JUDGMENT
V.K. Jhanji, J.
1. This will dispose of Civil Revision No. 1251 of 1992 as well as C.O.C.P. No. 785 of 1992. Civil Revision has been preferred by the tenant against the order of ejectment passed by the Authorities under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The contempt petition has been filed by the landlord on the allegation that the landlord took possession on
24.4.1992 pursuant to the order of ejectment and this Court, on 7.5.1992, while admitting the revision petition, had directed the parties to maintain status-quo with regard to possession, but the tenant on the night intervening 11/12-5-1992 took forcible possession.
2. In brief, the facts are that the premises in dispute were let out to the petitioner for running of ice-cream and ice-factory. Ejectment of the petitioner was sought on the ground, that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises w.e.f. 1.1.1986 continuously for a period of four months immediately preceding the presentation of the ejectment application, and also on the ground that the tenant has caused damage to the premises by its misuse. The tenant denied the averments made in the ejectment application and stated that he has not ceased to occupy the premises, but is in occupation of the same and using it without any interruption. As regards the ground of misuse, the tenant stated that the allegations of the landlord are vague. He, however, denied to have caused any damage or misused the premises. The Rent Controller on the appreciation of the evidence brought on record by the parties, ordered ejectment of the tenant, Aggrieved of the order of the Rent Controller, the tenant preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, exercising the powers of Appellate Authority, who vide the impugned order, dismissed the appeal. Tenant has now come in revision to this Court.
3. Counsel for the tenant contended that the manufacture of ice and ice-cream is a seasonal work and it commences in April and ends in October each year. The ejectment application was filed on 15.7.1987 and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of four months. He further contended that the intention of the tenant was not to bring the tenancy to an end. In support of this, he referred to a judgment in Sat Parkash and
Anr. v. Shiv Lal, (1991-1)99 P.L.R. 381.
4. In reply, counsel for the landlord, contended that both the Authorities on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, have returned a finding that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of four months, and this Court in revisional jurisdiction, should not re-appreciate the evidence.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and on going through the documents, reference to which was made by counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that there is no merit in the revision petition. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate Authority have in detail discussed the evidence brought on record. On appreciation of the evidence, the Authorities below have found that the tenant was not carrying on the business w.e.f. 1.1.1986. On perusal of the statement made by the tenant, I find that the tenant, in his cross-examination, has admitted the suggestion of the landlord that he was not carrying on any business in the premises w.e.f. 1.1.1986. He also admitted that for preparation of ice-cream, milk, sugar, saccharine and custard are used, but these were not purchased during the years 1986-87. He further admitted that no material for preparation of ice and ice-cream was purchased during these years. His witness, Jeewan Lal, RW-4, fairly admitted in his cross-examination, that no manufacturing was done in the factory for the last two years. This witness
admitted that electric supply was discontinued. RW-5, Bansi Ram, Accountant of the firm, in his statement, admitted that for the last 1-1/2 year, no manufacturing was done in the premises and the firm had not paid the electricity bills after 1.1.1986. It has also come in his statement that in order to recover the amount, the Electricity Board has filed a suit against the tenant. The electricity bills, a
reference to which was made by counsel for the tenant, show that the bilk were prepared on the basis of past average consumption. The bills do not show that any electricity was consumed during the relevant period. It is true that non
consumption of electricity alone is no proof that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises, but where in addition to non-consumption of electricity, the evidence establishes that the tenant is not carrying on the business for a period of more than four months preceding the presentation of the petition, then the
presumption would be that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises. It is not necessary that the tenant, by his own conduct, must bring the tenancy to an end. The view of this Court that in order to succeed, the landlord has to prove that the tenant by his own conduct has brought tenancy to an end, was not approved by the Supreme court in Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash,1994(1) R.C.R. 495. The Supreme Court held as under:-
“The High Court has held that the landlord has to prove that the tenant by his conduct has brought the tenancy to an end and with that intention discontinued the occupation of the demised premises, and since this has been done the applications have to be dismissed. The relevant clause of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act states that a tenant will be liable to eviction if he ceases to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. The section does not require the cession of tenancy in question, The only condition which has to be satisfied is the non-user of the building for the requisite period. The principle under-lying the provisions is that if a premise is not required by the tenant, it should become available to another person who may be in need thereof. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in assuming that unless the cession of the tenancy is proved, eviction cannot be ordered.”
6. In the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Apex Court, this Court will not go into the question as to whether the tenant had the intention to
bring the tenancy to an end. The landlord would be entitled to an order of ejectment once he successfully establishes on record that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of four months preceding the presentation of the petition without any sufficient cause. The onus to prove sufficient cause is always on the tenant. In the present case, the tenant has neither pleaded nor has proved that he was prevented from some sufficient cause for not carrying on the business for a continuous period of four months, The finding arrived at by the Authorities below is based upon facts. Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to make out any ground which would persuade this Court to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Authorities under the Act.
7. Accordingly, the civil revision is dismissed with costs which are assessed as Rs. 1,000/-. Petitioner is however, allowed two months time to vacate the premises provided the he/deposits the entire arrears of rent, including that of two months, with the Rent Controller within one month from today, and also files an undertaking within the aforesaid period that he shall hand over the vacant possession of premises to the landlord on the expiry of aforesaid two months, In case, the arrears of rent are not paid and the undertaking is not filed, then the respondent shall be entitled to execute the order of ejectment forthwith.
8. As the civil revision has been decided on merits, I propose not to go into the merits of the contempt petition. Therefore, the same stands dismissed as having become infroctuous.