CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5982 of 2001 PETITIONER: J.P. Bansal RESPONDENT: State of Rajasthan & Anr. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2003 BENCH: SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & ARIJIT PASAYAT. JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J
Appellant’s prayer for issuing a writ of mandamus to
the State of Rajasthan to pay compensation on cessation of
functioning as Chairman of the abolished Rajasthan Taxation
and Tribunal (in short ‘the Tribunal’) having been turned
down by learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the
Rajasthan High Court, this appeal has been preferred. As
the core question involved is pristinely legal, it is
unnecessary to enter into the factual aspects in detail.
Factual panorama in a nutshell is as follows:
Appellant was appointed as Judicial Member of the
Tribunal in terms of notification dated 16.9.1995 issued by
the Finance Department (Taxation Division) of the Government
of Rajasthan. Appointment of the appellant was made by the
Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a)
of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Taxes and
Tribunal Act 1995 (in short ‘the Act’). By the notification
dated 16.9.1995 referred to above, Chairman and the
technical member were also appointed. Subsequently, he was
appointed to discharge functions of Chairman of the Tribunal
till appointment of regular Chairman. This contingency arose
on the previous Chairman attaining the age of 65 years.
State Government vide notification dated 27.2.1999 issued an
Ordinance No.1/1999 styled The Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal
(Repeal) Ordinance, 1999 (in short ‘the Ordinance’). The
same became operative w.e.f. the date of notification i.e.
27.2.1999. By the above Ordinance under Section 5 matters
and proceedings pending before Tribunal on the date of
commencement of the Ordinance stood automatically
transferred to the High Court for disposal. As a consequence
of Tribunal being abolished, continuance of appellant as
Chairman automatically came to an end. Appellant claimed
compensation of Rs.5,35,648/- with interest @ 15% per annum
by filing a writ petition on the ground that his tenure
appointment was to continue up to 18.9.2000. Since there was
a premature termination of the tenure appointment, claim of
compensation for the balance period from the date of
termination of the appointment till 18.9.2000 (which
according to him was the last date of the period of tenure
appointment) was made. The writ application was filed before
the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench. The stand of the
appellant before the learned Single Judge was that there was
a Cabinet decision taken to release salary to the appellant
for the balance period which was to be paid. As the tenure
of the appellant could not have been curtailed, he was
entitled to compensation. By judgment dated 27.9.1999 in SB
Civil Writ Petition No.4379 of 1999 the writ petition was
dismissed by learned Single Judge. It was noted that the
validity of the Ordinance was not challenged. Since the
Tribunal itself was abolished and all cases pending before
it have been transferred to the High Court, no interference
was called for. It was noted that the exact amount of
compensation can only be decided by a competent court after
taking evidence of the parties. So far as implementation of
the Cabinet decision is concerned, it was noted that the
same was a matter of discretion of the Government and it was
open to the appellant to make a representation to the
concerned authorities. It was not open to the High Court to
enforce the Cabinet decision. The matter was carried in
appeal before the Division Bench which dismissed the same
holding that the learned Single Judge has pronounced a well-
reasoned judgment and no interference is called for.
Learned counsel for the appellant primarily took three
stands in support of the appeal. Firstly, it was submitted
that the decision of the Cabinet was enforceable. In the
meeting of the Cabinet four decisions were taken. They
related to: (1) Promulgation of Ordinance, (2) repatriation
of the Technical Member to his parent department (3)
absorption of the members of the staff and (4) payment of
compensation to the appellant. While the first three
decisions were implemented; only the last one relating to
payment of compensation was not implemented. The stand
taken by the State Government cannot partake the character
of Government order under Article 166 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short ‘the Constitution’) is not tenable.
Secondly, clause (2) of Article 310 of the Constitution
deals with payment of compensation on premature cessation of
a tenure appointment on the basis of contract to that
effect. Even though there was no contractual prescription
for payment of compensation, that has to be taken as inbuilt
requirement in the spirit of clause (2) of Article 310.
There has to be interpretation of the provisions for giving
effect to constitutional mandates. The decision taken by the
Cabinet was in line with the said provision and, therefore,
the High Court was not justified in refusing the grant of
compensation. Finally, since there has been violation of the
legitimate expectation of the appellant to continue till the
end of tenure period, by application of the principle of
legitimate expectation the State Government was bound to pay
compensation irrespective of whether there was any Cabinet
decision earlier or not and that would not make any
difference. Section 4(b) of the Ordinance also has relevance
in that context. Any obligation or liability accrued or
incurred under the Act repealed are not be affected by the
repeal.
In support of the stands reliance was placed on
following decisions: (L.G. Chaudhari, vs. The Secretary,
L.S.G. Dept., Govt. of Bihar and Others AIR 1980 SC 383,
State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan
and Ors. 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351, R. Rajendran and Ors. etc.
etc. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1107,
State of A.P. and Ors. vs. Bollapragada Suryanarayana and
Ors. 1997 (6) SCC 258, Dr. L.P. Agarwal vs. Union of India
and Ors. AIR 1992 SC 1872, Sri Justice S.K. Ray, vs. State
of Orissa and Ors. JT 2003 (1) SC 166).
In response, learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan
submitted that there was no Cabinet decision in the line
submitted by the appellant. Even if there would have been
any such Cabinet decision, it cannot meet the requirement of
Government order, as envisaged under Article 166 of the
Constitution. Further the termination of the appointment
came to be effectuated on the basis of legislative action.
Therefore, there is no scope for grant of any compensation.
The decisions relied upon have no application as there were
specific provisions for payment of compensation in the
concerned statutes. The principles of legitimate expectation
have no application to the facts of the case, as are the
provisions of Section 4(b) of the Ordinance.
There is no dispute that under sub-section (5) of
Section 3 of the Act, a Judicial Member was to hold office
for a term of five years from the date on which he enters
upon the office or till he attains the age of sixty two
years, whichever is later. In view of this undisputed
position, the controversy lies within the very narrow
compass.
Article 166 of the Constitution deals with the conduct
of Government business. The said provision reads as
follows:
“166. Conduct of business of the Government
of a State. (1) All executive action of
the Government of a State shall be expressed
to be taken in the name of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and
executed in the name of the Governor shall
be authenticated in such manner as may be
specified in rules to be made by the
Governor, and the validity of an order or
instrument which is so authenticated shall
not be called in question on the ground that
it is not an order or instrument made or
executed by the Governor.
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the
more convenient transaction of the business
of the Government of the State, and for the
allocation among Ministers of the said
business in so far as it is not business
with respect to which the Governor is by or
under this Constitution required to act in
his discretion.”
Clause (1) requires that all executive action of the State
Government shall have to be taken in the name of the
Governor. Further there is no particular formula of words
required for compliance with Article 166(1). What the Court
has to see is whether the substance of its requirement has
been complied with. A Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha
etc. vs. State of Mysore and Ors. (AIR 1964 1823) held that
the provisions of the Article were only directory and not
mandatory in character and if they were not complied with
it could still be established as a question of fact that
the impugned order was issued in fact by the State
Government or the Governor. Clause (1) does not prescribe
how an executive action of the Government is to be
performed, it only prescribes the mode under which such act
is to be expressed. While clause (1) in relation to the
mode of expression, clause (2) lays down the ways in which
the order is to be authenticated. Whether there is any
Government order in terms of Article 166, has to be
adjudicated from the factual background of each case.
Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the
appellant on L.G. Chaudhari (supra) to contend that for all
practicable purposes the decision of Cabinet has to be
construed as a Government order, because three of the
decisions taken by the Cabinet have been implemented. As
noted above, learned counsel for the State took the stand
that neither in the writ petition nor before the High
Court, the Cabinet decision itself was produced. In fact,
the Cabinet memorandum and the order of the Cabinet show
that no decision was taken to pay any compensation. In
this connection reference is made to the Cabinet memorandum
dated 18.3.1993 and the decision No. 57 of 1999. It was
further submitted that even if it is conceded for the sake
of argument that such decision was taken, the same cannot
be enforced by a writ petition.
We need not delve into the disputed question as to
whether there was any Cabinet decision, as it has not been
established that there was any Government order in terms of
Article 166 of the Constitution. The Constitution requires
that action must be taken by the authority concerned in the
name of the Governor. It is not till this formality is
observed that the action can be regarded as that of the
State. Constitutionally speaking the Council of Ministers
are advisors and as the head of the State, the Governor is
to act with the aid or advice of the Council of Ministers.
Therefore, till the advice is accepted by the Governor,
views of the Council of Ministers does not get crystalised
into action of the State. (See: The State of Punjab vs.
Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 SC 493, Bachhittar Singh vs.
State of Punjab and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 395). That being so,
the first plea of the appellant is rejected.
Coming to the plea relating to clause (2) of Article
310, it has to be noted that compensation is payable for
premature termination of contractual service. The clause is
only an enabling provision which empowers the Governor to
enter into the contract with specially qualified person(s)
providing for payment of compensation where no compensation
is payable under the doctrine “service at the pleasure of
the State”. In the absence of any specific term regarding
compensation, it cannot be countenanced that the intention
was to pay it. Had there been an inbuilt requirement to
pay compensation as contended by the appellant, there was
no necessity for specifically incorporating a provision in
that regard. A bare reading of clause (2) makes it clear
that there can be a stipulation for payment of compensation
in the contract to a person who is holding a civil post
under the Union or a State, if before the expiry of an
agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons
not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to
vacate the post. Being an enabling provision in the matter
of payment of compensation on the basis of a contractual
obligation, it cannot be said that even when there is no
stipulation in a contract of employment, the same is
implicit.
Submission of learned counsel that such a provision is
inbuilt and has to be read into the Act and the Ordinance
is clearly unacceptable.
It is said that a statute is an edict of the
legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or
construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia
legis of the legislature.
Interpretation postulates the search for the true
meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of
expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is
not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in
ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that
although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the
person who has spoken the words or used the language can be
approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be
approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act,
becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is
concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the
legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so
made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done
only by making another law or statute after undertaking the
whole process of law-making.
Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is
necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language. In spite of Courts saying so, the draftsmen have
paid little attention and they still boast of the old
British jingle “I am the parliamentary draftsman. I compose
the country’s laws. And of half of the litigation, I am
undoubtedly the cause”, which was referred to by this Court
in Palace Admn. Board v. Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran
(AIR 1980 SC 1187 at. P.1195). In Kirby v. Leather (1965 (2)
All ER 441) the draftsmen were severely criticized in regard
to Section 22(2)(b) of the (UK) Limitation Act, 1939, as it
was said that the section was so obscure that the draftsmen
must have been of unsound mind.
Where, however, the words were clear, there is no
obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the
court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending
or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the
Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of
a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour.
They have to remember that there is a line, though thin,
which separates adjudication from legislation. That line
should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by
“an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and
instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so”. (See:
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in
“Essays on Jurisprudence”, Columbia Law Review, P.51.)
It is true that this Court in interpreting the
Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in
interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at
this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport
Steels Ltd. v. Sirs (1980 (1) ALL ER 529, at p. 542):
“It endangers continued public
confidence in the political impartiality of
the judiciary, which is essential to the
continuance of the rule of law, if Judges,
under the guise of interpretation, provide
their own preferred amendments to statutes
which experience of their operation has
shown to have had consequences that members
of the court before whom the matter comes
consider to be injurious to public
interest.”
Where, therefore, the “language” is clear, the
intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the
language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what
has been said in the statute as also what has not been
said. A construction which requires, for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in
rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered
by the rule of exception, including that of necessity,
which is not the case here. (See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg.
(Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests (AIR 1990 SC
1747 at p. 1752); Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal
Corpn. (AIR 1966 SC 1678 at p. 1682); A.R. Antulay v.
Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak (1984 (2) SCC 500, at pp. 518, 519)].
Indeed, the Court cannot reframe the legislation as it has
no power to legislate. [See State of Kerala v. Mathai
Verghese (1986 (4) SCC 746, at p. 749); Union of India v.
Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96 at p.101)
The decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal (supra) is also of
no assistance to the appellant because the issues involved
was whether in respect of tenure post concept of
superannuation is applicable and the consequences of
premature retirement. In that context direction was given
for payment of arrears of salary etc. The issues were
entirely different and, therefore, that decision has no
application.
The decision in R. Rajendran and Ors. etc. etc.
(supra) revolves around altogether different controversy.
That related to doctrine of pleasure incorporated under
Article 310. It was, inter alia, observed in the said case
that the power to abolish a civil post is inherent in the
right to create it. The Government has power subject of
course to the constitutional provisions to reorganize a
department to provide efficiencies and to bring about
economy. It can abolish an office in good faith. It was
further held in that case that the abolition of the post of
village officers was sought to be achieved by a piece of
legislation passed by the State legislature. Want of good
faith or modalities cannot be attributed to a legislature.
The only question to be considered was whether the
legislature is a colorable one lacking in legislative
competence or whether it transgresses any of the
constitutional limitations. The plea that there was
violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution was
negatived as the Act did not affect right of any of the
incumbent of the posts to carry on any occupation of their
choice, even though they may not be able to stick on to the
post which they were holding.
So far as Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. (supra) is
concerned, there was a specific provision regarding payment
of compensation in the said case. That makes a great deal
of difference.
The decision in State of A.P. and Ors. vs.
Bollapragada Suryanarayana and Ors. (supra) does not in any
way assist the appellant and, in fact, is one which goes
against him. That case related to abolition of posts by
legislation. In the said case also there was a provision
for compensation specifically indicated in Section 5 of the
A.P. Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Act,
1985. As indicated in the case of Kailash Chand Mahajan and
Ors. (supra) clear stipulation in the Act makes a
difference. There is no specific provision for payment of
compensation in the present case.
The relevant observations appeared at paragraph 5 of
the judgment in Bollapragada’s case reads as follows:
“It is contended by the State that the
respondents are not entitled to gratuity or
the benefit of the Family Benefit Scheme
because the posts of part-time Village
Officers have been abolished under the said
Act. The Gratuity Scheme under GOMs dated
18.4.1980 provides, inter alia, for payment
of gratuity to the Village Officer at the
time of demitting office after attaining the
age of 58 years after giving notice to the
appointing authority. Therefore, the
Gratuity Scheme expressly provides for the
manner of demitting office on attaining the
age of 58 years, or 60 years, as the case
may be. It is only when the office is
demitted in the manner set out in the Scheme
that gratuity under the said GOMs becomes
payable. The office is required to be
demitted by the holder concerned after
giving a notice to the appointing authority.
This clearly contemplates a voluntary
relinguishment of office on attaining the
specified age. There is no retirement age
for this office. This provision would not
apply when, by legislation, the posts are
abolished. In such a situation there is no
question of voluntary demitting of office
after notice. The provisions of the said
GOMs, therefore, cannot be attracted when
the posts are abolished by legislation. This
is precisely the reason why under Section 5
of the said Act, a provision for
compensation has been made, which the
respondents have received.”
One of the pleas of the appellant was with reference to
Section 4(b) of the Ordinance, which reads as under:
“4. Savings The repeal made under Section
3 shall not affect
(a) the previous operation of the Act so
repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder; or
(b) any obligation or liability accrued or
incurred under the Act so repealed; or
xxx xxx xxx”
The said provision also does not in any way assist the
appellant because there is no obligation or liability
accrued or incurred under the repealed Act to pay
compensation. There was no obligation or liability fixed
under the Act for payment of compensation.
The decision in Sri Justice S.K.Ray vs. State of Orissa
and Ors. (JT 2003 (1) SC 166) is also distinguishable on
facts. In that case under the scheme of the enactment under
which the appellant was appointed, there was a bar on the
appointee to hold any office of trust or profit and also
there was bar on his acting as a member of the legislature,
Central or State or any other position which may come in
conflict with the office of Lokpal. There was provision also
that he cannot hold any office even after he ceases to hold
the office of Lokpal. There were these disabilities attached
to him for all time to come after ceasing to hold office.
In the instant case there is no such provision, and on the
contrary in the Ordinance Section 6 provides as follows:
“6. FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OF CHAIRMAN AND
MEMBER, –
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (7) of Section 3 of the repealed
Act, the Chairman or any other member of the
Tribunal shall not be ineligible for further
employment under the State Government or
under any local authority or under any
corporation owned or controlled by the State
Government.”
What remains to be considered is the plea of legitimate
expectation. The principle of ‘legitimate expectation’ is
still at a stage of evolution as pointed out in De Smith
Administrative Law (5th Edn. Para 8.038). The principle is
at the root of the rule of law and requires regularity,
predictability and certainty in governments’ dealings with
the public. Adverting to the basis of legitimate expectation
its procedural and substantive aspects, Lord Steyn in
Pierson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997
(3) All ER 577, at p.606)(HL) goes back to Dicey’s
description of the rule of law in his “Introduction to the
study of the Law of the Constitution” (10th Edn. 1968
p.203) as containing principles of enduring value in the
work of a great jurist. Dicey said that the constitutional
rights have roots in the common law. He said:
“The ‘rule of law’, lastly, may be used
as a formula for expressing the fact that
with us, the law of constitution, the rules
which in foreign countries naturally form
part of a constitutional code, are not the
source but the consequence of the rights of
individuals, as defined and enforced by the
courts; that, in short, the principles of
private law have with us been by the action
of the courts and Parliament so extended as
to determine the position of the Crown and
its servants; thus the constitution is the
result of the ordinary law of the land”.
This, says Lord Steyn, is the pivot of Dicey’s discussion of
rights to personal freedom and to freedom of association and
of public meeting and that it is clear that Dicey regards
the rule of law as having both procedural and substantive
effects. “The rule of law enforces minimum standards of
fairness, both substantive and procedural”. On the facts in
Pierson, the majority held that the Secretary of State could
not have maintained a higher tariff of sentence that
recommended by the judiciary when admittedly no aggravating
circumstances existed. The State could not also increase the
tariff with retrospective effect.
The basic principles in this branch relating to
‘legitimate expectation’ were enunciated by Lord Diplock in
Council of Civil Service Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the
Civil Service (1985 AC 374 (408-409) (Commonly known as CCSU
case). It was observed in that case that for a legitimate
expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative
authority must affect the person by depriving him of some
benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past
been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he
can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do
until there has been communicated to him some rational
grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an
opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance
from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn
without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons
for contending that they should not be withdrawn. The
procedural part of it relates to a representation that a
hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded
before the decision is made. The substantive part of the
principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit
of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is
already in receipt of the benefit that it will be continued
and not be substantially varied, then the same could be
enforced. In the above case, Lord Fraser accepted that the
civil servants had a legitimate expectation that they would
be consulted before their trade union membership was
withdrawn because prior consultation in the past was the
standard practice whenever conditions of service were
significantly altered. Lord Diplock went a little further,
when he said that they had a legitimate expectation that
they would continue to enjoy the benefits of the trade union
membership, the interest in regard to which was protectable.
An expectation could be based on an express promise or
representation or by established past action or settled
conduct. The representation must be clear and unambiguous.
It could be a representation to the individual or generally
to class of persons.
Even so, it has been held under English law that the
decision maker’s freedom to change the policy in public
interest, cannot be fettered by the application of the
principle of substantive legitimate expectation.
Observations in earlier cases project a more inflexible rule
than is in vogue presently. In R. v. IRC, ex p Preston
(1985 AC 835) the House of Lords rejected the plea that the
altered policy relating to parole for certain categories of
prisoners required prior consultation with the prisoner,
Lord Scarman observed:
“But what was their legitimate
expectation. Given the substance and purpose
of the legislative provisions governing
parole, the most that a convicted prisoner
can legitimately expect is that his case be
examined individually in the light of
whatever policy the Secretary of State sees
fit to adopt provided always that the adopted
policy is a lawful exercise of the discretion
conferred upon him by the statute. Any other
view would entail the conclusion that the
unfettered discretion conferred by statute
upon the minister can in some cases by
restricted so as to hamper or even to prevent
changes of policy.”
To a like effect are the observations of Lord Diplock
in Hughes vs. Department of Health and Social Security (HL)
1985 AC 776 (788):
“Administrative policies may change with
changing circumstances, including changes in
the political complexion of governments. The
liberty to make such changes is something
that is inherent in our constitutional form
of government.”
Before we do so, we shall refer to some of the
important decisions of this Court to find out the extent to
which the principle of substantive legitimate expectation is
accepted in our country. In Navjyoti Co-op. Group Housing
Society vs. Union of India (1992 (4) SCC 477), the principle
of procedural fairness was applied. In that case the
seniority as per the existence list of co-operative housing
societies for allotment of land was altered by subsequent
decision. The previous policy was that the seniority amongst
housing societies in regard to allotment of land was to be
based on the date of registration of the society with the
Registrar. But on 20.1.1990, the policy was changed by
reckoning seniority as based upon the date of approval of
the final list by the Registrar. This altered the existing
seniority of the societies for allotment of land. This Court
held that the societies were entitled to a ‘legitimate
expectation’ that the past consistent practice in the matter
of allotment will be followed even if there was no right in
private law for such allotment. The authority was not
entitled to defeat the legitimate expectation of the
societies as per the previous seniority list without some
overriding reason of public policy as to justify change in
the criterion. No such overriding public interest was
shown. According to the principle of ‘legitimate
expectation’, if the authority proposed to defeat a person’s
legitimate expectation, it should afford him an opportunity
to make a representation in the matter. Reference was made
to Halsbury’s Laws of England (p.151, Vol.1 (1) (4th Ed.
re-issue) and to the CCSU case. It was held that the
doctrine imposed, in essence, a duty on public authority to
act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant
factors, relating to such legitimate expectation. Within
the contours of fair dealing, the reasonable opportunity to
make representation against change of policy came in.
Lastly we come to the three-judge Bench judgment in
National Building Construction Corporation vs. S.
Raghunathan & Others. (1998 (7) SCC 66). This case has more
relevance to the present case, as it was also a service
matter. The respondents were appointed in CPWD and they
went on deputation to the NBCC in Iraq and they opted to
draw, while on deputation, their grade pay in CPWD plus
deputation allowance. Besides that, the NBCC granted them
Foreign Allowance at 125% of the basic pay. Meanwhile their
Basic Pay in CPWD was revised w.e.f. 1.1.1986 on the
recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission. They contended
that the above-said increase of 125% should be given by NBCC
on their revised scales. This was not accepted by NBCC by
orders dated 15.10.1990. The contention of the respondents
based on legitimate expectation was rejected in view of the
peculiar conditions under which NBCC was working in Iraq.
It was observed that the doctrine of ‘legitimate
expectation’ had both substantive and procedural aspects.
This Court laid down a clear principle that claims on
legitimate expectation required reliance on representation
and resultant detriment in the same way as claims based on
promissory estoppel. The principle was developed in the
context of ‘reasonableness’ and in the context of ‘natural
justice’.
The principles of legitimate expectation have no
application to the facts of the present case.
Looking at from any angle the appeal is devoid of any
merit and deserves dismissal, which we direct.