ORDER
S. Rajendra Babu, J.
1. The petitioner is calling in question the validity of the notifications dated 19-7-1993 and 16-8-1993 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore Rural District. The ground upon which the petitioner is challenging the same is that, there is no compliance with the provisions of Section 4(1) of the
Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. Secondly, it is contended that the notification at Annexure-B is issued by the Headquarters Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner who was placed in charge of the office of the Deputy Commissioner and the statutory powers exercisable by the Deputy Commissioner could not be exercised by any authority other than the Deputy Commissioner. Any in charge arrangement that had been made by the Government in that regard would not enable him to exercise the powers of the Deputy Commissioner under the Act. Therefore, it is submitted that the notification at Annexure-B is invalid. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that for purposes of this case, it is not necessary to examine the validity of the notification on the ground urged under Section 4(1) of the Act and would confine himself to the question relating to the validity of the notification at Annexure-B purported to have been issued by the Deputy Commissioner and really has been issued by the Headquarters Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner elaborated the submission made by him relying upon the decisions in M. Maridev (M. Mariyappa) v State of Mysore and Others and Patel Channe Gowda and Others v Krishnagowda and Others, to contend that an in charge Deputy Commissioner cannot be equated to a regular Deputy Commissioner and he cannot exercise those powers. So far as the decision in M. Maridev’s case, supra, is concerned, what fell for consideration before this Court was, in determining the seniority of a person whether the performance of duty as an in charge Deputy Commissioner or in an officiating capacity could also be taken into consideration or not. It was not in the context of exercise of powers under the statute that the matter was examined. Therefore, that decision cannot have any application to the facts of this case or the question arising in this case for our consideration. In the decision in Patel Channe Gowda’s case, supra, though the learned Judge who rendered the judgment adverted to Section 14 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, stated in specific terms that the wordings of the provision would not convert a Tahsildar
into an Assistant Commissioner for purpose of Section 14(3) of the Act. We do not think that, that is the correct way of reading that provision. The last phrase makes it clear that unless other provision is made by the Government, the person succeeding temporarily to the post shall be deemed to be the Assistant Commissioner and such successor shall take charge of the office. Even so, we do not know how when there is a deeming provision by which the officer concerned could perform all duties of an Assistant Commissioner, still it could be said that he would not be deemed to be an Assistant Commissioner therefore that view does not stand close scrutiny. In that view of the matter, we do not think the view taken by the learned Judge in the case is correct and we overrule the said decision on this aspect.
3. Further, learned Counsel relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Another v Hari Kishan Sharma, and Bangalore Medical Trust v B.S. Muddappa and Others, to contend that when the statute authorises one authority no other authority can exercise such powers. The authority who is empowered alone can exercise such powers. He submitted that if the statute provides that the Deputy Commissioner shall exercise the powers, no inferior or superior authority can exercise such powers. He drew our attention to the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act, wherein when authority had been designated as an authority to grant license, Government itself having performed such act, was not approved by the Supreme Court in Hari Kishan Sharma’s case, supra, and in Bangalore Medical Trust case, supra, wherein a scheme had been framed by the Bangalore Development Authority and such scheme could not have been altered by the State and that such statutory function could be performed only by the Bangalore Development Authority. We do not think these decisions have any relevance to the present case. The question before us is not that when one authority is designated any other authority can exercise such power. What has happened in the present case is, the Deputy Commissioner who was performing the duties was not available and another officer was asked to carry on the functions of the Deputy Commissioner and whether that officer
could have exercised the power in question or not is the matter for consideration in the present case.
4. Under the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, Deputy Commissioner is defined as Deputy Commissioner for the District and Commissioner means Divisional Commissioner or such other officer as may be appointed by the Government to exercise the powers of the Commissioner under the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner wants to draw a distinction between the two definitions. What the learned Counsel misses to notice is that, in defining the Commissioner there could be a separate Commissioner other than the Divisional Commissioner who can be in charge of administration and if such Commissioner had not been appointed, then it will be the Divisional Commissioner who will act as such Commissioner and that is the manner of understanding the said provision. So far as the definition of Deputy Commissioner is concerned, it is clear, it only means a Deputy Commissioner of a District who can act as a Deputy Commissioner of the District. We have to look at the Land Revenue Act and the Land Revenue Act provides that Government by a notification can appoint a Deputy Commissioner and that Deputy Commissioner will have to exercise all powers as provided under the Act or any other law in force. Section 14 enables the officer to discharge duties during the temporary vacancy arising thereto. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that if the Deputy Commissioner is disabled to perform his duties, unless other provision has been made by the State the person succeeding temporarily to his office shall be deemed to be Deputy Commissioner under the Act until the Deputy Commissioner assumes charge of his duties or till the State Government appoints a successor and such successor takes charge of his office. These provisions have been made not to create a vaccum in the office for he will be in charge of several jurisdictions. Bearing in mind the scheme of the provisions of the Act, we do not think, the Deputy Commissioner who could perform the duties under sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act could not be the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of Panchayat Raj Act in terms of Section 2(9) of the said Act. Therefore, we do not find any substance in any of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner.
Petition therefore, stands dismissed.
