ORDER
1. The petitioners in the instant writ petition pray for issuance of an appropriate writ particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the respondents herein to dispose of the representation of the petitioners dated 1-10-1998 for “spot enquiry-cum-survey” and “Payment of Compensation” as per the Land Acquisition Act within four weeks. The petitioners also seek declaration to the effect that the inaction of the respondents in considering the representation of the petitioners dated 1-10-1998 on par with petitioners in \VP No.26573 of 1997 dated 15-9-1998 as illegal and violative of Articles 4 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Facts in Brief:
The petitioners claim to be owners of the land admeasuring an extent of 12-00 acres and 14-00 acres in Sy. Nos.212 and 102 respectively of Nambal village Rebbana Mandal of Adilabad District. It is their case that the said lands were forcibly taken over by the Irrigation Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh way-back in the year 1965 for formation of Chakali Kunla’. According to them the lands in Sy. Nos.116 and 102 whose lands were also sub-merged in Chakali Kunta along with the lands of the petitioners approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.26573 of 1997 and this Court by an order dated 15-9-1998 directed the authorities to pay compensation as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The petitioners having come to know about the orders passed by this Court made representation dated 1-10-1998 to the respondents for payment of compensation along with the petitioners in WP No.26573 of 1997 dated 15-9-1998. But the authorities have refused to consider their representation. Hence the present writ petition,
2. The question that would arise for consideration in the instant writ petition is as to whether this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should interfere in the matter and grant any, relief whatsoever to the petitioners? Even according to the petitioners, they have lost the possession of the land in question as early as in the year 1965. They have not made any attempt whatsoever during all these thirty three years and claimed any relief whatsoever from any of the authorities. The cause of action according to the petitioners had arisen after this Court disposed of WP No.26573 of 1997 directing the respondents to consider the case for grant of compensation. The petitioners in the said writ petition are stated to be similarly situated.
3. It would be appropriate to have a look at the order and the directions issued by this Court in the said writ petition:
“The petitioners land are sought to be acquired for the purpose of Chakali Chcruvu. The possession of land was taken in the year 1964 itself. But even till today, after expiry of more than three decades, the compensation is not paid. It is highly deplorable. Therefore, the respondents are directed to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands of the petitioners within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and complete the proceedings including passing of the Award within 2 months thereafter. The petitioners shall be entitled to all the statutory benefits according to law.
With the above directions the writ petition is disposed of.”
4. The order obviously appears to be summary in its nature and does not lay down any law as such which would support the case of the petitioners. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power of this Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary and the relief cannot be claimed as of right. It is essential that persons who are aggrieved by any order of the Government or any executive action should approach the High Court with utmost expedition. This Court would be well within its jurisdiction in refusing to exercise its discretion, if there is any negligence or omission on the part of the petitioners in asserting their right. The Constitutional Courts in exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction should not encourage agitation of stale claims particularly in cases where there is no reasonable explanation for delay in asserting the rights by aggrieved persons.
5. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, , the Apex Court observed:
“It is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.”
6. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, 1995 (4) Scale 98, had an occasion to consider exactly similar question. The facts in the said case may briefly be noticed: An agriculturist of Vepani village in Nandat District of Maharashtra filed a writ petition, in the year 1991 WP No.3124 of 1991 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the Bombay High Court against the State of Maharashtra seeking appropriate direction to grant compensation to him for his land alleged to have been utilised by the Government without his consent for Vepana-Gogri Road-a road work carried out by the agencies of the State Government, in the course of execution of scarcity relief works undertaken by the State Government in the year 1971-72. The High Court allowed the writ petition directing the Collector to initiate the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On an appeal preferred by the State of Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court after an elaborate consideration of the matter observed:
“Again, as seen from the judgment, the portion of which is excerpted by us earlier, the High Court has not chosen to consider the ground of laches or undue delay on the part of the writ petitioners as that which disentitled them to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, because of its view that the ground of laches or undue delay cannot disentitle a citizen to obtain relief from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he claims compensation from the State for his land alleged to have been taken away by the State or its agencies.
The said view taken by the High Court that the ground of laches or undue delay on the part of a citizen docs not disentitle him to obtain relief under Article 226 of the Constitution when his claim for relief is based on deprivation of his property by the State or its agencies has since made it (High Court) to grant relief to the respondent in this appeal and other similarly situated, sustainability of such view requires our examination in this appeal.
How a person alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decisions of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblame-worthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State.
Learned Counsel for the respondent (writ petitioner) and others similarly situated, it must be stated to their credit, even did not choose to address any arguments before us supporting the view of the High Court that a citizen when complains before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of the violation of his legal right by the State, the High Court could grant relief to him without examining the question of laches or undue delay on his part in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for relief thereunder. What was contended on behalf of the respondent and persons similarly situated against whom SLP’s filed are not yet registered, was that the State Government when had not chosen to question some judgments of the High Court in writ petitions of the year 1987 where under certain ad hoc compensation had been granted on the allegation that their lands had been taken away for scarcity relief works by the agencies of the State in the year 1971-72 and further when a few SLP’s filed in respect of some subsequent judgments of the High Court in similar matters had been rejected in limine by 3 two-Judge Bench of this Court, the State Government should not be allowed to pursue the present appeal or other SLP’s filed by it in similar cases.
Coming to the exercise of power conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing orders, directions or writs for ‘any purpose’, such power is discretionary, being a matter well-settled, cannot be disputed.
Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person’s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblame-worthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the Court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.
Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement for such relief due to his blame-worthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily.”
7. The authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Digambar’s case (supra) squarely applies to the facts on hand.
8. There is no whisper in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition as to why the petitioners could not seek appropriate remedy for a period of more than 33 years. Mere fact that one writ petition filed by similarly situated persons was disposed of by this Court is no ground to grant similar relief. The fact that the State had not filed any appeal against the said order in WP No.26573 of 1997 is no ground for granting similar relief. Grant of relief by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not a matter of course.
9. The Judgment of the Apex Court in N. Balakrishnau v. M, Krishnaimirthy, 1998 (7) Supreme 209, and in Ram Chand v. Union of India, , would not render any assistance whatsoever in the matter.
10. A similar writ petition in WP No.8799 of 1998 came up before me for consideration and the same was dismissed at the admission stage with the following observations:
“The petitioner in the instant writ petition, prays for issuance of an appropriate writ, particularly one in the nature of writ of mandcumis directing the respondents to pay reasonable compensation as per the Land Acquisition Act, together with interest from 1969, solatium and additional market value in respect of the lands in Sy. No.44,45,46 and 47 to an extent of Ac.32.00 of Romipur Village, Jaipur Mandal, Adilabad District.
The petitioner claims to be the owner of the lands in question. According to him, the respondents have taken possession of the land forcibly for formation of ‘Kotha Cheru’ in the year 1969. Inspite of his repeated representations, the respondents have failed to proceed under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ‘the Act’) and pay compensation to the petitioner.
I am not inclined to interfere in the matter and propose to dismiss the writ petition at the admission stage, for the simple reason that the petitioner had kept quiet without any demur and protest since 1969. It is settled law that this Court would come to the rescue of only such persons, who are diligent in prosecuting their constitutional remedy. It is rather difficult to appreciate as to how and why a person could have kept quiet for a period of thirty years, having lost his land in the hands of the respondents.
The petitioner is stated to have made a representation and the same is not yet considered and stated to be pending in File No.B/12/1969. No opinion need be expressed on this question.
I do not find any merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
However, this order would not preclude the respondents from considering the representation of the petitioner, if any, stated to have been already filed by him.”
11. There is not even any attempt on the part of the petitioners in the instant writ petition to explain the reasons as to why they could not approach the Court within reasonable time.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any nicrit in this writ petition. The same shall stand accordingly dismissed. No costs.
