JUDGMENT
Dawson Miller, C.J.
1. This is an application in revision from an order of the District Magistrate of Saran, dated the 8th December last, refusing an application to cancel a bond binding over the appellants to keep the peace. It appears that information was lodged at the Thana at Chapra on the 13th July last year against the accused persons, to the effect that whilst the complainant was carrying on his ordinary avocations in one of his own fields, he was abased by the accused armed with lathis and garassas and would have been very severely beaten but for the fact that he managed to escape by running away. It appears that there has been some litigation between the complainant and his family on the one hand and several of the accused on the other, and those of the accused who were not actually parties to the litigation are close relations. On receipt of the information at the Thana, the Writer Head Constable held an investigation on the spot and submitted a report recommending proceedings against the accused under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Coda. Thereupon a notice was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, stating that “whereas it appears from the report of the Writer Head Constable, Thana Chapra, that 12 persons” (whose names are given including the present appellants) within the local limits of my jurisdiction are likely to commit a breach of the peace with Sakaldip Singh” (the complainant) “on account of his instituting a civil suit against Bala Singh and others for realisation of his debt, I, therefore, order them to appear on the 3rd August 1920 to show cause why each of them should not be ordered to execute a bond for Rs. 200 in two sureties of Rs. 100 each to keep the peace for one year.” In due course the accused persons appeared and evidence was taken both on behalf of the complainant and on behalf of the accused. The enquiry lasted for some days and it was adjourned from time to time. In the result the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that some of the accused persons had not been proved to have taken any part in the proceedings complained of and also that they bad no common interest in the matter with the others, who were the principal persons concerned in the dispute between the complainant and themselves. But with regard to the others he found that they had in fact tried to assault the complainant and later on when the Writer Head Constable made his investigation, that they were still then in a condition of mind and intention which showed that they were likely to commit a breach of the peace and he, therefore, ordered each of those who are the present appellants to execute a bond of Rs. 100 with two sureties of Rs. 50 each to keep the peace for one year or, on failing to do so, to undergo simple imprisonment for the same period. An application was made to the District Magistrate to set aside that order, but as it appeared to him that there was no good ground for cancelling the bond, he rejected the application.
2. It is from that order that the present application in revision is made to this Court. It is contended, in the first, place, that the order served upon the accused persons did not properly comply with the provisions of Section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that when a Magistrate acting under Section 107 deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under that section, he shall make an order in writing setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be enforced and the number, character and class of the sureties required. The complaint now made against that order is that it did not set forth the substance of the information received and certain cases have been drawn to our attention in which it has been held that where a notice of this description is given, the Magistrate should give notice to the party who is to be affected by it of the particular conduct On his part which is complained of and that the notice should contain clear and definite information of the kind mentioned in Section 107 directly affecting the person against whom process is issued. It is said that in the present case no such clear and definite information was given. The two cases relied upon do not appear to me to bear any resemblance to the facts of the present page. The first one, that of Ramkishore Acharjee Chowdhry v. Arip Khan 21 W.R. Cr. 6 was a case where certain acts on the part of the persons served were stated in the notice as being those relied upon for showing that there was a likelihood pf a breach of the peace, but when the matter same before the Magistrate the case there set up was entirely abandoned and a new case alleging different facts was attempted to be made against the persons charged, and it was held in that case that as they had had no notice of what the nature of the somplaint against them was, they clearly had no opportunity when they appeared before the Magistrate of producing, any evidence to rebut that charge. In the other case, that of Jaiprakash Lal, In the matter of the Petition of (2), the matter was there referred to a Full Bench upon the question whether a Magistrate of one district had power under the law to issue process for taking security to keep the peace from a resident of another Magistrate’s district. That matter was referred to the Full Bench who gave their opinion upon the point, and when it same bask again to the Referring Court that Court, accepting that decision, had to quash the whole of the Magistrate’s proceedings with reference to the application, but in the course of delivering their judgment the Court stated that information of the kind mentioned in Section 107 must be of a clear and definite kind directly affecting the person against whom process is issued and it should disclose tangible facts and details, so that it may afford notice to sash person of what he is to come prepared to meet. In the present case, having regard to the course which this case took, especially having regard to the investigation whish was made by the Writer Head Constable and the fact that the case was adjourned from time to time to admit of further evidence being given by the parties, there can be no question whatever that in fast the appellants had ample notice of the case that was made against them and also ample time to produce any evidence in support of their own case, and no objection was ever taken from first to last before the Magistrate that they had been in any way hampered or embarrassed by reason of any defeat in the notice, and even assuming, without deciding, that there was some defect or irregularity in the form of the notice served, I am quite satisfied that, if that must be taken to have been so, it did not in any degree prejudice the appellants in putting forward their case before the Magistrate and under the provisions of Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code, I do not think that even if it were thought there had been some technical omission in the form of that notice, we have any power to reverse or alter the order made by the Magistrate in the present case. That really was the substance of the application made before us to day and that point, in my opinion, fails.
3. A further point was made, although not seriously persisted in, that the learned Magistrate who made the order had not dealt with the case of each individual person amongst those against whom the notice was issued. I have read his decision in the case and it seems to me that that point also must fail. What he said is (dealing with the case against all the accused): “I am, however, doubtful whether Jeonandan, Dhanji Umanath Chaube, Ambica Chaube took a leading part, if at all any part, in the proceedings. The last two have no common interests with the principal accused and no particular act is attributed to Jeonandan and Dhanji, who are only mentioned as present at the bar tree. The other accused once tried to assault the complainant and another time before the Writer Head Constable were likely to commit a breach of the peace, and it is likely that they may commit a breach of the peace in future.” It was not necessary for the learned Magistrate to mention each of the appellants by name. He had the evidence before him dealing with their acts as a whole and evidence of their presence on the occasion and of what they did, and the manner in which he differentiates between the evidence against some of them and the evidence against the rest was, in my opinion, a perfectly proper and regular way of dealing with the evidence. In these circumstances I think that this application should be rejected.
Adami, J.
3. I agree.