JUDGMENT
P.S. Mishra and B. Prasad, JJ.
1. The petitioner claiming to represent vox populi has filed the instant application for a writ in the nature of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to issue to the respondents quashing the oath administered to respondent No. 4 by the Speaker of Bihar Vidhan Sabha as a member of the said Sabha and restraining respondent No. 4 from sitting and participating in the proceedings thereof.
2. The petitioner has stated that he is a social and political worker, a former member of the Legislative Assembly and an office-bearer of the Bhartiya Janta Party, Bihar Pradesh. According to the petitioner Shri Satya Narain Dudhani was elected from 280-Tondi Assembly Constituency of the State of defeating respondent No. 4 Sri Uday Kumar Singh in the general assembly election held in March 1985. Shri Satya Narain Dudhani was declared elected on Bhartiya Janta Party Ticket on 7.3.1985. Respondent No. 4 (Uday Kumar Singh) challenged Shri Satya Narain Dudhani’s election by filing an election petition (Election Petition No. 1 of 1988) at the Ranchi Beach of this Court on grounds inter alia of illegalities and irregularities alleged to have been committed by the Returning Officer and other officers in the counting of votes of various candidates, at the election. The said election petition was finally heard by L.P. Sahdeo, J. who after hearing the parties delivered his judgment on 6th December, 1988 setting aside the election of Shri Satya Narain Dudhani and declaring respondent No. 4 (Shri Uday Kumar Singh) elected. But on that very date, that is to say, on 6th December, 1988 learned counsel appearing for Shri Satya Narain Dudhani made an oral prayer for stay of the operation of the order before L.P.N. Sahdeo, J., as Shri Satya Narain Dudhani wanted to challenge the judgment of this Court before the Supreme Court of India. The petitioner has alleged that Sahdeo, J., observed for filing an application in writing on that very day and an application in writing was tiled and a copy thereof was also served on learned Advocate for respondent No. 4 (Shri Uday Kumar Singh) who was present in the Court. Sahdeo, J., however, passed no order on the application on that day. The application for stay was posted on the next day that is to say on 7th December, 1988 for orders. Responds it No. 4, Shri Uday Kumar Singh, however, managed to obtain a certified copy of the Judgment and got it seat to Patna through special messenger. He met the Speaker on the morning of 7th December, 1988 with the certified copy of the Judgment. The speaker at about 11 a.m. got him sworn in as a member of the Legislative Assembly and also got the judgment and swearing in of respondent No. 4, Shri Uday Kumar Singh notified in the Official Gazette on 7.12.1988 itself. However, when the application for stay was heard by Sahdeo, J., on 7.12.1988 operation of the Judgment in the election case was stayed for 15 days. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 4, Shri Uday Kumar Singh was present in the Court. Shri Satya Narain Dudhani filed Civil Appeal No. 4337 (N.C.E.) of 1988 before the Supreme Court of India against the Judgment and order dated 6.12.1988 passed by Shahdeo, J. He also filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 32577 of 1988 before the Supreme Court for stay of the operation of the Judgment and order of this Court.
3. We are informed at the Bar that the Supreme Court has admitted the appeal for hearing, but declined to grant any stay in favour of Shri Dudhani. The Petitioner has contended that the respondent No. 4 manipulated and the respondent No. 2 (Speaker of Bihar Legislative Assembly) connived in administering oath of office to respondent No. 4, Shri Uday Kumar Singh, in violation of the constitutional mandates; and in hurried and hush-hush way demonstratively been mala fide.
4. Article 188 of the Constitution of India states-
Every member of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council of a State shall, before taking his seat, make and subscribe before the Governor, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.
As a result of the election to the Legislative Assembly a member may qualify to take his seat, but cannot do so without making and subscribing before the Governor or some other person appointed on that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. As to who may be deemed to have been elected and thus…entitled to take his seat is to be found in the provisions as contained in the Representation of People Act., When a general election is held as per Section 73 of the Representation of People Act, the same is notified by the Election Commission in the Official Gazette after the results of the election in all the constituencies are declared by the Returning Officer under the provision of Section 53, or as the case may be, Section 66, the names of the members elected is notified. After such notification, the House or Assembly is deemed to be duly constituted. Shri Dudhani’s name was notified by the Election Commission after the general elections. He became a member of the duly constituted Assembly. Part VI of the Representation of the People Act contains provisions as to the disputes regarding elections and provides in Section 81 thereof for presentation of petition calling in question any election on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-section (1) of Sections 100 and 101 of the Act to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. Trial of election petition, procedure, evidence etc, as envisaged in the said part of the Representation of the People Act come to end with the decision of the High Court at the conclusion of the trial of election petition as envisaged in Section 98 thereof by an order:
(a) dismissing the election; or
(b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or
(c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidates to have been duly elected.
Section 116-A provides for appeal to the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law or fact) from every order made by a High Court within a period of 30 days and Section 116-B states (1) an application may be made to the High Court for stay of operation of an order made by the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99 before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing therefrom and the High Court may; on sufficient cause being shown and on such terms and conditions as it may think fit, stay the operation of the order; but no application for stay shall be made to the High Court after an appeal has been preferred to the Supreme Court (2) where an appeal has been preferred against an order made under Section 98 or Section 99, the Supreme Court may, on sufficient cause being shown and on such terms and conditions as it may think fit, stay the operation thereof (3) when the operation of an order is stayed by the High Court, or, as the case may be, the Supreme Court, the order shall be deemed never to have effect under Sub-section (1) of Section 107 and a copy of the stay order shall immediately be sent by the High Court or, as the case may be, the Supreme Court, to the Election Commission and the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, of the House of Parliament or of the State Legislature concerned.
Section 107, however, of the Act states-
Subject to the provisions contained in Chapter IV-A relating to the stay of operation of an order of the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99, every such order shall take effect as soon as it is pronounced by the High Court.
(2) Where by an order under Section 98 the election of a returned candidate is declared to be void, acts and proceedings in which that returned candidate has, before the date thereof, participated as a member of Parliament or as a member of the Legislature of a State shall not be invalidated by reason of that order, nor shall such candidate to any liability or penalty on the ground of such participation.
This provision, however, is preceded by two other provisions one in Section 103 and the other in Section 106 of the said Act. Section 103 has enjoined upon the High Court to, as soon as may be, after the conclusion of the trial of an election petition, intimate the substance of the decision to the Election Commission and the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, of the House of Parliament or of the State Legislature concerned and, as soon as may be thereafter to send to the Election Commission an authenticated copy of the decision. Section 106 states that after the receipt of any order made by the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99 the Election Commission shall forward copies of the order to the appropriate authority and, the case where such order relates to an election to a House of Parliament or to an election to the House of the Legislature of a State, also to the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, of the House concerned and shall cause the order to be published-
(a) where the order relates to an election to a House of Parliament,
in the Gazette of India as well as in the official Gazete of the State concerned; and
(b) where the order relates to an election to the House or a House of the Legislature of the State, in the Official Gazette of the State.
5. A comprehensive look to these provisions, therefore, reveals that the High Court’s order, under Section 98 declaring election of Shri Dudhani void and further declaring that the respondent No. 4 had been duly elected, took effect as soon as it was pronounced by Shahdeo, J. on 6.12.1988. That, however, was subject to the stay of operation of order by the High Court itself as provided in Section 116-B and thereafter by the High Court as provided therein. With the declaration aforementioned the fourth respondent, became entitled to take his seat, subject to oath as contemplated in Article 188 of the Constitution of India. Provisions in Section 103 of the Act, however, are not empty formalities. The Court has been, as noticed above, enjoined to communicate the substance of the decision to the Election commission and the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, of the House of Parliament or of the State Legislature concerned and thereafter to send to the Election Commission an authenticated copy of the decision. This is a provision to ensure that there is an official communication of the decision to the Election Commission and the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, and before such communication by the High Court to examine whether any application for stay if filed before it or not and if stayed, such communication also to go with a copy of the judgment and order to the Election Commission and the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, so that they may know and accordingly act to postpone until such time, the appeal is finally disposed of by the Supreme Court any action pursuant to the judgment and order of the High court under Section 98 of the Act.
6. A certified copy of the judgment or order of the Court is no doubt a duly authenticated information to all concerned about the decision taken by the Court. That, however, cannot be substituted to replace a communication or intimation by the High court. It appears that respondent No. 4 had obtained a certified copy of the Judgment of the Court and it also appears, that the certified copy of the Judgment of the court was presented by him to the Speaker of the Assembly (respondent No. 2). Without for a moment suggesting that the Speaker could not take notice of the certified copy of the Judgment to the Court, it is indeed curious if not surprising why the Speaker accepted certified copy of the Judgment of the Court as the information about the result of the case of respondent No. 4 against Shri Dudhani and without waiting even for an authenticated information as to whether any petition for stay of operation of the Judgemnt and order had been filed or not and if filed with what result the speaker proceeded to administer oath to respondent No. 4 The sequence of event, as noticed above, shows that all that had transpired on the 6th December, 1988 was subject to the order that the High Court was likely to make on the 7th December, 1988 on the application filed on behalf of Shri Dudhani for stay of operation of the order (Judgment of the High Court). The Court on the 7th December, 1988 had stayed the operation of its judgment but on the 7th December, 1988 at an hour when perhaps Hon’ble Judge at Ranchi was hearing arguments on the stay petition and examining whether a case has been made out for staying the operation of the Judgment and order of this Court or not, respondent No. 2 accepted verbal communication of respondent No. 4 about the stay matter and administered oath to him at 11 a.m.. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was under hurty and attempt to defeat the petition of stay before of High Court by a fait accompli.
7. Apart from the fact that the Speaker had not received any intimation form the Court of the substance of its decision there was also no occasion for the Speaker to proceed without waiting for the publication of the result of the election by the Election Commission as contemplated in Section 106 states that after the receipt of any order made by the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99 the Election Commission shall forward copies of the order to the appropriate authority and, in the case where such order relates to an election to a House of Parliament or to an election to the House or a House of the Legislature of a State as also to the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, of a House concerned and shall cause the order to be published.
(a) where the order relates to an election to a House of Parliament, in the Gazette of India as well as in the Official Gazette of the State concerned; and
(b) where the orders to an election to the House or a House of the Legislature of the State, in the Official Gazette of the State.
8. It is reasonable in the context of the Scheme of law to presume that until notified in the Official Gazette any member does not become a member of duly constituted House. Provision in Section 73 of the Act clearly shows that mere declaration of the result of the election by the Returning Officer is not enough. A notification by the Election Commission in the Official Gazette, after the result of the election in all constituencies, of the name of the elected candidates is necessary before the Assembly or House is deemed to be duly constituted. It will not be possible thus to ignore the requirements of Section 106 for the publication in the Official Gazette of the State concerned the result of the election or declaration of the election by the High Court under Section 98 of the Act. It will be pertinent therefore to question whether the Speaker could allow respondent No. 4 to take his seat in a duly constituted House without publication of his name in the Official Gazette.
9. Article 188 which mandates before taking seat as a member of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council of a State for making and subscribing oath before the Governor or some persons appointed in that behalf by him will operate after the notification under Sections 71 and 73 of the Representation of the People Act. This publication and the publication of the result of election of a candidate by the order of the High Court Section 106 of the Act are comparable. Therefore after declaration of election under the High Court order and its publication alone one may become entitled to take oath under Article 188 of the Constitution of India Respondent No. 4 took oath before the publication of the result of his election but soon after the declaration of his election by the High Court. As he could not do so as a result of the declaration of his election by the Returning Officer without its publication as required under Section 73 of the Act he could not take oath without the publication merely on the basis of the declaration of the result of his election by the High Court,
10. A notification dated 22.3.1985 authorising the Speaker of the State Assembly has been produced before us that states that in exercise of the power under Article i8b of the Constitution of India, the Governor of the State has been pleased to appoint Shri Karpoori Thakur a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, to be the person, before whom members of the said Assembly, shall make and subscribe the oath or affirmation referred to in the said Article on the 2nd and 4th April 1985, until the election of Speaker and the Speaker to be the person before whom members of the said Assembly who have not made and subscribed such oath or affirmation shall after such election, make and subscribe the same.
11. It is noticed above that it was an authorisation to the Speaker after his election to act in that behalf as contemplated in Article 188 of the Constitution before whom members of the Assembly duly constituted after elections in the year 1985 were to make and subscribe oath. Words in Article 188 of the Constitution “or some person appointed in that behalf by him” are also to be found in Article 219 of the Constitution. Article 219 of the Constitution says that every person appointed to be a judge of a High Court shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the Governor of the State or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. In the case of Sabir v. State , a question had arisen whether the oath made and subscribed before the Chief Justice and not before the Governor of the State was a valid oath or not. The contention before the Court was that oath could only be made and subscribed before the Governor of the State or some person appointed in that behalf by him. Ordinarily, oath should be made and subscribed before the Governor but in case the Governor decided to appoint some other person to act in that behalf he was required to appoint that some person for his presence for oath. In a learned judgment, Jagdish Sahay, J. (as he then was) has discussed at length the principle behind such a prescription and has said : “It is clear from the relevant provisions of the Constitution that it has been deliberately provided that oath should be made and subscribed before the Head of the State except in the case of Heads themselves. There is good reason behind this rule. The oath or a solemn affirmation creates a moral obligation and consciousness in the mind of one who takes it of the solemn and serious duties he is called upon to discharge of his undertaking that he would do so conscientiously, diligently and according to the Constitution and the laws. The origin of the oath can be traced to a religious source. The idea was to invoke God so that its breach may be visited with divine wrath. It has also a secular aspect, the same being impeachment or dismissal in the case of high dignitaries and punishment for perjury according to the laws of the land in the case of witnesses for its infringement. The gravity and solemnity of the oath is enhanced if it h made and subscribed before the highest officer of the State. Its value is reduced if the person before whom it is made does not enjoy that highest status. It is admitted on all, hands that much depends upon the impressive manner in which an oath is made for its subjective potency. Therefore the presence of the President or the Governor as the case may be at the time of making and subscribing oath is not a mere formality but has much deeper significance.
12. Coming to the words “before the Governor of the State or some person appointed in that behalf by him” the Court has said. The use of the words “in that behalf” in our opinion means for that specific purpose ‘or’ on that particular occasion’. In Section 220(4) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the words were “before the Governor or some person appointed by him. This provision is almost the same as Article 219 of the Constitution except for the omission of the words in that behalf “after the word” ‘appointed’. The expression ‘in that behalf cannot be divorced of specificity. Consequently, the rule enshrined in Article 219 of Constitution is that normally oath should be made and subscribed before the Governor can also appoint some one else for that purpose. Proceeding further Court has said : Though Article 219 of the Constitution does not say so expressly it is obvious that departure from the normal rule of the Governor himself being present can be made only for good reasons. Any general order for an in definite period or a routine practice requiring oath being made and subscribed before some one else and not the Governor can only result in defeating the provisions of the Constitution. Consequently, every time that an appointment is announced and the question of making and subscribing of oath arises the Governor has to apply his mind and decide whether he would like the oath to be made and subscribed before himself or would appoint some one else to do so. He is the best Judge to decide which course he would adopt, but the matter should receive his attention on every occasion. We have already said above that the expression “in that behalf” in the context in which it is used means ‘for that sake’ or for the purpose of witnessing the oath being made and subscribed by the particular person who is appointed to be a judge. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the Governor should not have made a general authorisation as he did by means of the latter addressed to the Chief Justice dated 25th August, 1963.”
The Allahabad Court found defect in the following words:
Governor Governor's Camp. Uttar Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, My dear Chief Justice. August 25, 1963.
Thanks for your letter of the 24th August, la exercise of the power conferred by Article 219 of the Constitution of India 1 appoint the Chief Justice or the Acting Chief Justice, Uttar Pradesh and during his absence from Allahabad the seniormost Puisne Judge available at the moments at Allahabad as the person in whose presence every person appointed to be a Judge of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh before he enters upon his office, makes and subscribes oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule of the Constitution of India.
Yours Sincerely,
(Sd) Bishwanath Das
(Bishwanath Das)
A comparision of the authorisation by the Uttar Pradesh Governor under Article 219 of the Constitution and the Bihar Governor under Article 188 of the Constitution will show that while there was some hint of a general authorisation by the Uttar Pradesh Governor, appointment of the Speaker by the Bihar Governor by his order dated 22.3.1985 was limited to the members who had already been elected and ratified to constitute the Assembly. It was an authorisation confirmed to making and subscribing oath by the persons who had already been declared members of the Assembly. To read in this authorisation a general authorisation to extend to any person entering the House subsequently will mean giving such extended meaning to the words in the order which some how will cover the case of the respondent No. 4. It will be possible therefore to hold that the Governor had not authorised the speaker to act in his place before whom any person other than one who had already been notified as a member of the duly constituted Assembly prior to 22.3.1985 could take oath.
13. While the Allahabad’s case was a case of some sort of authorisation the instant case is one in which there has been no authorisation at all.
On the facts of Sabir’s case, however, the Allahabad Court pointed out that it would not be said that the Governor had no jurisdiction to authorise the Chief Justice to have the Judges concern make and subscribe oath in his presence. The defect was in the manner in which that jurisdiction was exercised by the Governor. The Allahabad Court This said though the Governor could not have given such a general authority thus relieving himself for an indefinite period of his constitutional duty to consider in each case whether he would himself like to be present to see a person appointed to be a judge of the High Court making and subscribing oath or he would for that purpose appoint some one else, but it was only an irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction. This irregularity did not vitiate the making and subscribing of oath by the Judges and their duty into office.
14. A contrary view has, however, been taken by V. Ramaswami, J. ‘(as he then was) in G. Vasantha Pai v. C.K. Ramaswami and Anr. . In that case words “in that behalf” used in Article 188 of the Constitution have been interpreted. The Court has said that the words “in that behalf” in Article 188 are intended both to acknowledge the making and subscribing the oath and for certifying that it was done in the form that is required. The purpose of appointment being thus to enable the members generally to take oath before such authority and get a certificate of compliance with Article 188, the words, “in that behalf” could not be given a restricted meaning as referring to the persons who are to make the oath and not the authority to witness and give declaration of compliance. The Madras Court recorded its disagreement with the views expressed by the Allahabad Court in the following words “with great respect to the learned Judges, I could not subscribe to this view. For one thing it proceeds on the assumption that once a person is appointed by the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 219 which is similar to Article 1988, the Governor abdicates his powers, which assumption, as I have already held, is not correct and the Governor still retains his powers. The question of deciding on each occasion as to whether he would do it himself or have its done by others, does not arise all. Secondly, the learned Judges themselves have interpreted the words ‘in that behalf as meaning’ for that sake’ or for the purpose of witnessing the oath being made and subscribed. But, however, the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that these words also imply the witnessing of oath of a particular person or parsons. I have no doubt that the use of the words “in that behalf” in no way restricts the power of the Governor to appoint one or more persons either by name or by designation for a particular period or for an indefinite period, provided it specifies that they are appointed in exercise of the powers under Article 188 and for the purpose of any and every member of the Assembly or the Council, as the case may be, to make and subscribe their oath or affirmation.
15. The above view if accepted may destroy altogether the contentions of the petitioner based on any defect in oath-taking of respondent No. 4. While the Allahabad Court opined against any general authorisation, the Madras Court opined that such general authorisation was permissible. The Allahabad Court, however, also said that though general authorisation was not permissible, is such authorisation was made, it was an irregular exercise of jurisdiction and not altogether without jurisdiction. On the authority, as aforementioned, therefore, in case it is held the Speaker was authorised to act on behalf of the Governor of the State at oath-taking of even such person who subsequently became the members of the Assembly, these may be no defect in the membership of the respondent No. 4 and his function as a member of the Legislative Assembly.
16. Much has been said before us about the jurisdiction of this Court and Article 212 of the Constitution which says that the acknowledgement of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure and no officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. Article 212 has extended immunity to the proceedings in the Legislature from judicial review, ft also excludes functions or acts of Officers of the Legislature in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business or for maintaining order in the Legislature in respect of the exercise by him all such powers from Judicial review. A question arises whether making and subscribing oath before the Governor or some person appointed in that behalf by him is a proceeding of the Legislature or not and also whether by acting on behalf of the Governor of the State the Speaker (respondent No. 2) acts as an Officer or member of legislature exercising powers vested by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business or for maintaining the order in the Legislature or not. There can be no doubt to it that the Legislature is entitled to function unraveled of any interference by any person or authority. It may be seen that Article 188 of the Constitution has created an obligation for oath-taking before the Governor or some person appointed in that behalf by him. Any person appointed by the Governor (may be the Speaker or any member of the House) shall not act in any proceeding in the Legislature but as a delegate of the Governor of the State. He by such appointment does not either become an Officer or a member of Legislature of a State. He may however for other reason and/or otherwise may bean Officer or member of the Legislature. As a delegate of the Governor of be the Stats he shall not be acting in any proceeding in the Legislature, but shall by the subscribing oath-making a member elected eligible to sit in the House and unless one sits in the House he does not act in any proceeding in the House. Respondent No. 4, until oath was subscribed to him, acted not as a member of the Legislature. The Speaker (respondent No. 2) acted as a delegate of the Governor before the respondent No. 5 took his seat in the House and thus acted before and not in the proceeding in the House Taking oath, though a constitutional obligation before one takes his seat in the House in no part of the business of the House. Authorisation under Article 188 of the Constitution shall not make any person who shall act on behalf of the Governor, a person in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business or for maintaining the order in the Legislature. Whether one is validly elected as a member or not or whether one is eligible to sit as a member in a House or not is a question which shall determine the very eligibility of the person concerned to take part in the Legislature and to participate in the proceedings of th2 Legislature. The being the position in law, this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution shall in our view be not inhibited by the immunity of the proceeding of the Legislature or those Officers or members in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating the proceeding or the conduct of business or for maintaining the order in the Legislature. Such an issue in our view shall be subject to judicial review and subject to jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
16. In view of the contentions we would have preferred a detailed hearing and a deeper consideration of the question raised before us, we however, find that any order that this Court may finally make in favour of the petitioner, if at all his contentions are accepted, shall be futile. In Shri Dudhani’s appeal against the Judgment of this Court before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has declined to grant any order of stay. Respondent No. 4 thus today is eligible to sit as a member in the Bihar Legislative Assembly.
17. It is well-settled that a writ in the nature of quo warranto is not granted against a person who for the reasons of his qualification may be appointed to the same office. Respondent No. 4 for the reason of the declaration of his election by the judgment of this Court and for the reason of his being entitled to sit as a member of the House in the absence of any stay granted by the Supreme Court should not be denied the right to be present in the proceedings of the Legislature.
18. Although there has been some attempt before us on behalf of the respondents that petitioner has no locus standi to maintain this application, when confronted by series of judgment of this Court including Dineshwar Prasad v. The State of Bihar , and several judgments of the Supreme Court including State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1975 SC 912. Drigraj Kucr v. Amar Krishna Narain Singh and the judgment in the King v. Speyet (1916) I KB 595 respondents have given up the said contention.
For the reasons aforementioned alone we reject this application.