JUDGMENT
Mukul Mudgal J.
1. This is an application under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code filed by the petitioner/management of M/s Ircon International Limited against its employee, respondent No. 5, Shri V.K. Talwar, on the basis of what are averred to be false averments made in this Court in the application under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act i.e. CM 8057/2000 supported by an affidavit. The sum and substance of the petitioner’s case is that in order to buttress his claim under Section 17B of the Act, the respondent No. 5 had averred that he was out of employment since 1983 and to counter a plea raised by the petitioner in CM 11121/2000, the respondent also averred that he had secured a passport only in 1998 and had been present in India without any interruption ever since 1983 till September 2000. The petitioner’s case was that the said claim was false was evident inter alia from the fact that the respondent No. 5 had been in possession of a passport much prior to 1998 and the VISA endorsement showed that he was given transfer of residence permit by paying Rs. 1,58,000/- which is only possible if a stay abroad was for more than 2 years and above.
2. The sum and substance of the averments in the present application under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code is as under:
a) As per the requirement of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act that after respondent No. 5’s dismissal from services with the petitioner on 7th December 1983, he had not been in gainful employment and consequently payment under Section 17B of the Act was claimed during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court.
3. It is thus stated by the respondent No. 5 in his application CM 8057/2000 under Section 17B, filed in this Court that he was not gainfully employed since 7th December 1983 till the date of the filing of the application under Section 17B of the Act on 14th September 2000.
4. The petitioner has summarized the false averments made by respondent No. 5 as under:-
(i)” In his application under Section 17B at pages 102-103 para 5 which reads as “The respondent no. 5 is filing the accompanying affidavit to the effect that respondent no. 5/workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and, therefore, the workman/respondent No. 5 is entitled to the statutory relief in the event of any Award dated 15-5-2000 passed by the labour court.”
(ii) At page 103. Para 6 “That the respondent/workman is out of employment ever since December 1983 as per the Single Order of dismissal, dated 7-12-1983 through which the respondent as well as co-worker Ajay Kumar were dismissed from the services on the alleged ground of insubordination with immediate effect without holding any enquiry.”
(iii) At page 104 para 7 ….. The family of the respondent No. 5 consists of his aged parents, his wife and two minor daughters of the age of 15 and 5 years respectively and being out of employment for 17 years, when the labour court could finally decide his dispute after the outcome of the writ petition as well as the LPA pending before this Hon’ble Court, the respondent No. 5/applicant should not be allowed to starve any further, more particularly in view of Section 17B of the I.D. Act.”
(iv) Affidavit at page 106, para 2 “that I state on affirmation that I have not been employed in any establishment, during the period of the pendency of my industria1 dispute pending in the labour court commencing from the date of my dismissal, i.e. 7-12-83 till date nor I was gainfully employed during the period with a hope that I shall be reinstated with all backwages and I have been pursuing the matter along with my co-worker, Shri Ajay Kumar who preferred the Civil Writ Petition No. 389/84 in the High Court.”
(v) In his reply to petitioner’s application i.e. C.M. No. 11121 of 2000 at page 196 at the bottom ” This belated application asking the answering respondent to produce his passport has got no relevance in the present case because the burden to prove that the answering respondent was employed gainfully during the period, lies on the petitioner company/ employer. The answering respondent has already filed an affidavit to this effect on 7th Sept. 2000 that he has not been gainfully employed when he filed the application under Section 17B of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947.”
(vi) At page 197 at the middle it is stated ” The affidavit has been filed, as already stated above on 7th September 2000 and, therefore, nothing survives but the employer is under a statutory duty during the pendency of this writ petition to pay the back wages which was superseded by the order dated 5th May 2000 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No. 1541/2000 that an interim payment of Rs.3,00,000/- may be made to the co worker, Shri Ajay Kumar to which the Labour Court award dated 15th May 2000 is subjected.”
(vii) At page 198 at the bottom ” Sine the dismissal Along with co worker Shri Ajay Kumar and the documentary evidence to such effect are on record of the Conciliation Officers, Central and Delhi Administration, and the entire proceedings before the labour court where the physical presence of the answering respondent was in the court on 27th January 1986, 6th February 1986, 14th March, 12th May, 26th May, 25th September, 1986, 14th January, 26th March, 18th May, 12th October, 2nd December 1987, 24th March, 27th July, 15th November, 6th March 1998, 25th May, 25th September, 26th September, 1989, 20th January, 20th February, 19th April, 13th March, 20th November 1990, 14th March, 22nd August, 1991, 15th February, 2nd September 1992 and 26th April 1993.
(viii) At page 200 para 5 it has been stated ” the driving license No. P 970070046 was issued by the Transport Authority, Delhi which cannot be issued unless the answering respondent is physically present whose photograph is taken on the driving license.”
(ix) At page 200 para 6 it is mentioned by the answering respondent that the answering respondent applied for issuance of the new passport sometime in March 1998 and the same was issued on 3rd September 1998 which further confirms that answering respondent never went abroad for employment during the period 1997 or 1998 since the passport has been issued on 3rd Sep[tember 1998.”
(x) At page 203 para 3 it is further mentioned that it is again reiterated that the answering respondent was not gainfully employed during the entire period of termination of services till he reported for duty on 8th December 1999 with the petitioner company after the judgment in LPA No. 64 of 1993 which was pronounced on 29th November 1999.”
(xi) At page 204 para 4 it is averred that ” the electrostat copy of the passport can be perused by this Hon’ble Court whether the answering respondent has ever travelled abroad for any such employment, in view of the facts already stated above whereby his presence in India has been without any interruption ever since 1983 till date.”
(xii) At page 204 para 5 it is submitted that “the answering respondent has not gone abroad for employment at any point of time which is evident from the passport on record, there is no question of any visa document being issued by the Ministry of External Affairs and, therefore, there is no question of any alleged employment of the answering respondent during this period of 17 years”
5. It is thus averred that the aforesaid statements on oath and the document filed therein constitute an offence punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The relevant statutory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code read as under:-
“Indian Penal Code
191. Giving false evidence.___Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.
192. Fabricating false evidence.___ Whoever causes any circumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document containing a false statement, intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding, is said to “to fabricate false evidence” .
193. Punishment for false evidence. – Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine, and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.___(1) No court shall take cognizance__
(a) …. …. … ….
(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or
(ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate.
340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195(1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the in interest of of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, –
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the court thinks it necessary so to do send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and given evidence before such Magistrate;
(2) The power conferred on a court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section 195.
(3) A complaint made under section shall be signed, –
(a) where the court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the court as the court may appoint;
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the court.
(4) In this section, “court” has the same meaning as in section 195.”
“Industrial Disputes Act
17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts.___Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court:
Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be.”
6. Reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Shri Yasobant Das on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Karunakaran vs. T.V. Eachara Warrier wherein it has been held in paras 19, 20 and 21 as under:-
“19. Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 makes provisions as to offences affecting the administration of justice. Sec. 340, Cr.P.C., with which the chapter opens is the equivalent of the old Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The chapter has undergone one significant change with regard to the provision of appeal which was there under the old Section 476B, Cr.P.C. Under Section 476B, Cr. P.C., (old) there was a right of appeal from the order of a subordinate court to the superior court to which appeals ordinarily lay from an appealable decree or sentence of such former court. Under Section 476B (old) there would have ordinarily been a right of appeal against the order of the High Court to this Court. There is, however, a distinct departure from that position under Section 341, Cr. P.C. (new) with regard to an appeal against the order of a High Court under S. 340 to this Court. An order of the High Court made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 340 is specifically excluded for the purpose of appeal to the superior court under Section 341(1), Cr. P.C. (new). This is, therefore, a new restriction in the way of the appellant when he approaches this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
20. Whether, suo motu, or on an application by a party under Section 340(1), Cr. P.C., a court having been already seized of a matter may be tentatively of opinion that further action against some party or witness may be necessary in the interest of justice. In a proceeding under Section 340(1), Cr. P.C., the reasons recorded in the principal case, in which a false statement has been made, have a great bearing and indeed action is taken having regard to the overall opinion formed by the court in the earlier proceedings.
21. At an enquiry held by the court under Section 340(1), Cr. P.C., irrespective of the result of of the main case, the only question is whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offence and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take such action.”
7. Reliance has further been placed by the petitioner on Baban Singh and Another vs. Jagdish Singh and Others it has been held as under by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:-
“7 . The matter has to be considered from three stand points. Does the swearing of the false affidavits amount to an offence under S. 199, Indian Penal Code or under either S. 191 or 192, Indian Penal Code? If it comes under the two latter sections, the present prosecution cannot be sustained. Section 199 deals with a declaration and does not state that the declaration must be on oath. The only condition necessary is that the declaration must be capable of being used as evidence and which any Court of justice or any public servant or other person, is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence. Section 191 deals with evidence on oath and S. 192 with fabricating false evidence. If we consider this matter from the standpoint of S. 191, Indian Penal Code the offence is constituted by swearing falsely when one is bound by oath to state the truth because an affidavit is a declaration made under an oath. The definition of the offence of giving false evidence thus applies to the affidavits. The offence may also fall within S. 192. It lays down inter alia that a person is said to fabricate false evidence if he makes a document containing a false statement intending that such false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and so appearing in evidence may cause any person who, in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding. When Baban Singh and Dharichhan Kuer made declarations in their affidavits which were tendered in the High Court to be taken into consideration, they intended the statements to appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, and so appearing, to cause the Court to entertain an erroneous opinion regarding the compromise. In this way their offence came within the words of Ss. 191/192 rather than S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code. They were thus prima facie guilty or of fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding.”
8. It is further averred by the petitioner by filing CM 11121/2000 that the respondent No. 5 had been gainfully employed abroad and received adequate remuneration during the period 1983-1997 and the petitioner to substantiate this plea accordingly called upon the respondent No. 5 to produce his passport Along with the relevant visa endorsements.
9. The stand of respondent No. 5 advanced by his counsel, Shri M.C. Dhingra that even if it is assumed that there is a wrong and false averment made, it is not made in relation to the claim raised under Section 17B of the Act and therefore, cannot lead to any action under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the false declaration, if any, has not been made to advance the claim under Section 17-B of the Act but only made in reply filed by the respondent No. 5 to CM 11121/2000 filed by the petitioner.
10. The sum and substance of the averments in this application under Section 340 of the Code is that false averments were made about the non -employment of the respondent No. 5 in any establishment during the period 7th December 1983 to 7th September 2000. To support this stand that he was not employed during the aforesaid period, the respondent No. 5 submitted on oath in his affidavit that he has applied for a passport only in March 1998 which was to support and substantiate the plea that he could have not gone abroad for employment during the period 1997-98 since the passport was issued on 3rd September 1998 only. To counter this plea of the respondent No. 5, the petitioner has relied upon the following documents/or copies thereof to support the plea that the above statement of respondent No. 5 was prima facie false and this Court should direct action under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the respondent No. 5:-
(a) Reply dated 5th January, 2000 to the petitioner’s application dated 23rd November, 2000;
(b) Driving license (Annexure R-5-H), issued by the RTO, New Delhi on 2-9-97;
(c) Pasport dated 3th September, 1998 (Annexure R-5/I);
(d) Passport bearing No. E-003318(Annexure R-A-I);
(e) Passport bearing No. M-708479 dated 15th April, 1978 issued by the RPO, New Delhi
(f) Treasury Challan No. 237/97 dated 4th October, 1997 at ICD, Patparganj;
(g) Affidavits dated 7th September, 2000 and 5th January, 2001
11. The petitioner’s case is thus that in order to substantiate his claim under Section 17B to the effect that respondent No. 5 was not employed in any establishment since the termination of his services by the petitioner on 7th December, 1983 till the date of the affidavit in September, 2000, it was averred by respondent No. 5 that he had never gone abroad prior to the issuance of passport date 3rd September, 1998. It was also averred that from 27th January, 1986 till 26th April, 1993 during the course of the proceedings, respondent No. 5 was present in the Labour Court. A similar claim about his presence in Delhi was also made about 2nd July, 1997 when a driving license was issued in Delhi in favor of respondent No. 5.
12. Further in order to counter the claim of the petitioner made in C.M. No. 11121/2000 asking the respondent No. 5 to produce his passport to demonstrate the gainful employment of the respondent No. 5 abroad, it was averred by respondent NO. 5 that respondent No. 5 applied for a new passport in March, 1998 and got it on 3rd September, 1998 and never went abroad for employment during 1997-98 as passport was only issued on 3rd September, 1998. It was also averred by the respondent No. 5 that “his presence in India has been without any interruption ever since 1983 till date.”
13. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioner/applicant that in the rejoinder to the above application, the petitioner, produced photocopies of respondent No. 5’s passport showing that it was issued on 13th June, 1988 and he was granted transfer of residence by the challan dated 4th October, 1997 and the respondent No. 5 paid Rs.1,58,000/- for securing transfer of residence to India. This according to the petitioner totally falsified the claim of the respondent No. 5 that he had never been abroad during 1997-98 and was present in India since 1983. It is only in response to this Court’s order dated 22nd March, 2001, did the respondent No. 5 disclose by his affidavit dated 17th April, 2001 that he held a passport dated 15th April, 1978 and was issued another passport No. E-003318 on 13th June, 1988. It was then stated by respondent No. 5 that he had gone to Bangkok. Thus it is prima facie apparent that the claims made by respondent No. 5 in this Court prior to the rejoinder to CM 11121/2000 in this Court to the effect that the respondent No. 5 never went abroad during 1997-98 and he was in India since 1983 till the date of the affidavit of respondent NO. 5 in September, 2000 are not correct. The order of this Court dated 22nd March, 2001 is relevant and is extracted hereunder:-
“Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, Learned Additional Solicitor General has drawn my attention to the fact that the contrary to the impression created by Respondent No. 5, he had been issued a passport previously which discloses foreign travel. In my view an affidavit in reply is called for since this would go to the root of the question as to whether Respondent No. 5 was gainfully employed in the intervening period.
Affidavit be filed by the Respondent No. 5 within two weeks. Copy of the same be supplied to the other side.
Renotify the matter for further consideration on 24th April, 2001.”
14. The defense of respondent No. 5 in reply to the application under Section 340 filed by the petitioner is too glib and facile and suggests that unless there was any prima facie false averment in the claim under Section 17B any other false statement on oath does not attract Section 191, 192 and 193 of the I.P.C. Mr. Dhingra has submitted that since the allegedly false pleas were made not in the Section 17B application and only in reply to the rejoinder in another CM.No.11121/2000 filed by the petitioner, proceedings under Section 340 can not lie. In my view to give the interpretation to Section 340 and Section 193 as suggested by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 will be making a mockery of the legislative intent behind these provisions. The plea of the respondent No. 5 further is that the relevant period for Section 17B was 20th July, 2000 onwards when the writ petition was filed by the petitioner in this Court. The plea of respondent No. 5 that employment in Bangkok from 1993 to 1997 is not relevant is to make otiose and illusory, the salutary provisions which are meant to ensure probity in judicial proceedings. Furthermore the statements were made to buttress the claim of respondent No. 5 that he was not employed since 1983 and thus were made directly in aid and support of the plea of respondent No. 5 under Section 17B of the Act and were made when this Court on 22nd March, 2001 directed the respondent No. 5 to file an affidavit in reply to CM 11121/2000 as the issue of foreign travel went to the root of the question whether respondent No. 5 was gainfully employed during the intervening period.
15. Thus the respondent No. 5’s claim that the false averment, if any, was made not directly in a claim made by him under Section 17B of the Act but was made in response to respondent’s plea in CM.No.11121/2000 is not sustainable. Even if what the respondent No. 5 submitted is correct the provisions of Sections 191 and 192 of the Code cannot be construed so narrowly as suggested by respondent No. 5. As long as there is a false statement made in connection with the claim by the respondent No. 5 in judicial proceedings, such statement would clearly fall within the ambit of the aforesaid sections 191, 192 and 193 of the IPC which prohibit giving or furnishing of false evidence in any judicial proceeding. The plea of respondent No. 5 that the possession of passport is not relevant for the purpose of the claim made by him under Section 17B of the Act is thus totally unsustainable.
16. In this view of the matter the plea of the respondent No. 5 that he was not employed during the period 1983-97 in Bangkok is neither relevant nor material as the period involved is from 2nd July 2000 i.e. the date of the filing of the writ petition, cannot be sustained. As per the mandate of Section 17B of the Act, even if a false statement is made on oath in order to sustain or support such a plea, it would clearly fall within the ambit of the provisions of Sections 191 & 192 of the IPC.
17. The Supreme Court in M.S. Ahlawat vs. State of Haryana and Another summarized the law laid down by this Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam as follows:-
“This Court in Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam, stated that where the offence relates to a Court under Section 195, Cr.P.C. sanction of the Court should be obtained first and such sanction should be granted only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely and to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very end. It is made clear that there is no inherent power to make a complaint apart from the provisions of Section 195, Cr.P.C.”
Thus it is evident that chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code deals with false evidence and offences against public justice and provides that in respect of the offence relating to documents used in court including affidavits as per the law laid down in K. Karunakaran’s case (supra), private prosecutions are barred and only the Court in relation to which the offence was committed may initiate proceedings. Section 195 of the Code is in fact mandatory and forbids any court to take jurisdiction of such offences without sanction of the concerned Court. It has also been held that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent upon the Court to order prosecution but to exercise judicial discretion to order prosecution only in larger interest of the administration of justice. I am, therefore, of the view that as per the law laid down in Chajoo Ram’s case (supra) the alleged perjury is deliberate and conscious and on the averments of the petitioner, if proved, conviction is probable or likely.
18. Consequently, I am of the view that larger interests of the administration of justice requires further action against respondent No. 5. I have recorded a prima facie finding as laid down in Chajoo Ram’s case (supra). It has been held in Chajoo Ram’s case (supra) that sanction for prosecution should be granted only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely and it is not desirable to start prosecutions for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution. The same position of law has been laid down in Mohan Singh vs. Late Amar Singh through LRs , the relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“Tampering with the record of judicial proceedings and filing of false affidavit in a Court of law has the tendency of causing obstruction the due course of justice. It undermines and obstructs free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice and aims at striking a blow at the rule of law. The stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and no one can be permitted to take liberties with it by soiling its purity. Since we are prima facie satisfied that the tenant has filed false affidavits and tampered with the judicial record, with a a view to eradicate the evil of perjury, we consider it appropriate to direct the Registrar of this Court to file a complaint before the appropriate Court and set the criminal law in motion against the tenant, the appellant in this case namely Mohan Singh.”
19. In view of the foregoing discussions I am satisfied that the documents and affidavit filed by respondent No. 5 in this Court demonstrate that his plea regarding his not being in India since 1983 is prima facie not correct. A Court is thus required to ensure that the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice is not obstructed. Of late litigants have tended to utter falsehoods with impunity as on several occasions they have managed to get away with such false statements owing to the unnecessary indulgence and misplaced generosity. False averments on oath not only vitiate the probity of judicial proceedings but considerable time is spent and expenses incurred for truth to be unravelled. Thus if a dishonest plaintiff secures and continues an interim order on a false averment and a dishonest defendant delays the proceedings by pleading a false defense, then unless and until willful lies are viewed sternly and dealt with effectively, the judicial system will suffer thereby harming the honest litigant. Contumacious falsehoods by unscrupulous litigants have been eating into the vitals of our judicial system and ought to be put down firmly. In the present case the respondent No. 5 has continued to stand by his statements and has in fact sought to justify his questioned averments. He has also contended that the statement alleged to be false must be strictly made under Section 17B of the Act and statements made in an affidavit, filed in response to the petitioner’s application are not relevant.
20. Considering all the facts and circumstances discussed above, I am of the view that in the present case it will be appropriate and the ends of justice will be fully met upon a direction to the Registrar General of this Court to file a complaint before the appropriate Court and set the criminal law in motion against respondent No. 5 not later than 31st January, 2004. The above observations are only prima facie and the concerned Court before whom the complaint is filed will dispose of the complaint expeditiously independently of the prima facie conclusions recorded in this judgment.
21. With the above observations the application under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code stands disposed of.
