CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4834 of 1999 PETITIONER: K.D. DEWAN RESPONDENT: HARBHAJAN S. PARIHAR DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/10/2001 BENCH: SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI & S.N. PHUKAN JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2001 Supp(4) SCR 241
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and order of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana in C.R. No. 3791 of 1998 dated April 6, 1999.
The appellant is the tenant of Suit Premises No. 2235. 1st Floor, Sector
21-C, Chandigarh (for short, ‘the Premises’) of which one Bhakhtawar Singh
was said to be the owner. The father of the respondent, Bagicha Singh,
inducted the appellant into possession of the premises in 1965. The
respondent was paying rent to him till his death in 1976. Thereafter, the
appellant has been paying the rent to the respondent. On the ground that he
required the premises for his own occupation the respondent filed Rent
Application No. 231/1996 under Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, ‘the Act’). The appellant denied
that the relationship between him and the respondent was that of the tenant
and the landlord and further denied that the respondent required the
premises for his personal occupation.
On considering the evidence produced by both the sides, the learned Rent
Controller found that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed
between the respondent and the appellant; it was also found that the
respondent satisfied the requirement of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of
Section 13 of the Act. Accordingly, the learned Rent Controller ordered
eviction of the appellant on September 25, 1997. He unsuccessfully
challenged that order before the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, who
dismissed the appeal on July 27, 1998. The appellant then carried the
matter before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by filing Civil Revision
No. 3791 of 1998 which was dismissed on April 6, 1999. It is the validity
of that order that is challenged in this appeal.
Mr. O.P. Sharma the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has
vehemently contended that having regard to the definition of the term
‘landlord’ in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, the respondent cannot be
treated as landlord; he laid emphasis on the words “every person from time
to time deriving title under a landlord” and agrued that no document has
been filed and no material was placed before the Court to show that the
respondent derived his title from the heir of the owner of the premises
after his death. Therefore, he could not be treated as a landlord for
purposes of Section 13(3)(a) of the Act.
Mr. A. Mariarputham, the learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that
the Act maintained distinction between an owner of a premises and a
landlord of the premises; for purposes of Section 13(3)(a), what is
required to be seen is whether the person seeking eviction satisfies the
requirement of the definition of ‘landlord’ and, therefore, all the courts
rightly held that the respondent was the landlord and ordered eviction of
the appellant.
The short question that arises for our consideration is, what is the import
of the word ‘landlord’ in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act?, and whether
the respondent has rightly been held to be the landlord and entitled to
seek eviction of the appellant.
The said provisions reads as follows :
“Section 2(c): ‘landlord’ means any person for the time being entitled to
receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own
account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a
trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other
person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in
the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time
deriving title under a landlord;”
A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following
categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord : (1) any person
for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or
rented land;
(2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other
person;
(3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner
authorised under the Act and (4) every person from time to time deriving
title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought
within the meaning of ‘landlord’, Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from
the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his
title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes
of the said category the transferor of the title referred lo therein must
fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the
meaning of clause (c) of section 2 a person need not necessarily be the
owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many
cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be
that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the
Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the act the
legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a
landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only
as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of
the Act.
Having noticed the definition of the term ‘landlord’, it will be useful to
refer to Section 13(3)(a) of the Act which reads as follows :
"Section 13(1) xxxx xxxx xxxx (2) xxxx xxxx xxxx
(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possession –
(i) in the case of a residential building, if – (a) he requires it for
his own occupation”
A plain reading of the provisions extracted above makes it clear that to
claim a relief thereunder a person must be a landlord within the meaning of
the terms in Section 2(c); his being owner of the premises is neither a
pre-requisite nor a relevant factor.
Mr. Sharma relied on the following observation of this Court in M.M. Quasim
v. Manohar Lal Sharma & others. AIR (1981) SC 1113 :-
“for the purposes of Section 11(l)(c) the expression ‘landlord’ could,
therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a
right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the
exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the
tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own
occupation.”
Mr. Sharma has submitted that the respondent is only a rent collector and
he cannot be said to be a person who has a right to remain in occupation
and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else,
therefore, he cannot be granted relief under clause (a) of sub-section (3)
of Section 13 of the Act. We are afraid we cannot accede to the contention
of the learned counsel. To understand an observation in a judgment it is
necessary to look into the factual context and the provision which has
fallen for consideration of the Court. In that case Section 11(l)(c) of the
Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947* (for short,
‘the Bihar Act’) fell for consideration of this Court. Though the
definition of the term ‘landlord’ in Section 2(d) of the Bihar Act is much
the same, its ambit is cut down by Explanation I appended to Section 11(1 )
(c) of the said Act which is in the following terms:
“Explanation I: In this clause the word ‘landlord’ shall not include an
agent referred to in clause (0 of Section 2”
It is plain that in the context of the explanation in that case the meaning
of the term ‘landlord’ is understood by excluding an agent for purposes of
recovery of possession by the landlord for his occupation which is
reasonable and which is in good faith.
A similar provision is also to be found in Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 which specifically excludes an agent from the
purview of landlord for purposes of recovery of possession from the tenant
on the ground of personal occupation.
From the above discussion it follows that such a truncated meaning of the
term ‘landlord’ cannot be imported in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act
having regard to the width of the language employed therein and there is no
other provision in the Act to restrict its meaning for purposes of Section
* “//. Eviction of tenants – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
contract or law to the contrary hut subject to the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and to those of Section 12, where a tenant
is, in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction
therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or
more of the following grounds:
(c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the
landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for
whose benefit the building is held by the landlord :
Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of
such occu-pation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from
a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation
of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass
a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in
occupation of the tenant which portion shall hence forth constitute the
building within the meaning of clause (aa) of Section 2. and the rent so
fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5.
Explanation. – In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an
agent referred to in clause (d) of Section 2″ 13(3)(a) thereof to an owner
of the premises alone. The appellant has been paying monthly rent of the
premises to the respondent from 1976. The respond-ent is thus the landlord
of the premises under the Act and is entitled to seek relief under Section
13(3)(a) of the Act. In this view of the matter, we find no illegality in
the order of this High Court under challenge. The appeal is without merit
and it is liable to be dismissed.
Mr. Sharma, however, pleads that some reasonable lime may be granted to the
appellant to vacate the premises. Having regard to the facts and circum-
stances of the case, we are of the view that as the appellant has been in
possession of the premises for more than 35 years, in the interest of
justice he should be granted reasonable time to search an alternative
accommodation, We accordingly grant him time till end of April, 2002,
subject to his filing an usual undertaking within four weeks from today.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.