G. Murali Mohan vs District Judge And Anr. on 11 June, 1997

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59
Andhra High Court
G. Murali Mohan vs District Judge And Anr. on 11 June, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997 (3) ALT 775
Author: N S Reddy
Bench: S P Rao, N S Reddy


ORDER

Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, J.

1. This petition is filed to issue an order or a direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari, declaring the order of the second respondent in ROC No. 552/96 C.II/1, dated 19-3-97 in confirming the order of the first respondent in Dis. No. 5422 dated 5-8-96 as arbitrary, bad, illegal and violative of principles of natural justice, and consequently direct the respondents to regularise the service of the petitioner by awarding two increments.

2. The petitioner, while working as a Steno-typist in the Court of the Special Mobile Court, Cuddapah, acted in violation of C.C.S. (sic. C.C.A.) Rules and punishable for misconduct, negligence, misbehaviour, unauthorised absence and insubordination. On Exs. P-3 and P-11 reports of the Magistrate of the Special Mobile Court, Cuddapah, against the petitioner, the District Judge, the first respondent herein, appointed I Addl. District Munsif, Proddatur, as an enquiry officer in his proceedings Ex.P-12.

3. The Enquiry Officer framed five charges for misconduct, negligence, misbehaviour, unauthorised absence, and insubordination. The sum and substance of the charges is that :

The petitioner was absenting from duties very frequently and on 16-8-95, when he was called for dictation by PW.1 (Magistrate of the Special Mobile Court), he was found absent and came to the office about one hour thereafter.

The petitioner did not type the judgment in C.C. No. 9/95 as dictated by PW. 1 and he has added some sentences of his own in the judgment and when the said lapse was pointed out to the petitioner by PW.1, he reacted and replied in an arrogant and insolent manner and further he was not available in the office hours when PW.1 called him for dictation.

The petitioner was absent during office hours on 25-8-95 also for about three hours in the afternoon. Whenever PW.1 questioned about the absence of the petitioner, he gave insolent replies.

On 6-9-95, PW.3, a lady Telugu typist of the said Court, gave Ex.P-4 complaint to PW.1 alleging that the petitioner misbehaved with her and abused her in filthy language.

4. The plea of the delinquent is one of denial. However, he admitted that he added some sentences to the judgment in C.C. No. 9/95 though it was not dictated by PW.1 and that he did so on the advice of his senior colleagues. He also admitted that this addition was not approved by PW.1 and in fact, he was sternly warned to type only what was dictated and nothing more or nothing less. He also further admitted that he was absent from the office on 25-8-95, but his explanation is that he went to the Stenographer in the I Addl. District Judge’s Court, Cuddapah, on some official work. His case is that the unseemly incident involving PW.3 and the petitioner occurred only due to provocation of PW.3

5. He was given full opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry and in fact, he was represented by an Advocate throughout the enquiry. During the enquiry, PWs. 1 to 8 were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-18 were marked. The delinquent examined himself as DW.1 and also examined DWs 2 to 4. The learned Enquiry Officer, after considering the evidence on record, found that all the charges were proved against the delinquent. On receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority i.e., the first respondent herein, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing the delinquent, passed the impugned order dated 10-7-96 imposing punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect under Rule 8(i)(iii) of A.P. (CCA) Rules, 1963. The delinquent, aggrieved by the above order, preferred an appeal in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the second respondent herein, on administrative side. The High Court, after considering all material on record, dismissed the appeal. This writ petition is filed by the delinquent questioning the orders of the first and second respondents imposing punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect under Rule 8(i)(iii) of A.P. (CCA) Rules, 1963.

6. Mr. G. Venugopal Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, contended that this is a case of no evidence and the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse and consequently the impugned orders are liable to be set aside and the petitioner is entitled to relief prayed for in the petition. He further submitted that the punishment imposed is quite disproportionate to the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and that justice has to be tempered with mercy by taking a lenient view regarding punishment.

7. Mr. P. Ravi Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, while refuting the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are wholly based on evidence on record and that there is sufficient evidence in support of the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer and the respondents 1 and 2 are fully justified in passing the impugned orders.

8. We have gone through the whole record and satisfied that it is not a case of no evidence and the findings of the enquiry officer are not perverse. The evidence of PW.1, by itself, is sufficient to establish the charges against the delinquent. Besides the evidence of PW.1, there is evidence of P.W.3 and others amply corroborating the testimony of P.W. 1. There is absolutely no material to doubt the veracity of PW.1, whose evidence is pivotal in establishing the charges. The evidence of DW. 1, the delinquent is self-serving. The testimony of other defence witnesses is highly interested, inconsistent and improbable.

9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., the Supreme Court held that the
“Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/ Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But the finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. When the authority accepts the evidence and the conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The Court/ Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of that case.”

10. In view of the above factual and legal position, we do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authorities in the instant case.

11. Considering all the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the punishment imposed on the writ petitioner is quite lenient and not disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court. Therefore, we find that on the facts of the present case, no grounds are made out for interfering with the punishment imposed.

12. The petition is therefore dismissed. No costs.

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