PETITIONER: IDOL OF THAKURJI SHRI GOVIND DEOJI MAHARAJ Vs. RESPONDENT: BOARD OF REVENUE, RAJASTHAN, AJMER & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/08/1964 BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1965 AIR 906 1965 SCR (1) 96 ACT: The Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945, rr. 4 and 5-"State grant" in favour of idol-Liability for "Matmi dues"-Practice-Writ Petition-Maintainability by affected party. HEADNOTE: The appellant, an Idol, is the grantee of certain lands. They are "State grants" under r. 4 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945, having been made or recognised by the Ruler of the State. All State grants are subject to Matmi dues under the Rules, that is, to the amount payable to the State by the successor of a deceased grantee, on his recognition as such. There had been changes in the person of the Shebait of the idol twice, the previous incumbent dying and his son being recognised as the successor. The respondent therefore passed an order demanding Matmi dues from the present Shebait. The appellant by a Writ Petition disputed the validity of the order, but the petition was dismissed. On appeal, HELD:(i) The grants in question being grants made in favour of the idol and not in favour of the Shebaits, no question of the death of the grantee or his successor could arise and consequently, the respondent could not claim any Matmi dues from the appellant. [100F-H]. (ii)Though the order for payment of Matmi dues had been nominally passed against the Shebait, as they were intended to be enforced against the properties belonging to the appellant, the appellant's Writ Petition was maintainable. [102E-G]. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 326 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 10, 1959
of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No.
10 of 1957.
B. K. Bhattacharya and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General for the State of
Rajasthan,
K. K. Jain and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar C.
J. The short point of law which arises in this appeal is
whether under rule 5 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945, the
appellant, the Idol of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj,
is liable to pay the Matmi amount in question. It appears
that respondent No. 1, the Board of Revenue, had passed an
order on November 6, 1956, directing that the Matalaba Matmi
amounting to Rs. 15,404/14/6 be recovered from the Shebait
of the appellant temple. The appellant disputed the
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validity of this order and filed a Writ Petition (No. 10 of
1957) in the High Court of Rajasthan contending that the
said amount was not recoverable from the appellant. The
High Court has dismissed this writ petition and the
appellant has come to this court with a certificate granted
by the High Court.
In its petition, the case for the appellant was that several
lands had been granted to the appellant from time to time
and that these grants were made in the name of the Idol, and
that the Seva Pooja of the Idol and the management of its
properties was entrusted to the Goswami ever since the Idol
of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj was taken to Jaipur
from Brindaban. On the death of the ninth Shebait, Goswami
Shri Krishna Chandra succeeded to the Shebaitship in 1888
and continued to be in management as such Shebait until
1935. On his death, his eldest son Goswami Bhola Nath
succeeded and Seva Pooja was looked after by him during his
lifetime. On the death of Goswami Bhola Nath in 1945, his
eldest son Goswami Pradumna Kumar succeeded to the
Shebaitship and has been carrying on the management of the
properties of the temple and looking after the Seva Pooja of
the Idol. It was during the management of Pradumna Kumar
that the impugned order has been passed by respondent No. 1.
According to this order, Matmi has been sanctioned “in
favour of Goswami Bhola Nath on the death of Krishna Chandra
Deo and in favour of Pradumna Kumar Deo on the death of
Bhola Nath” and the total amount directed in that behalf is
Rs. 15,404/14/6. The appellant’s petition specifically
averred that the property in question bad been granted to
the Idol itself and that the Shebaits have been performing
the Seva Pooja of the Idol and managing the properties of
the temple as such Shebaits. On these allegations, the
appellant prayed that an appropriate writ, order or
direction should be issued prohibiting respondent No. 1 and
the Collector, Sawai Madhopur, respondent No. 2, and their
nominees or agents from recovering or from taking any step
for the recovery of any Matalaba Matmi under the impugned
order of respondent No. 1 from the petitioner’s estate. The
appellant also claimed that an appropriate order or
direction or writ should be issued quashing the said
impugned order as well as the prior order dated April 20,
1954 on which the latter order was based.
Respondents 1, 2 and the State of Rajasthan which was joined
as respondent No. 3 disputed the appellant’s claim and made
several pleas. In regard to the allegation of the appellant
that the properties in question had been granted to the
Idol, the
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respondents’ reply merely, stated that allegation was not
admitted as the documents regarding the original grants were
not traceable. The respondents urged that the Matalaba
Matmi had been properly levied by respondent No. 1 against
the Shebaits and that the appellants grievance that its
properties were not liable to pay the said amount was not
well-founded.
The High Court has proceeded to deal with this dispute on
the basis that the appellant, the Idol of Thakurji Shri
Govind Deoji Maharaj was the owner of the properties. It,
however, took the view that since the Shebaits were managing
the properties and performing the Seva Pooja of the
appellant Idol, Shebaitship itself being property the
relevant Rules applied, because the beneficial interest
which the Shebaits held could be said to amount to a ‘State
grant’ within the meaning of r.4(1). On this view, the High
Court came to the conclusion that what,is contemplated in
the Matmi Rules is the succession to a Shebait. In that
connection, the High Court referred to the fact that the
predecessors of the present Shebait had applied for Matmi
and the present Shebait himself had similarly filed an
application in that behalf. According to the High Court,
the plain meaning of the definition of ‘Matmi’ is that it is
payable at the time of the recognition of the succeeding
Shebait. In this connection the High Court has also
observed that the writ petition had been filed by the Idol
and though the Shebait appeared as the agent of the Idol, it
was not a petition filed by the Shebait as such, and since
the impugned order had been passed against the Shebait, the
grievance made by the Idol was technically not justified.
Even so, since the High Court was inclined to take the view
that by virtue of the beneficial interest which the Shebaits
have in the property of the temple the impugned order had
been properly passed, the High Court considered the merits
of the writ petition filed by the appellant and dismissed it
with costs. The main judgment has been delivered by
Bhandari J. Modi. J. has agreed with the conclusions of
Bhandari J. and in a brief order he has indicated the
principal grounds on which his conclusions rested. Modi J.
also held that it was not possible for the Court to help the
appellant in view of the Rules as they stand. He thought
that the only relief which the appellant can secure is by
moving respondent No. 3 to exercise its discretion under
clause (xvii) of r.20 and get exemption from the payment of
the amount in question. It is against this decision that
the appellant has come to this Court.
The Jaipur Matmi Rules came into force in 1945 and some of
the relevant provisions of these Rules must now be
considered
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Rule 4 contains definitions. Rule, 4(1) defines a ‘State
grant’ as meaning a grant of an interest in land made or
recognised by the Ruler of the Jaipur State and includes a
jagir, muamla, suba, istimrar, chakoti, badh, bhom, inam,
tankha, udak, milak, aloofa, khangi, bhog or other
charitable or religious grant, a site granted free of
premium for a residence or a garden, or other grant of a
similar nature. Rule 4(2) defines a person holding a State
grant as a ‘State Grantee’. Rule 4(3) refers to ‘Matmi’ and
defines it in these terms:
“Matmi” means mutation of the name of the
successor to a State grant on the death of the
last holder. The person in whose name matmi
is sanctioned is called the “matmidar” and the
sum payable by him on his recognition as such
by the State is called “matalba matmi”.
Rule 4 (4) defines ‘Nazarana’ thus:
“Nazrana” is the sum payable, in addition to
matalba matmi, by an adopted son or by a
successor other than a direct male lineal
descendant of the last holder”.
It will thus be noticed that under r. 4 (1) a State grant
means, inter alia, a grant of an interest in land made by
the Ruler of the Jaipur State and it includes a charitable
or religious grant. The High Court has dealt with the
present writ petition on the basis that the grant has been
made in favour of the Idol. In fact, the two grants to
which our attention was invited fully support this view.
The copy of the Patta dated 21st Ramzan St. 1123 (Amnexure
Exbt. 4) shows that the villages Dehra and Salampukh
Balahadi in Pargana Hindaun Baseshu Prasad were allotted for
“Punya Bhog” of Thakurji Sriji. Similarly, the copy of the
Patta dated Katik Badi 8 of Smt. 1808 (Annexure Exbt. 5)
shows that the village Govindpur Bas Hathyod Tehsil Oasaba,
Sawai Jaipur was allotted for the Bhog (food offerings) of
Thakurji Sriji. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in dealing
with the. present appeal on the same basis which the High
Court has adopted in its judgment. The grants in question
were grants made in favour of the Idol and not in favour of
the Shebaits. It is well-known that a religious grant can
be made either in favour of the Idol as such or may be made
to a person burdening the grantee with the obligation to
render requisite services to the temple. It is with, the
first category of grants that we are concerned in this
appeal. The grant is one to the Idol and if the Shebait
manages the properties granted to the Idol, it is by virtue
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of his Shebaitship and not because he is in any manner a
grantee from the State as such.
Rule 5 provides that all State grants shall be subject to
Matmi with certain exceptions. With these exceptions we are
not concerned. Rule 6 provides for the submission of death
reports by persons claiming succession to a grant. Rule 7
prescribes the penalty for the successor’s failure to make
the report. Rule 8 provides for attachment of State grants
pending Matmi. Rule 9 provides for the Bhograj expenses
during. attachment of a bhog grant. Under Rule 12, a claim
for succession to a State grant, if not made within a year
of the last holder’s death, shall be rejected as time-barred
and the grant resumed. Rule 13 deals ,with the question of
the persons entitled to succeed. Rule 14 deals with the
same problem in the absence of a direct male lineal
descendant. The proviso to rule 14 lays down, inter alia,
that in the case of a grant for the maintenance of a temple,
other than a lain temple, it shall be within the discretion
of the Government to select as successor any one of the male
lineal descendants of the original grantee, with due regard
to his suitability for the performance of worship. With the
rest of the Rules we are not concerned in the present
appeal.
The question which arises is, can the grant made to the
appellant be said to attract the operation of rule 5 ? Rule
5 prescribes for the levy of Matmi in respect of State
grants and if the said rule applies, the appellant would
have no case. In deciding the question as to whether the
appellant’s estate is liable to pay Matmi under r. 5 it is
necessary to examine the nature of this Matmi, and find out
whether a claim in respect of it can be made against the
appellant. We have already noticed that Matmi means
mutation of the name of the successor to a State grant on
the death of the last holder. It is obvious that in the
case of a grant to the Idol or temple as such there would be
no question about the death of the grantee and, therefore,
no question about its successor. An Idol which is a
juridical person is not subject to death, because the Hindu
concept is that the Idol lives for ever, and so, it is
plainly impossible to predicate about the Idol which is the
grantee in the present case that it has died at a certain
time and the claims of a successor fall to be determined.
That being so, it seems difficult to hold that any claim for
Matmi can be made against the appellant, and that must
clearly lead to the inference that no amount can be
recovered from the properties belonging to the Idol on the
ground that Matmi is claimable
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against a person who claims to be the successor of the
Shebait of the appellant.
The learned Advocate-General was unable to dispute this
position. He, however, attempted to argue that all grants
pertaining to the properties of the appellant were not
before the Court, and so, it may not be proper to proceed on
the basis that all the properties of the appellant have been
granted to the appellant in its own name. We are not
impressed by this argument. We have already noticed that a
specific averment was made by the appellant in paragraph 3
of its writ petition that all the State grants made to the
appellant from time to time were in the name of the Idol,
and though the, respondents did not specifically admit this
averment, they pleaded that since the documents regarding
the original grants were not traceable, they required the
appellant to prove its case in that behalf. The appellant
produced two grants and it appears from the judgment of the
High Court that the matter was proceeded with on the basis
that the ldol is the grantee of all the properties. That
being so, we do not think it is open to the Advocate-General
now to contend that some of the properties may have been
granted to the Shebaits no doubt burdened with the
obligation to perform the services of the Idol.
The High Court appears to have taken the view that because a
Shebait has some kind of a beneficial interest in the
property of the temple, that beneficial interest itself
could be treated as a State grant and it is on this basis
that the High Court held that the impugned order passed by
respondent No. 1 was valid. In the present case we are not
concerned to enquire whether for recognising a succeeding
Shebait any Matmi can be recovered by the respondents; but
since the High Court has laid emphasis on the fact that the
Shebait has a beneficial interest in the properties granted
to the appellant, it is necessary to point out that though
the Shebait by virtue of the special position attaching to
Shebait under the Hindu law can claim some beneficial
interest, that interest is derived not by virtue of the
grant made by the State, but by virtue of the provisions of
Hindu law, or custom, or usage of the temple or locality
where the temple is situated. In Tilkayat Shri Govindalalji
Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1) the “position
of the Shebaits was incidentally considered, and the
observations made by Mr. Justice Ameer Ali in Vidva Varuthi
Thirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar (2) were cited with
approval. “In almost every case”, said Mr. Justice Ameer
Ali, “the Mahant is given the right to a part of the
usufruct, the mode of
(1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561.
(2) 48 I.A. 392, 311.
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enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct depending again on
usage and custom. In no case was the property conveyed to
or vested in him, nor is he a trustee in the English sense
of the term, though in view of the obligations and duties
resting on him, he is answerable as a trustee in the general
sense for mal-administration.” Therefore, it seems to us
that the High Court was in error in holding that the
beneficial interest of the Shebaits in the properties
granted to the appellant amounted to a State grant, and so,
the impugned order was perfectly valid. The incidental
effect of the conclusions reached by the High Court may
perhaps be taken to be that the order passed by respondent
No. I being valid, the amount in question can be recovered
from the properties of the appellant. That is why we
thought it necessary to clarify the position in law on this
point.
In fact, by Civil Misc. Petition No. 1081 of 1964 it has
been brought to our notice by the appellant that it had made
a compensation claim because lands granted to the appellant
had been resumed by the State of Rajasthan by notification
No. F.(388)/ REV/1.A/53 dated Jan. 1, 1959 and that an
annual sum by way of annuity to the Deity had been
sanctioned by the State of Rajasthan under its order dated
April 24, 1962. This order has, however, directed that the
amount of Rs. 15,404/14/6 which has been ordered by
respondent No. 1 to be recovered by way of Matmi should be
deducted and that, it is urged before us by the appellant,
cannot be done. This fact clearly shows that the appellant
is justified in apprehending that though the order of Matmi
dues has been nominally passed against the present Shebait,
it may be enforced against the properties belonging to the
appellant. Since we have held that the properties granted
to the appellant constitute State grants under r. 4(1), but
do not become liable to pay Matmi dues under r. 4(3), we
must hold that the appellant’s writ petition was justified
inasmuch as it asked for an appropriate direction
restraining the respondents and their nominees or agents
from recovering the said amount from the appellant’s estate.
Therefore, prayer made by the appellant in paragraph 16(1)
of its writ petition must be allowed. Since we are not
concerned with the validity of the order passed by
respondent No. 1 against the present Shebait, we propose to
express no opinion in regard to the merits of the prayer
contained in paragraph 16(2) of the writ petition.
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by
the High Court is set aside and the appellant’s writ
petition is allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed.
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