinbefore, we hold that the petitioner could not be said to be guilty of any misconduct on account of his having given a copy of the letter written by Dr. Kurien to Shri Moti Bhai Chaudhry and the said Act of the petitioner was an Act done bona fide in good faith. The communication of Dr. Kurien cannot be said to have been a confidential document for the purposes of government. It was also not open to the respondents, after setting aside the punishment of censure to have started the inquiry de novo and to punish the petitioner with the major penalty of compulsory retirement. The punishment of compulsory retirement inflicted upon the petitioner is, therefore, quashed and set aside. In view of the statement as aforesaid made by the petitioner’s counsel, the petitioner be treated as having voluntary retired from the date of his compulsory retirement i.e. 5.7.1982. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.

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