JUDGMENT
Ramaswami, C.J.
1. In this case the petitioners have applied to the High Court for the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari to call up and quash an order of the State Government dated the 21st of March, 1955, requisitioning a portion of the premises known as “The Patna Law Press Building” in hold-ing No. 46 on the Dak Bungalow Road in the Patna Municipal Corporation area. Cause has been shown by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the State of Bihar and the other respondents to whom notice of the application was ordered to be given.
2. The petitioners state in their affidavit that they are the joint owners of the premises Known as “The Patna Law Press Building” in holding No. 46 on the Dak Bungalow Road. The petitioners have let out a portion of the premises of a total floor area of 6500 square feet to the National Cadet Corps (Bihar Branch) for being used as their godown and office.
It appears that the National Cadet Corps (Bihar Branch) needed more space for their office and, therefore, the State of Bihar requisitioned five mere rooms under the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Bihar Premises Requisition (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1949 (Bihar Act 15 of 1950). The order of requisition was made on the 21st of March, 1955, by the State Government. That order is annexure II of the affidavit of the petitioners. The petitioners, further allege that on the 31st of March, 1955, an order was made by the Collector of Patna under Section 3, Sub-section (5), of the Statute, authorising Mr. L. L. Sinha, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, to enter and take possession of the premises. The allegation of the petitioners is that the notice required to be given under the proviso to Section 3 of Bihar Act 15 of 1950 was not given to all the joint owners of the premises. It was also contended that the premises in dispute are being used as show-rooms for the Jalan Safe and Steel Furniture Ltd., and so the State Government had no authority to make an order of requisition under Section 3 (1).
It was also contended the State Government had no authority to requisition premises under Act 15 of 1950 for the purpose of the National Cadet Corps. The contention of the petitioners was that the provision of accommodation for the National Cadet Corps was a Union purpose and not a State purpose and, therefore, the State Government had no auhority to make the requisition under Section 3 for that purpose.
3. A counter-affidavit has been filed, on behalf of the State of Bihar.
4. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners, in the first place, that the portion of the building which is requisitioned is being used as a show-room for the Jalan Safe, and Steel Furniture Ltd., and, therefore, the State Government had no authority to requisition the premises under Section 3 of the statute. The argument is based upon the definition of the expression “premises” in Section 2 (d) of the Act.
Section 2 (d) defines the expression “premises” to mean any building or part of a building “in which the owner does not ordinarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain”. It is alleged by the petitioners that the portion of the building which is requisitioned is used as a show-room. On behalf of the respondents the learned Government Pleader referred to enclosure D of the counter-affidavit.
This is a letter dated the 17th of December, 1954, from the House Rent Controller to the District Magistrate of Patna. It appears from this letter that the portion of the premises requisitioned was not used as a show-room for the steel furniture but was vacant. The question raised by the petitioners is, therefore, a controversial question of fact, and in such a case it is well established that the High Court will not determine the question in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution (See for instance — ‘Bijayananda v. State of Bihar’, 1LR 32 Pat 1148 at p. 1186 : (AIR 1954 Pat 266 at p. 278) (A). The argument of the petitioners on this point must therefore, fail.
5. I shall then proceed to consider the argument that notice under Section 3 was not given to one of the petitioners, namely, Murli Manohar Jalan, and therefore, the order of requisition under Section 3 is illegal and void for want of jurisdiction. The argument of learned Counsel is based upon Section 3 (1) which states :
3. (1) Whenever It appears to the State Government that any premises in any locality are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose, it may, by order in writing, requisition such premises :
Provided that no order requisitioning such premises shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity has been given to the landlord and, where it relates to premises in occupation of a tenant, also to such tenant to show cause against the proposed order within such time to such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed :
x x x x x It was stated on behalf of the petitioners that both Hiralal Jalan and Murli Manohar Jalan were the owners of the holding and, therefore, the notice under Section 3 should have been given to both the petitioners. It was admitted by the Govern ment Pleader that notice was given only to Hiralal Jalan but it was submitted by the Government Pleader that Hiralal Jalan was the father and Murli Manohar Jalan was the son and they con stituted a joint Mitakshara family and the notice to the father was tantamount to a notice also on the son Murli Manohar Jalan.
In paragraph 1 of the petitioner’s affidavit it is conceded that Hiralal Jalan and Murli Manohar Jalan were members of a joint Mitakshara family, but it was argued by Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad that petitioner No. 1, Hiralal Jalan, was not the karta of the joint family and that he used to reside outside Patna and that Murli Manohar Jalan actually managed the family affairs.
There is no such statement expressly made in the application of the petitioners and there is no express denial that petitioner No. 1 is the karta of the joint Mitakshara family. The question whether petitioner No, 1 represented petitioner No. 2 is essentially a question of fact and cannot be satisfactorily determined in the proceedings taken under Article 226.
It Is, however, admitted in this case that petitioner No. 1, Hiralal Jalan, was served with a notice under Section 3 (1) of the statute. The question whether notice under Section 3 should also have been given to petitioner No. 2, Murli Manohar Jalan Involves a question of disputed fact and, therefore, the argument of the petitioner on this point must be rejected.
6. The next question presented for determination is whether the State Government is competent to make requisition of premises under Bihar Act 15 of 1950 for the purpose of office accommodation of the National Cadet Corps. The argument of the petitioners is that the National Cadet Corps is in the nature of a Union agency or in the nature of a Union institution for technical training.
Counsel for the petitioners referred in this connection to item 65 of List I of – the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Item 65 is in the following terms :
“65. Union agencies and institutions for–
(a) professional, vocational or technical train-ing, including the training of police officers; or
(b) the promotion of special studies or research; or
(c) scientific or technical assistance in the investigation or detection of crime.”
It was contended, therefore, that the National Cadet Corps was a Union subject and the provision of office accommodation for the National Cadet Corps was a Union purpose and it was not competent for the State Legislature to enact legislation with respect to acquisition of property for the purpose of the Union.
Counsel for the petitioners also referred in this connection to the National Cadet Corps Act, 1948 (Central Act XXXI of 1948). In my opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners is erroneous. I do not agree that the provision of office accommodation for the National Cadet Corps is a “Union purpose”.
The National Cadet Corps may be an institution or an agency of the Union, but it is essentially a scheme for a provision of military training to students of colleges and schools located within the State and the scheme is intended to improve the physique and the moral discipline of such students. Section 4 of Act XXXI of 1948 states :
“4. The Central Government may constitute in any Province or acceding State one or more units of the Corps, members of which shall be recruited from amongst the students of any university or school, and may disband or reconstitute any unit so constituted,”
Section 12 provides for the constitution of an Advisory Committee. Section 12 states :
“12. (I) The Central Government may for the purpose of advising it on all matters of policy connected with the constitution and administration of the Corps appoint a Central Advisory Committee consisting of the following persons, name-ly,–
(a) the Minister for Defence, who shall be the Chairman of the Committee;
(b) the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, ex-officio;
(c) the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Education, ex-officio;
(d) the Financial Adviser, Defence, ex-officio;
(e) the Chief of the Army Staff and Comman-der-in-Chief, Indian Army, ex-officio;
(f) the Chief of the Air Staff and Air Marshal Commanding, Royal Indian Air Force, ex-officio;
(g) the Chief of the Naval Staff and Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy, ex-officio;
(h) five non-official members to be nominated by the Central Government; and
(i) two members elected by the Central Legislature,
(2) The Central Government may also appoint, for the same purpose as is specified in Sub-section (1) such Provincial or State Advisory Committees as it may consider desirable from time to time and may prescribe their duties and functions.” Counsel for the petitioners may be right in saying that Act XXXI of 1948 falls under item 65 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, But we are concerned in the present case not with the question of legislative competence but with the meaning of the expression “purposes of the Union” In item 33 of List I. and with the meaning of the language of item 36 of List II. Item 33 of List I, namely, the Union List, is in the following terms :
“33. Acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union.”
Item 36 of List II, which is in the State List, is as follows :
“36. Acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III.”
It Is also necessary to refer in this connection to entry 42 of List III, the Concurrent List :–
“42. Principles of which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purposes is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.”
If all these legislative items are examined, it is clear that the categories of “purpose” contemplated by the Constitution are three in number, namely, “Union purpose”, “State purpose” and “any other public purpose”. It is obvious that every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, but there may be cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither a State purpose nor a Union purpose but comes under the residuary head of “any other public purpose” within the meaning of item 42 of List III.
With regard to this residuary category of public purpose it is obvious that the State is competent to legislate under item 36 of the State List providing for the requisition or acquisition of property. I think there is difference between the Australian Constitution and the Indian Constitution on this point.
Section 31 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution empowers the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to “the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws. “It should also be noticed that under Section 52 (1) of the Australian Constitution there is a grant of exclusive legislative power to the Commonwealth Parliament in respect of “all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes.”
It is obvious that the language of item 36 of the State. List of the Indian Constitution is wholly different. As I have already stated, the State Legislature is competent to legislate for acquisition or requisition of land not only for “State purpose” but also for “other public purpose” within the meaning of item 42 of List III. I accept the argument of Counsel for the petitioners that Act 15 of 1950 may fall under item 65 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; but I do not see how provision of office accommodation for the National Cadet Corps falls under item 65.
I am satisfied that requisition of property for the purpose of accommodating the National Cadet Corps is not really a Union or State purpose but falls in the third category of “other public pur-pose” in the language of item 42 of the Concurrent list. There is also an alternative aspect from which the matter may be examined.
A scheme or undertaking like the National Cadet Corps may have different aspects or facets; it may serve not only the purpose of the Union but the purpose of the State or any other public purpose. Even so, it is not possible to regard the requisition of office accommodation for the National Cadet Corps as one solely appurtenant to Union purpose. Such a purpose does not cease to be a State purpose or other public purpose within the meaning of item 36 of the State List and I think the State Legislature is competent in such a case to legislate on the subject of requisition or acquisition of property.
The view that I have expressed is borne out by a decision of the Supreme Court in — ‘State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan’, (S) AIR 1955 SC 810 (B), which overrules the decision of the Bombay High Court reported in — ‘Ali Gulshan v. State of Bombay’, AIR 1953 Bom 337 (C). My concluded opinion, therefore, is that the State Legislature is competent to enact legislation for the acquisition or requisition of property for the object of providing office accommodation for the National Cadet Corps. I think that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners on this aspect of the case must be rejected.
7. For these reasons I hold that the petitioners have made out no case for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. The application fails and must accordingly be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-.
Raj Kishore Prasad, J.
8. I agree.