ORDER
K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
1. The petitioner is the first accused in Crime No. 20 of 1986 of City Crime Police Station. This case was originally registered as Crime No. 29/80 of Kannamaly police station and the same was transferred to the Crime Detachment, Ernakulam for investigation and the case has now reached the Court of Special Judge (SPE/CBI)-II & IV Additional Sessions Judge as case No. 33 of 1987.
2. This petition has been filed to quash the proceedings in this case against the petitioner. The incident happened on 19-3-1980 at about 2.45 p.m. The petitioner was the owner of a motor boat by name “St. Xavier”. This boat was used for ferry service between Kannamaly and Perumpadappu on that day. 19-3-1980 was the festival day in Kannamaly church. It is alleged that the boat St. Xavier, though it had only a capacity for carrying 80 passengers, took on board 300 passengers and proceeded from Kannamaly to Perumpadau. As the boat reached the middle of the lake, water gushed into the boat. People on board cried aloud in panic and in a shortwhile the boat capsized. Most of the passengers were saved, but 30 unfortunate persons lost their lives in this incident. The prosecution would further contend that the boat St. Xavier was a condemned boat and its licence had expired on 17-3-1978 and thereafter no fitness certificate was issued. During investigation CW 2 the Canal Officer was also questioned and from the charge-sheet submitted to the Court it is seen that CW 2 has been cited as a witness to prove that the first accused was given direction not to ply this boat. CW 57 has also been cited to prove that warnings were given to the boat crew and they were directed not to ply this boat. CW 155, the Chief Inspector, has been cited to prove that this boat had no valid permit and no fitness certificate was issued after 17-3-1978. Therefore the case of the prosecution as a whole is to the effect that the petitioner herein has committed an act so imminently dangerous without any excuse and thereby caused the death of 30 persons and an offence under Section 302 has been made out on the basis of this allegation.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that charge under Section 302, I.P.C. against the petitioner is not sustainable, and even on the prosecution allegation supported by the first information report would only prove that at the most the appellant could be prosecuted only for the offence punishable under Section 304-A, I.P.C. To appreciate the contention of the petitioner a close analysis of Section 300, I.P.C. and its 4th illustration given would be necessary.
4. Section 300, I.P.C. and illustration (d) read as follows:
300. Murder – Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
secondly- xx xx
Thirdly – xx xx
Fourthly – If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
(d) A, without any excuse, fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
Clause ‘fourthly’ of Section 300 is in respect of an imminently dangerous act which must, in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When that act is committed with the knowledge that death might be the probable result and without excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or injury as is likely to cause death, the offence would come within the four-corners of the definition of murder. Generally this section is applicable to a case where the accused has no intention to cause death to any particular person. The interpretation of clause ‘fourthly’ of Section 300 came up for consideration in Anda v. State of Rajasthan . The Supreme Court held that the offence of murder under clause ‘4thly’ of Section 300 comprehends generally the commission of imminently dangerous act which must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In State of M.P. v. Ram Prasad also the Supreme Court explained the scope and ambit of clause ‘fourthly’ of Section 300. The Supreme Court held:
Although clause fourthly is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular person (as the illustration shows) the clause may on its terms be used in those cases where there is such callousness towards the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is likely to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
5. The Court while framing charge need only consider the relevant items of evidence as disclosed from the various documents and statements produced by the prosecution. If the acts attributed to the accused can be comprehended within the ambit of particular section, the Court will be perfectly justified in framing a charge against the accused under that section. A detailed consideration of various items of evidence on which the prosecution relies is not necessary at the time of framing charge. From the various items of evidence produced before the Court by the prosecution the Court below was justified in framing a charge against the revision petitioner under Section 302, I.P.C. No serious prejudice has been caused to the revision petitioner as he would get full opportunity to challenge the prosecution evidence. Moreover, under our system of criminal justice the burden is upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence and the accused would be entitled to defend the case and has also right of appeal if the case is decided against him. The rights of the accused are well safeguarded and there is no failure of substantial justice. Under such circumstances this Court should be very reluctant in interfering with the framing of charge by the trial Court.
Therefore the petition is dismissed.