ORDER
B.S. Raikote, J.
1. Vide order dated 25-6-1999, the writ petition was ordered to be posted along with CRP No.2037 of 1998 and accordingly both the revision petition as well as the writ petition are now posted before us. By this common order, we are disposing of both of them, since they involve common questions of facts and law.
2. CRP No.2037 of 1998 is filed challenging the judgment and order dated 16-12-1997 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad on his file in CMA No.261 of 1994. By this order, the appeal filed by the Government of Andhra
Pradesh was dismissed by confirming the order No.8 dated 12-9-1994 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments. It has to be noted at this stage itself that by the said order No. 8 dated 12-9-1994, the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments has declared that the respondent No.1 in the revision petition G. Rajandernath Goud, s/o Jaganath Goud, was entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,000/- as honorarium per month, being the hereditary trustee of the temple by name Sri Venkateshwara Swamy Devasthanam, Chikkadpally, Hyderabad, made as respondent No.3 in the writ petition. It has also to be noted at this stage itself that neither before the Deputy Commissioner of, Endowments, nor before the appellate authority, this Devasthanam was a party. We have also noticed from the cause title of the revision petition that this temple is not made as one of the respondents.
3. The writ petition in WP No.26985 of 1998 is filed for a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in not implementing the order dated 16-12-1997 passed in CMA No.261 of 1994, as illegal and void, which order is the subject matter in CRP No.2037 of 1998. In other words, the writ petition is filed for implementing the impugned orders in the revision petition. Therefore, the fate of the writ petition would depend upon the result in the revision petition. Hence, we propose to consider the revision petition first.
4. In CRP No.2037 of 1998, the Government of A.P. is the revision petitioner. It has challenged the orders of both the Courts below awarding an honorarium of Rs.3,000/- per month to the respondent No.1 G. Rajandernath Goud as the hereditary trustee of the temple in question. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration streneously contended that Rajandernath Goud was not the hereditary trustee of the temple as per Section 43 Register of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious
Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Endowments Act, 1987′) (which is equal to section 38 Register of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 and hereinafter referred to as ‘the Endowments Act, 1966′), in which entries are made regarding the nature of the temple and the endowment and the Rajendernath Gaud’s grandfather has not been noted as founder trustee for the temple in question. There is no mention of any honorarium fixed for either the founder trustee or his successors. On this basis, he contended that the findings recorded by both the Courts below that Rajandernath Goud was the founder trustee is illegal. He further submitted that assuming for the sake of argument that Rajendernath Goud and his predecessors in title were trustees of the temple in question, but such hereditary rights stood abolished by the Endowments Act, 1987. He further submitted that as a hereditary trustee, Rajandernath Goud cannot claim any honorarium after the commencement of the Endowments Act, 1987. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1-Rajandernath Goud contended that notwithstanding the abolition of hereditary rights under Sections 16, 34 and 144 of the Endowments Act, 1987, the said Act has specifically saved the “honour” of such trustees, and the honorarium which the respondent No. 1 is claiming goes with the “honour”, therefore, all other rights might have been abolished by the Endowments Act, 1987, but the honorarium is saved and as such he can claim the same under Section 87(1)(e) of the Endowments Act, 1987. Therefore, he submitted that both the authorities below have not committed any error in granting the honorarium to respondent No.1. In support of the respective contentions, both the Counsels relied upon common judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Pannalal Bansilal Patil v. State of A.P., , AS. Narayana v. State of A.P., and A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. Slate of A.P., . They also invited our attention to the relevant provisions under the Endowments Act, 1987 with reference to the corresponding sections under the Endowments Act, 1966, which is repealed by the Endowments Act, 1987.
5. Having regard to the contentions raised by both sides, the following points arise for our consideration : —
1. Whether the respondent No.1-G. Rajandernath Goud is a hereditary trustee of Sri Venkateswara Swamy Devasthanam, Chikkadpally, Hyderabad ?
and
2. Whether by virtue of being the hereditary trustee, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to honorarium under the Endowment Act, 1987?
6. Whether the respondent No.1-Rajandernath Goud is a hereditary trustee or not has already been decided under the Endowments Act, 1966 by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Hyderabad vide order dated 23-5-1987 in OA No.1 of 1987. In the OA No. 1 of 1987, respondent No. 1 -Rajandernath Goud was the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments and after assessing the evidence on record, the Deputy Commissioner held as under:
“In the result, I hold in exercise of the powers vested in me under Section 77(lXc) of the APC & HRI/& ACT 17 of 1966 that the Trusteeship of Sri Venkateshwara Swamy Temple is held in the Jangaiah’s branch of ‘Gudidevuni Family’ as Founders and that the present petitioner is declared as the Hereditary Trustee of the subject temple.”
From the above order of the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments it is clear that respondent No.1 has already been
declared as hereditary trustee, and to that petition, Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and Executive Officer of the temple were made as respondents. When the department has already suffered an order at the hands of the Deputy Commissioner in that case, by holding that Rajandernath Goud is a hereditary trustee and when that order has become final as not being challenged, it is not open to the department and the Government, again to contend in this petition that Rajandemath Goud was not a hereditary trustee at all. In view of the findings already rendered by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments in O.A.No.1 of 1987 vide order dated 23-5-1987, we have no option, but to hold that respondent No.1 is the hereditary trustee of the temple in question. It has to be further noted at this stage itself that after five days of that order and with effect from 28-5-1987, the Endowments Act, 1987 has came into force, repealing the Endowments Act, 1966. By virtue of Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987 it has been provided that notwithstanding any compromise or agreement entered into or scheme framed, or judgment, decree or order passed by any Court, Tribunal or other authority, prior to the commencement of this Act, the rights of a person for the office of the hereditary trustee or mutawalli or dharmakarta or muntazim or by whatever name it is called stood abolished by the commencement of this Act. Respondent No.1 was fortunate enough to be declared as hereditary trustee to the temple in question in OA No.1 of 1987, but unfortunately all such rights of hereditary trustyship stood abolished after five days of that order, with effect from 28-5-1987. The fact that all the hereditary rights have been abolished by Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987 is not disputed by respondent No.1, nor can it be disputed by respondent No.1. But the contention of the Counsel for the respondent No.1 is that notwithstanding the abolition of hereditary rights, the “honour” and the “honorarium” have been saved by, the amended Act of 1987 and accordingly the respondent No.1
was entitled to honorarium and in this view of the matter, the impugned orders do not call for any interference. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader contended that by virtue of Section 16 and other provisions of the Endowments Act, 1987, all the hereditary rights have been abolished, including the right, if any, to receive honorarium by such a hereditary trustee. Therefore, both the authorities below have erred in granting such honorarium to respondent No.1.
7. In order to appreciate the contention regarding the point No.2 we have to necessarily refer to the relevant provisions of the Endowments Act, 1987. As we have already stated above, Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987 abolished all kinds of hereditary rights of the hereditary trustees. Under Section 34, even the hereditary rights of Mirasidars, Archakas and other office holders and servants in the religious institutions also have been abolished. However, under clause (2) of Section 34, such officer holder or servant holding office at the commencement of the amended Act of 1987, notwithstanding the abolition of the hereditary rights, continue to hold such office or post on payment of only such “emoluments” and subject to such conditions of service referred to by subsections (3) and (4) of all the holders of the office and servants under the institution also stood abolished, enabling them to receive certain emoluments as per the service conditions. Section 144 of Endowments Act, 1987, further provided that notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other authority or in any scheme, custom, usage or agreement, or in any manual prepared by any institution or in any Farmana or Sanad or any deed or order of the Government to the contrary, all shares which payable or being paid at the commencement of this Act to any trustee, Dharmakartha, Mutawalli or any office holder or servant etc., and any shares in the kanukas offered either in kind
or in cash or both by the devotees either in Hundi, Flats or otherwise or any rusum in the Archana or Seva tickets etc., or the shares in Prasadams and Panyarams offered either by the temple or devotees etc., shall stand abolished with effect from the commencement of the Endowments Act, 1987, From this it follows that any kind of shares payable either in cash or kind to such trustees or other servants also was abolished by Section 144 of the Endowments Act, 1987. From these provisions it is clear that any kind of hereditary rights in whatever the name they were called, where abolished by virtue of the Endowments Act, 1987. In other words, all such hereditary rights recognised in the Endowments Act, 1966 were abolished by repealing the said Act. However, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 submitted that by virtue of Section 142 of the Endowments Act, 1987 the “honour”, to which a person was entitled by custom is saved by the Act and if that is so, the honorarium which the respondent No.1 was receiving has a hereditary trustee also is saved. He further submitted that “honorarium” goes with this “honour” and, therefore, that is also saved. But in our opinion, this submission on behalf of respondent No.1, that the honorarium to which the hereditary trustees were entitled to was saved by Section 142 of the Endowments Act, 1987 is not acceptable for more than one reason. As we have already noted above, by virtue of Sections 16, 34 and 144 of the Endowments Act, 1987, all the hereditary rights of trustees, Archakas, Miracidars or any servants etc., have been abolished. From reading of Sections 16, 34 and 144, we find that any kind of property either in cash or kind to which such holders of office were entitled to as a hereditary right, have been abolished and by virtue of Section 142 and what has been saved is only the “honour” of participating in the religious worship and ceremonies of the institution, without any liability, financial or otherwise on the institution, except what
is provided under the Act. By virtue of Section 34, notwithstanding such abolition of hereditary rights, so far as Archakas, Mirasidars and other office holders and servants are concerned, they would be entitled to seek certain emoluments for the services rendered by them, if they are holding their office as on the date of commencement of the Endowments Act, 1987. Except this limited right of receiving emolument, as a part of consideration for the services rendered by the servants of the institution, no other right or liability is saved by the Endowments Act, 1987, Section 142 has saved only the “honour” of participating in the religious ceremonies by the trustees. In other words, such an “honour” the hereditary trustee would continue to enjoy without any ‘honorarium’ or any kind of rights, which were earlier recognised as hereditary rights. The other saving as provided under Section 17(1) of the Endowments Act, 1987, is that whenever a trust is to be constituted, one of the trustees shall be from the family of the founder trust, if he is not disqualified. As per this provisions the ‘honour’ is saved to the family of the founder of the trust to occupy one seat in the trust board by virtue of such hereditary right of succession without being appointed as a trustee in the manner prescribed for other trustees, as long as such trustee of the founder family is qualified to be a trustee. If that is so, the respondent No.1 would be entitled to all the “honour” in the religious ceremonies and also right to become one of the members of the trustees by virtue of being trustee from the founder family and such right cannot be denied to respondent No.1.
8. In fact, the conclusions arrived at by us with reference to the relevant provisions of the Endowments Act, 1987 are supported by the judgments of the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in Pannalal Bansilal Patil’s case (supra), has upheld the Constitutional validity of Sections 16 and 17 to 19 of the Endowments Act, 1987 and
in Paragraph No.26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that notwithstanding such abolition of hereditary rights under Section 16, but by virtue of Section 17, the “honour” has been saved in favour of a founder family member of such founder, in order to ensure efficient management and governance of the institution, by observing as under:
“The autonomy in this behalf is an assurance to achieve due fulfilment of the objective with which it was founded unless, in due course, foul in its management is proved. Therefore, so long as it is properly and efficiently managed, he is entitled to due freedom of management in terms of the deed of endowment or established practice or usage. In case a board of trustees is constituted, the right to preside over the board given to the founder or any member of his family would generate feeling to activity participate, not only as a true representative of the source, but the same also generate greater influence in proper and efficient management of the charitable or religious institution or endowment. Equally, it enables him to persuade other members to follow the principles, practices, tenets, customs and sampradayams of the founder of the charitable or religious institution or endowment or specific endowment. Mere membership along with others, many a times, may diminish the personality of the member of the family. Even in case some funds are needed for repairs, improvement, expansion etc., the board headed by the founder or his family member may raise funds from the public to do the needful, while the executive officer, being a Government servant, would be handicapped or in some cases may not even show interest or inclination in that behalf. With a view, therefore, to effectuate the object of the religious or charitable institution or endowment or specific endowment and to encourage
establishment of such institutions in future, making the founder of in his absence a member of his family to be a chairperson and to accord him major say in the management and governance would be salutary and effective. The founder or a member of his family would, thereby, enable to effectuate the proper, efficient and effective management and governance of charitable or religious institution or endowment or specific endowment thereof in future. It would and incentive to establish similar institutions.”
In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in this judgment, the respondent No.1 as a family member of the founder, would be entitled to be a member of the Trust Committee or is entitled to manage the institution until such a Trust Committee is constituted, provided he does not incur any disqualification in terms of Section 18 of the Endowments Act, or no foul is proved regarding such management. The Supreme Court also upheld the validity of Section 144 of the Endowments Act, 1987. From this it follows that any kind’ of monetary benefit the trustee or other officer by whatever the name they were called, were enjoying, either by way of shares in cash or kind or both also stood abolished. If that is so, even if there was any honorarium payable to the family of the founder trustee on the basis of the income of the temple in question, the said right stood abolished by virtue of Section 144 of the Endowments Act, 1987. The judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AS. Narayana v. State of A.P. ‘s case (supra), also declared the same law regarding the Archakas, Mirasidars and the servants of the institution, by holding that all the hereditary rights stood abolished, by virtue of Section 34 of the Endowments Act, 1987, except whatever is saved by the Act. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 contended that in a subsequent judgment reported in A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P.
(supra), the Supreme Court recognised the honorarium to be paid to certain persons and, therefore, the concept of honorarium contemplated by hereditary rights stand recognised even by this judgment of the Supreme Court. But from the reading of the said judgment, we find that the Supreme Court in this judgment was considering the right or otherwise of the Archakas, Sidhanties etc., who were rendering services to the institution, as the persons employed by the institution, on the basis of the recommendations of the Committee constituted in that behalf. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised certain pay scales meant for Pradhana Archaka and other archakas and honorarium paid to Tholppachar, Siddanti and others and also pay scale or honorarium paid to Pedda Jeeyangar, Chinna Jeeyangar and others. In this judgment, the recommendations of the Committee regarding the pay scales and other honorarium to be paid to the officers and servants of the institution was approved by the Supreme Court. But in the instant case, the honorarium that is claimed by the respondent No.1 is only as a hereditary trustee. As we have already noticed above, by virtue of being hereditary trustee of the family, such trustee would be entitled to become a member of the Trust Committee or of the Trust Board. But the entire property of the institution vests in such trust board or Trust Committee. Thus, the Trust Committee or trust board is in the position of the master to employ other office holders and servants of the institution like Pradhana Archakas and others. For such a master, in whose the property of the trust vests, is not entitled to any remuneration or salary or any other kind of monetary or other benefits under the institution. The Trust Committee constitutes such members, who have come forward to render the services, having faith in God and charitable purposes, without expecting any remuneration of any kind whatsoever. Respondent No. 1 also by virtue of being a member of the family of the founder, would be entitled to become a
member of such Trust Committee or board with the same pious object. For such a member of the committee, including a member from the founder family, no remuneration is prescribed by the Endowments Act, 1987 and the Rules. We asked the learned Counsel on both sides whether any sitting fee or any incidental expenses incurred by the Trust Committee are provided under any rule or notification. It is at this stage, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 brought to our notice the rules issued under G.O. Ms. No.370 dated 19-4-1989, under which T.A. and D.A. are provided to the members of the Trust Committee or the board, including that of the Executive Officer. Therefore, it goes without saying that as a member of the Trust Committee, such a hereditary member of the Trust Committee would be entitled to the same emoluments whatever that is prescribed under G.O. Ms. No.370 dated 19-4-1989 and in addition to that, he is not entitled to any honorarium or remuneration or by whatever name it is called.
9. In the light of the above position of law, we again revert back to the orders of the authorities below. From the reading of the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 12-9-1994 in OA No.61 of 1990, renumbered as OA No.11 of 1994, we find that the respondent No. 1 had claimed an honorarium of Rs.4,00,000/- per year as emoluments and perquisites regarding the temple in question. It is also further clear from this order that this Court in WP No.2885 of 1969 directed the Deputy Commissioner to finalise the enquiry under Section 77 of the Endowments Act, 1966 on his file in OA No.16 of 1970 and accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner declared that the temple in question as a public temple vide order dated 28-11-1980. The said order was challenged in OS No.170 of 1981 by Rajandernath Goud. But the said suit was dismissed on 14-8-1984 and even his appeal in CCCA No.21 of 1988 was also dismissed.
Meanwhile, the respondent No.1 filed a writ petition in WP No.3773 of 1986, requesting this Court to appoint him as custodian of the temple in the place of his father, who has become old. The said writ petition being dismissed, he filed a appeal in WA No.653 of 1986 and the Division Bench of this Court directed the competent authority to constitute a board of trustees under Section 15 of the Endowments Act, 1987 and the Division Bench further directed that the petitioner’s hereditary rights could be enquired into by the authorities on merits. In OA No.40 of 1987, the respondent No. 1 Rajandernath Gaud claimed an honorarium at Rs. 4,00,000/- per annum on the basis of he being the hereditary trustee. The Deputy Commissioner vide his order dated 17-8-1987, held that the petitioner-Rajandernath Goud was entitled to honours and pujas in perpetuity as member of the founder’s family. He further held that the petitioner therein (respondent No.1 herein) was entitled to get his name and gotram recited in the first puja performed in the temple every day and the petitioner and his heirs were also entitled to sit on the planks and wear kankanams and get the utsavas, Sevas, brahmotsavama etc., performed. But the claim of the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) for grant of honorarium was negatived. Against that order of the Deputy Commissioner, the respondent No.1, has preferred an appeal in CMA No.1 of 1988 before the Additional Chief Judge-Cum-II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and vide order dated 14-9-1990, the Additional Chief Judge, allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner with an observation that the respondent No.1 would be entitled to the same benefits and to claim the honorarium as claimed by other hereditary trustees in Andhra and Telangana areas. Regarding the quantum the matter was remanded. On remanded the matter was registered in OA No.61 of 1990. The Deputy Commissioner by observing that the temple in question falls under the administrative
control of Commissioner of Endowments, Hyderabad, having exceeded Rs.5,00,000/-, as per the provisions of the Endowments Act, 1987 held that the matter was required” to be decided by the Commissioner of Endowments Department. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent No.1-Rajendranath Goud preferred an appeal in Appeal No.44 of 1993 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad held that the matter was required to be decided by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments only and accordingly remanded the matter back and after remanded, the said case was taken up in OA No.11 of 1994, and an order is passed which is in challenge in this revision petition. In this impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner held that he could decide the dispute in question under Section 87(1 )(e) of the Endowments Act, 1987. By the impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner further held that in CMA No.1 of 1988 the Hon’ble Chief Judge, City Civil Court has ruled that the respondent No.1 is the hereditary trustee was entitled to some honorarium for the services rendered by him and how the matter before me was only to decide the quantum, since the order in C.M.A.l of 1988 has already become final. He also ….. took note of the
fact that as per the established usage and custom the trustee who was rendered services was entitled to such honorarium ranging from Rs.100/- to few hundreds or more, but not l/3rd share as claimed by the respondent No.1 earlier. He also …… took note of
the submission made by the Counsel appearing for the Government that there was a practice of receiving such honorarium by the trustees who are rendering services to such institutions. He also considered the argument on the respondent No.1’s side that in the institutions like Sri Laxmi Venkateshwara Swamy temple, Manyamkonda of Mahboobnagar District the hereditary trustee was paid an honorarium of Rs.2,500/- per month on the basis of its annual income at Rs.7,10,962/- and on that
basis after holding that the income of the temple in question was around Rs.20,00,000/-, held that the respondent No.1 was entitled to an honorarium of Rs.3000/- per month from the date of filing of OA No.40 of 1987 before the Deputy Endowments Commissioner, Hyderabad. From this impugned order, one thing is certain that OA No.40 of 1987 was filed prior to 17-8-1987 for determining the honour and honorarium for the respondent No.1. As on that date, the Endowments Act, 1987 had come into force with effect from 28-5-1987. But the said Act was challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court directed maintenance of status quo ante. In other words, as per the directions of the Supreme Court, the legal position as it stood prior to the commencement of Endowments Act, 1987 were to be maintained during the pendency of the matter before the Supreme Court. It is only by the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Pannalal Eansilal Patil’s case (supra) and A.S. Narayana’s case (supra), the matters were disposed of by the Supreme Court in the year 1996. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Bansilal Patil’s case has been rendered on 17-1-1996 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.S. Narayana’s case has been rendered on 19-3-1996. From this it follows that right from the year 1987 to January, 1996, the authorities were following the law as it stood prior to the commencement of the amended Endowments Act, 1987 on 28-5-1987. Therefore, from this fact it is clear that OA No.40 of 1987 and the judgment in CMA No.1 of 1988 were all the judgments rendered as per the law that held the field prior to the commencement of the Endowments Act, 1987. It is submitted by the Government Pleader that till the judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered in the year 1996, the authorities were paying the honorarium and other emoluments as per the old Endowments Act, 1966 and after the pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court, no honorarium is paid to
any trustee by whatever the name it is called. He also produced before us a letter of the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments to the effect that after the pronouncement of the judgment by the Supreme Court, no remuneration or any emoluments are paid to any of the trustees. But in the impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner and also the appellate authority followed the law as it stood prior to the pronouncement of the judgment by the Supreme Court in the year 1996. Therefore, both in the order of the Deputy Commissioner and also in the order of the appellate authority, we find a reference that some of the trustees were entitled to 1/3 of the income of the temple etc. But is should be noted that during the pendency of these proceedings initiated in OA No.40 of 1987 only the Endowments Act, 1987 has come into force with effect from 28-5-1987, abolishing all kinds of hereditary rights by virtue of Sections 16, 34 and 144 of the Act. As we have already stated above, Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987 has specifically abolished all kinds of hereditary trustees as defined under Section 2(15) of the Endowments Act, 19.66 notwithstanding any decree or any order of any Court or authority. If that is so, the judgment of the City Civil Court, Hyderabad in CMA No.1 of 1988 stood nullified by Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987 and in this view of the matter, the Deputy Commissioner in the impugned order, could not have relied upon the observations made in CMA No.1 of 1988 notwithstanding the fact that these observations had become final. As we have already stated above they were all the observations traceable under the repealed Act, in which the hereditary trustees were entitled to certain emoluments or remuneration. The present proceedings are in continuation of the proceedings in OA No. 1 of 1988 and the Endowments Act, 1987 applies even to all the pending proceedings and to the decrees in appeal. If that is so, the appellate authority and the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments were in error in relying upon the observations
made in CMA No.1 of 1988 on the file of the City Civil Judge, Hyderabad for awarding honorarium in favour of the respondent No.1-Rajandernath Gaud. The appellate authority also failed to see that the order in CMA No.1 of 1988 stood nullified by Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987. Since the Supreme Court has directed maintenance of the status quo ante till the pronouncement of the judgment in the year 1996, as we have already stated above, the authorities relied upon the old Act in deciding the disputes between the parties. Therefore, the observations made in CMA No.1 of 1988 would no long stand in view of Section 16 of the Amended Act of 1987. In this view of the matter, both the appellate authority as well as the Deputy Commissioner have misdirected themselves in awarding honorarium to the respondent No.1, only on the basis of the observations made in CMA No.1 of 1988. As we have stated above under Section 142 of the Endowments Act, 1987 what is saved is only the ‘honour’ to participate in the religious functions, but not the honorarium. Contrast to Section 142 of the Endowments Act, 1987, if we refer to the Endowment Act, 1966, we find that by Section 102, the Endowments Act, 1966 had repealed the previous Act and which had saved not only the honour, but also other emoluments of the trustees. As we have stated above, all the emoluments or honorarium or any monetary benefits which the trustees were entitled to by virtue of the custom or practice, stood abolished by Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987 and even if it is taken as property in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A. Samajam v. Commissioner H.R. &C.E… Hyd., MR 1971 SC 891, it stood abolished by virtue of Section 16 of the Endowments Act, 1987. Therefore, Section 142 has simply saved the honour of participating in the religious ceremonies. Having regard to this position of law and also the judgments of the Supreme Court that we have referred to above, we hold that both the authorities below were in
error in granting honorarium to the respondent No.1 Rajendernath Goud, who is entitled only to the TA and DA as per the rules framed under GO Ms. No.370, dated, 19-4-1989. In this view of the matter, we find that the impugned orders of the Deputy Commissioner and the appellate authority are not sustainable and accordingly they are liable to be set aside.
10. WP No.26985 of 1988 is filed by respondent No.1 for implementing the orders that are liable to be set aside. Since the impugned orders are liable to be set aside, there would not be any order to be implemented as prayed for in the writ petition. In this view of the matter, the writ petition becomes infructuous. Accordingly, we pass the order as under :
CRP No.2037 of 1988 is allowed and the
impugned orders of both the authorities below are hereby set aside and the writ petition in WP No.26985 of 1988 is hereby dismissed as being infructuous. But in the circumstances we direct the parties to bear their own costs.