JUDGMENT
C.V.N. Sastry, J.
1. This is a matter arising under the Industrial Disputes Act. The employer has filed this appeal questioning the order of the learned Single Judge confirming the award of the Labour Court whereby the Labour Court has ordered reinstatement of the five workmen whose services have been terminated by the employer and payment of 50% of backwages to them. The five workmen in question seem to have put in service ranging from 8 to 18 years. On a charge that they participated in an illegal strike their services were terminated in the year 1981. On a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication, the Labour Court, while holding that the misconduct alleged against the workmen is proved, however, found that the punishment of termination of services is shockingly disproportionate and unjust. The Labour Court accordingly directed reinstatement with 50% of backwages. The learned Single Judge found no reason to interfere with the award of the Labour Court and dismissed the writ petition filed by the employer.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant made a feeble attempt to canvass the correctness of the award of the Labour Court as also the order of the learned Single Judge, but we find absolutely no valid grounds to interfere with the same. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, brought to our notice an additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant in the writ appeal wherein certain subsequent developments are sought to be brought to the notice of the Court with a view to deny any relief to the workmen. It is stated in the said additional affidavit that the appellant-company ceased to exist in 1985 itself i.e., even before the award of the Labour Court, on the death of its proprietor Sri Girrajmal, that subsequently a partnership-firm was formed in the name and style of Girjanal Beedi Factory and that the said partnership-firm is in no way concerned with the erstwhile sole proprietary concern.
3. We are afraid, it is not possible to accept this contention. This appears to be only a device to deny to the workmen the fruits of the award granted in their favour. The alleged partnership-firm is nothing but “old wine in a new bottle” and it is only a successor in interest of the employer. According to Section 18(3)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the award of the Labour Court shall be binding on the employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates. That apart, this question was not raised before the Labour Court or even before the learned Single Judge. The appellant cannot, therefore, be permitted to raise the same at this stage. It is, therefore, not possible to interfere with the order under appeal on the basis of the allegations made in the above additional affidavit. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the same. We find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.
4. It appears that the award of the Labour Court has not so far been implemented by the employer and that the workmen were, therefore, obliged to file a petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court and the same is still pending. It is indeed a matter of great regret and concern that the poor workers, whose services have been terminated in the year 1981, have not so far been able to get justice. We, therefore, direct the Labour Court to dispose of the petition under Section 33-C(2) said to have been filed by the workmen immediately and see that the award is implemented without any further delay.
