JUDGMENT
Raju, J.
1. This is a first appeal by the original plaintiff J. J. Mody, who was appointed is Regional Publicity Officer on 8-11-1949. He was dismissed from service on 6-12-1950 after having been suspended from service earlier, and a departmental inquiry was held into the allegations that he had made some defamatory aspersions against some Ministers of the Government of the Bombay State. This order cf dismissal was, however, set aside in Civil Suit No. 10 of 1952 filed by the appellant. After the decision of that suit the Government passed an order on 26-5-54 continuing his suspension from 6-12-1950 and gave a second notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be removed from service. On 20-12-1954, the Government passed an order dismissing the appellant from service. The present suit was thereupon filed by the appellant on 30-9-1955 for a declaration that he is not guilty of any misconduct, that tho second order of suspension dated 26-5-1954, and the second order of dismissal, dated 20th December 1954, are illegal, void, ultra-vires and inoperative, that he still continues in service in the post which he held prior to his first suspension order, dated 9th March, 1950, and that he is entitled to all bis salaries with progressive increments and allow
ances and other rights and amenities attached to his post. He has also prayed for an order on the State of Bombay to reinstate him in the post which he held prior to his first suspension, dated 9-3-1950 and for a decree for Rs. 11,945-13-0 for arrears of salary and dearness allowance. Lastly, he has prayed for costs of the suit. The suit was resisted by the State. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. In appeal the following points are urged:
(1) the preliminary inquiry held by Mr. Aiyer, the Director of Publicity, on 7-3-1950 was illegal, as no reasonable opportunity had been given to the appellant in that inquiry.
(2) A subsequent departmental inquiry ordered by the order dated 29-6-50 whereby Mr. Benjamin, the Collector of Baroda was appointed as the inquiry Officer was vitiated by the fact that the Inquiry Officer viz., the Collector of Baroda is subordinate to one of the Ministers against whom aspersions were alleged to have been made.
(3) A statement admittedly signed by the appellant was extorted from him by pressure in the preliminary inquiry.
(4) Legal aid was not allowed, although the
appellant had made a request for permission to engage a lawyer.
(5) The words staled to have been uttered by the appellant making aspersions against the two Ministers were uttered jokingly in the course of a private talk and do not amount to misconduct in law.
(6) The suspension order dated 26-5-1954 could not have any retrospective effect.
(7) No reasonable opportunity was given to the appellant to put forward his case at the departmental inquiry, because he was not allowed permission to engage a lawyer.
(8) The Public Service Commission had not been consulted and therefore the order of dismissal is vitiated and void.
2. As regards tile alleged illegality of the preliminary inquiry conducted by Aiyer, the Director of Publicity, it is important to note that this alleged inquiry was conducted before a show-cause notice was given. It was, more or less, in the nature of collection of facts. Under Article 311 of the Constitution, we have to see whether a reasonable opportunity had been given to the Government servant jn question as contemplated in the said
Article. II a reasonable opportunity had not been given, then the order of dismissal would be bad. Even when a Court decides that an order of dismissal is bad in view of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, it does not hold that the
departmental inquiry was illegal. What it holds is merely that a reasonable opportunity had not
been given to the Government servant in question. We therefore do not propose to discuss the point as to the legality or otherwise of the preliminary inquiry which was conducted initially before a show-cause notice was given. The main question that the appellant has to prove is that no reasonable
opportunity had been given to him as required by Article 311 of the Constitution.
3. It is next contended that during the preliminary inquiry a statement signed by the appellant was extorted under pressure. This is a question of fact, which the Court has no jurisdiction to inquire into.
4. It is next contended that the Collector oj Baroda, being a subordinate to the Revenue Minister, was biased against the appellant and that the departmental inquiry should not have been given to an officer of the revenue department. It is contended that the inquiry should have been entrusted to an officer of the Judicial Department. The learned counsel for the appellant relies On Baishnab Charan Das v. State of Orissa, (S) AIR 1957 Orissa 70. However, it is not necessary to refer this decision in view of the fact that the question had been decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, (S) AIR 1957 SC 425 at p. 429, their Lordships have made the following observations :
“It is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appeal to be done. As Viscount Cave, L. C. has observed in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices, 1926 AC 586 at p. 590:
“This rule has been asserted, not only in the case of Courts cf Justice and other judicial tribunals, but in the case of authorities which, though in no sense to be called Courts, have to act as Judges of the rights of others.”
In dealing with cases of bias attributed to members constituting tribunals, it is necessary to make a distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice so attributed. It is obvious that pecuniary interest however small it may be in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would wholly dis-qualify a member from acting as a Judge. But where pecuniary interest is not so attributed but instead of a bias is suggested it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to be decided jn each case. “The principle”, says Halsbury, “nemo debet esse judex in cause pro-pria sua precludes a justice, who is interested in the subject-matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice therein.” (Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 21, p. 353, para 952). In our opinion, there is and can he no doubt about the validity of this principle and we are prepared to assume that Principle applies not only to the justices as mentioned by Halsbury but to all tribunals and bodies which
are given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties.”
5. But in the instant case there is nothing to show that the Collector of Baroda was in any way biased against the appellant. Simply because the allegations related to alleged aspersions made against the Revenue Minister, it cannot be said that the Collector of Barcda was biased against the appellant, The Collector of Baroda would not be biased against the appellant if he was not satisfied that the appellant had made such aspersions. The question before the Collector was whether the appellant had, in fact, made such aspersions. It is therefore difficult to hold that on this quesion the Collector of Baroda was prejudiced against the appellant.
6. It is next contended that the Collector of Baroda did not follow the instructions given in the Manual prepared by the Government of Bombay containing instructions for officers holding departmental inquiries- He has relied on Province of Bombay v. Madhukar Ganpat, 53 Bom L R 754 : (AIR 1952 Bom 37), and, in particular, on the following observations :
“A domestic tribunal was bound to act strictly according to its rules and was under an obligation to act honestly and in gcod faith.”
It is clear from the observations therein that the Judges of the Bombay High Court were referring to the rules under the Police Act. The manual of instructions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant does not consist of statutory rules but merely consists of departmental instructions. The learned counsel for the appellant also relies on the following observations in the same case at p. 763 (of Bom LR) : (at p. 42 of AIR) :
“If the requirements of natural justice had been complied with, a Court of law would not act as a Court of Appeal in reference to a decision of a domestic tribunal. In the body of his judgment Mr. Justice Blackwell referred to the observations of Lord Atkinson in Thompson v. British Medical Association N. S. W. Branch), (1924) AC 764 (p. 778) :
‘That decision if legal evidence be given in the course of the proceeding adequate to sustain it, cannot in the absence of some fundamental error be impeached or set aside, save upon the ground that this body was interested or biased by corruption cr otherwise, or influenced by malice in deciding as it did decide,’ and characterized them as obiter. Then, again, in Bell v. Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd., 47 Bom LR 916 : (AIR 1916 Bom 88), it was held that a domestic tribunal was not bound by the ordinary rules cf evidence nor was it bound to follow the procedure of the Courts of law or anything like it. It was not even bound to hear the parties, but might reach its decision even by correspondence. It was observed in that case that it was not even bound to act in a way that the “man in the street would necessarily regard as just. But even if we were to held on the authority, of 1924 AC 764, that adequate legal evidence is necessary to support a charge in an enquiry by a domestic tribunal, even then, in our opinion, there was adequate legal evidence in this case.”
It is, therefore, contended that there must be adequate legal evidence, and it is also argued that in fact there is no adequate evidence in the case, because there is only the evidence of Mr. N. N. Naik, who is on inimical terms with the appellant- There can be no doubt that there must be-adequate legal evidence in a departmental inquiry. The observations relating to adequate evidence do not permit Courts to appreciate the evidence at a Departmental inquiry or before a domestic tribunal. As observed in that very case itself, if the requirements of natural justice had been complied with, a Court of law would not act as a Court of appeal in reference to the decision cf a domestic tribunal. We, therefore, do not propose to appreciate the evidence and to decide whether; the officer holding the departmental inquiry was right or not in the conclusion which he had arrived at.
7. It is next contended that the departmental inquiry is vitiated because the appellant was not allowed to engage the services, of a lawyer. That the appellant had made an application for permission to engage a lawyer and this permission was refused are admitted facts. It is, however, contended by the learned Government Pleader for the State that it is not necessary to give permission to a Government servant to engage a lawyer at an inquiry preceding the order of his dismissal-No doubt there is no provision in the Constitution or anywhere else making it obligatory On the officer holding the inquiry to give permission to the Government servant in question to engage the services of a lawyer. The main question is whether the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution have been complied with; in other words, whether a Government servant had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The question whether he had been given such a reasonable opportunity would always depend on the facts of each case find the circumstances of each case, and the question whether the appellant had been given a reasonable opportunity would depend on various considerations. In Khem Chand v. The Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080 at p. 1095 : (AIR 1958 SC 600 at p. 306), their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations :
“The government servant must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. He must not only be given an opportunity but such Opportunity must be a reasonable one. In order that the opportunity to show cause against the proposed action may be regarded as 3 reasonable One, it is quite obviously necessary that the government servant should have the opportunity, to say, if that be his case, that he has not been guilty of any. misconduct to merit any punishment at all and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is much more drastic and severe than he deserves. Both these pleas have a direct bearing on the question of punishment and may well put forward in showing cause against the proposed punishment…..
The reasonable oppportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes :
(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based;
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is Over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant.”
These observations are also referred to in Kapur Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 493, at p. 498. It is true that in these cases, the question whether a reasonable opportunity would include a permission to engage the services of a lawyer was not considered, because it did not arise for consideration on the facts of the cases decided by the Supreme Court. In Nripendra Nath v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal 1, the following observations were made :
“The petitioner’s first grievance is that he was denied the use of a lawyer and, therefore, the principles of natural justice have been violated. Rule 55 which I have quoted elsewhere expressly requires “adequate opportunity” to be given to the public servants. The question then is, can the assistance of a lawyer be regarded as part of such “adequate opportunity”. The learned Advocate General has relied on the well-known authority of Rajagopala Ayyangar v. Collector of Salt Revenue, Madras, ILR (1938) Mad 127 : AIR 1937 Mad 735, and contended that the words “to be heard in person” in Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules expressly excludes the right to be represented by a lawyer in support of this contention. He has cited other authorities of Qudratullah v. N. W. F. Province, AIR 1944 FC 72; Veeraswami v. Province of Madras, AIR 1948 Mad 379; Lakshmi Narayan Gupta v. A. N. Puri, AIR 1954 Cal 335; Kamppa Udayar v. State of Madras, AIR 1956 Mad 460 and Punjab State v. Bhagat Singh AIR 1955 Punj 118 a. p. 122.
The question now in India has to be judged not only on the expression “adequate opportunity” and “be heard in person” in Rule 55 but also in the light of the expression “a reasonable opportunity of showing cause” in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. If on the particular facts and complexity of a case, assistance of a lawyer is regarded as a part of reasonable opportunity, then denial of such an opportunity is violation alike of the constitutional protection under Article 311(2) and the principles of natural justice. The leading authority of she case of ILR 1938 Mad 127 : AIR 1937 Mad 735, and the decision of the Federal Court and other Courts on the same subject, did not have
occasion to consider this in the light of the Constitution. Assistance of a lawyer cannot always be regarded as a part of “reasonable opportunity to show cause”. Courts in India on the particular facts of some cases have held that assistance of a lawyer was not part of a reasonable opportunity. It may on the facts of a particular case be a luxury, unnecessary or immaterial. What is reasonable opportunity in the Indian Constitutional context Of Article 311(2) will depend on the facts of each case and the Constitution has laid down no hard and fast rule by defining reasonable opportunity for all cases.”
8. In R. C. Verma v. R. D. Verma, AIR 1958 All 532 the following observations were made at p. 543 :’
“It is true that in the departmental trials the petitioner is not entitled to claim as a matter ot right facility for legal advice, but the refusal to afford a reasonable opportunity to take the legal advice when viewed in the light of other circumstances may legitimately lead to the inference that the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity.”
In Dr. K. S. Rao v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 414 the following observations were made:
“The petitioner replied that, having regard to his status and the fact that he wished to challenge the correctness of the opinion of the Medical Board, his case required to be handled by an advocate. But that simple request Was refused. It might be that, in the opinion of the enquiry officer the case did not require specialised professional help, but from the point of view of the petitioner, it was a seriouS matter’ which affected his official career and which might, as indeed if has happened in this case result in his dismissal from service. Rightly or wrongly when the petitioner was under a reasonable apprehension that the enquiry was the result of a preconceived plan and a concerted action on the part of the Medical Department, his request for professional help was certainly justified and the enquiry officer should have given him that Opportunity. His refusal to accede to that simple request has certainly deprived the petitioner in the circumstances of the case of an opportunity to de-fend himself.”
With respect, we agree with the view that whether the refusal, to give permission to engage a lawyer would amount to the failure to give a reasonable opportunity to show cause for purposes of Article 311 of the Constitution, would depend on the facts and the circumstances of each case. In the instant case the matter is quite simple. The appellant was alleged to have made defamatory aspersions against some Ministers of the Government, The question whether he had made these aspersions or not was a matter for the departmental inquiry to decide. It is true that whether the making of such aspersions would amount to misconduct in law was not directly a matter for decision before the officer holding the departmental inquiry. That question was a matter for decision by the officer deciding the question whether to impose a penalty. If the aspersions do not amount to misconduct in law, it would also be open to the appellant to urge that argu-ment in a Court of law. We, therefore, feel
that this was not a case in which the omission to give permission to engage a lawyer would amount to failure to give reasonable opportunity.
9. It is next urged that while passing the order of dismissal the Government did not consult the Public Service Commission as required by Article 320 of the Constitution. But, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have decided in State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal, (S) AIR 1957 SC 912 as follows: "Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution does not confer any tights on a public servant so that the absence of consultation or any irregularity in consultation, should not afford him a cause of action in a Court of law, or entitle him to relief under the special powers of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or of this Court under Article 32. It is not a right which could be recognised and enforced by a writ. On the other hand Article 311 of the Constitution has been construed as conferring a right on a civil servant of the Union or a State, which he can enforce in a Court of law. Hence, if the provisions of Article 311, have been complied with in this case -- and it has not been contended at any stage that they had not been complied with --he has no temedy against any irregularity that the State Government may have committed. Unless, it can be held, and we are not prepared to hold that Article 320(3)(c) is in the nature of a rider or proviso to Article 311, it is not possible to construe Article 320(3)(c) in the sense of affording a cause of action to a public servant against whom some action has been taken by his employer." 10. On this point, an application for amendment of the plaint was given to the trial Court and it was rejected on the ground that it had been given at the time of the hearing of argument. The learned Judge has not referred to the observations contained in (S) AIR 1957 SC 912, referred to above, but he referred to D. A. Koregabnker v. State of Bombay, 59 Bom LR 22 : (AIR 1958 Bombay 167), where in it is held that the provisions of Article 320(3Xc) of the Constitution of India are mandatory and that non-observance would vitiate any order passed by the Government imposing a penalty upon a public servant. We feel that the learned Judge should have allowed the application for amendment of the plaint. In fact, the plaintiff had put questions in the cross- examination of one of the defendant's witnesses referring to the necessity for consultation with the Public Service Commission. In any case, this was not a question of law and the only thing that the Government had to prove was either to show that the Public Service Commission had been consulted or to show that in
the case of the appellant such consultation was not necessary. In these circumstances the application for amendment should have been allowed. In fact, there was no need for amendment of the plaint because the fact that the order of dismissal is illegal has been Set out in the plaint. The fact that it is Illegal may be due to several reasons and several arguments may be advanced to show that it was illegal, and it is not necessary to set out in the plaint all the arguments in support of the plea. It is true that the fact that the Public Service Commission had not been consulted had not been set out in the plaint. But this was a point within the special knowledge of the defendant, and in these circumstances, no amendment of the plaint was really necessary. However, in view of the declaration of law contained in the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1957 SC 912, it is not necessary to consider this contention.
11. It is also contended that even assuming that the defamatory remarks had been made by the appellant against the two of the Minitsers of the Government, that itself would not amount to misconduct in law. It is conceded by the learned Government Pleader that the utterance of such remarks does not amount to an offence under the Government Servants’ Discipline and Conduct Rules. But the appellant is in the position of a servant of the Government of the State and the Government of the State is in the position of a master. General principles relating to master and servant would therefore apply. A master is entitled to dismiss his servant for various reasons and some of them are as follows:
(i) Where the act or conduct of the servant is prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the master or to the reputation of the master; (ii) where the act or conduct of the servant is inconsistent or incompatible with the due or peaceful discharge of his duty to his master; (iii) where the act or conduct of a servant makes it unsafe for the employer to retain him in service; (iv) where the act or conduct of the servant is so grossly immoral that all reasonable men will say that the employee Cannot be trusted; (v) where the act of conduct of the employee is such that the master cannot rely on the faithfulness of his employee; (vi) where the act or conduct of the employee is such as to open before him temptations for not discharging his duties properly; (vii) where the servant is abusive or if he disturbs the peace at the place of his employment; (viii) where the servant is insulting and insubordinate to such a degree as to be incompatible with the continuance of the relation of master and servant; (ix) where the servant is habitually negligent in respect of the duties for which he is engaged; and (x) where the neglect of the servant, though isolated, tends to cause serious consequences. This enumeration is not exhaustive. But the case of the appellant would tall under at least two of the grounds enumerated above. The remarks made by the appellant
would lower the reputation of the Ministers.
It is true that the Government of the State is carried on in the name of the Governor
vide Article 154 of the Constitution. But under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, it can be said that the Ministers are a part of the Government. In this view, the remarks made by the appellant have a tendency to affect the reputation of his master and the master is, therefore, entitled to dismiss his servant for such reasons. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention urged by the appellant.
12. It is lastly urged that the suspension order dated 26-5-54 could not have retrospective effect. The first order of suspension is at Ext, 92 and by that order the Government of Bombay directed that the appellant should be placed under suspension with effect from the date on which the order was received by him pending the disposal of the departmental inquiry into his conduct. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report and the Government passed an order of the dismissal of the appellant
on 6-12-50 and naturally, after the appellant
came to be dismissed, he can no longer be held as an officer under suspension. The order of suspension therefore came to an end with the order of his dismissal. But as a result of the suit filed in the civil Court, the order of dismissal was declared to be void. On 26-5-54, the Government passed a second order continuing the previous order of suspension. This order can be treated as fresh order of suspension of the appellant. In fact, it purports to be a continuation of the previous order of suspension. As already observed, in view of the terms of the first order of suspension, that
order came to an end on 6-12-50, when the appellant was dismissed. Even apart from the wording of the first order of suspension, the order of suspension must be deemed to terminate on the date of the order of dismissal, because a Government servant cannot be dismissed and kept placed under suspension at the same time- AS observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 600,
with the order of dismissal the order of suspension lapses and the order of dismissal replaces the order of suspension, which then ceases to exist. The subsequent declaration by the civil Court that the order of dismissal was bad could not revive the suspension order when it did not exist. By reason of the order of the civil Court the appellant was deemed to be continuing in service. He continued in service until he was suspended from service-Such an order of suspension was passed on 26-5-54, and the appellant must be deemed to be placed under suspension from 26-5-54, and the order of suspension cannot suspend an officer with retrospective effect from an earlier date, because a Government servant in the absence of an order of suspension must be deemed to have been in service. We therefore, hold that the order of suspension cannot have any retrospective effect and would have effect only from the date of the order i.e. 26-5-54.
But, by virtue of the order of the civil Court in the first litigation, the appellant was deemed to be in service. Ordinarily, therefore, the appellant would be entitled to salary for the period between the date of his dismissal namely 6-12-50 and the date of his second suspension, namely 26-5-54, But his plaint for part of this period is barred by limitation as the suit was filed on 30-9-55. For wages or salary the period of limitation is three years, to which two months have to be added because a notice of two months is necessary under the provisions of Section 80, C. P. Code — vide Section 15 of the Limitation Act. As the suit was filed on 30-9-55, the appellant would therefore be entitled to salary from 30-7-52 to 26-5-54, the date of the second order of suspension. It is admitted that for the first year of this period, the appellant would have been entitled to a pay of Rs. 310/- per month including dearness allowance and during the next 10 months, he would have been entitled to Rs. 325/- including the dearness allowance. He would, therefore, be entitled to an amount of Rs. 6,950/-, but for the fact that he drew salary of Rs. 2970/-during these 22 months by accepting another employment at the rate of Rs. 20/- plus dearness allowance at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month. This figure is conceded by learned counsel for both sides. In arriving at this figure, the subsistence allowance at Rs. 70/- per month payable to the appellant for 7 months, which has not been drawn by him has not been taken into account. The appellant would therefore be entitled to Rs. 3,980/- by reason of the fact that the second order of suspension could not have retrospective effect.
13. In the result the judgment of the lower Court is confirmed with a modification, and the appellant is declared to be entitled to Rs. 3,980/- together with interest at 4 per cent per annum from 26-5-54. The plaintiff will get proportionate costs of the suit as well as of the appeal from the defendant. The respondent-defendant will bear its own costs of the appeal and the suit.
14. (8-9-61.) Both sides agree that there
is an arithmetical mistake and that the figure
Rs. 3980/- in the last para of the above order
should be Rs. 4303.95. The figure Rs, 3980, is
therefore altered to Rs. 4303.95.
