ORDER
1. The petitioner was accused No.6 in SC No.47f of 1993 against which Crl.A No.283/95 was filed. He was also accused No.2 in SC No.415/93 and also accused No.3 in SC No.417/93. In SC No.415/93 the petitioner was convicted for the offence under Section 395 IPC and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, a fine of Rs.100/- was also imposed upon him. The sentence was pronounced on 11th July, 1994. On the same day he was convicted and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment with a fine of Rs.100/- in SC No.417/93 as well. On 8-9-1994 the petitioner was sentenced in SC No.471/93 under Section 395 of IPC. He has to undergo imprisonment of 10 years. Against this conviction and sentence he filed an appeal which has been decided by this Court on 17th April, 1998. The appeal has been dismissed and the sentence has been upheld. This application under Section 482 Cr.PC has been filed seeking a direction that the sentence given to the petitioner should run concurrently. Now the petitioner wants that the sentence given in SC Nos.415/93 and 417/93 should run concurrently with the sentence given in SC No.471/93 on 8-9-1994. This request had not been made before the learned Sessions Judge. This request had also not been made before the High Court when the High Court heard the appeal against judgment in SC No.471/93.
2. In the light of the facts this Court has to consider whether this Court can give such a direction at this stage or not. The occurrence had taken place in the intervening night of 13/14th July, 1990 with respect to SC No.415/93. The occurrence with respect to SC No.417/94 had taken place on 12th November, 1991 whereas the occurrence with respect to SC No.471/93 had taken place in the intervening night of 23/24th February, 1992. The relief of running of sentence concurrently in SC No.415/93 and SCNo.417/ 93 has already been granted by the Sessions Judge and this Court in these proceedings does not want to intervene in the mailer. But, whether this Court could order running of sentence concurrently for the occurrences which had taken place in July, 1990 and November, 1991 with an offence committed on 23rd February, 1992, or not, is a question which will have to be considered. If the sentence given to the accused in offences committed during a period of two years is directed to run concurrently, it will be a licence to offenders particularly to those who appear to be professional dacoits. The present petitioner has also been convicted in three cases of dacoity and if this Court direcls that the sentence should run concurrently, it will be a licence for such offenders to go on committing offences for number of years before they are caught up by the Police. Whether they commit one offence or dozen offences they will know that they have to suffer only one set of sentence and this will be a dangerous trend. Therefore, I am not inclined to direct, on the facts of this case, that the sentence should run concurrently in SC No.471/93 alongwith other two sentences. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on a judgment of this Court in V. Venkatesivarlu v. State of A.P., 1987 Crl.LJ 1621, which has taken a view that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC to pass directions in accordance with Section 427 Cr.PC. Whether this power is available to the High Court after an appeal has been decided, by the High Court or not, would still remain a question to be answered. But, I do not want to go into that aspect of the matter at present because the Division Bench ilself has in similar circumstances refused to pass directions that the sentence should run concurrently in a case which was similar to the present case. The Division Bench after holding that the High Court has the power to pass directions regarding concurrently running of sentence, found in the facts of the case before it in para-11 :
“11. This leads us to the question whether any interference is called for in the instant case. As pointed out by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, this power should be exercised sparingly and not in any arbitrary manner, and the nature of the offence has also to be taken into consideration. It is needless to say that in the case of professional dacoits the Court has to exercise its extraordinary power sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities and to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case, the petitioner is convicted for the offence of dacoity in both the cases. Having regard to the nature of the offence, we do not think that this is a fit case where we should exercise our inherent power or suo motu revisional power in favour of the petitioners.”
3. For these reasons, I do not find any merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.
