PETITIONER:
HARNAMA SINGH (DEAD) LRS. ON RECORD & OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI HARBHAJAN SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1991
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
RAMASWAMY, K.
CITATION:
1992 AIR 109 1991 SCR (3) 703
1992 SCC Supl. (1) 709 JT 1992 (1) 546
1991 SCALE (2)497
ACT:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908--Section 148 read with
Section 15(1), the Punjab Pre-emption Act and Article 136,
Constitution of India, 1950--Suits for pre-emption--Dis-
missed under Order 20, Rule 14-Deposit of pre-emption
amount--Extention of time--Whether to be raised in appeal
before the Supreme Court.
Constitution of India, 1950--Article 136--Appeal--Depos-
it of pre-emption amount--Whether to be raised before the
Supreme Court.
HEADNOTE:
Three brothers executed four sale deeds on June 25,
1968, to respondent. The 4th brother, whose legal represen-
tatives are the appellants, filed four suits of pre-emption
against the vendee-respondent and those were decreed on
terms of payment of pre-emption money on or before August
30, 1970.
The plaintiff-pre-emptors-appellants filed four appeals
before the District Judge for the reduction of the pre-
emption money. On an application moved by the pre-emptors
the time for deposit of the amount fixed under the decree by
the Trial Court was extended till further orders.
The appeals were rejected under Order 41 Rule 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as being insufficiently stamped and
not properly presented.
Before hand, however on 26.10.1970, the plaintiff-pre-
emptors, deposited the pre-emption amount in the Trial
Court.
The pre-emptors sought execution of the pre-emption
decrees. The vendee-judgment debtor raised objections stat-
ing that the suits stood automatically dismissed for non-
deposit of the pre-emption money within the time identically
stipulated under the decrees.
The objection was sustained by the Trial/Executing Court.
704
The appeal to the Appellate Court at the instance of the
preemptors, was allowed, permitting the execution to pro-
ceed.
A Single Judge of the High Court in further appeal
upheld the view of the District Judge, but the Division
Bench of the High Court allowed the Letters Patent Appeals,
upholding the objection made by the vendee-respondent, that
there were no decrees which could be executed, against which
these appeals by special leave to this Court .were filed.
The appellants contended that the controversy could be
determined on the anvil of Section 148 of the Code of Civil
Procedure by extending time by the Court, as it was extend-
able when any period was fixed or granted by the Court for
the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Court,
even though the period originally fixed or granted had
already expired; that this Court should exercise its plenary
power in the interests of justice to extend the time.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court,
HELD: 1. There is no law of pre-emption permitting a
decree to be drawn in terms of Section 15(1) of the Punjab
Pre-emption Act. Were the Court to exercise at all the
discretions on the subject, the Court would in any event be
completing the process of decreeing the suits; the suits
which have been held to fall down under Order 20 Rule 14 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, tantamounting to their dismiss-
al, and that too on present day when such decrees cannot be
passed. [707C-D]
2. The objections of the vendee must remain sustained
and the pre-emptor-appellants must fail in the event, not
getting their suits for pre-emption decreed. Decretal money
deposited by the appellants may be permitted to be withdrawn
by them, if not already withdrawn. [707F-G]
Atarn Parkash v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1986] 1 SCR
399, followed.
Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram & Ors., [1983] 1 SCR 844 and Jagar
Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava and Others, [1961] 2
SCR 918, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2266-69
of 1979.
705
From the Judgment dated 9.8.1978 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 576 to 579 of 1975.
Harbans Lal and M.V. Goswami for the Appellants. Iqbal Singh
for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered:
These appeals by special Leave are directed against
the common judgment and decree of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court passed in L.P.A. Nos. 576-79 of 1975.
Three brothers, by means of four sale deeds executed on
June 25, 1968, sold some parcels of land to Harbhajan
Singh-respondent herein. The 4th brother by the name of
Ujagar Singh, whose legal representatives are the appellants
herein,. filed four suits of preemption ,against the vendee
and those were decreed on July 15, 1970, on terms of payment
of pre-emption money on or before August 30, 1970. Four
appeals were filed by the plaintiff-pre-emptors before the
District Judge for the reduction of the pre-emption money.
On an application moved by the pre-emptors the time for
deposit of the amount fixed under the decree by the Trial
Court was extended till further orders. The appeals finally
were rejected under Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as being insufficiently stamped and hence not
properly presented. Before hand, however, ‘the
laintiff-pre-emptors all the same, deposited the pre-emption
amount in the Trial Court, on their own, on October 26,
1970.
After the rejection of their appeals, the pre-emptors
sought execution of the pre-emption decrees which attracted
objections by the vendee-judgment debtor. The primary objec-
tion raised was that the suits stood automatically dismissed
for non-deposit of the preemption money within the time
identically stipulated under the questioned decrees. The
plea of the vendee was based on the mandate of Order 20 Rule
14, Civil Procedure ‘Code whereunder the Court when decree-
ing the claim to pre-emption is required to specify in the
decree on or before which the pre-emption money shall be
paid, if not already paid, and further if it is not so paid,
the suit shall stand dismissed with costs. (Whatever is
relevant in Order 21 Rule 14 alone has been taken note of).
The date specified by the Trial Court as said before was
August 30, 1970 and under the interim orders of the Appel-
late Court the time for depositing the said money was ex-
tended till
706
further orders. Undeniably the Court never passed any fur-
ther orders in that regard and thus the time for depositing
the said money stood extended without any limit. The. objec-
tion was sustained by the Trial/ Executing Court. On appeal
to the Appellate Court at the instance of the pre-emptors,
the District Judge took .a contrary view permitting the
execution to proceed. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court in appeal upheld the view of the District Judge, but a
Division Bench of the High Court. In Letters Patent Appeals,
reversed the District Judge as also the Single Judge uphold-
ing the objection by the vendee that there were no decrees
which could be executed.
We have heard learned counsel for the appellant for he
alonewas present.
There has been a sea change in the law of pre-emption in
the States of Punjab and Haryana where from these appeals
have arisen. Whereas in Punjab the Punjab Pre-emption Act
itself has been repealed, in Haryana it has substantially
been chopped down by justicing. This Court in Atam Parkash
v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1986] 1 SCR 399 declared ultra
vires section 15(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, as ap-
plicable to Haryana, whereunder certain relatives of the
vendor had been given the right to pre-empt a sale of immov-
able. property. The view of this Court and the present state
of law is not by any means insignificant or irrelevant for
judging the present matter and for resolving the controversy
in hand. Rather its pervasive thought permeats the mind.
Learned counsel for the appellants would have the con-
troversy determined on the anvil of Section 148 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, pleading for time to be extended by the
Court, as it is extendable when any period is fixed or
granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or
allowed by the Court, even though the period originally
fixed or granted has already expired. He has brought to our
notice that in the main matter when the appeal was rejected
by the District Judge as being insufficiently stamped time
was asked from the District Judge to make good the deficien-
cy in the stamp duty but that was rejected and though he
concedes that the matter was not taken up in revision before
the High Court, it is still contended that this Court should
exercise its plenary power to extend the time in the inter-
ests of justice and have the Court fee made good. He also
concedes that when the District Judge was asked to extend
and specify the time for deposit of the pre-emption money,
he had declined to exercise his discretion, so as to regula-
rise payment, when the appellants had by themselves
707
deposited the pre-emption money on October 26, 1970 before-
hand,leaving the matter to be agitated before the executing
Court. Likewise it is contended that this Court can and
should specify the time for deposit so as to regularise it
in exercise of powers under Section 148 C.P.C. He also high-
lights that the mistake herein was that of the Courtand for
both the propositions he takes aid of Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram
& Ors., [1983] 1 SCR 844 and Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar
Lal Bhargava and Others, [1961] 2 SCR 918. In any event he
concedes that for the later wrongful non-exercise of discre-
tion of the District Judge, the matter was not taken in
Second Appeal or Revision, as the case may be, before the
High Court.
We have pondered over, the matter. Our view may appear
some-what slanting but we cannot disassociate ourselves from
the canvass now spread, showing there is no law of pre-emp-
tion permitting a decree to be drawn in terms of Section
15(1) of the Punjab Pre- emption Act. Were we to exercise at
all the discretions on the subject afore-mentioned we would
in any event be completing the process of decreeing the
suits; the suits which have been held to fall down under
Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, tantamount-
ing to their dismissal, and that too on present day when
such decrees cannot be passed.
The High Court however, took the controversy in a different-
light. It took the view that the insufficiently stamped
appeals be/ore the District Judge were no appeals in the eye
of law, as was contende don behalf of the vendee, and the
view of the District Judge in not extending time was right
as it was rightly considered that the appeals had not been
entertained at all. Support was also taken for its view by
the High Court from the circumstance of the order of the
Court extending time ex-parte, which conferred no obligation
on the vendee to treat the decree operative against him as
and when the pre-emptors chose to deposit the pre-emption
money. The High COurt on this reasoning restored the judg-
ment of the Trial/Executing Court,upholding the objections
of the vendee. Where the High Court arrived by following one
way, we have been led to arrive by another. The end result,
however, is the same that the objections of the vendee
mustremain sustained and the pre-emptor-appellants must fail
in the event,not getting their suits for pre-emption de-
creed. The appeals must thus inevitably fail and are hereby
dismissed. Decreetal money deposited by the appellants may
be permitted to be withdrawn by them, ii not already with-
drawn. No costs for there is no opposition.
V.P.R. Appeals dis-
missed.
708