ORDER
Manmohan Sarin, J.
1. The above batch of writ petitions have been preferred by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. The challenge in the writ petitions is to the judgment dated 23.4.1998 of the Central Administrative Tribunal. By the impugned, judgment the Central Administrative Tribunal, following its decision in Dr. Sangeeta Narang & Others Vs. Delhi Administration etc. (1988 (6) ATC 405), directed the petitioner to pay to the respondent doctors the same pay-scales and other benefits like Provident Fund, Medical Attendance, etc. as payable to the regular Junior Medical Officers, performing similar duties. The Tribunal further held that the respondents would be deemed to have continued in service till regular appointments are made to the posts in accordance with rules and instructions. Direction was also issued to the petitioner to consider relaxation of age to the extent of service on ad hoc or contract basis, rendered by the respondents if they happen to be the candidates before the Union Public Service Commission for selection. Petitioner’s plea that the appointment of the respondent doctors was purely on contract basis and was to be governed as per the emoluments and terms set out in the appointment letter was negatived.
2. Petitioner’s case is that appointment of doctors to various hospitals and dispensaries of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi are made through the Union Public Service Commission under the Central Government Health Scheme Rules. The Ministry of Health and Family Planning is the controlling authority. The selection by the Union Public Service Commission is a long drawn out and on-going process. Vacancies result either by retirement or creation of new posts. It is submitted that at any given point of time there are about 150 posts vacant.
Petitioner submits that to relieve the pressure and strain on the health care services, a few posts were filled on contract basis in 1996-97. When the appointment of the respondents on contract basis was coming to an end, the respondents chose to move the Central Administrative Tribunal, resulting in the impugned judgment being passed.
3. Petitioner assails the impugned judgment on the ground that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction as it had no authority to go beyond the terms of the contract of appointment. The appointment of the respondents was purely on contract basis for limited periods. Parties were to abide by the terms of the contract and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to carve out fresh terms. It was a specific term of the appointment letter that a consolidated amount was to be paid and no more. Respondents were also not entitled to lay any claim to regularization by virtue of the contractual appointment. The impugned judgment directing payment of wages at par with regular doctors, to respondent doctors appointed on contractual basis for limited period, has far reaching financial consequences. The Government would not be able to make appointments on contract basis and, consequently, the health care services would suffer as the posts would remain vacant. This, in brief, is the submission of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that implementation of the impugned judgment would tantamount to giving back door entry to doctors and it would breed inefficiency as rejected candidates would get inducted in services on regular appointment. Lastly, it is contended that reliance on Sangeeta Narang’s case (supra) was misplaced as it was a case of ad hoc appointment and not purely that of a contractual appointment.
4. Regarding petitioners’ contention in respect of Sangeeta Narang’s case, we may note that the Special Leave Petition filed by the department against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal in Sangeeta Narang’s case has been dismissed by the Apex Court. The Government, in fact has itself implemented the decision in Sangeeta Narang’s case and issue a circular letter/order dated 2.11.1988, which appears at page 48 of the paper book. In the said letter the terms, “ad hoc appointment” and “appointment on contract” have been used interchangeably. Even otherwise, the distinction sought to be made out between the contractual employment and ad hoc employment would not be of any consequence. Especially when the petitioners have themselves admitted that there are at any point of time about 150 vacancies, which remain to be filled. It is the petitioners’ own case that the said posts remain vacant as regular appointments are made only by selection through the Union Public Service Commission, which is a time consuming process. We may also note that the appointments though originating in contract, acquire a “status” inasmuch as they are governed by applicable rules and regulations and not by original letter/order of appointment alone. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. A.K. Roy (AIR 1986 S.C. 737). The decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, as approved by the Apex Court, in Sangeeta Narang’s case (supra) clearly holds that it is not open to the authorities to terminate the services of the temporary employees who may have been appointed for specified periods at any time of their own sweet will, when there is admittedly need for their services. The attempt to distinguish Sangeeta Narang’s case on the ground that it is one dealing with ad hoc appointment and not a contractual one, is of no avail.
We may note that the petitioner is declining to pay the same emoluments to the respondent doctors as they pay to the regular appointed doctors only because the appointments of respondent doctors are contractual appointments, which according to the petitioner have to be governed by terms of the contract for all purposes. It is not the petitioner’s case that the respondent doctors are not discharging similar duties and functions.
5. Let us now consider the authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of her contention that the respondents are not entitled to parity in emoluments with the doctors appointed on regular basis. Reliance by the petitioner is on certain decisions, where the principle of ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ has not been applied.
i. Learned counsel for the petitioner first relied on Harbans Lal & Others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , wherein doctrine of ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ was held to be not applicable. Carpenters working in the “Wood Work Center” of Himachal Pradesh State Handicrafts section of the Corporation sought parity in wages with those working in the State Government on regular basis. It was not disputed that there were no regular employees working in the category of ‘carpenters’ on the establishment of the Corporation. The Corporation was, however, paying the minimum wages as applicable in construction industry to the concerned carpenters. The Court held that discrimination complained of must be within the same establishment owned by the same management. We do not see how any support can be drawn by the petitioner from this decision. Admittedly the respondents and the Junior Medical Officers appointed on regular basis, with whom parity is sought, are employed by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, performing similar duties in the hospitals and dispensaries of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi.
ii. Reliance was next placed on State of Haryana Vs. Jasmit Singh & Others . Petitioners in this case were employed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar/Pump Operators on daily wages. They sought parity with those regularly employed by the State Government. The Apex Court noticed the case law in respect of the doctrine of “equal pay of equal work”. It observed that the application of the doctrine was not always an easy task and there were inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations. The daily rate workers were not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers. Restrictions, etc. on age were not there for daily rated workers. The selection process was totally different. The daily wagers had no liability for transfer. The Court found that the daily rates workers could not be equated with regular employees and, hence, were not entitled to equal pay. In the instant case, it is the admitted position that qualifications required, viz. MBBS Degree, is same for both. The work performed is the same. Same Rules and regulations are applicable to the doctors employed on contract basis so far discharge of their duties is concerned. The cited case is, therefore, distinguishable and is of no avail to the petitioners.
iii. Learned counsel next relied on Ghaziabad Development Authority & Others Vs. Shri Vikram Choudhury & Ors., to canvass that daily wage employees need not be paid at par with regular employees. The Apex Court in the said case held that as long as petitioner Authority had work and projects in hand, the services of daily wagers could not be terminated. It was only in case if work was not there that principle of ‘last come first go’ was to be applied. As long as there were no regular posts available, there was no question of payment of wages at per with the regular employees. In the instant case, admittedly, regular posts are available and, hence, the said authority is of no avail to the petitioners.
iv. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. & Others Vs. B.K. Tiwari [JT 1987 (10) SC 25] to urge that the terms of the appointment letter ought to be given effect to. In the cited case respondent was offered appointment as a ‘Manager, by a Public Corporation. The appointment letter specifically gave the pay scales after revision, which had been accepted. Reliance on the cited case is completely misplaced and the petitioners cannot draw any support from it.
v. Reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on Union of India & Ors. Vs. Harish Balkrishna Mahajan while assailing the direction given in the impugned order regarding considering relaxation of age for the respondents if they happen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission. The reliance on the said case is completely misplaced. In the cited case, the direction of the Tribunal was assailed and quashed since the posts of Directors in Central Government Health Scheme were required to be filled by the Union through the Union Public Service Commission. The direction to consider in consultation with the State Public Service Commission for regularisation was, therefore, found to be in violation of Article 320 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the only direction given is to treat the service of the petitioners as without break and to consider age relaxation for the period served in case the respondents happen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission.
6. It is also not disputed before us that the respondent doctors possess the required educational qualifications and the training for discharging duties as Junior Medical Officers. The nature of their duties are, admittedly, similar to the regularly appointed doctors. The respondents are also liable to serve in any of the dispensaries or hospitals of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and may be moved from one place to the other. In these circumstances, we find no justification for denying them parity in emoluments with the doctors in regular service. The doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” should be applicable. The respondents did not claim or seek from the Central Administrative Tribunal or before us, regularisation of their posts but are only seeking parity of emoluments and other benefits as applicable to medical officers appointed on regular basis.
Learned counsel for the respondents have taken us through the terms of the appointment letter, the extensions given from time to time and the advertisement issued to demonstrate the transferability of the job and highlighting the other terms as well as the applicability of the rules and regulations. The advertisements issued inviting applications as well as the appointment letters issued and the extensions given clearly establish the requirement for these vacancies and jobs, which is even otherwise not disputed in the writ petitions. As a matter of fact, the learned government counsel conceded that posts are always available and such appointments are always required in order to properly run the public health services. The process of regular Selection is through the Union Public Service Commission and is cumbersome and long drawn out.
7. We may also, at this stage, notice the contention of the government counsel that the relief granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal to the respondents amounts to back door entry into the service. The submission is not correct. The relief granted is confined to parity in salary and emoluments with those payable to the regular doctors. The directions issued to consider relaxation of age for the years of service rendered by the respondents on ad hoc or contract basis, if they happen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission for selection, cannot be considered as directing regularization or making any back door entry.
In order to somehow justify the unequal treatment to the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondent doctors are rejects from the regular selection process and, therefore, they cannot claim equal treatment. This contention is totally misconceived and untenable. Respondent doctors also possess the same degree and qualifications as those employed on regular basis. Besides, the respondent doctors have also been admittedly employed on the basis of selection and scrutiny, though not through the Union Public Service Commission. It is the Government, which invited them to take up job through public advertisement and not vice versa. Lastly, it is not the case of the Government that these doctors are not discharging their duties efficiently or meritoriously and, therefore, they have to be paid less than what the doctors appointed on regular basis are paid.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, submitted that the writ petitions were completely devoid of merit. Relying on A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen he submitted that there was an additional reason to refuse interference with the impugned order since there has been no failure of justice. The impugned order only seeks to undo the injustice meted out to the respondents. We find merit in this submission.
9. The present writ petition by the petitioner is aimed at depriving the respondents of their legitimate emoluments and dues. Rather, acting as a model employer, the Government is attempting to take unfair advantage of the situation prevalent in the country on account of large scale unemployment. It is not the case of the petitioner that the services rendered by the respondents are in any manner inferior to the services rendered by the regularly employed doctors. The respondent doctors took up employment on contractual basis for short term on account of force of circumstances and should not be made to suffer on this account. The stand taken by the petitioners apart from being legally untenable, is unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and unjust. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 2,000/- for each petition.