JUDGMENT
Malimath, C.J.
1. This revision has come up before us on a reference made by Justice Kochu Thommen by his order dt. 4th April, 1986 on the ground that the judgment rendered by Justice Narendran in Veluthakunju v. Sankaran, 1979 Ker LT 501 requires re-consideration.
2. The petitioner is decree-holder, he having obtained the same in O.P. (DR). No. 66 of 1971 under Act 11/1970 from the Sub Court, Alleppey. A sum of Rs. 10,698/- was found due from the respondents as on 14-7-1970 and the respondents were required to pay the same by 17 instalments. The petitioner was also entitled to future interest on the principal amount found due. The petitioner sought execution in E.P. No. 82/77 for the balance of the amount due to him. On 9th December, 1980 the respondents deposited Rs. 11,422.76 and prayed that it be certified that the decree is fully satisfied. In doing so a claim was made by the respondents to the effect that they are not liable to pay future interest from 14-10-1975 till 14-1-1977 having
regard to the provisions of Section 7 of the Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1975). The executing court accepted this contention and certified that the decree stands satisfied. It is the said order that was challenged by the petitioner in this revision petition.
3. The short question for consideration is as to whether the respondents are not liable to pay future interest as directed by the Sub Court, Alleppey for the period from 14-10-1975 to 14-1-1977. The contention of the petitioner receives full support from the judgment of Justice Narendran in Veluthakunju’s case, (1979 Ker LT 501). The stand taken by the respondents, however, is that the said decision does not lay down the law correctly and that therefore the same requires re-consideration.
4. The Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1975 Act’), was enacted as is clear from its preamble to provide temporary relief to certain debtors in the State of Kerala. Section 3 of the said Act states :
“3. Bar of suits and applications and other proceedings. — No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted, no application for execution of decree in respect of a debt shall be made and no appeal, revision petition or application for review against any decree or order in any such suit or application shall be ‘ presented or made in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of one year from the commencement of this Act or such longer period as may be specified by the Government by notification in the Gazette; and all such suits, applications, appeals and petitions instituted, made or presented before such commencement and pending at such commencement shall stand stayed for the said period.”
It is clear from this provision that no steps could be taken either for recovery of a debt or for execution of a decree in respect of a debt due from a debtor and no appeal or revision petition or application for review in respect of such proceedings could be filed before the expiry of one year from the commencement of the Act, or such longer period as may be specified by notification in the gazette. The section further provides that suits and other proceedings for recovery of debts that were already pending on the date of commencement of the Act stand statutorily stayed for the said period. The power under Section 3 was actually exercised and the period specified in Section 3 was extended till 14th January, 1977. There is another important provision with which we are concerned viz., Section 7 which reads as follows :
“7. Interest not to accrue in respect of debts.– No interest shall accrue during the period mentioned in Section 3 in respect of a debt due at the commencement of this Act from a debtor entitled to the benefits of Section 3.”
It is clear from this provision that interest could not accrue against the debtor during the period mentioned in Section 3 of the Act. As the period mentioned in the section is from 14-10-1975 to 14-1-1977, by the operation of Section 7 no interest accrued in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents in respect of the decretal date. It is not and it cannot be disputed that the clear effect of Section 7 of the 1975 Act is to prevent the accrual of interest for the period mentioned in Section 3, meaning thereby that the creditor would not be entitled to claim interest for the said period.
5. In Veluthakunju’s case. (1979 Ker LT 501), Justice Narendran has taken the view that the debtor if he has not claimed and secured the benefit under Section 7 when the 1975 Act was in force, would not be entitled to claim any relief on the strength of Section 7 of the said Act after the said Act ceased to be in operation. The learned single Judge has come to that conclusion holding that the 1975 Act is a temporary statute and that the rights conferred by Section 7 have not been saved by the repealing Act. The 1975 Act was repealed by the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance, 1977 which in turn was replaced by the Kerala Debt Relief Act, 1977. Section 13 of the 1977 Act which provides for repealing and saving reads as follows :
“13. Repeal and saving.-
(1) The Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975 (30 of 1975) and the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance, 1977 (9 of 1977) are hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance, 1977 (9 of. 1977), anything done or deemed to have been done : or any action taken or deemed to have been taken under that Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under this Act.”
The learned single Judge has pointed out that the rights that accrued in favour of the respondents under Section 7 of the 1975 Act have not been saved by the 1977 Act which repealed the 1975 Act, following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Krishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301 that the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. It was held that the respondents not having claimed and secured the benefit on the strength of Section 7 of the 1975 Act before 14-1-1977, they are not entitled to claim any relief on the strength of the said provision after the same ceased to be in operation. It appears to us that there is not (no) basis for the
assumption made by the learned single Judge that the 1975 Act was a temporary statute. Though the relief sought to be granted by the said Act was temporary relief in favour of debtors as defined in the Act, it is not possible to hold that the Act itself was a temporary statute. It is not an Act which could expire by efflux of lime fixed by the statute. If the Legislature intended that the life of the statute should be for a limited period that period would have been specified in the Act itself. Section 3 of the 1975 Act provides for bar of suits and applications and other proceedings for a period of one year from the commencement of the Act. There is a further provision entitling the State Government to extend the period specified by Section 3 by means of a notification issued in the gazette. Even in regard to the period that could be specified by the State Government under Section 3, no limitation as such has been prescribed. Hence as long as the Act remained without being repealed, the power under Section 3 could be exercised extending the period by issuing an appropriate notification in the gazette. Such would not have been the position if the 1975 Act was a temporary statute. If the 1975 Act was a temporary statute, ordinarily there would not have been a need to repeal the same as it would have expired by efflux of time. But we find in this case that the 1975 Act was repealed by the Ordinance 9 of 1977 which was replaced by the 1977 Act. Though the relief granted by the Act was of a limited character, it is not possible to take the view that the 1975 Act was a temporary statute. Consequently, it follows that the view taken by the learned single Judge that Section 4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act which provides for the consequences of repeal is not attracted to the repealing of the 1975 Act by the 1977 Act is not correct.
6. But then it was contended that even if the 1975 Act was not a temporary statute as a different intention has been expressed in the 1977 Act that we must hold that the provisions of Section 4 of the General Clauses Act are not attracted. For this argument reliance was placed on the language of Section 13 of the 1977 Act. By Section 13, the 1975 Act as also the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance, 1977 have been repealed. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance, 1977, anything done or deemed to have been done or any action taken or deemed to have been taken under that ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the Act. It was pointed out that whereas there is an express provision in this behalf in regard to action taken or deemed to have been taken under the repealed Ordinance of 1977, there is no such provision in regard to the repealing of 1975 Act. It was contended that if the intention of the Legislature was to save anything done or deemed to have been done or any action taken or deemed to have been taken under the 1975 Act, there would have been provision similar to Sub-section (2) of Section 13 in respect of 1975 Act as well. It is necessary to point out that the provisions of Section 4 of the General Clauses Act get attracted whenever there is a repeal of any State enactment unless a different intention appears. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 which deals with the Ordinance, in our opinion, is not sufficient to draw the inference that a different intention appears from the language of Section 13 of the 1977 Act. A specific provision came to be made to save the right that had accrued under the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance 1977, as what was being repealed or replaced was an ordinance which had a limited period of life like a temporary statute. No such provision was required to be made in respect of the repeal of the Kerala Debt Relief Act, 1975 as it was a permanent statute. It is also not possible to draw the inference that the Legislature intended to deny relief to debtors under the 1975 Act if they had not secured relief under the said Act during the period when ihe said Act was in force. Besides, it is necessary to point out that the declaration by Section 7 itself is enough to confer right on the debtor and nothing more was required to be done. The 1977 Act did not contemplate any proceedings to be taken for enforcement of 1975 Act during the period specified in Section 3. On the contrary Section 3 itself makes it clear that there is a bar to initiate proceedings during the period mentioned in Section 3. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that Section 4 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to the repeal of 1975 Act by the 1977 Act. Section 4(c) of the General Clauses Act makes it clear that any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed is saved and the same can be enforced even after the repeal of the enactment. Hence we have no hesitation in taking the view that the right conferred by Section 7 of the 1975 Act was of an enduring character and it vested in the respondents rights which could be enforced even after the repeal of 1975 Act. As it is not possible, with great respect, to agree with the view taken by Justice Narendran, the decision reported in Velunthkunju v. Sankaran, 1979 Ker LT 501 is hereby overruled.
7. For the reasons stated above this revision fails and is dismissed. No costs.