JUDGMENT
S.S. Nijjar, C.J.
1. The petitioner, Javed Ahmed Khan, has filed this writ petition styled as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondents to do their statutory duties in accordance with law and to take such measures in accordance with the Building Rules and Regulations so as to prevent the construction of high rise buildings in total violation of the Rules and Regulations.
2. The petitioner also seeks the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to make suitable Regulations indicating the nature of relaxation and the extent to which it is permissible to prevent future abuse of the building laws. The petitioner has further prayed for the issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned sanctions and relaxations granted to construct high rise buildings in the city at the 92nd meeting of the Mayor in Council dated 16th March, 2005. The petitioner has also prayed for appointment of Special Officer or Officers to conduct an enquiry into the rampant sanctions granted on 16.03.2005 at the 92nd meeting of the Mayor in Council of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as KMC), to construct a 35 storied building by relaxation of the Building Rules.
3. We may notice briefly the facts pleaded by the petitioner in support of the writ petition. The petitioner was an elected Councilor from Ward No. 66 of KMC since 1995. He claims that the petition is not for gaining political mileage or for attaining fame through litigation. The said theory would be conclusively dispelled by the fact that he has been elected for three consecutive terms from his Ward in the KMC. The writ petition is purely for the protection of the healthy and safe environment of Kolkata. The petitioner is alarmed with the prospect of Kolkata becoming a dead city or a concrete jungle. According to the petitioner the challenge into this petition is only to the mushrooming of unprecedented growth of skyscrapers and multi-storeyed buildings in violation of the Rules and Regulations. The petitioner is alarmed and apprehensive that unless the rampant violations of the Building Rules and Regulations are not checked, it will become a City of corpses some day. The petitioner is aware of the dangers to the environment of the city as he was also the erstwhile Member of Mayor in Council (Bustee & Environment) of the outgoing Councilors of KMC. He is presently leader of the opposition in the KMC.
4. The grievance of the petitioner is with regard to the purported sanction of the building plan for erecting sky scrapers in South Kolkata designed to be the highest in the city, the cynosure of eyes to take the pride of place in Kolkatas map at premises No. 375, Prince Anwar Shah Road. According to the petitioner the sanction has been granted in rampant disregard of the relevant Act, Building Rules and Regulations. The premises No. 375, Prince Anwar Shah Road were known as M/s. Joy Engineering Works Limited. The aforesaid company went into liquidation and its assets were sold by public auction. The Assets Sale Committee of M/s. Joy Engineering Works Limited, respondent No. 4, published an advertisement for sale of the property of that company at premises No. 375 and 357/1, Prince Anwar Shah Road. In the advertisement it was stated that land comprises of buildable land and water body. The total dimension of water body is 1.31 acre. Property at premises No. 375, Prince Anwar Shah Road was free hold property comprising of 29.59 acres of land including water body of 1.31 acres and the remaining 1.55 acres was lease hold property appertaining to premises No. 357/1, Prince Anwar Shah Road. The premises were purchased through a registered sale deed by South City Project (Kolkata) Limited (hereinafter referred to as South City), respondent No. 10. The sale deed was silent about the existence of water body. South City submitted the plan for sanction of residential building complex consisting of four towers, having basement plus ground plus 35 stories. The space so generated for residence purposes was to the tune of 3,35,968 Sq. Mtrs. on a plot of area covering 1,19,747 Sq. Mtrs. i.e., 29.59 acres more or less. The Director General (Building) KMC, respondent No. 12, submitted a report in which a number of objections had been raised to the sanction of the building. The first objection was with regard to the interior open space. It was stated that under Sub Rule 4 of Rule 59 of the KMC Building Rules, 1990 the width ranges from 2.6 Mtrs. to 6 Mtrs. approximately as against 21.80 Mtrs. as per the Rules. There were also infringement of height to the effect that as per Sub Rule 2 of Rules 64 of the KMC Building Rules, 1990, considering the recorded width of the means of access, the height comes to 47.535 Mtrs. only against which the proposed height according to the proposal for sanction was 109 Mtrs.
5. It was further reported that amendment of Rule 64 was awaiting for Government Gazette. Under the amended building Rules the proposed height of 109 Mtrs. would be permissible. It was further reported that if the proposed height of 109 Mtrs. is accepted by the Mayor-in-Council, respondent No. 10, shall have to deposit extra fees to the KMC for additional height. It was however recorded that the relaxation of Rule 62(2), Rule 59(4) of the KMC Building Rules, 1990 was permissible by Mayor-in-Council. In spite of the aforesaid objection, by a resolution dated 23rd October, 2003, Mayor-in-Council approved and sanctioned the plan of South City. The petitioner claimed that he was not present in the aforesaid meeting, although, he was a member of the Mayor-in-Council. South City also submitted a revised plan for sanction. This sanction was duly accorded on 28th July, 2004. Even here, according to the petitioner, correct details have not been set out. On 1st March, 2005 a proposal was submitted by the Director General (Building) for further relaxation of the Rules and Regulations for building constructed by South City. This proposal was placed in the Agenda for consideration by the Mayor-in-Council. This meeting was attended by the petitioner but Item Nos.M-91.15 to M-91.47 of the Agenda could not be taken up for consideration because of the objection raised by the petitioner and one, Anup Chatterjee, respondent No. 17 and these items were further deferred. A meeting of the Mayor-in-Council, was again called on 16th March, 2005 for consideration of the budge proposal of the KMC for the financial period of 2005-06. According to the petitioner no other agenda was there in the said meeting. In this meeting item No.M-92.33 regarding sanction of revised and re-submitted sanction plan for multi-storeyed building to be constructed at premised No. 375, Prince Anwar Shah Road by South City was approved. It is stated that in approving the sanction, respondent Nos. 11, 12 and 13 had acted in collusion and overstepped their jurisdiction. The sanction was granted by respondent No. 11 only to beat the deadline of the Municipal election which was round the corner. The meeting of the Mayor-in-Council dated 16th March, 2005, is stated to be contrary to the procedure in terms of Regulations 15(1) of the Mayor-in-Council Regulations 1986. The petitioner further claimed that South City is liable to pay penalty to the tune of Rs. 16 crores but this has been arbitrarily reduced to only Rs. 2 crores. Therefore, the action of the respondent has resulted in a huge loss to the public exchequer.
6. The respondents have filed affidavits-in-opposition. South City, respondent No. 10, has clearly stated that the writ petition is not maintainable as it is not a Public Interest Litigation but has been filed by the petitioner to vindicate his own personal interest. The petition is politically motivated. The petition is vexatious and does not meet the criteria for the maintainability of writ petition which is claimed to be Public Interest Litigation. The petition is liable to be dismissed also on ground of delay and laches. The petitioner had the knowledge of the Housing Project all along. The work on the project commenced on March 2004. Advertisement had been appearing in all leading newspapers and hoardings since March, 2004 the booking started soon and by December, 2005, 70% of the flats and 95% of shopping space in the shopping mall was completed. More than 1100 families and more than 200 retailers are involved in the Housing Project. South City Projects had undertaken to construct a building complex consisting of 1640 flats and shopping units. Legally also, the building plan has been duly sanctioned by the KMC at the first phase on 28th February, 2004. South City paid a sum of Rs. 22.50 crores as sanction fees. When the revised building plan for the second phase was sanctioned on 2nd May, 2005, a further sanction fee of Rs. 6.68 crores has been paid. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise any objection at this stage as at the material time he was a Member of the Mayor-in-Council which granted the sanctions. Petitioner never raised any objection to the sanction of the building plan at the relevant time. Now after a period of two years from the date of the first sanction of the building plan, the petitioner cannot be permitted to urge that there was an infringement of the Building Rules. It is further stated that except for small residential buildings to be erected on a plot of less than 500 Sq. Mtrs. of land or a heritage building, no building plan can be sanction without the approval of the Mayor-in-Council. The approval of the sanction of Mayor-in-Council is a collective decision taken by the body which is collectively responsible for the decision. No Member of Mayor-in- Council can be permitted to contend after nearly two years that the sanction duly granted was illegal or without his knowledge or consent. The decision of majority of Members of Mayor-in-Council is binding upon all Members.
7. In paragraph 8 it is categorically stated that the proposal for sanction of the building plan was under the Regulations required to be circulated among all the Members including the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to say that he was not aware of the application for sanction. An added reason given to challenge the locus standi for the petitioner for maintainability of the writ petition is that he is not even the resident of the area in which skyscrapers are being built. He resides about 10 Kms. away. It is also stated that, in fact, the writ petition is borne out of rivalry between the petitioner and respondent No. 11. Subrata Mukherjee, respondent No. 11, is ex-Mayor of KMC. He had been elected as a Councilor on a nomination made by Trinamool Congress Party. During the period from the year 2000 to May, 2005 the Councilors elected as the nominees of the aforesaid political party constituted the KMC Board. Petitioner was also a Member of Trinamool Congress Party. He became a Member of Mayor-in-Council being a Member of Trinamool Congress Party. So long as respondent No. 11 remained in the Trinamool Congress no objection was raised by the petitioner. However, after respondent No. 11 left the Trinamool Congress Party and contested the KMC elections as an independent candidate supported by the Indian National Congress Party, which party he eventually joined, the petitioner chose to move this petition blaming respondent No. 11 for sanctioning the plan with obvious political vendetta against respondent No. 11. The petitioner again won the last Municipal election from Ward No. 66 as the nominee of Trinamool Congress Party. Therefore, South City is merely a victim of the political rivalry and personal conflict between the petitioner and respondent No. 11. Another reason for filing the present writ petition is that the petitioner has become the leader of the opposition in the KMC and is trying to malign the respondent No. 11 in diverse ways and means. Respondent No. 11 further submitted that the petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. It is stated that the South City having paid a huge sanction fees amounting to Rs. 22.50 crores and 6.68 crores believed that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law. Construction work has already progressed. Structure upto 25th floor for Tower one, 20th floor for tower two, foundation work for tower three have been completed. A sum of Rs. 215 crores (approx.) have been spent for construction work. 2000 workers are engaged at the site of the work. Stock of building materials and plant and machinery worth of Rs. 50 crores is lying at the site. Internationally reputed Consultants, Architects, Landscapers and Designers have been engaged for the implementation of the project. Out of 1640 residential flats about 1100 have been already agreed to be sold. 95% of the shopping Malls have been agreed to be let out. The proposed tenants would be selling the most famous brand names such as, Marks & Spencers Shoppers Stop, Pantaloon, Bennetton, Shringar. Any interference with the work at this stage would do more damage to the development of the City than any benefit to any section of this society.
8. A detailed affidavit has also been filed by the KMC on behalf of respondent No. 6, 7 and 8. These respondents have also raised objections to the maintainability of the writ petition on the same grounds as pleaded by South City Project, respondent No. 10. With regard to the report submitted by the Director General (Building) of the Corporation, it is submitted that the same were duly considered by the competent authority. After taking into consideration the suggestions made in the report the Municipal Building Committee in its 310th meeting held on 20th February, 2003 recommended the plan for sanction subject to compliance of certain requisitions to the effect that no Building Rule be allowed to be infringed unless approved by the competent authority. It is reiterated that the petitioner was the Member of MIC (Bustee & Environment) but there is nothing on record to show that any objection was ever raised to the grant of the said revised plan. The petitioner is one of the Members of MIC accepted the resolution granting sanction of the revised plan. Therefore, the writ petitioner cannot now be permitted to raise any objection on the ground that the sanction has been illegally granted.
9. We have perused the entire record. We have also heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
10. Mr. Anindya Mitra and Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents had submitted that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. This writ petition has been filed to advance the political cause of the petitioner. In support of this submission learned Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in 2003 AIR SCW 6105.
11. It is further submitted that the petitioner being a Member of Mayor-in-Council at the relevant time cannot now be permitted to challenge the same. In support of the submission learned Counsel has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bihar Public Service Commission and Anr. v. Dr. Shiv Jatan Thakur and Ors. .
12. The third objection raised by all the counsel for the respondents is with regard to delay and laches. It is submitted that the petition ought not to be entertained at such a late stage when the entire building has virtually been completed. In support of this submission learned Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors., .
13. Mr. Alok Ghose, learned Counsel for the KMC, has also submitted that petitioner has no locus standi to file the present writ petition. In support of this submission he has relied on an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in W.P. No. 592 of 2003 decided on 06.02.2004. He has submitted that the petition is politically motivated. It is an abuse of the process of Court. It is vindictive in nature. Therefore, the petition ought to be dismissed with heavy cost. In support of this submission the leaned counsel has relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of:
1) Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2004 AIR SCW 1494.
2) Kushum Lata v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 180.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Bimal Chatterjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is only interested in ventilating the grievances on behalf of the public. The construction of the skyscraper without due sanction of law would clearly be not for the benefit of the city of Calcutta. Learned Counsel submits that even though the petitioner was a Member Mayor-in-Council at the relevant time, he would not be bound by all the decisions that have been taken. Even, otherwise, it is a matter of record that the petitioner had objected to the sanction of the revised plan. The Agenda of the meeting of the Mayor-in-Council on 16th March, 2005 did not include the sanction of the revised plan. According to the learned Counsel the water body which was in existence in 1.31 acres of land and which was part of the premises No. 375 Prince Anwar Shah Road has been totally destroyed by the respondents. Learned Counsel submitted that the judgments relied on by the respondents would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
15. We may first of all take up the preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. The definite parameters within which PIL can be entertained have been laid down in the judgments that have been cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents. In the case of R & M Trust (supra) the Supreme Court considered the effect of delay and laches in entertaining a Public Interest Writ Petition. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the challenge in a PIL to the building licence issuing for construction of multi-storeyed/multi-apartments in Bangalore. Grievance of the petitioner was, the menace of multi-storeyed and multi-apartment buildings in Bangalore city particularly in Koramangala layout which is considered to be a posh and prestigious layout, which had been increasing. Many property developers, investors in buildings and speculators in real estate were alleged to have started their activities which are detrimental to the quality of life of the residents of the area. Multi-stoyred buildings and multiapartment buildings were causing strain on the public amenities. Then it was alleged that the property developers by using their influence and money are getting licences against the statutory prohibitions. The writ petition was dismissed by a Learned Singh Judge of the Karnataka High Court on the ground that it suffered from delay and laches.
16. In an appeal from the judgment of the Learned Single Judge the Division Bench of the High Court held that there is no delay in laches in preferring the writ petition. The licence granted to the respondents in the writ petition were held to have been illegally granted and were quashed. Further directions were issued to the corporation to demolish the illegal construction. Aggrieved by this order, the builders have approached the Supreme Court. After considering the entire matter the Supreme Court observed as follows:
34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interests created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?
35. We are of the opinion that delay in this case is equally fatal, the construction already started by the appellant in 1987 and building had come up to thee floors. Thereafter, it was stopped in 1988 and in March 1991 it resumed after permission was granted. The writ petition was filed in November 1991 meanwhile construction was almost complete. Therefore, delay was fatal in the present case and learned Single Judge rightly held it to be so. It was also brought to our notice that 46 multi-storey buildings have come up in this area. Learned Counsel has produced photographs to show that buildings more than three and four floors have been constructed in and around this area.
17. In our opinion, the observations made above are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the present case, the writ petition has also been filed two years after the building plan was sanctioned. The building work is substantially completed. Huge amount of money has already been spent. Third party interests have already been created. More than 1100 flats have agreed to be sold. The shopping area has already been leased out. The writ petition is, therefore, clearly barred by delay in laches.
18. In similar circumstances the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India, , considered even five months delay to be fatal. Therein it was observed as follows:
Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the appellant more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of Respondent 4 and during this period, Respondent 4 incurred considerable expenditure aggregating to about Rs. 1,25,000 in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bars and in fact set up the snack bars and started running the same. It would now be most iniquitous to set aside the contracts of Respondent 4 at the instance of the appellant. The position would have been different if the appellant had filed the writ petition immediately after the acceptance of the tender of Respondent 4 but the appellant allowed a period of over five months to elapse during which Respondent 4 altered their position. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case in which we should interfere and grant relief to the appellant in the exercise of our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. Again in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Digambar it was observed as follows:
The power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. Persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtained thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where the High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State.
20. This observations will leave no manner of doubt that delay and laches is a very relevant consideration for entertaining even a PIL petition.
21. The 2nd objection raised by the respondents is that respondent being a Member of the Mayor-in-Council cannot be permitted to challenge the collective decision of Mayor-in-Council. Again the aforesaid submission would have to be accepted in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Bihar Public Service Commission (supra). In this judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
28…Whatever that be, no member of a Public Service Commission, in our considered view, could be allowed to question the validity or correctness of the functions performed or duties discharged by the Public Service Commission as a body, while he was its member. It ought to be so for the simple reason that such member must be regarded to be a party to the function required to be performed or the duty required to be discharged by the Public Service Commission as a body or institution, even though he might have been a dissenting member or a member in a minority or a member who had abstained from taking part in such function performed or duty discharged. Discretionary remedy vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot therefore, be allowed to be invoked by a member of the Public Service Commission to question the correctness or validity of functions performed or duties discharged by the Public Service Commission as a body or institution, according to well established procedures.
22. We may notice here that Mayor-in-Council is the main body of the KMC. It is constituted under Section 3 of the KMC Act, 1980. Under this Section it is provided that the following shall be the municipal authorities for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, namely:
(a) the Corporation,
(b) the Mayor-in-Council, and
(c) the Mayor.
23. Section 6 provides that the elected members of the Corporation shall elect-
(i) one member to be the Mayor who shall be a whole-time functionary, and
(ii) one member to be the Chairman,
24. Under Section 7 the term of office of Mayor and Chairman is coterminus with the membership of the Corporation.
25. Section 8 provides for constitution of the Mayor-in-Council.
26. Section 8(1) provides that there shall be a Mayor-in-Council consisting of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and not more than ten other elected members of the Corporation. In our opinion, the learned Counsel for the respondents have correctly stated that a member of Mayor-in-Council would be in the same position as a Member of the Cabinet in the State Government. The principles of collective responsibility would be equally applicable to the proceedings of the Mayor-in-Council as it is applied to the decisions at the Cabinet of a Sate Government.
27. Section 396 provides that the Municipal Commissioner shall sanction the erection of a building or the execution of a work subject to certain conditions. The proviso of Section 396 makes it clear that no sanction shall be accorded without the prior approval of the Mayor-in-Council in case of any building, except a residential building, proposed to be erected or re-erected on a plot of 500 Sq. Mtrs. or less of land or a heritage building. The second proviso to 396 provides further that the Mayor-in-Council shall consider the recommendations of the Municipal Building Committee and those of the Heritage Conservation Committee and shall finalise its decision after such consideration. Sub-Section (2) of Section 396 sets out the contingencies under which sanction can be declined.
28. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that the petitioner being a Member of Mayor-in-Council is clearly bound by the collective decision taken by the Corporation to sanction the building plan. We, therefore, find merit in this submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents also.
29. The Third preliminary objection taken by the respondents is that the petition is politically motivated. We may, here, examine certain facts which are not disputed by the parties. The petitioner is undoubtedly active in the Municipal Corporation politics. According to the pleaded case of the petitioner he has been repeatedly elected as a Commissioner from Ward No. 66 since 1995. It is also not disputed that Subrata Mukherjee, respondent No. 11, was the Mayor-in-Council at the time when the Building Plan was sanctioned. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was a Member of the Mayor-in-Council. It is also not disputed that both the petitioner and the respondent No. 11 belonged to the same political party at the relevant time. It is also a matter of record that respondent No. 11 has since left the Trinamool Congress Party and joined the Indian National Congress Party. The petitioner is the leader of the opposition. In such circumstances, it would be difficult to hold that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is only to prevent any danger to the development of the city. The petition seems to be clearly motivated by considerations other than Public Interest Litigation. In such circumstances, the third objection taken by the respondents about the maintainability of the writ petition would also appear to be not without any substance. The Supreme Court in the case of Balco Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India laid down the parameters within which the Public Interest Litigation should be entertained. The observation of the Supreme Court are as follows:
78. While PIL initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other spheres, Prof. S.B. Sathe has summarised the extent of the jurisdiction which has now been exercised in the following words:
PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive:
-Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist but are shared widely by a large number of people (bonded labour, undertiral prisoners, prison inmates).
– Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections of society (women, children, bonded labour, unorganised labour etc.).
– Where judicial law-making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter-country adoption, the education of the children of prostitutes).
– Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the sanctity of democratic institutions (independence of the judiciary, existence of grievances redressal forums).
– Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful to the environment and jeopardize peoples right to natural resources such as air or water.
79. There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that Public Interest Litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation and has a tendency to be counterproductive.
80. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public-spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There have been, in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to re-emphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by a Petitioner and entertained by the Court and all we need to do is to recapitulate and re-emphasize the same.
30. Again in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (supra) the Supreme Court considered the entire history of the development of the Public Interest Litigation and observed as follows:
12. Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest and ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of Public Interest Litigation should not be used for suspicious product of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the Court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique considerations. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap ppopularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserves to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
14. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motive, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
31. The aforesaid ratio has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Kushum Lata v. Union of India and Ors. .
5. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out….
32. Coming down heavily on petitions filed for motives other than Public Interest Litigation, the Supreme Court imposed very heavy cost in the case of Dr. B. Singh (supra) while dismissing the appeal. In the opening paragraph of the judgment it is observed as follows:
Arijit Pasayat, J. : This petition filed purportedly under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution) shows to what extent the process of law can be abused. It carries the attractive brand name of public interest litigation, but the least that can be said is that it smacks of everything what a public interest litigation should not be.
33. After examining the facts of that case the Supreme Court observed that a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is noticed that people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. We may quote here the relevant extract of this judgment:
16. Self-styled saviours who have no face or ground in the midst of pubic at large, of late, try to use such litigations to keep themselves busy and their names in circulation, despite having really become defunct in actual public life and try to smear and smirch the solemnity of Court proceedings. They must really inspire confidence in Courts and among the public, failing which such litigation should be axed with heavy hand and dire consequences.
34. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we are of the opinion that the present Writ Petition would not be maintainable.
35. In the present case as noticed earlier the necessary sanction has been duly granted by the Mayor-in-Council. Requisite fees for the grant of sanction have been paid. The petition, in our opinion, seems to be wholly misconceived.
36. The writ petition is, thus, dismissed.
37. There will be no order as to costs.
Tapen Sen, J.
38. I agree.
